An enquiry on the morality and the self of managers through a Jungian perspective. by Rozuel, Cecile.
8703699
UNIVERSITY OF SURREY LIBRARY
ProQuest Number: 10131087
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10131087
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
An Enquiry on the Morality 
and the Self of Managers 
Through a Jungian Perspective
Cécile Rozuel
School o f Management 
University of Surrey
A disseitation submitted in fuljQlment of the requirements for the award of the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2009
© Cécile Rozuef 2009
« We only need moralitj  ^out of a lack of love, let’s repeat it, and that is 
why, of morality, we need so much 1 It is love that commands, but love is 
lacking ; love commands in its absence, and by its very absence. »
Andi*é Comte-Sponville 
Petit traité des grandes vertus
« It’s all a question of imagmation. Our responsibility begins with the 
power to imagine. It’s just as Yeats said: In dreams begin responsibility. 
Turn this on its head and you could say that where there’s no power to 
imagine, no responsibility can arise, »
Haruld Murakami 
Kafka on the shore
A b s t r a c t
Business ethics research has developed along three main lines: the ethics o f the 
business institution and the economic laws from which it derives; the ethics o f the 
business organisation, and the issue o f ascribing moral responsibility to a non­
physical entity; and the ethics o f the business actor (Wood, 1991a). Focusing on the 
latter level o f enquiry, we argue that understanding the etliics o f business actors 
requires to articulate why and how ethical people sometimes do unethical things, and 
why and how sometimes they abstain from doing so.
In order to investigate this “grey zone” (Levi, 1989), we focused on the moral 
perception and moral experiences o f managers. Managers often occupy a key 
position in organisations, acting as an interface with various organisational and 
external stakeholders. Furthermore, managers face issues o f a moral dimension 
almost everyday (Carroll, 2002). Moral philosophers and business ethicists have both 
endeavoured to define the moral cliaracter of management. In particular. Virtue 
Ethics in the tradition o f Aristotle (1992), or interpreted by MacIntyre (1985) or 
Solomon (1992; 2002), has challenged the traditional approach to the issue o f 
personal morality and emphasizes individual reflection on, and practice of, the 
virtues and of phronesis (practical wisdom). This important moral element remains 
ill-defined however. Psychology-based studies have attempted to decipher the 
process of ethical decision-making, but they have failed to consider the individual as 
a whole, rather than as an essentially cognitive or emotional being. Carl Jung’s view 
of the psyche (1977; 2001b) is characteristically opposed to such approach. The 
archetypal self, representing the essence o f the individual, is constmed as the centre 
of the psyche, itself constituted by the conscious, the personal unconscious and a 
collective unconscious. In a Jungian perspective, achieving one’s individuality, that 
is becoming “individuated”, enables the person to relate to an ethical conscience, 
which is connected to the self and transcends the moral rules set up by customs and 
social habits (Jung, 1978b; 2002).
Adopting an interpretivist perspective, a study was designed to explore the relevance 
of this conceptual framework and provide new elements to better understand the 
moral experiences of managers. Twenty-five managers were interviewed, and seven 
cases were analysed in depth. The findings suggest that the self occupies a central 
role in managers’ morality, and that being connected to one’s self and acting as an 
individual, freed from the collective persona we often play, fosters moral strength 
and moral courage, and enhances phronesis.
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F o r e w o r d
A great part of education is to inculcate people with a certain sense o f morals, o f 
what is good or right, and what is not acceptable, from the community point o f view. 
I grew up with notions o f universal rights every human being was entitled to, and the 
importance to try to be and do good. But there started the problem. Why is it so hard 
to be good (at least that is my personal experience!)? And why do people seem to 
have different notions of what it is to be a good person? If we could agree on thirty 
fundamental rights no one should be deprived of (and that is the meaning o f the 
United Nations Universal Declaration o f Hiunan Rights, 1948), why is it so difficult 
to actually implement these? Is it all a utopia or are we just experiencing some 
‘normal’ hurdles on the way to a peaceful and happy world? If so, then what will it 
take for people to be universally good? Or rather, can we be ‘just’ good, and get rid 
o f the devils, evil and all that is associated with negativity, destruction and violence? 
Is it something we can pursue? Is it something we should pursue?
I did not fonuulate these questions all at once, but they ultimately constitute the core 
of my personal research today and they inevitably pervade my PhD research. 
Reflexivity, which requires the researcher to make the reader aware of his or her 
personal train of thought, is an important aspect of interpretive research. I believe it 
is neither possible nor desirable to separate my personal questioning from my 
academic research, which does not mean I am unable to be critical and self-critical. 
On the contrary, my readings nourish my reflection and enable it to test itself against 
a variety o f arguments and counter-arguments, evolving cohesively.
This PhD research started with Virtue Ethics and first-line management, which were 
the two main themes o f research laid out by Prof. Colin Hales and Dr. Doug Foster, I 
came on board because my interest in business ethics had driven me to consider the 
issue at the level of the individual, the person who acts as a manager. I had questions, 
curiosity and passion, but I did not know where to start.
Guided by my knowledgeable supervisors, I delved into moral philosophy and a mix 
o f other more or less (in my opinion) relevant texts, with high hopes and an 
eagerness to develop my knowledge and comprehension o f the subject matter. I 
should have known the road would not be straightforward. Notwithstanding the 
complexity of some philosophical opuses, I started to feel that Virtue Ethics was not 
providing me with satisfying answers to my questions, although it was undoubtedly 
an interesting track to pursue. I grew both frustrated and anxious. Frustrated because 
it did not seem to make sense to me in the way it seemed to make sense to others; 
anxious because I felt time was flying and I was maybe wasting time on an otherwise 
perfectly acceptable theoretical framework in which to locate my research. But I just 
couldn’t work it out.
In parallel with my research, or maybe because I felt stuck, 1 came across some more 
‘spiritual’ literature. I came to meet people, discover some alternative modes o f 
therapy and read about their underpinning philosophy. These made sense to me, in 
that I could relate my own experience, my own tliinking and my own questions to 
what they had to offer. It did not provide me with answers, but it allowed me to
understand better, more clearly, what I was struggling with. It helped me reflect 
differently on myself and my expectations. It helped me reffame and actually start 
my personal quest for the good with just that level of confidence, faith and hope that 
I believe is necessary to ask the right questions and avoid the numerous traps of 
nihilism, cynicism, or blind credulity. Ultimately, it helped me regain interest in my 
research, and provided that kick-off I needed to find a framework I was comfortable 
with, that I understood and that offered promising elements to examine the questions 
I wanted to ask. That is how the notion of self emerged as part of the research 
question.
I embraced a more spiritual approach, even though my supervisors felt caution was 
needed to contain my research question. I soon discovered they were right to some 
extent when I came across the variou s sub-fields of research attached to the concept 
of work and spir ituality. But when I discovered Carl Jung’s work, I knew 1 had found 
my framework. Not a perfect, ‘ultimate truth’ framework, but a framework that 
would allow my questions to be asked and to mean what 1 intended them to mean. I 
was enthusiastic (and I still am) for his numerous ideas and insights on society and 
humanity. I was impressed by his reflections on the modern world, and stunned that 
nearly eighty years later, they remain so topical and accurate. 1 did not know whether 
his view o f the psyche, tire centrality o f self and individuation would allow me to 
understand entirely how managers experience moral issues, but I was sure it was 
worth asking the question. 1 had observed people and myself, and 1 was inclined to 
believe that we always are a mix o f black and white, of good and evil; the point is to 
find the balance that is neither detrmiental to us nor to the world, and learn to sustain 
it. Jung, as 1 understand his theory, explains this clearly. I thus began to develop a 
working framework to use for my research, centred around the notion of ‘se lf in a 
Jungian sense (detailed in Chapter 3), and later used this framework to see whether it 
could tell us something new about managers, ethics and ‘trying to be a good person’. 
This thesis is the result of this enquiry.
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C h a p t e r  1 -  In t r o d u c t io n
1.1. R e se a r c h  R a t io n a l e
Ethical reflection has accompanied the development o f trade as an activity since the 
very eaily ages. Rules had to be set in order to sustain good commercial 
relationships. Trust and equity are basic values upon which any economic system 
needs to be founded. If  moral philosophy at first did not particularly address the 
ethics of business, the growth of commercial exchanges and the industrialization of 
economies in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries raised some 
significant moral and social issues that neither philosophers nor economists could 
ignore. Actually some business people understood and responded to the needs o f  
their workers initiating social involvement of business into the community (Smith, 
2003). The early twentieth century saw the expansion of the corporate model and the 
beginning o f the golden era o f a capitalist economy, although stock market crashes, 
bankruptcies and scandals have regularly called into question its effectiveness and its 
validity ever since. The contemporary debate that examines the ethics of business lies 
within the scope of this history.
The past fifty years have seen a tremendous increase o f interest in the “business 
ethics problem”. However this tag uncovers various aspects o f the relationships 
between business and society. Generally the terms and conditions of business 
responsibilities towards society are dependent upon one’s viewpoint. From a 
“shareholder model” perspective, corporations are only accountable to the owners o f 
the capital whilst proponents of the “stakeholder model” argue that companies should 
also account for their actions to a wide range o f constituents who affect and are 
affected by them (Hummels, 1998; Carroll, 1999; Lantos, 2001; Weiss, 2003; 
Freeman, 2005). The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) heads a fast- 
developing research area that is composed of a variety of business ethics-related 
themes which include Corporate Social Responsiveness, Corporate Social 
Performance, Stakeholder Management, Corporate Governance, Business in or and
Society (Carroll, 1991 and 1999; Webley, 1997; Smith, 2003). The aims pursued are 
slightly different, yet almost all o f these concepts tackle the ethical question at the 
organisational or institutional level and leave the issue o f personal responsibility of 
business people as incidental.
The pressure to make a short-term compelling business case for CSR contributed to 
shaping the research field, which then on favoured the macro-level o f analysis over 
the analysis o f the individuals who comprise the organisation. However Davis and 
Blomstrom’s early definition of social responsibility tells a different story (1966:2 as 
quoted in Carroll, 1999): “social responsibility [...] refers to a person’s obligation to 
consider the effects of his decisions and actions on the whole social system”. The 
empliasis is not being put on either the role of a corporate entity or the collective 
responsibility o f a group of managers but on the responsibility each person has in the 
organisational structure. Consequently, the ethics of any organisation or corporation 
are function of the ethics of the individual human actors that work in it or for it 
(Wood, 1991:699). The “business ethics problem” at that particular level targets the 
morality of managers as key decision-makers and of employees as organisational 
actors. A variety o f  often multi-disciplinary research projects have purported to 
explore the ethics o f business people yet one central question remains unanswered: 
“What makes [relatively] ethical people do unethical things?” (Willcock, 2008). The 
fact is that most of us are neither cold-hearted monsters nor pure altruists, but rather 
belong to the grey zone in between these two extremes. This grey area is filled with 
numerous characters which we ought to understand if we are to understand human 
nature, argues Levi (1989:40). The issue raised is that of the readiness o f a person to 
accept what she would otherwise condemn. In particular, how is it that despite 
having strong moral values, we remain able to act wrongly or to witness a wrong act 
without intervening? Or more simply how is it that we so easily accept that “there is 
nothing we can do to change that”? Besides, what is the price to pay at the level o f 
our conscience for accepting something we know we should not accept from our 
moral point of view? This issue is central to the larger business ethics debate. Indeed, 
the choices we make set the tone of our morahty, as well as the moral climate and 
moral standards of the organisations and communities we belong to. Morality does
not begin with codes of conduct or principles, but rather with the individual^ and his 
experience o f moral matters (Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007).
This thesis thus aims to explore the individual’s experience o f morality, especially 
his perception o f the grey area. This topic so far has only been partially examined. 
The business ethics literature has shown the tendency to consider managers as mere 
business actors and to forget about the people they are once they leave the office. 
Consequently, the focus has been directed to the technicalities o f the job or the 
responsibility levels instead o f the more emotional reactions to moral dilemmas. 
Psychology or social psychology have attempted to address this gap, but they have 
failed to provide a working framework that can inform the personal experience o f the 
manager facing moral issues. Emphasis has been put on describmg stages o f ethical 
decision-making (Trevifio and Brown, 2004), or the context of management action 
from an ethical perspective (Victor and Cullen, 1987). Economics and business 
institutions have been accused of creating an amoral playground, wliich makes 
managers adopt different rules from the traditional values that guide them 
(Korhonen, 2002; Allinson, 2004). Yet the moral nature of business and corporations 
still is the object of a heated debate, suggesting that we might need to turn elsewhere 
to find elements o f an answer. Context does not seem able to explain just by itself 
why people behave the way they morally do.
Moral philosophy offers valuable clues to apprehend moral experiences, yet it is 
often too normative and, thus, limited. Moral philosophers have approached the 
question of ethics from var ious perspectives and at different levels, starting with the 
nature o f the Good down to the conditions defining one’s moral responsibility to 
society. One’s attachment to a specific tradition actually determines one’s view o f 
the Good and how one can implement it. Deontology, Utilitarianism and Virtue 
Ethics tend to be presented as the three main alternatives to choose from, but they 
differ widely on the importance the individual is granted in their respective moral 
framework. Virtue Ethics defends the view that morality is a matter o f character 
rather tlian o f formal rules or o f processes of maximization. Its proponents have
 ^ In an effort to avoid repetitions or conftisioii, tire following convention has been adopted: the 
“individual” is referred to as “lie” and “him”, tlie “person” and die “researcher” are referred to as 
“she” and “her”. Tliis is purely anecdotal however.
participated in bringing the attention back to the person who performs the actions 
(e.g. Solomon, 1992). However, confiision remains on the nature of the person who 
performs these actions, especially when Virtue ethicists explore the sphere o f 
business. Managers are often assimilated with actors who enact their managerial part, 
so that ethics is discussed within the boundaries of their managerial role. Yet 
Aristotle (1992) argued that the pursuit o f the good life implies the unity o f body and 
soul within a self who develops a virtuous, rightly balanced character. Hence, the 
centrepiece o f Aristotle’s moral vision is the self, that is the person taken as a whole 
instead of a collection o f distinctive roles. The relationships between the self and the 
morality o f the person have not been systematically explored with a focus on 
business people. This research aims to address this gap by identifying a conceptual 
firamework that would articulate self and morality in a comprehensive manner, so as 
to gain a greater knowledge o f the relationships between these two central concepts.
1.2. R e se a r c h  Q u e st io n  a n d  O b je c t iv e s
The research aims to provide a better understanding o f the morality o f individual 
managers. Oui purpose is to depict in a comprehensive manner the inner constitutive 
moral elements of individuals who work as managers.
In order to achieve this goal, we will focus on the personal experiences managers 
have o f morality. Indeed moral issues tend to be perceived differently by different 
people. Equally, different people experience similar situations in different ways, 
reacting sometimes unexpectedly to a moral dilemma. In order to truly understand 
managers’ viewpoint of morality, it is thus essential to capture their personal moral 
experiences. The question guiding the research can therefore be formulated as 
follow:
“How do managers personally experience morality?”
If  we look closely at the implications o f the main research question, we notice that 
the term “how” announces an exploratory study. The term “managers” identifies the 
focus o f the research whilst “personally” implies that we are interested in managers
as individual people and not just as organisational actors. The verb “experience” 
means that we will investigate the various aspects of the phenomenon without 
restricting the analysis to a particular area (for example the emotional aspect or the 
rational aspect of it). Finally, the research examines “morality” that is the values, 
standards, codes or intuitive reactions that directly or indirectly refer to some 
definition of Good and Evil. Although one can argue that we cannot literally 
“experience morality” the expression is meant to bring focus on the individual who 
experiences the moral dilemma rather than on the content o f the moral values. This 
reseaich does not purport to discuss at length the nature of Good and Evil, but to 
provide an understanding o f how one’s morality unfolds and operates within oneself.
The concept of self is proposed as a guiding notion to undertake the investigation. 
The self represents the most intimate element that defines who a person is. In fact it 
epitomises the person as a whole individual without social masks or enacted roles. 
Since we aim to capture the personal experiences of managers, we need to consider 
the self o f those managers. The self is central to the conceptual framework used in 
this study and will be discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless we can highlight how 
consideration o f the self fits within the main research question. In particular the 
following questions will help structure the research:
(1) Morality
- How do managers experience their personal morality?
- How do managers define and know their moral boundaries?
- How do managers perceive their self?
- What is the role o f the self in the moral decision-making, moral action and 
overall moral experience of managers?
The objectives of the research are therefore tlireefoid. The purpose of the study is to 
gain a greater knowledge of the inner constitutive moral elements of managers. In 
particular we will examine how important the self is within the personal moral
experiences of managers. It is expected that upon completion of the research study, 
conclusions will infonn on:
(1) whether managers consider their self when making decisions o f a moral 
nature;
(2) the relative importance of the self in managers’ moral experiences;
(3) other elements o f hnportance in managers’ moral experiences.
1.3. M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  M e t h o d
The reseai ch aims to capture personal interpretations of moral experiences. Doing so, 
we also intend to investigate the significance o f the phenomenon of self within the 
context of personal moral experiences. The research thus adopts an interpretivist 
perspective, and the methodological assumptions are grounded in the belief that^ 
reality is subjective and uncovered through participants’ reflections and 
inteipretations of the world (Saunders et al., 2003). The researcher wants to 
understand, and she acknowledges her subjectivity in order to generate a deeper 
appreciation o f the phenomenon. The value and credibility o f the interpretation are 
assessed by an extensive contextualisation of the data analysed.
Methodologically, the research adopts a case study approach. Since the focus of the 
study is the personal experience o f various individuals, each participant is considered 
a single case to be analysed. Case studies encourage contextualised data and fit well 
with an exploratory scope. They favour theory development and welcome the 
subjectivity of the researcher as yet another learning opportunity (Donmoyer, 2000).
Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews, which were later transcribed. 
Interviews are coimnonly used in qualitative studies because they allow for greater 
flexibility and authenticity in the data collected (Silverman, 1993). Twenty-five 
managers were interviewed, although six interviews were later discarded for various 
reasons at the time o f analysis (see Chapter 4). The interviews were analysed and 
coded. The findings were then interpreted in relation to the conceptual framework 
that emerged from the literature review, and the various accounts were contrasted
with one another in order to picture the relative significance o f the identified inner 
constitutive moral elements o f managers.
1.4, O u t l in e  o f  th e  T h e sis
The first chapters will review the literature informing the two central concepts o f self 
and morality. Chapter 2 attempts to define the meaning of “ethics” and “morality”, 
and ponders on the contribution o f  various philosophers on the question o f individual 
morality. The chapter then turns to defining what “management” is and who 
“managers” are, before critically reviewing the inputs of past and current business 
ethics hterature on the theme of the moral manager and moral management.
Chapter 3 focuses on the contribution of psychology to the understanding o f moral 
experiences. In particular, the chapter discusses various studies that have enquired 
about the moral behaviour o f individuals, and the advantages and shortcomings o f 
their respective methodologies. The chapter then reviews the meaning o f the concept 
of “self’ and its most distinctive features. Finally, the chapter introduces a Jungian 
framework as a promising framework to understand people’s moral experiences. The 
core concepts are defined and the relationships between self and morality, as 
described by Jung, are highlighted.
Chapter 4 introduces the research methodology and the methods selected for 
collecting and analysing data. As stipulated earlier, the study adopts an interpretivist 
perspective but the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the 
various ‘rival’ paradigms are explained. The relevance of a case study approach and 
the methods for data collection aie then assessed, before presenting in detail the 
interpretive process used to analyse the data. Ethical considerations are addressed 
next, in particular the issue o f credibility and objectivity o f the analysis. Finally, the 
pilot study implemented prior to the main study is briefly presented.
The next two chapters are concerned with examining the cases o f managers’ moral 
experiences. Chapter 5 first introduces the study participants and explains how seven 
cases were selected for an in-depth analysis. Then, the chapter proceeds with
analysing foui* cases according to elements drawn from the Jungian framework. 
These cases are highlighted as illustrating the influence o f the persona and the 
phenomenon o f compartmentalisation on the way these managers approach moral 
dilemmas. Chapter 6 focuses on three other cases which are discussed extensively. 
These cases are identified as examples of how connectedness to self and self­
integrity shape these managers’ moral behaviour and overall moral experience. 
Chapter 6 finally proposes a summary o f each of the remaining twelve cases whose 
interpretation equally relies on the Jungian framework.
Chapter 7 offers an interpretation o f the cases and confronts the various findings. The 
relevance of the Jungian framework is addressed whilst drawing linkages with other 
studies and models that integrate the self within a moral perspective. The relation 
between phronesis and individuation is clarified, and its implications for managers 
are addressed. The chapter then proceeds with examining the importance o f the self 
in one’s moral strength and moral courage, whilst the issue of freedom to act and the 
question o f authority are discussed and located within the existing literature.
Chapter 8 offers some conclusions. It reviews the research question and research 
objectives, and critically assesses the scope of the study and the findings. Future 
opportunities for research on these questions are also discussed.
C h a p t e r  2 -  M o r a l it y , E t h ic s  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t
“Wliat is a good man like? How can we make 
ourselves morally better? Can we make ourselves 
morally better? These are the questions the 
philosopher should try to answer.”
Iris Murdoch 
On "'God" and "Good"
2.1 . In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter aims at discussing ethics in management. It will be demonstrated that 
the significance o f ethics in the business world is not new and that the implications 
are wide-ranging. The role o f the manager, whatever the level and scope of his or her 
responsibility, makes him or her accountable towards the organisation and towards 
society. Because they are habilitated to make decisions that have implications for the 
miming of the organisation and the work of other employees, managers are morally 
engaged in their decisions and actions. They may be role-models, they may be 
leaders, or they may just be supervisors; in any case their behaviour and their actions 
have moral implications for others (Carroll, 2002). They are therefore directly 
concerned with ethical matters, as the growing research field on ethics in 
management demonstrates.
In preamble, we will define and discuss some of the traditions that have shaped our 
understanding of morality today (part 2.2). In paiticulai*, we will examine the 
philosophies that investigate the moral person rather than moral principles or moral 
actions per se. Indeed, since our concern is to explore the morality of individual 
managers, we are more likely to learn from perspectives that favour the individual 
level o f analysis. Part 2.3 proposes a review of the meaning o f the terms 
‘management’ and ‘manager’. Finally, part 2.4 offers a conceptual overview o f the 
main issues in business ethics in general, and management and ethics in particular.
2.2. E th ic s  a n d  M o r a l it y
2.2.1, D efin itio ns
Ethics and morality are terms that are not easy to define. Ethics generally consists in 
“The moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or how an activity is 
conducted” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). When we say something is ethical, 
we either mean that it is concerned with moral principles (descriptively) or that it is 
“morally correct” (normatively). Morality is more closely associated with a sense of 
right and wrong, with “standards of good behaviour” (Oxford English Dictionary, 
2002). We could argue that there is not much difference between ethics and morality, 
except for the fact that ethics sounds more ‘practical’ whereas morality may be 
viewed as more ‘conceptual’. Piercey (2001) believes that differentiating ethics from 
morality has become a common habit amongst contemporary philosophers who tend 
to privilege one concept over the other. For Piercey (2001:53), morality is associated 
with “practical reasoning” articulated aromid rights and duties, whereas ethics is “an 
older and fiizzier-edged kind of practical thinking”.
More often than not, however, the two terms and their derivatives are used 
interchangeably (Fischer, 2004) and this thesis will adopt this position. The 
preference given to one tenu over the other very much depends on the context and 
the common linguistic usage: we will speak o f ‘applied ethics’ but rarely o f ‘applied 
morality’; on the other hand, we will examine ‘moral development’ rather than 
‘ethical development’. To summarise, ethics appears to be more practice-oriented 
and more dynamic, whereas morality is more concerned with the philosophical, 
psychological or metaphysical grounds of what is right and wrong. Also, some prefer 
one term over another, judging ethics either more or less noble than morality; others 
clearly distinguish between the concepts, like Carl Jung who differentiates what he 
names “moral conscience” from “ethical conscience” (Robinson, 2005). But these 
are more relevant when it comes to examine the details of a given theory. To discuss 
the general matter o f the right and the good, it is possible to consider ethics and 
morality are synonymous, albeit each might have its peculiar flavour. Both concepts
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are probably essential, and somehow indissociable, to understand and assess human 
behaviour.
A distinction is often made between descriptive and normative ethics. Broadly, it 
separates ‘what is’ from ‘what ought to be’. Descriptive ethics aims to describe and 
list the behaviours, beliefs, values or standards that constitute or inform the morality 
of individuals. Somehow, descriptive ethics is almost morally neutral, in that it does 
not judge but provides facts to understand what is. On the other hand, normative 
ethics is clearly prescriptive and concerns itself with what morality should be, that is 
what should be considered good behaviour, good principles. Moral philosophers 
usually talk about normative etliics, whereas researchers in applied ethics work 
around both descriptive and normative elements.
There are still discussions to determine whether moral principles are or can be 
objective, and if what is right and wrong, trae and false can be decided upon once 
and for all. Equally, arguments about ancient texts and how they should be 
interpreted are still on-going (see Singer, 1993). Kaler (1999) even suggests that we 
should dispense fi*om studying moral philosophies because they are too reductionist 
and useless in solving practical moral dilemmas. Conveniently, Morton (2003) 
suggests that we can know tliat such act is wrong or such person is morally good 
without having to choose between various moral philosophies. According to him, 
there exists ‘thick’ moral beliefs for which evidence is strong and non-misleading, as 
well as ‘thin’ moral beliefs for which justification and evidence is more delicate to 
find, but which are ‘real’ and at least as objective as some other beliefs that we tend 
to take for granted (Morton, 2003). Sometimes we often know what is right to do 
without knowing that we know, and the current lack of agreement on the origin, 
nature and content o f our moral knowledge does not mean that we do not possess 
moral knowledge at all (Morton, 2003).
Nevertheless, this common, ahnost intuitive laiowledge o f the good we are supposed 
to have must take its roots somewhere. Intuitionists would argue that moral facts and 
moral values are in some sense objective and we can enter in a causal relation with 
them to know what is good and to act upon that (Dancy, 1993). Yet, if moral facts
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are real and ‘out there’ (providing we have the ability to perceive them), intuitionists 
do not actually explain the origin o f these moral facts. We would argue that any 
intuitive knowledge of the good must somehow be present in everyone and 
sufficiently compelling to mform our thinking and influence our behaviour. It may 
well be that the notion of others is the essential basis upon which to develop 
universally guiding moral principles. Vine (1983:30) claims that “commitment to a 
moral code involves affirmative recognition of one’s shared humanity with those to 
whom it is applied.” This concept of “shared humanity” should be acceptable to both 
atheists and believers, since it can be either taken as it is, or understood as the 
reflection of God in each and every one o f us.
Kaler (1999:211) roots morality in the common good and argues that “as a 
combination o f social needs along with the avoidance of harm and the promotion o f 
benefits, morality is very clearly all about establishing the common good”. He later 
defines the common good as an “assemblage o f all those very different things that 
are and are not good for human beings.” Yet, even Kaler’s rather pragmatic take on 
morality suits the concept of “shared humanity”. Indeed, despite Kaler’s arguments, 
the common good implicitly searches for the universal, for what human beings can 
agree is good and not good for them as a whole. In order to reach such agreement, 
there must necessarily be an acknowledgment of the other as deserving the very same 
treatment as oneself, and the reason for that is because the other is like oneself. We 
are the same in that shared humanity, and morality is rooted and imbued with it. If  
morahty is rooted in a shared humanity, how does it express and how do we come to 
know it? These are questions moral philosophy is concerned with,
2.2.2. Learn in g  Fr o m  M oral P h ilo so ph y
Many philosophers have pondered on moral matters, and two positions seem to have 
been established: on the one hand are those who have tried to define what morality is 
or should be; on the other hand are those who seek to determine how we can know 
what morality is, or how we can know that morality is indeed moral. Many modern 
moral philosophers, who follow the footsteps of Kant or Mill, would belong to the 
first category. In this category, since the revived interest in Virtue Ethics, we can
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further distinguish moral philosophies according to the question which they tackle. 
Broadly, Deontology and Utilitarianism propose answers to the question ‘What ought 
we to do?’, whereas Virtue Ethics is concerned with ‘Wliat sort of person ought we 
to be?’. Our focus here is to examine how these theories contribute to an 
understanding o f the morality o f the person, in particular how a person experiences 
and gives meaning to her moral behaviour. Since our goal is to understand how 
averagely moral people can nevertheless fail to act morally well, we will look for 
perspectives that place the person at its core and that attends to her internal 
deliberations. Because Virtue Ethics has received much attention from moral 
philosophers and business ethicists recently, it will be discussed separately. We turn 
first to duty-based and utility-based ethics.
Immanuel Kant is credited with deontological ethics and the idea that moral duties 
are dictated by reason, but as O’Neill (1993) explains, there exists a considerable 
difference between Kant’s ethics as it appears in his writings, Kant’s ethics as 
interpreted by its critics, and Kantian ethics which includes the modern branch o f 
Deontology-based philosophy. Kant’s central proposition was to rely solely on 
reason -  rather than on a pre-established belief in God or human laws -  to develop 
moral principles, which would then bear a natural authority on everyone because of 
their universality. The Categorical Imperative thus takes the form o f “Act only on the 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law” 
(O’Neill, 1993:177). The action that derives from a “morally worthy maxim” is said 
to be “in accordance with duty”. People must endeavour to endorse a morally worthy 
maxim tlirough their whole life and act out of duty, but even if they don’t do so, they 
have to try to perfonn those indispensable actions that duty demands (O’Neill, 
1993:178).
O’Neill insists that most of the criticisms made against Kant’s ethics are based on a 
loose interpretation of Kant or tar get Kantian ethics rather than Kant’s original view. 
In particular, she insists that Kant did not view principles o f duty as a guide to make 
moral decisions, but rather as a constraint one should bear in mind when thinking 
rationally about different possible courses of action (O’Neill, 1993:182). To that 
extent, Kant’s contribution to moral philosophy is valuable and it encouraged a
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serious questioning o f the methodology and assumptions on which other moral 
theories are based. Nevertheless, on what grounds should we feel concerned about 
others? To render maxims universal implies a certain concern for other people as 
well as oneself. But it is not made clear why, besides what reason dictates, we should 
feel compelled to care for others.
Duty-based theories are usually contrasted with utility-based perspectives such as 
Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, commonly held as the fore-runner o f consequentialist 
theories, is attributed to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The doctrine focuses 
on the concept of utility and roots moral choices in the consideration o f people’s 
preferences. The theory can be sketched out as follow: amongst the possible 
outcomes, the right (hence the moral) choice should be the one that provides the 
greatest utility to the greatest number o f people -  i.e. according to Bentham, utility 
means maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (Goodin, 1993). Nowadays, utility 
has been replaced by beauty or truth, but the rationale remains the same.
Utilitarianism is divided into two versions, rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism. 
Act-utilitarianism is what many know as utilitarianism, i.e. a maximization 
calculation that serves as a basis to make moral judgments. Decisions are made based 
on the consequences each act has on the general happiness. Rule-utilitarianism, 
however, defends the necessity o f rules aside from the consequentialist mode of 
reasoning, because obedience to some rules would maximize the general happiness 
more than would pure act-utilitarianism (Benn, 1998:72-73). Rule-utilitarianism 
stands as an attempt to bridge the universality o f deontological principles with the 
pragmatism of act-utilitarianism, but it fails to justify convincingly how it remains 
faithful to the spirit of consequentialism (Benn, 1998).
Popular in the field o f economics, utilitarianism is most distinctly practical (at least it 
appears to be so) and is often referred to in public policy, because o f its engagement 
with the themes o f equality and property rights. However, as Hare (1989) argues, our 
limited cognitive capabilities make us unable to contemplate all the possible 
outcomes of a situation, hence utility maximization is always only relative, and 
relative to our capabilities. Therefore, Hare proposes to combine thinking and feeling
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to decide how we ought to behave towards another person to whom we should relate. 
Doing so, he attempts to bring together duty and utility by suggesting the co­
existence of integrated moral rules for daily life with some preference-maximization 
calculation for those instances when rules will not do.
Richard Hare’s universal prescriptivism (1989) considers that the matter o f ethics is 
essentially logical and that moral propositions can be assessed only on their logical 
properties, i.e. their logical consistency and, hence, their logical truth. Moral 
judgments or principles are validated as long as they are not tainted by moral 
convictions. As a consequence, moral judgments ought to possess the following core 
features: that they are prescriptive (i.e. that they induce action and not just 
intellectual speculation) and universal (i.e. that everyone be subjected to the same 
treatment in similar situations); that we have to possess knowledge of facts; and that 
if we are not in possession o f that knowledge, we should be able to imagine how it is 
like and share the same preferences with other individuals should we be in their place 
(Hare, 1989:179-184).
Ideally, according to Hare, we would possess the moral capabilities of an 
“archangel”, a superhuman being freed from human limitations and “other human 
weaknesses”. As such, the archangel “could think in an act-utilitarian way. But it 
would often be disastrous if we humans try to do it, for obvious reasons” which 
include our limited capacity for empathy, knowledge, information gathering and 
clear-thhiking (Hare, 1989:188). At our level, we shall be expected to pursue the 
optimal preference-satisfaction whilst also cultivating our intuitions to guide us on a 
daily basis. Hare alludes here to a somewhat intuitive moral capability similar to 
what Morton proposed, but he does not explain what the qualities o f these intuitions 
are, nor where they come from. Although he attempts to bring a more pragmatic 
stance on morality, acknowledging the place of reasoning and intuiting in moral 
decision making and accounting for human fallibility, according to Iris Murdoch 
(2001a) his insistence upon a morality based on logic only deprives it of its moral 
value.
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Murdoch (2001b:76) is concerned with “how we can make ourselves better”. 
However, for Murdoch human beings are “naturally selfish and that human life has 
no external point or véXoç [telosf’; she also insists that we ought not to expect any 
transcendent meaning or belief regarding ourselves, because: “We are what we seem 
to be, transient mortal creatures subject to necessity and chance.” (Murdoch, 
2001b:76-77). Only the Good possesses that quality o f transcendence and 
untouchable perfection (2001b:91). Murdoch therefore suggests a realist quest for the 
Good, where love, embedded in attention to nature and reality, acts as a guide 
towards an ideal o f perfection which, given nothmg else is real and we are not guided 
by a Supreme Guide towards some earthy or other-worldly achievement, is the only 
thing that matters. In other words, efforts should be made to try and see the world as 
it really is, beyond our fantasies and self-obsessions that only prevent us from getting 
closer to the Good. Moral endeavour consists in breaking the illusionary veil that 
prevents us from perceiving the Good as the ultimate, transcendent source of moral 
matter (Murdoch, 1983:86). Virtue is evident because everything else is pointless 
(2001b:96).
Murdoch therefore calls for a practice on self to break the veil of illusions and false 
beliefs, and aspire to the only valuable transcendent concept of the Good. Yet 
Murdoch doubts we should trust our ability to critically uncover our self-deception, 
suggesting the self may never find the path of vii'tue because o f its inability to 
dismiss its fantasies. Doing so, she fails to provide us with a means to actually work 
towards living the moral life, despite her view tliat man is “a unified being [...] who 
has some continual slight control over the direction and focus o f his [moral] vision.” 
(2001 a:39). Her ideal of the perfect Good resonates with Platonic Ideal forms, and 
her virtue-based ethics differ from an Aristotelian perspective on that ground. A 
virtue-based approach reintegrates the individual as a whole within the ethical frame, 
and acknowledges the complexity o f articulating both reason and feelings or 
intuitions in moral practice, as Hare and Murdoch both suggested in different ways. 
However, Aristotle’s take on the virtuous life provides a more structured account o f 
the various moral mechanisms that inform our decisions and behaviour.
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2.2.3. Vir t u e E thics
Virtue Ethics occupies a particular place in moral philosophy because it has been 
around for much longer than its apparent ‘rivals’, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, 
and because it is primarily interested in characters instead of actions. Hence the good 
person is someone who has developed a good character, that is who has understood 
the virtues and who, by habit and education, has fostered a state of balance o f their 
character which makes them do the good action ‘naturally’ (Solomon, 2002). This is 
not to say, however, that the concept of virtue in the context of ethics is 
unproblematic. For instance MacIntyre, who is often associated with Virtue Ethics, is 
himself critical o f the use o f the concept.
Aristotle’s contribution to Virtue Ethics as a moral philosophy is acknowledged by 
most as more substantial and especially more systematic than that of Plato, although 
Thomas Aquinas’s Chr istian interpretation of the virtue-based approach is probably 
the second most in^ortant contribution to the Virtue Ethics tradition. In spite o f his 
sometimes elitist, if not frankly questionable views, Aristotle remains the major 
reference for virtue-based morahty.
2.2 .3 .1 . Aristotelian  V irtue  Ethtcs a n d  t?tf. sft.f
In his Nicoinachean Ethics^, Aristotle defines the virtues as the moral and intellectual 
characteristics that have been fashioned by habit and education. Because every 
human being, as opposed to other hving beings, is granted the capacity to reason, 
everyone has the potential to develop the virtues, although Aristotle concedes that 
only a few of us will effectively master them fully (Vardy and Grosch, 1999:34). The 
virtues are developed and practiced according to the doctrine o f the Mean. Each 
virtue is described as a state of balance between two extremes; for instance the virtue 
of courage is the mean between the opposed vices of rashness and cowardice. To 
possess a virtue implies that one is neither deficient in nor in excess of that quality 
(Aristotle, II, VI-20). It is not that one can be excessively virtuous, however; for
 ^A ll tlie Aristotle references are from his Nicomachean Ethics {Ethique deNicomaque, 1992, Paris: 
Flammarion) and follows the format: Book number. Chapter number — Paragraph number.
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instance, if one is said to be excessively courageous, then one shall be called rash 
instead o f courageous, because if one was truly courageous (that is if one truly 
possessed the virtue o f courage) then one could not be in excess o f the virtue, for 
then it would imply that a virtue can be a vice. Similarly, the doctrine o f  the Mean 
does not imply that virtue is a middle-way between two extreme states, so that one 
can be virtuous if one acts ‘mildly well’ (Benn, 1998:175). It solely means that each 
virtue can be determined as a just balance between two vices.
To practice and master the virtues allows one to lead the good life. The chief good is 
eiidaimonia, which usually translates as happiness, flourishing or well-being 
(Hursthouse, 2001:9). To lead the good life means that one can achieve eudaimonia 
(Aristotle, I, XI-14). Practice is essential for Aristotle. It is through practice that the 
individual can train and develop good habits and good dispositions, which allows 
him to become more naturally inclined towards the virtues. We should do so because 
else we would not be able to achieve happiness. Virtues are indeed constitutive of the 
good life (Benn, 1998:178).
Besides, human beings are directed towards the completion of a telos, the realisation 
of which gives sense to the development of the virtues. According to Aristotle, 
everything in nature has a function, according to which it can be judged. If  it 
performs its fonction well, then it can be judged good. Aristotle argues that human 
bemgs, just like everything else, have a function. Their ulthnate function, i.e. the 
telos  ^ consists in rational thinking. Therefore the good life, which is also the virtuous 
life, is the life of sound rational deliberation. The individual achieves his purpose 
through practical wisdom and moral virtue, the latter providing one with a sense o f 
direction whilst the former equips one with the appropriate means to attain one’s 
telos (Aristotle, VI, XIII-6).
Aristotle would argue that virtuous friends are mirrors on which we can rely in order 
to know ourselves truly and sincerely (Simpson, 2001:319). For Aristotle, friendship 
{agape) is an essential virtue without which life lacks any value, and he devotes two 
chapters o f his Nicomachean Ethics to discuss its various forms (Aristotle, VIII, I-l). 
Perfect friendship can exist amongst two virtuous people, but friendship is itself a
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virtue one should cultivate. Friendship is a basis for social interaction and 
community-building, therefore Aristotle uses this virtue as a regulator of community 
life and relationships. To the virtuous person, friendship is the ultimate external 
good. To deprive her from agape is to make her less virtuous because the truly 
virtuous person would like to share her happiness and richness with others, especially 
other virtuous friends (Aristotle, IX, IX-3). This is so because happiness implies 
being apt to act, and virtuousness finds its meaning in the practice o f the virtues. So 
in friendship, the virtuous person cultivates the virtues further more. (Aristotle, IX, 
IX-4).
Leading the virtuous life implies that the person as a whole commits to enacting the 
virtues. She shall not pretend to act virtuously but bring her whole self into the 
pursuit of the virtues. This is all the more significant as Aristotle insists on the unity 
of the self. Indeed, the self is deemed essential in so far as “the soul is the source of 
being for the body and the ground of all the acts of the body in growing, moving, 
sensing, desiring, or thinking” (Simpson, 2001:315). Self-awareness is intrinsically 
linked with the awareness of the physical, biological body, but as such only allows us 
to grasp the basic level o f selfliood. Somehow, self-awareness is necessary but not 
sufficient in establishing a complete sense of self. What one also needs is self- 
knowledge, which is otherwise harder to gain and which demands reflexivity.
Simpson (2001) thus summarises Aristotle’s view of the self as follow: the self is 
partly animal in nature, but also moral in the voluntary, thoughtfiil practice o f the 
vh'tues. The unity o f  the self implies both the unity of body and soul, and also the 
unity o f actions, of desires and pleasures within the soul. Only the good person 
experiences unity within herself, as informed by practical reason, whereas the non- 
virtuous person suffers from “dissonance” as if she was pailed between conflicting 
desires. Therefore “virtue is what brings our soul to unity and makes us into single 
selves”. Yet, in order to be truly virtuous, that is to cultivate those qualities essential 
to the good life in accordance with our natural talents, we need to Imow our self and 
not simply be aware of our self. Self-knowledge consists in “widening and 
deepening” our awareness to uncover the “mysterious and divine” aspect of the self
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who subsequently becomes “both the source and goal of human life” (Brooke, 
1991:18).
We shall distinguish moral virtues from intellectual virtues. Tire list o f the virtues 
tends to vary according to the translation and interpretation, but generally moral 
virtues include courage, temperance (or self-mastery), benevolence (also known as 
generosity or liberality), magnificence, magnanimity, friendliness, patience, modesty, 
as well as proper ambition, trutlifiilness, wittiness and righteous indignation. 
Intellectual virtues, on the other hand, include art, knowledge (intelligence), practical 
wisdom (or prudence), science and intuition. A major argument in the theory o f the 
virtues is that of the unity o f virtues. In other words, should the virtuous person 
possess all the virtues to be called virtuous? Another formulation would be: is 
virtuousness defined as the mastery of all the virtues? This point has been debated by 
Foot (2002) and Kent (1999), amongst others, with a view to examining whether 
there can be relative virtuousness alongside absolute virtuousness, with the latter 
representing the person who has mastered and who practices all the virtues. What 
emerges from the discussion is the importance o f the intellectual virtue o f practical 
wisdom (or phronesis).
2.2 .3 .2 . Phrqnesis
Practical wisdom is a disposition based on just reason, action-focused and having as 
its object what is good and bad for humans (Aristotle VI, V-4). Practical wisdom is 
essential in preserving oneself from viciousness, and reflects the ability to deliberate 
appropriately upon human matters. It is close enough to possessing a soimd common 
sense. The practically wise person needs to be acquainted with the details of the 
situation as well as with general principles that intend to the good, but then makes 
her judgment from what she perceives the mean to be “in the here and now”, as if an 
intuitive knowledge o f the appropriate reaction came naturally to her (Simpson, 
1997:249). To put it differently: “Pmdence, the finding o f the virtuous mean, is 
reason finding what accords with reason. As and when each situation arises, a finely 
attuned reason, unclouded by the distractions of passion, will simply sense what is 
right, what goes too far and what does not go far enough.” (Simpson, 1997:251).
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In modem Virtue Ethics, phronesis remains a central tenet, attached to a sense o f 
excellence and appropriate balance in whatever is being pursued (Hursthouse, 1999; 
see also Foot, 1978; MacIntyre, 1979 and 1985; Solomon, 1992, 2002 and 2003; 
Maguire, 1997; Megone, 2002). The concept of phronesis aims to bridge moral 
philosophy and moral psychology, although not always convincingly (Doris, 1998). 
It also illustrates how Aristotle accounts for emotions as well as reason. The virtuous 
person controls and directs her emotions (tlirough habit -  moral virtues), and 
understands why she is to act as such (through education -  intellectual virtues) 
(Vaidy and Grosch, 1999). Therefore, as Simpson (1997:252) remarks: “Aristotle’s 
psychology and ethics are closely tied together. Both are closely tied to observation: 
the observation o f human souls in action, in particular the observation of how 
passion and reason interact, and o f  how passion will dominate reason if nothing is 
done early in life to prevent it.” For that reason, education from an early age is 
essential to develop knowledge and awareness of the virtues, but equally essential is 
knowledge and awareness of oneself and one’s mner mechanisms. There is a need to 
develop an ability to detect the respective roles and influence o f passion and reason 
in oneself, yet Aristotle does not develop his theory in this direction any further.
Doris (1998) argues that Aiistotle’s character-based ethics is challenged by the 
influence of the situation. Doris (1998:508) believes that “behavioural variation 
among individuals often owes more to distinct circumstances than distinct 
personalities. [...] We have little assurance that a person to whom we attributed a 
trait will consistently behave in a trait-relevant fashion across a m n o f trait-relevant 
situations with variable pressures to such behavior”. Hence even the virtuous man 
might, under given circumstances, fail -to act virtuously because his actions are at 
least as much function o f the situation characteristics as of his own character. In this 
purview, phronesis is reduced to a merely intellectual quality which does not 
necessarily affect one’s moral behaviour.
If  we go back to Aristotle, though, phronesis is defined loosely. Practical wisdom is 
clearly different from knowledge and wisdom {sophia). It has as its object the 
mdividual and spells out one’s knowledge o f oneself (Aristotle, VI, VIII-3 and 4).
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Yet Aristotle does not really explain how one is expected to develop phronesis. He 
assumes that the ‘gentlemen’ are already acquainted with the good and with what 
virtues are and require, so that the recognition of an intuitive knowledge of the good 
should be self-evident for them But this is not supposed to be self-evident for 
everyone else, and there is no guarantee that some o f our intuitions are not directed 
by passion, or that even our practice of wise reasoning will necessarily guide us 
towards the most appropriate virtuous action. On that aspect, psychology might offer 
some more detailed accounts of moral deliberation, and solutions to help us nurture 
and develop practical wisdom.
Phronesis is prompted as the central component of moral knowledge and moral 
practice m so far as it enables us to know what virtue is and to behave accordingly. It 
does not summarise what morality is, nor is it sufficient to possess it to be called a 
moral person; however phronesis emerges as a necessary foundation for moral 
knowledge and moral practice. The person deprived of a sound common sense can 
hardly entrance her moral knowledge because her motivations are erratic instead o f  
consistent with her values. So what does phronesis consist in? As we already 
suggest, Aristotle does not provide much erqrlanation about this key virtue; instead 
he tends to assume that it is something we can acquire tlirough practice too. But how 
can we cultivate practical wisdom? I f  everyone should indeed endeavour to lead the 
good life, then everyone should first and foremost concentrate on cultivating 
phronesis. In her virtue-based perspective, Murdoch does not provide any insights 
mto the concept of practical, wisdom either. She focuses on the process of reality 
unveiling rather than on the factors that allow it to happen. For instance, she insists 
that we must beware our illusions and self-pity tendencies but she does not explain 
how we are supposed to achieve this goal, except urging us to pay attention to the 
beauty of art and nature. Certainly, then, something must happen within us that 
makes us realise that we are mistaken, that what we thought was real is not, and that 
the Good is what we should commit to. But nothing is said about that ‘something’ 
although that is where moral deliberation takes place.
The great achievement of Virtue Ethics as compared with action-based theories is 
that it allows for a systematic questioning o f the moral motives for action. Benn
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(1998:174) stresses that motives are “what gives our actions their moral 
complexion”. Practical wisdom should enable us to discern our true motives. 
However, Aristotle concedes that not everyone can achieve perfect virtue, but 
everyone should do their best. Although Doris (1998) agrees with this statement, he 
stresses that this concession actually relativizes the relevance o f  Virtue Ethics as a 
more comprehensive normative moral framework. Furthermore, Virtue Ethics does 
not provide a clearly articulated account of phronesis., which prevents us from 
examining how moral choices aie formulated and what influence our miderstanding 
of a moral situation. Phronesis remains an important element of morality, but its 
explanatory power is limited. We can nevertheless conclude that morality is 
essentially a matter of the inner, and that the process of knowing oneself is key to 
developing the aptitude for just moral deliberation and virtuousness. With that in 
mind, we will turn to the moral agents we aim to examine, that is managers.
2.3 . M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  M a n a g e r s
Many different people compose an organisation but almost every organisation lias 
managers, albeit they might not wear the title. Managers are sanctioned by a greater 
degree of responsibility, even when they operate at the first-line level, because they 
are m charge o f making a part of the organisation work well, be it a three-people 
team working on a machine or a whole department with hundreds of employees. 
Because, as will be discussed below, they occupy a key position in the company and 
since they are present in most organisations, the enquiry on the ethics o f the 
individual organisational actor will be circumscribed to managers. Besides, as 
Carroll (2002:141) or Cadbury (2002:11) affirm, managers face ethical issues 
everyday and in every dimension of thefr work.
2.3.1. H istorical  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  t h o u g h t
Although Christopher Grey (1999) declares that “We are all managers [and] we 
always were”, it is surprisingly difficult to define what a manager is and, 
subsequently, what management is. Managers and management probably fall into the 
category of those terms everyone understands but no one can define. At best, the
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average citizen will be able to describe some of the activities a manager does but that 
usually does not reflect the whole picture. Similarly, despite an impressive literature 
examining the whereabouts o f management and managers, there appears to be no 
deal* working definition o f the terms (Thomas, 1993; Stewart, 1997; Hales, 2001b).
This is so partly because research has not examined m a consistent way the issues o f 
management, in particular what is specific to managers, and how managers should be 
defined (Hales, 2001a). It is also possibly linked to the ideological framework in 
which researchers posit themselves and from where they define and reflect on 
management (du Gay, 1994; Grey, 1999). On this particular point, it is not 
ascertamed that the bureaucratic manager has been dethroned by a more 
entrepreneurial type o f manager, but it is clear that organisational forms and actors 
pertain more than ever to the grey area as opposed to a black and white vision 
opposing formal bureaucracy to flexible enterprise (see du Gay, 1994; du Gay et al., 
1996; Fournier and Grey, 1999).
Although the activity o f management, understood as co-ordinating and controlling 
the work of others, is almost as old as mankind (Thomas, 1993) only since the 
Industrial Revolution has management gained such a prominent status in society, and 
only since the beginning of the twentieth century has it been the object of extensive 
academic research. Kreitner (2001) retraces the history of management thought by 
highlighting the different successive approaches to management:
- The “Universal process approach” focuses on the commonalities o f the 
functions necessary to manage any organisation. French engineer turned 
administrator Henri Fayol, whose Administration Industrielle et Générale 
remains a landmark in management theory, best represents this approach. In 
his opus, Fayol introduced his fourteen principles of management that still are 
considered a useful way to classify managerial functions. They also illustrate 
a fair apprehension of the human factor whereby employees are expected to 
be obedient and productive but equally ought to be treated fairly almost as a 
moral obligation (Kreitner, 2001:43)
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The “Operational approach” brings attention to the production process and 
assesses its efficiency and quality. American self-made man and father of 
Scientific Management Frederick W. Taylor laid the foundations o f this 
approach and developed a systematic chase against time and effort waste. 
Other contributors to this quest include the Gilbreths and Heniy Gantt on the 
efficiency side, and Deming or Feigenbaum on the quality side (Kreitner, 
2001:47-48). Although often considered at the root o f the dehumanisation of 
work, this approach brought at the time significant improvements to the 
working conditions o f employees, in particular less fatigue and wage 
incentives. Wliat needs to be acknowledged is that economic and social 
contexts have changed, thus this approach cannot be transposed literally to 
today’s organisations, although it sometimes is, which creates a moral 
problem.
The “Behavioural approach” is more humanistic and brings attention to the 
people within the organisation. Elton Mayo, Mary Parker Follett and Douglas 
McGregor contributed to putting the workers’ emotional needs and 
motivation system on the management agenda. The field o f organisational 
behaviour that gathers sociologists, psychologists and management theorists, 
is a direct heir o f this approach, which more than any others place the human 
being at the core of the organisation and o f the production system (Kreitner, 
2001:51-52). In the search for efficiency, there is a risk that such concern for 
what motivates people ends up becoming purely instrumental to achieve 
greater productivity and profitability. Yet, it is rightly suggested that people 
are the key resource upon which organisational success ultimately depends. If 
it is to be sustainable, caring about people cannot be purely instrumental; it 
has to bear a moral dimension too.
The “Systems approach” views the organisation as a whole that is greater 
than the sum o f the parts. This approach, initiated by the work o f Chester 
Barnard, is interested in the organisational dynamics and borrows its 
metaphors from natural sciences. Organisational learning and Chaos theories 
are two follow-ups o f the Systems approach, which requires managers to
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broaden their view of the ‘running of the operations’ and somehow assumes 
that the organisational entity can learn (Kreitner, 2001:54-57). It is in this 
purview tliat the issue of the moral agency of the organisation as such is the 
most acute. If  organisations are indeed livmg things, capable o f learning and 
thinking, then they ought to bear the responsibility for what they learn, think 
and do. Yet how can we make a non-physical and non-emotional entity 
morally accountable for what it does (this is discussed later in part 2.4.1)? 
Besides, despite the emphasis on the systems, this approach actually tends to 
welcome the human ability to evolve, adapt and ‘sense’ the change and 
engage with it -  almost a consecration o f intuition along with a necessary 
intelligent and respectful cooperation.
The “Contingency approach” is a new, relativist perspective that believes that 
the most appropriate management theories and practices very much depend 
on the situational context. It is a wide-ranging, enquiring view concerned 
with the organisational environment -  maybe too much according to its critics 
(Kreitner, 2001:58-60). From the business ethics viewpoint, the contingency 
approach does not sit well with deontology, which supports universal laws 
notwithstanding the circumstances. Even if  one is not deontologist, there is a 
certain difficulty in accepting the idea that ‘it all depends -  including ethics’. 
O f course, ethical principles or moral values provide general guidance and 
our moral responsibility lies in our ability to implement these principles or 
values within a given situation, without betraying the spirit o f the principles 
or the values. However, there is only so much adaptation to the context, and it 
is never entirely the fault of external circumstances.
Finally, Kreitner (2001:60-63) mentions the “Excellence approach” as 
proposed by Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman, tfoough which the authors 
attack conventional management and claim a quick-fix, anecdote-based 
approach instead. The interest o f this new proposition is that by shaking the 
conventional approaches, the authors brought the focus back on the ‘basics’, 
e.g. customers, employees and innovation. Yet, the study lacks empiiical 
support and does not reflect the complexity of management as it really is.
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This approach somehow eir^hasizes the learning-by-doing, which is 
compatible with the view o f moral development tlirough personal eiqierience. 
Wliat matters here then is what we do with what we learn.
2.3.2. DEFINING MANAGEMENT AND MANAGER
Having reviewed the schools o f thought that have shaped the concept, let’s try to 
define what management and manager mean. Management is generally understood as 
“deciding what to do and then getting it done through people” (Aimstrong, 1999:2). 
Managers’ expertise does not lie in a specialist or technical knowledge, but in the 
ability to oversee the activities, coordinate the people and draw a general plan of 
progress (Hannagan, 2005:5). As quite a few people may experience, not everyone is 
suited for such a role. Equally, most people are familiar with the experience o f 
management, but not everyone has experienced what it is to be a manager. Enteman 
(1993) speaks of “managerialism” to illustrate how nowadays everybody manages 
their life, from the family household to the workplace. Nevertheless, the manager-job 
(i.e. the job content and responsibilities) is quite different from the manager-mindset 
(i.e. the need to organise, plan, manage all aspects of one’s life and relationships). A 
more detailed definition o f management can be proposed:
“...A  process which exists to get results by making the best use of the 
human, financial and material resources available to the organization and to 
individual managers. It is very much concerned with adding value to these 
resources, and this added value depends on the expertise and commitment of 
the people who are responsible for managing the business.” (Armstrong, 
1999:3)
Management is not equivalent to managerial role however. Actually, confusion 
reigns over what management really designates. Indeed, “managerial work, jobs, 
behaviour, tasks or frmctions” have been used interchangeably to represent 
management m research studies (Hales and Tamangani, 1996). Yet the implications 
of ‘management as a process’ as opposed to ‘management as a list of tasks’ are, for 
example, very different. Hales (2001b:5) illustr ates this complexity:
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“...the key point is that ‘management’ as a process is shaped by the forms 
o f organization thiough which it is conducted and is the outcome of a 
complex system o f interdependent activities carried out by a vaiiety of 
different individuals whose common designation as ‘managers’ disguise the 
fact that they are responsible for distinctly different specialized elements of 
that process.”
Furthermore, management can refer to the process of managing, but might also refer 
to ‘the management’ (team) o f an organisation (Stewait, 1997; Grey, 1999). In the 
latter case, questions about who to include in ‘the management’ and whether the 
management possesses a distinctive dimension and responsibility need to be 
addressed (see Tsahuridu, 2004). Do we or should we anthropomorphise ‘the 
management’ as we do with ‘the organisation’? Intuitively, management seems to 
encompass more than a job description or more than the characteristics o f the 
managers. In fact, it is often ‘the management’ rather than individual managers that 
is accused o f being responsible for the adversities triggered by the activities of the 
corporation. As Hales (2001a;56 -  italics original) puts it; “individual managers may 
not make a difference because no-one does: organisational outcomes emerge, without 
evident authorship, ftom complex negotiated interactions -  even if, after the event, 
participants and observers may try to make sense o f these outcomes by attributing 
them to the actions of specific individuals.”
Nonetheless, that no one makes a real difference at the organisational level is not a 
strong enough argument to relieve organisational actors from their moral 
responsibilities (Boatright, 1988:306). Managers, as coordinators, supervisors or 
planners, have a clear role in the actions of ‘the management’ and ‘the organisation’ 
for which they are at least partly accountable. Furthermore, managers may do “what 
everyone does in managing themselves and their lives” but “they are paid to do it -  
and they are paid to do it because they manage other people (employees) as well as 
themselves and do so on behalf o f  others (employers)” (Hales, 2001b: 11 -  italics 
original).
The general typology that describes what a manager does is inspired by Fayol and 
Mintzberg’s works, and is centred on the tasks of planning, organismg, motivating 
and controlling (Stewart, 1997). Hales (200lb: 10) lists the following as dimensions
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of the managerial job: acting as figurehead; monitoring and disseminating 
information; negotiating; handling disturbances; allocating resources; directing, 
monitoring and controlling; liaising, networking; innovating; planning and 
scheduling; and managing human resources. It is important to notice that leadership 
represents just one aspect o f what managers do. Although managers are often 
expected to act as team-leaders, they are not reducible to this role, and neither should 
they. In fact, leaders and managers are equally important in promoting good ethics in 
the organisation, the former because of their charisma and ability to inspire others, 
and the latter because of the level of authority and exemplarity they aie granted 
(Carroll, 2002). Other researchers have tried to capture the meaning of management 
and manager tlirough the ‘role’ approach (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1975; Boatright, 
1988; Kraut et al., 1989; Fondas and Stewart, 1994). The role perspective includes 
not only the functions, tasks or responsibilities but also the covert behaviours and 
implicit social and moral expectations related to the manager status or position. 
When the concept o f role is discussed in an organisational context, two broad levels 
of enquiry co-exist (e.g. see Bassett and Carr, 1996).
One level focuses on the organisation as a unit of analysis, and views roles in terms 
of different individuals assigned to a given task, who have to interact with one 
another to achieve the organisational goal. The roles may be constraining and 
mteraction o f the different roles may cause conflict, in so far as the objectives o f the 
financial manager may conflict with the objectives of the maiketing manager. But the 
very existence of roles is understood as the pursuit of organisational effectiveness 
and there is ample room for developing ‘liaison and conflict management roles’ or 
‘buffer roles’ if appropriate (Bassett and Carr, 1996). Importantly, the system is 
based on the “one person-one role” principle, which implies that problems and 
conflicts can only occur between two roles, that is between two distinct people. The 
second level focuses on the individual and analyses the relationships between the 
role and the self. Drawing mainly from psychology and sociology, that level ‘allows’ 
one individual to have several roles and defines conflict as the tension between the 
self and a role, or between different roles amongst which an individual has to choose 
or by which an individual is influenced in a given situation. The role perspective has 
been used in several studies with a view to frame moral dilemmas (see part 2.4.2).
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Because societies and economies change, managers are in charge of making the 
organisation adapt and evolve accordingly. As Hannagan (2005:6) declares:
“The management challenge is to maintain control over the processes o f an 
organisation while at the same time leading, inspiring, directing and making 
decisions on all sorts of matter. The challenge for modern managers is to 
deal with this tension between operating the present systems, structures and 
processes and the need to change in order to survive.”
Successful modern managers seem to blend the traditional theories o f management 
with the various inputs of researchers and practitioners over the past fifty years. They 
need to be able to adapt both ftom experience and from a knowledge-database to 
respond effectively and efficiently to the issues and the prospects of the business 
(Hannagan, 2005). Ultimately, though, should management be considered an art or a 
science? It probably is both, because managers make their decisions based on a mix 
of intuition and rational calculation through ‘scientific’ models o f plamiing and 
decision-making. Indeed, for Kreitner (2001:16), “Management is a complex and 
dynamic mixture o f systematic tecluiiques and common sense”; whilst Hannagan 
(2005:13) declaies that “There is mass of infonnation available to most managers in 
terms o f costs, prices and market conditions, but in the end decisions may be based 
on ‘hunch’ or intuition.” Management is “reflection in action” (Hannagan, 2005:14), 
which implies that managers must be alert, focused and fully conscious if they are to 
be successfiil.
2.4, M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  E t h ic s
The previous discussion has established that managers are in charge of a variety o f 
tasks that often involve other people, either subordinates or other managers; that they 
are accountable for the efficient ranning of the organisation at different levels; that 
they are submitted to a certain degree o f tension due to conflicting duties, situations 
or demands; that they make their decisions both rationally and intuitively; and that 
they tend to be defined by what they do or what they achieve. Several ethical 
implications can be drawn from this description: first, managers deal with people
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therefore they have an obvious moral duty to respect them as such and to act fairly. 
Second, the tension inherent to the performance expectation managers are submitted 
to, especially as agents for the organisation’s owners, bring them closer to the 
ethical/unethical borderline (Carroll, 2002). This suggests that moral dilemmas are 
part o f the manager’s life, that they might be more or less acute, and that 
consequently “moral thinking” is an “essential capability” for managers (Paine,
1996). Finally, we can notice that rationality and intuition both come into play in 
decision-making. We made a similar conclusion fiom our previous discussion on 
ethics. Using this commonality as a starting point for the enquiry, the next part scans 
the business ethics literature with a view to identifying elements that can shed new 
light on the morality of the individual manager and his internal conflicts o f 
conscience.
2.4.1. L o cating  M an a g e m en t  AND ETHICS IN the B usiness E thics L iteratu re
A concern for ethics in transactions has been present ever since the early ages 
(Trevino and Brown, 2004:77). As the Code o f Hammurabi illustrates, codes of 
conduct emerged as trade took off. In Ancient societies, trade was a non-negligible 
source o f economic wealth even when exchanges were entrenched in social customs. 
Hammurabi’s Code remains a strikingly modern legislative work adapted to what 
seemed to be a society o f merchants and traders around 1700BC {Encyclopedia 
Universalis, 1995:189-190). Yet, along with economic growth and wealth, disputes 
over disloyal competition or fair return on mvestment, not to mention issues o f 
employees’ rights and wages, were already fairly common issues. Indeed, concern 
over the fairness o f business transactions has been present for centuries and lias 
grown in importance with the size o f the markets and corporations. The Industrial 
Revolution marked the beginning o f world-scale capitalism and the rise o f large 
organisations where anonymity reigns, and the trend has not stopped ever since. 
Today, because of (or thanks to?) their enormous power -  both economic, social and 
political -  business organisations are at the heart of the discussion on the role and 
responsibilities of economic actors towards the future of the planet and those who 
inhabit it. Consequently, those who manage business organisations are at the 
forefront o f the ethical debate.
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2.4.1.1. Ethics, economics and the rational Decision-Maker
The ‘corporation’ has become, for the discontented, the epitome o f short-term profit- 
oriented capitalism (e.g. Bakan, 2004). Each wave o f corporate scandals and 
collapses due to fraudulent or irresponsible behaviour seems to encourage scholars 
and practitioners to rethink the fimdamentals o f the business system and to lay 
sounder foundations for better practice. Yet, we may have to admit we are short of 
progress. Maybe this is due to the disproportionate coverage o f unethical behaviour 
as opposed to good business practices that makes us expect business to be the realm 
of poor ethics to the point o f creating a self-fiilfilling prophecy (Haibesleben et al.,
2004). It may also be that the way the ‘problems’ are approached is not appropriate 
(and has never been) because corporate scandals are no contemporary phenomena 
and business-related adversities seem endless (Vogel, 1991; Korhonen, 2006). The 
rise of the industrial society is usually associated with the loss o f community 
solidarity, the growth of individualism and the perfecting of an amoral business 
context (Shepard et al., 1995). Furthennore, the advent of the limited liability status 
gave their chance to both ingenious entrepreneurs and unscrupulous crooks (Metzger 
and Dalton, 1996; Davies, 1997; Bakan, 2004).
In this context, it is heart-warming that the question of the ethics o f business has 
become a central issue in business and management studies and praxis -  at least in 
theory. There are encouraging signs, for instance the fact that a greater number of 
people are willing to accept a somewhat radical questioning of institutionalised 
practices, symbols, values and behaviours, if not a paradigm shift (Shepard et a l, 
1995). However, there is no agreement on the direction towards which business 
ethics should move, partly because the question rebounds on a variety of sub­
questions that are multi-disciplinary in scope -  from the nature of human motives to 
the definition o f ‘what is good’ and for whom; and from the ontology o f business 
organisations to the definition and value of business goals (Vogel, 1991).
The ‘business ethics research agenda’ should ideally integrate the various levels o f 
concern on ethical behaviour, which are: “the person’s internal awareness o f ethical
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principles; the organizational contexts of thought and action; and the realities o f 
combining ideals and work demands” (Kahn, 1990:319). In an attempt to organise 
the debate, Wood (1991a) suggests that the literature on the responsibilities of 
business can be divided into tliree interrelated rather than competing levels that she 
names institutional, organisational and individual. In her view, moral expectations on 
business are tlireefold; one can distinguish the “expectations placed on all businesses 
because o f  their roles as economic institutions, expectations placed on particular 
firms because o f what they are and what they do, and expectations placed on 
managers (and others) as moral actors within the firm” (Wood, 1991a:695), The 
following is an examination o f what has shaped our understanding o f management 
and ethics so far, amongst the larger business ethics research field.
The institutional level, as identified by Wood, addresses the very nature of business. 
It examines the relationships between society and business, and defines what 
business is and, most importantly, what business is for. The legitimacy of business as 
a social institution, and its relationships, rights and responsibilities towards society, 
is fundamentally called into question (Wood, 1991a). The organisational level 
questions the role o f the business organisation. Society offers a wide range o f 
organisations, whose best-known example probably is the corporation. Legally, the 
debate has examined the extent to which business organisations were moral agents, 
and as such what their rights and responsibilities were. Practically, efforts have 
concentrated on what the corporation was expected to do by society and the 
stakeholders, from which concepts o f Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate 
Social Performance or Sustainability have emerged and grown. Although each level 
influences one another, the individual level is o f particular interest to this enquiry, 
and the following discussion liighlights the elements relevant to the individual 
manager facing ethical issues.
The past forty years or so have been dominated by the neo-classical, ‘Friedmanite’ 
approach which defines ‘business’ in a narrow way -  that is to make profits to 
guarantee a fair return on the capital owners’ investment (Friedman, 1970; Davies,
1997). However, an increasing number of scholars have called for a re-reading o f 
Adam Smith’s theory, arguing that the economist’s writings have been mistakenly
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interpreted as the justification for the firee-market argument (Farmer, 1964; Wilson,
1989; Kline, 2006). Solomon (2006) as well as Werhane (1999 and 2002) call to 
mind Adam Smith’s other major work. The Theoiy o f Moral Sentiments. Althougli 
Smith himself viewed this work as a necessary complement to his most famous 
Wealth o f Nations, the fomier has been rather ignored. Actually, Smith’s argument 
has been fragmented to eventually generate a bulk of isolated concepts that are used !
variedly in economic theories. Thus, the model o f tlie ‘economic man’, who acts on a 
purely rational, self-interested basis, or that of the pure and perfect market 
competition are the stepping stone o f many theories; yet, they are just theoretical and 
have no descriptive value -  a point too often forgotten when it comes to regulate 
business transactions. Allinson (2004) illustrates how someone’s view o f the 
economic system depends on how such theoretical models are understood and 
integrated. He tags the rational economic man an “incomplete” picture and argues 
that the deepest nature of man is to be “driven by Eros to be a creator and producer 
of goods and services that serve the whole o f mankind by providing a better and 
more beautiful way of hfe.” (2004:64)
Likewise, Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) denounce the “fallacy o f economic 
science” by explaining how economic theories tend to become self-fulfilling. They 
argue that institutions aie set up and modelled according to the theories, and that 
theories carry an imphcit normative value that influences individual behaviour and 
individual comprehension o f social reality tlirough language. Theoretical 
assumptions become beliefs which shape institutions and behaviours so as to create a 
social reality that is indeed a reflection o f the theories. As the beliefs are reinforced 
by their apparent ‘truthfulness’, they aie “diffused as normative rules of behavior” 
which in turn create behaviours in accordance with the primary assumptions (Ferraro 
et al., 2005; Morrell and Anderson, 2006).
Besides, because theories provide a language to describe and explain social reality or 
social phenomena, they implicitly but necessarily constrain people’s interpretation of 
the reality or phenomena, since no word is innocent (Korhonen, 2002). For instance, 
economists’ rationale for placing self-interest at the core o f hmnan behaviour is 
confused and arguments grounded in psychological egoism, ethical egoism or self-
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interest as a mere heuristic assumption prove to be inconsistent, tautological or self- 
defeating, according to Bowie (1991), Yet, however artificial the self-interest motive 
really is in human character, it is so entrenched m people’s psyche that it has become 
a real fact (Maitland, 1997; Ferraio et al., 2005). The same could be said o f the 
competition ideal and the market efficiency assumption, to some extent. Awareness 
of such mechanisms might seriously challenge the conceptions we hold o f the social 
obligations of business organisations towards society (Shepard et al., 1995).
Some have perceived such a shift as a threat to the legitimacy o f profit-making in 
favour of an ‘ethics first, profits second’ type of approach. For instance, Vallance 
(1993) counter-argues that business’s role is not to favour people’s self-fulfilment 
anyway, and that business and economics are not all there is in society and in life, 
implying that other institutions exist to take care of social and ethical issues. Coming 
from a very different perspective, Kline (2006) also attempts to defend the goodness 
of profit-making and identifies intrinsic rules o f trade that encompass both profit- 
making and moral duties. However, none o f these argmnents seem convincing 
enough, because business is very much present in many aspects of society (the fact 
that some multinational corporations are worth more than some national economies 
illustrates the power o f business today); and because it remains doubtful that all 
business actors will abide by the rules if they can get away with socially damaging 
self-interested actions at little cost.
As explained above, several business ethicists including Etzioni (1988) or Bowie 
(1991) have articulated their arguments around the contestation of the rational, self- 
interested economic man, which they see as too perverted a model on which to base 
the economic system. A system centred on self-interest and selfishness rather than 
self-love and consideration for the community’s welfare is deemed to be eventually 
counter-productive (Berthouzoz, 2000; Doomen, 2005). A business system where 
people are allowed, or even expected to lie when it is in their interest would equally 
be sub-optimal and short-lived (Bowie, 1991). Therefore, minimal rules and virtues 
such as honesty and trust, seem necessary for the good conduct, and indeed the 
survival, o f any economic system based on exchange and transactions. Of course, 
societies have not grown secularly and the traditions o f dominant religions have
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shaped the moral understanding o f business and trade we have held in the past and 
we hold today. Vogel (1991) suggests that the business ethics debate is inherently 
contradictory because o f the radically different Catholic and Protestant approaches to 
business and profit-making: the former condemned business and usury as immoral, 
whereas the latter reconciled material wealth with moral goodness.
Perhaps this explains why business ethicists feel tom by an apparently impossible 
choice to make between the pursuit of moral excellence and that of material 
prosperity, a dilemma that is reflected in the difficulty to maintain coherence within 
the research field (Kahn, 1990). To make the choice furthermore Cornelian, suffice 
to consider how business provides both good things to society, for instance enough 
growth to sustain social well-being, and not-so-good things in the forms of 
scandalously high golden parachutes for incompetent CEOs, arms trade and the like. 
However, it is perhaps excessive to take business ethics as an oxymoron. Maitland 
(1997) for example believes that business and ethics can be reconciled if the market 
is viewed as “a school of the virtues”. Although at first people would act virtuously 
because it is in then self-interest, after some time they would acquire the virtues and 
practice moral business for its intrinsic reward (Maitland, 1997). Nonetheless, this 
appealing theory, mixing elements fi-om Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics, 
presupposes there exists a community that binds social actors together in the pursuit 
of a common good. Yet, as Maitland points out, acting as a free-rider (i.e. being 
selfish whilst everyone else acts virtuously) offers even greater benefits that being 
virtuous for the sake of virtue or o f the community, which leads us to conclude that 
the market alone caimot be the safeguard o f morality.
2.4 .1 .2 . eTHICS AND THE ORGANISATION
To examine the organisational actor, we might first need to examine what an 
organisation is and what its relations with its members are. Both in legal and social 
terms, wliat an organisation is in actual fact remains blurry. If  it is more than the sum 
of the individuals that compose it, then the idea of granting the organisation a 
responsibility of its own and a morality of its own, that would be distinct ftom the 
responsibility and morahty o f its agents, is a priori acceptable. On the contrary, if any
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organisation is just the product o f the actions and decisions o f the individuals who 
comprise it, then whatever the organisation does is the responsibility of these people 
(Nesteruk, 1992).
Some take the cynical view that referring to those ‘organisational beings’ as 
commonly as we do today is pernicious and has “the potential to distract attention 
from the real decision-makers, perhaps enabling them to evade responsibility for 
their actions” (Ashman, 2005). A dual and reverse process is thus implemented, 
whereby we humanise abstract entities (for example talking about organisational 
values is misleading because an organisation is a non-human construction that does 
not and cannot possess conscience or values) whilst we dehumanise ‘real human 
beings’ whose decisions and actions are no longer accounted for but transferred to 
the organisation as such (McKenna and Tsahuridu, 2001; Bakan, 2004; Ashman,
2005). Furthermore, as managers endorse the role of representative agents o f the 
organisation, they are as such e^gected to act only in the organisation’s best interests, 
which means to be driven by profitability and growth (Ewin, 1991).
A more gentle view poses that the organisation, as more than the sum of the 
individuals that comprise it, becomes the locus for “a shared community of purpose” 
(Warren, 1996), or alternatively is a member of a wider community and 
“inconceivable without that community” (Ewin, 1995). In any case, the possible 
responsibility of the organisational entity does not alleviate organisational members 
fi'om their accountability and moral responsibilities (Paine, 1996; Berthouzoz, 2000). 
In particular, the ties between organisational and individual responsibility require 
attention (Dobson, 1999). Of course, the systemic process that turns organisational 
outcomes into something more than the sum of individual acts renders impractical 
the unambiguous pinning o f the responsibility on one specific link o f the chain 
(Hales and Tamangani, 1996; Tsahuridu, 2004). Nonetheless, it is too simple to 
conclude that the acts o f one individual do not make any difference in the final 
outcome. No matter the circumstances, no matter the roles of others, individuals are 
actors, active or passive, and that is usually enough in the eyes of the law and social 
custom to hold each one o f us responsible for what we do or do not do. For the social 
machine to keep going, each screw must hold tight; we equally live in a social
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system made up o f organisations and each element defines and is defined by the 
whole (Hoffman, 1986).
Another moral problem is raised when we grant organisations an identity o f their 
own. To what extent can an organisation know and reason about the appropriateness 
of its actions? Moral judgments can be rendered only for those who possess the 
‘mens rea% that is the propensity to reflect on facts and concepts (Velasquez, 1983 
quoted in Metzger and Dalton, 1996). Because it is not possible to impute act 
intentionality to an organisation (as differentiated from its members and leaders), it 
ensues that organisations cannot really be said to possess moral agency. Likewise, an 
organisation is deprived from emotions, hence its incapability to demonstrate 
compassion or generosity by itself. Because of its nature, an organisation thus cannot 
be virtuous. It is equally not selfish, in so far as selfisluiess is a character trait that 
would require conscience of self and emotional capacity (Ewin, 1991). Emotions are 
a non-negligible aspect o f morality, as demonstrated recent progress made in the 
field of artificial intelligence. Allen et al. (2000) mention that although computers are 
more consistent in applying moral rules and principles, they lack the ability to 
empathise with other sentient beings -  an ability that does make a clear difference, 
Locke (1983:116) points out that: “moral reasoning is the exception, not the rule, 
something we engage in only when faced with difficult problems, or in our more 
philosophical moments: the majority o f moral behaviour is unaccompanied by any 
conscious moral calculation”. Somehow, moral reasons are more relevant than moral 
reasoning.
Traditionally, bureaucratic organisations have epitomised the ‘impersonal machine’ 
in which detached and interchangeable actors perform their tasks rationally and 
withdraw their personality (Ladd, 1970 quoted by Metzger and Dalton, 1996). This 
model, sometimes caricatured but other times very real, has been extensively 
criticised on the grounds that it allows for immoral behaviour to occur because o f the 
culture of impersonality amongst other things (see for instance Jackall’s depiction o f 
the roots o f American bureaucracies, 1988:11). Popularised by Max Weber, the 
bureaucratic model is usually characterised by a hierarchical structure, a strict 
division of labour that separate different professional experts, and an extensive
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reliance on rules and procedures (Buchanan, 1996). The bureaucratic structure is by 
excellence a structure in which roles are set and personal characteristics aie not 
allowed so that agents can be easily replaceable and interchangeable. Eventually, o f 
course, one becomes an expert in their role, but they do not do so by making the role 
theirs; rather it is the role that formats the person into a stereotypical character, which 
reflects and defines the position, the tasks and the organisation itself (Merton, 1940).
Personality, individuality and creativity are absent from bureaucracy to the extent 
that they impede the efficiency o f the management and production process. In his 
analysis o f French bureaucracies, Crozier (1964) concludes that impersonal rules, 
centralised decisions, isolation and subsequent group pressure, and power 
relationships regarding the control o f “areas of uncertainty” create a “vicious circle” 
that leads organisational members to solve problems by elaborating more rules and 
engendering greater isolation. This ultimately contributes to reinforcing the 
bureaucratic characteristics that might have initiated the problem in the first place. 
Actually, bureaucracy reproduces itself as well as its members according to a similar, 
constant profile (Dugger, 1980). It is therefore unsurprising that Johnson (1981:56) 
insists on the need to review bureaucracies’ organisational structures and processes 
“in order to reduce the anonymity o f decision making”, whilst Buchanan (1996) 
contends that strengthening the ethical commitments of bureaucratic actors would 
limit the agency problem and offer a better outcome than alternative models of 
corporate responsibility or bureaucratic roles. Paradoxically, this confirms that 
emotions (of which bureaucratic actors are deprived de facto) are of significance in 
moral behaviour (Mine, 2004).
Dyck and Scliroeder (2005) take even more distance with the bureaucratic model. 
Inspired by Weber’s ideal-types, they propose that managers shift their moral-point- 
of-view from the conventional to a radical model characterized by compassion, 
stewardship and critical approaches to practice and thinking. It is probable that 
altering the conditions of moral perception by modifying the context (that is the 
organisational structure, the moral climate and culture and so on) or the social 
expectations attached to defined roles is likely to affect people’s moral behaviour. 
The key to this programme, though, is to make people aware o f the changes and
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willing to implement them, because it is people who initiate the basic structures of 
the social world. Yet, why would people do so?
In spite of the numerous talks about ethics in business and its relevance to develop 
sustainable growth, in spite o f much active lobbying to integrate stakeholders’ 
concern into strategic management, and to prioritise good management practice over 
profitable practice, ethical misbehaviour still occurs in organisations and corporate 
scandals seem to reproduce (a recent example is the French bank Société Générale’s 
trader fiaud amounting to nearly €5 billion). It is not that business people are morally 
insensitive, or unwilling to merge their personal morality with their work ethic. 
There may be impediments at the institutional level, which fells within the 
competence of politics. There may also be impediments at the individual level, and 
these have been insufficiently examined. The next part addresses this issue.
2.4,2. P racticing  E thics: Co rpo rate  S ocial Respo n sib ility  a n d  M oral 
MANAGEMENT
Although everyone should be ethically sensitive, managers are often expected to be 
role models and to set the tone in the organisation (Kantor and Weisberg, 2002; 
Morrell and Anderson, 2006). In fact, the higher the manager’s position within the 
company, the higher the expectations imposed on him or her to be a role model. 
Studies in leadership have highlighted that top executives and leaders should play a 
key part in encouraging particular behaviours and attitudes towards ethical standards 
(see for instance Thomas and Simerly, 1995; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Minkes et 
al., 1999; Kantor and Weisberg, 2002; Rendtorff, 2003; Trevino and Brown, 2004). 
Effective ethical leadership goes beyond the ‘do as I say, do not do as I do’ and 
leaders are expected to embody the values they preach and inspire others to act as 
well (Wheststone, 1997; Trevino et al., 2000). But a role model in a business 
environment is not necessarily someone who would be considered a moral exemplar 
in another context. In fact, people tend to have different conceptions o f moral 
exemplarity (Walker and Hennig, 2004). In practice, the pressure to achieve business 
(as opposed to ‘social’) objectives is usually identified as a cause for moral feilure 
(Bird and Waters, 1989), although Solomon (2005:111) argues that the problem is
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not so clear-cut and that opposing virtuous conduct to business perfonnance is a 
mistalce because “ethics is a way of life, a seemingly delicate but in fact very strong 
tissue of endless adjustments and compromises.”
Because it apprehends how the organisation as a whole can perfomi better in both 
financial and non-financial (i.e, social, environmental) areas, the CSR approach 
provides a framework for good practice and pragmatic policies. It appeals to business 
practitioners and political leaders alike. It also seems to bridge the ‘gap’ between 
academics and practitioners, granting the former hard-earned recognition and 
providing the latter with ‘ready-made’ tools to perform better on the social scale. 
However, the vast majority o f the CSR literature (and alike) relies on the neo­
classical assumptions and does not address the question of the puipose o f business 
organisations in a capitalist economy. Consequently, CSR research has been targeted 
as either too compromised, that is submissive to the profit-maximisation imperative, 
or too constraining and ill-adapted to the realities of the business world, as if  putting 
moral and social demands on businesses would impede their development, if not 
their survival (see Webley, 1997; van Marrewijk, 2003).
Several reviews have examined the history and the development o f the CSR concept, 
yet it remains quite vague, and the CSR field is for the most part varied (Garriga and 
Mêlé, 2004; Kakabadse et al., 2005). First mentioned by Bowen in the 1950s, the 
concept of CSR has been extensively discussed, refined and developed over the past 
fifty to sixty years (see Jones, 1980; Carroll, 1991 and 1999; Fischer, 2004). The 
CSR perspective now stretches from a Friedmanite apprehension of the corporate 
responsibilities towards society (according to which CSR is strategic in the pursuit of 
the best economic outcomes which are assumed to be similar to the best social 
outcomes) to a challenging, all-encompassing, ahiiost spiritual view of the business 
organisation as part of the cosmos (see Lantos, 2001; Frederick, 1986, 1994 and
1998). The CSR field may not have reached critical mass but several themes have 
emerged to offer alternative foci o f enquiry, notably Corporate Social Performance 
(Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991b and 1991c; Roman et a l, 1999) and Stakeholder 
Approach (Jones, 1995; Hummels, 1998; Szwajkowski, 2000; Freeman, 2005).
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Although it is more often centred on the organisation, CSR research has started to 
examine the role managers play in the ethics of corporations.
For example, Athanasopoulou (2004) led a qualitative study amongst managers’ role 
conflicts at work. Using the role theory, she distinguishes inter-role from person-role 
conflicts and explains that inter-role conflicts (which is when the person experiences 
conflicting demands from different roles, for instance ‘as a manager’ versus ‘as a 
community member’) are more ftequent than person-role conflicts (that is when the 
role expectations conflict with the person’s values). She then lists the “rationalisation 
mechanisms” managers implement to cope with such conflicts, which consist in: (1) 
distancing oneself from the situation (“it is part of the job”); (2) hoping that it is for 
the best (“I am protecting the jobs of other people”); or (3) taking a “deterministic 
approach” which implies that what happens is inevitable because “it is not entirely up 
to me to decide” (Athanasopoulou, 2004:18). Overall, however, justifications (1) and 
(3) illustrate a tendency to mitigate one’s responsibility by annihilating ‘the human’ 
under ‘the manager’, ‘the business’ or ‘the organisational machine’. Justification (2) 
is more engaging but is a plain example of utilitarian rationalisation. It is not wrong 
in itself, but it nevertheless weakens the value o f the human in so far as one person’s 
well-being is balanced against other people’s well-being. It is not certain under these 
circumstances that the decision is purely motivated by a desire to protect others 
rather than one’s own interests and well-being first and foremost.
Athanasopoulou’s study is interesting but remains insufficient with regards to 
analysing the rationalisation mechanisms and the conditions under which decisions 
are made. Indeed, she describes how managers justify their behaviour but she does 
not dig into the rationale behind these claims. Yet in order to improve our moral 
behaviour, we need to understand what makes us act the way we do. A greater degree 
of self-knowledge is required to uncover the meaning and significance o f moral 
experiences. Smidman’s argmiient about excellent managers who work for 
companies that produce harmful goods equally falls short of explanation regarding 
the mechanisms and factors of influence in the process of moral deliberation.
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Sundman (2000) examines from a Virtue Ethics perspective whether a good manager 
is also a moral manager, and suggests that the demands of morality are external to 
the business practice so that a good manager ought not to be a moral manager. Yet, 
as Dawson and Bartholomew (2003:135) rightly point out, a virtuous manager would 
still be concerned with what produces the organisation he works for. Hence, working 
for an arm manufacturer would raise serious moral issues that contravene the ideal of 
the good life and human happiness. Besides, pleading ignorance would not obliterate 
one’s responsibility because the virtuous manager would be wise enough to know 
what he participates in. “Virtuous business people have the interest of society in 
mind and knowledge o f the human goods to which their work contributes” (Dawson 
and Bartholomew, 2003:135-136). To word it differently, neither Athanasopoulou 
nor Sundman examine the self behind the manager, and how this self relates to other 
selves.
Actually, virtue ethicists have been prominent in the management ethics research 
field recently, either to support Virtue Ethics as a comprehensive moral framework 
for managers or to aigue that management cannot be virtuous (Dawson and 
Bartholomew, 2003). Some researchers localise on the concept o f practice. For 
instance. Brewer (1997) proposes that management be called a practice on the 
grounds that management qualifies in each tliree categories of internal goods. Yet 
Moore (2002) argues that management is rather a “feature of institution or 
organisation” and that only business, if conceived holistically, can be properly 
considered a practice because it is effectively contributing to society.
For our enquiry, however, the most interesting contribution o f Virtue Ethics to 
business studies is the notion o f character. What character means is not 
imcontroversial and some virtue ethicists do not even refer to the concept (Statman,
1997). Watson’s outline o f the concept illustrates some of the misunderstandings that 
occur in the field. Watson (1997) argues that the character-based virtue approach 
shall not be confused with character utilitarianism (i.e. developing a virtuous 
character in order to achieve happiness) nor with perfectionism (which remains 
consequentialist in essence). For Watson, it actually embraces a non-consequentialist 
view without necessarily implying a purpose to which human actions be directed.
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Yet, for Aristotle, the development o f character with good dispositions towards the 
viitues frilly participates in the achievement of the good life. A character-based ethics 
in the spirit o f Virtue Ethics is teleoiogical, thus somewhat consequentialist too.
MacIntyre’s depiction of the manager is probably the most famous application of the 
character concept to business. As interpreted by MacIntyre (1985) a character is 
more than a social role. It demands that role and personality be fused so that the 
distinction between what is specific to one individual and what is specific to his 
social role disappear s. Therefore, the character stands for the moral representation of 
the culture to which it belongs. Besides, “the requirements of a character are imposed 
fi-om the outside, from the way in which others regard and use characters to 
understand and to evaluate themselves” so that ultimately “the character morally 
legitimates a mode o f social existence” (MacIntyre, 1985:29). MacIntyre identifies 
tlnee characters representative o f modern society but his depiction o f the 
bureaucratic manager has been particularly commented (see Deetz, 1995; Mangham, 
1995a and 1995b; Nash, 1995; Dawson and Bartholomew, 2003). The bureaucratic 
manager is “manipulating others and manipulated by the system he has created” and 
“his area of expertise is efficient management which, for him, has no moral 
dimension” (Vardy and Grosch, 1999:103-104) and indeed may itself be illusory 
(MacIntyre, 1985). A controversial picture of manager, the character depicted by 
MacIntyre is an ideal-type, although it is unclear how much MacIntyre himself 
believes it miiTors reality. This likely participated in boosting the debate o f  the moral 
status of management and managers.
We might need to recall at this point that our enquiry is not concerned with moral 
management as such. Indeed, moral management is prescriptive and aims to promote 
a strategic model of management that combines organisational profitability with 
concern for stakeholders and social well-being. Carroll (2002:151) explains that: “If  
the moral management model is to be achieved, managers need to integrate ethical 
wisdom with their managerial wisdom and to take steps to create and sustam an 
ethical climate in their organizations.” On the contrary, our examination o f 
managers’ morality is set to be mainly exploratory, and to examine the content o f the 
moral thinlcing, feeling and acting o f managers as individuals. The purpose is first to
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understand the inner mechanisms and sources o f influence. In order to do so, we can 
review how management and managers have been examined from the moral point o f 
view, both descriptively and normatively.
CaiToll (2002) categorisation of models o f management aims to be descriptive. He 
lists the characteristics o f immoral, moral and amoral managers. First, immoral 
management highlights “a style that not only is devoid of ethical principles or 
precepts, but also implies a positive and active opposition to what is ethical” (Carroll, 
2002:145). Immoral managers are only concerned with their interests and make 
profit-based decisions regardless o f the moral and legal obligations they have. Moral 
management on the other hand “conforms to high standaids of ethical behavior and 
professional standards of conduct” in the pursuit of profit (Carroll, 2002:246). Moral 
managers are attentive to the letter and the spirit of the law, and their strategy 
encompasses moral standards. Finally, Carroll identifies two types of amoral 
managers. Unintentional amoral managers are not conscious of, or sensitive to the 
implications their decisions have on stakeholders, whereas intentional amoral 
managers adopt a conservative view that ethics and business ought not to be mixed. 
Intentional amoral managers consciously avoid thinking about ethics when at work, 
whereas unintentional amoral managers are simply ignorant of the fact that what they 
do has moral consequences.
Carroll (2002) suggests that the vast majority of managers might fall within the 
amoral management category, and that at the individual level, each manager goes 
into phases that range from the immoral to the moral management model, depending 
on the ciicumstances. But overall, organisations aie likely to be filled with amoral 
managers who “are basically good people, but they essentially see the competitive 
business world as ethically neutral” (Carroll, 2002:148). The conclusion is that more 
efforts should be made to raise managers’ awareness o f the ethical challenges in the 
business environment and to explain to them how they can benefit from being 
ethically proactive.
The most interesting element in this picture of morality in management is the notion 
that a manager is mostly amoral, but at times falls into the innnoral or moral
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category. Carroll (2002) specifies that tliis conclusion is speculative and requires 
empirical support. We are not concerned with this point, however. What is 
significant is that at least some managers tend to lack awareness of the moral 
dimension of their job, and that when they sense the moral implications o f a 
situation, they have as much a tendency to act wrongly as they have to act rightly 
from the moral point o f view. The same individual can be moral one day and 
immoral another day because the circumstances changed his perception of the 
situation.
We can draw two conclusions from this: first, most people are dual, tliat is equally 
capable o f goodness as badness; second, the key to understand why people behave as 
they do (rightly or badly) lies in their internal deliberations that reflect the perception 
they have o f the situation and the peculiar circumstances, as we already suggested. 
This concurs what Trevino and Brown (2004:70) underlines as a lack of “moral 
awareness, ethical recognition, or ethical sensitivity”. Basically, managers are not 
necessarily able to detect the moral component o f a situation, hence to act in a 
morally considerate way. But, as Trevino and Brown (2004) specify, moral 
awareness is just the first stage in the wider process o f decision-making. The authors 
add that when it comes to ethics, people are likely to be equally good and bad 
depending on their environment. They question the autonomy o f moral agents by 
arguing that most adults are followers and reproduce what they observe amongst 
their peers. There is no denying that the culture and the personal qualities o f leaders 
and managers set the tone within the organisation, and that ethics must be practiced, 
not just hanged on the wall, if it is to be meaningful. Yet individuals are rarely 
coerced into doing something they disagree with. Certainly, examples exist where 
people are tlireatened with being fired if they do not follow the orders, and the fear o f 
unemployment can count as a mitigating circumstance. But it cannot be accepted as 
an excuse for denying one’s moral agency nonetheless, because it is always a matter 
of choice. To make the decision in agreement with one’s conscience represents a 
challenge which announces the critical importance of self-lcnowledge.
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2.5. S u m m a r y
This chapter has introduced and discussed elements from moral philosophies that 
could inform the understanding o f individual morality. In particular Virtue Ethics in 
the Aristotelian tradition was identified as promising, although incomplete, because 
of its interest in the character of the individual. The significance o f the virtue of 
phronesis was acknowledged, but its definition was judged too imprecise for an in- 
depth understanding of people’s moral deliberation process. We noticed that the 
proposition o f an intuitive knowledge of the Good, rooted in a “shared humanity” 
and allied with a just ability to reason and to act upon one’s decisions is appropriate 
to explore individual morality, yet it fails to provide sufficient details to set to the 
exploration. The chapter then provided a review of the concepts o f management and 
managers, and examined more precisely the business ethics literature that has 
investigated morality and management. We concluded that more needed to be known 
about the inner mechanisms of moral deliberation and self knowledge. The following 
chapter will examine this question in greater detail.
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C h a p t e r  3 -  M o r a l it y  a n d  t h e  In d iv id u a l  Se l f
“We can only work towards perfecting ourselves if there is a 
struggle, if there is opposition to be overcome. A soul can only 
become perfect when it has travelled the path leading to perfection 
and come to understand, to know everytliing there is in creation. 
We cannot be near God If we know nothing of unhappiness and 
sin, if we do not ‘feel’ and tmly understand the other creatures, and 
in order to really know them we have to have been in direct contact
with them.”
Bahram Elahi 
The Path of Peifection
3.1 . I n t r o d u c t io n
This chapter is concerned with exploring the internal elements of moral deliberation 
which leads to moral action, and to identify a framework that would allow us to 
understand the mechanisms and constitutive elements inherent to phronesis or 
practical wisdom. Because of the nature of this enquiry, we need to turn to 
psychology and moral psychology to look for some answers. Thus the chapter begins 
with a critical examination o f  the internal moral process, more particularly moral 
development and the stages of ethical decision-making (part 3.2). Part 3.3 discusses 
the relations between the self and morality. We will examine the importance of the 
self in our moral understanding and moral endeavours. This will relate to the concept 
of shared humanity introduced in the previous chapter.
Finally, part 3.4 introduces Carl Jung’s self-centred psychology and summarises the 
framework that will be used for the study. Jung’s psychology is self-centred in the 
sense that it places the self at the centre o f the psyche in a dynamic and transcendent 
relation. After the main elements of Jung’s view of the psyche are introduced, it will 
be argued that a Jungian framework offers a promising solution to apprehend and 
actually develop phronesis, in so fer as self-knowledge constitutes the basis for moral 
knowledge.
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3.2. U n w r a p p i n g  M o r a l i t y
Psychology has been keen to look into the mechanisms of moral behaviour, moral 
thinking and moral reasoning o f individuals. A greater number o f researchers 
acknowledge how moral enquiry can benefit from psychological as well as 
philosophical inputs. For instance Kaler (1999:212) states: “Abandoning ethical 
theory does not mean sole reliance on common sense. [...] Instead of looking to a 
separate realm o f ethical theory, ethical investigation looks to theories drawn from 
the social and natural sciences: theories that help the ethical investigation determine 
what is and is not good for human beings by illuminating the nature o f human nature 
and the effects o f particular sorts o f social arrangements upon human beings.” 
Ebrahimi et al. (2005) concur, as well as Bartlett (2003:225) who relates some 
business ethicists’ claims that too much emphasis was put on philosophy and not 
enough on “the more psychological aspects of business ethics, such as behavioural 
intentions and the beliefs that shape those intentions.” However, psychology can 
contribute in many different ways to ethical enquiries, as we shall now see.
3.2.1. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGERS
Moral psychologists have concentrated their efforts on a few concepts that inform 
moral development and ethical decision-making. Applied to management, studies 
have investigated the interaction, integration or conflict between managers’ personal 
values and business obligations (e.g. Finegan, 1994; Fritzsche, 1995; Fisher, 1999; 
Oliver, 1999; Nonis and Swift, 2001; Cadbury, 2002; Bartlett, 2003; Napal, 2003). 
To a laige extent the purpose is to assess whether and how managers’ background, 
personal values or moral philosophies influence the way they make decisions, handle 
ethical dilemmas and reflect on their and others’ actions (Forsyth, 1992). Rehgious 
beliefs have received particular attention, with a view to detennining whether and 
how religious values affect one’s beliaviour and self-expectations (e.g. Colby and 
Damon, 1995; Weaver and Agie, 2002; Maclean et a l, 2004). Alternatively, 
Gilligan’s assertion o f a gender difference in the view of ethics (women’s care versus 
men’s justice) has led to enquiries about whether men and women are ethically 
different (White, 1992; Luthar et a l, 1997; Kreie and Cronan, 1998). The question o f
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age is sometimes mentioned but it is unclear whether being older implies being 
wiser, hence having greater moral sophistication (Sikula and Costa, 1994).
If some managers find a way to integrate their beliefs to their work, others find a way 
to cope with sometimes contradictory duties (for instance by compartmentalising 
then life) whilst some feel the constant tension between what they want to be and 
what they have to do (Lovell, 2002). This ‘grey’ area has been looked at through the 
concept of ethical climate, introduced by Victor and Cullen (1987) but developed and 
used in several studies (e.g. Cullen et al., 1989; Luthar et al., 1997; Wimbush et al., 
1997; Barnett and Vaicys, 2000; Fritzsche, 2000). The ‘perception’ view has also 
proved popular and a few studies have examined how managers (or business students 
or other practitioners) perceive moral dilemmas, and in some cases how they judge, 
make decisions on and respond to an issue (e.g. Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1993; 
Singhapakdi et al., 1996; Dukerich et al., 2000; Mattison, 2000; Malone, 2006). 
Usually, perception o f moral issues is closely linked to personal moral standards and 
contextual characteristics (Baack et al., 2000; Jaffe and Pasternak, 2006).
These studies are statistically rich but they generally omit to consider managers as 
human beings and, as a correlate, as individual selves. Managers are taken as 
organisational actors or defined in relation to their environment and their relations. 
However, the self is the core of our morality. Knobe (2005) suggests there exists an 
“ideal of being yourself’ that accounts for a significant part of our moral systems. 
From the perspective o f developmental psychology, Bergman (2002) reviews major 
contributions to moral development theory and highlights how the self participates 
in the articulation and implementation of moral judgments. Blasi (1984 and 1993) in 
particular grants the self a central role in the morality of a person, in so far as the 
person will be motivated to act according to her ideals that constitute her sense of 
moral self or her self-identity. People aspire to consistency between their actions and 
their aspirations because their self is key to who they are. Colby and Damon’s (1993 
and 1995) studies o f moral exemplars’ personality emphasize the importance o f 
cohesion between one’s moral judgments and one’s sense of self in fostering moral 
behaviour. In fact, '‘^ when there is perceived unity between self and morality, 
judgment and conduct are dii'ectly and pi'edictably linked and action choices are
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made with great certaintyK [...] Thus, when moral and personal goals are a central 
component of self, moral goals are central to the self” (Colby and Damon, 1993:150 
-  italics original). Conscience, to that extent, might be viewed as the selfs tool to 
remind us o f who we really are, to recall the personal autonomy that seems to suffer 
in situations o f moral dilemma (Killen and Nucci, 1995; Lovell, 2002). To begin our 
enquiry about the self and its relation to morality, the following part examines the 
relevance o f a moral development approach.
3.2.2. MORAL DEVELOPMENT
The nature and content o f moral development has been extensively researched by 
Piaget, Kohlberg and many followers and critics. Kohlberg’s work established a solid 
though debatable theory o f moral development (Weinreich-Haste, 1983; Colby and 
Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg’s theory o f moral development clearly focuses on 
rationality. Emler (1983:55 -  italics original) summarises it as follow: “Moral 
development is seen as essentially a cognitive process with cognitive products. 
Development consists of the successive emergence o f increasingly complex and 
adequate forms o f moral reasoning. Moral action is compelled by moral thought and 
thought generates decisions or conclusions that are morally compelling because they 
are logically compelling.”
Kohlberg identified six distinct stages o f moral reasoning, through which each 
person progresses incrementally with no regressing. The higher the stage, the more 
sophisticated the moral reasoning and the more metaphysical the object of concern o f 
the person. Ishida (2006:65) lists the characteristics o f each stage:
o Stage 1: Orientation to punishment, obedience, and physical and material 
power. Rules are obeyed to avoid punisliment. 
o Stage 2: Naïve instmmental hedonistic orientation. The individual conforms 
to obtain rewards.
o Stage 3: “Good boy/girl” orientation designed to win approval and maintain 
expectations o f one’s immediate group. The individual conforms to avoid 
disapproval. One earns approval by being “nice”.
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o Stage 4: Orientation to authority, law, and duty, to maintain a fixed order,
whether social or religious. Right behaviour consists o f  doing one’s duty and 
abiding by the social order, 
o Stage 5: Social contract orientation, in which duties ar e defined in terms of
contract and the respect of other’s rights. Emphasis is upon equality and 
mutual obligation within a democratic order, 
o Stage 6: The morality o f individual principles of conscience that have logical
comprehensiveness and universality. Rightness of acts is determined by 
conscience in accord with ethical principles that appeal to 
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.
People start from the pre-conventional level (stage 1 and 2), where they are only 
concerned about themselves, up to the conventional (stage 3 and 4) then post- 
conventional (stage 5 and 6) levels, yet they do so at various pace. Also, not 
everyone reaches the post-conventional level.
This Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) approach has proved popular amongst 
researchers on ethical decfeion-making and behaviour. In particular. Rest’s Defining 
Issues Test or DIT, that measures the stage preference, and Lind’s Moral Judgment 
Test or MJT, which focuses on stage consistency, are two measurement tools 
developed from Kohlberg’s theory (Ishida, 2006). As such, they share the 
implications and limitations o f the theory. Indeed, a major criticism o f Kohlberg’s 
model and o f the many follow-up studies based on it (for instance Trevino, 1986 or 
Forte, 2004), is its strong reliance on reasoning to measure people’s degree of moral 
development, including the capacity to take others’ perspective as part of one’s 
mental processing o f a moral puzzle (Bergman, 2002). Within the CMD perspective, 
morality is about the cognitive ability to reason, which is taken as the necessary and 
sufficient condition for moral action. Yet morality is more likely a matter o f rational 
reasoning and emotional response, or at least experienced-based intuition 
(MacLagan, 1998). A former collaborator of Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan has 
particularly targeted the male-oriented prejudices of the model and proposed that 
women develop morally according to a sense o f cai e rather than a sense o f justice 
(Putman, 1996), We alluded in the previous chapter to the fact that emotions have 
been neglected and rationality has been overstated in the study o f  morality (e.g.
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Greenspan, 2000; Bos and Willmott, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Hine, 2004). Also, several 
studies on moral exemplarity (e.g. Monroe et a l, 1990; Colby and Damon, 1993 and 
1995; Matsuba and Walker, 2005) or investigating empathetic and sympathetic 
characteristics in close link to imagination (e.g. Piper, 1991; Deigh, 1995; Gordon, 
1995; Magai and McFadden, 1995) provide evidence that call into question the 
predominance o f rational reasoning in morality.
Another problem with the CMD model is that it does not allow for regression, so that 
once a stage has been reached, there is supposedly no turning back to more selfish 
concerns when making a decision. However, experience could demonstrate that it is 
not just so straightforward (Maclean et a l, 2004). If it were, then post-conventional 
people would never act motivated by their own self-interest or just because ‘the law 
says so’. In other words, once stage 6 is reached we would not commit ‘moral 
mistakes’, that is we would not ignore other people’s well-being no matter the 
circumstances or the incentives to do so. ‘Once virtuous, always virtuous’ does not 
seem an accurate picture of human beings if we look at people and at ourselves, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter (part 2.4.2). Furthermore, the pre-conventional, 
conventional and post-conventional stages are assumed to be hermetic and sufficient 
to classify everyone, although in reality they fall short in doing so (see for example 
Knobe’s discussion o f the ‘Raskolnikovs’, 2005).
3.2.3. ROLES
The final major contribution o f Kohlberg’s theory is the importance given to role- 
taking abilities as an integrative part o f moral development (Walker, 1980). People 
progress upwards in their moral development depending on their capacity to take the 
perspective of other people when they assess and account for a moral situation. The 
concept of role has been widely used in the literature, although often with varied 
preconceptions and implications (Neiman and Hughes, 1951; Biddle, 1986). Role 
theory is appreciated because it locates the individual within his social context and it 
discusses the shaping and enactment o f role expectations (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
These expectations usually define the content of role obligations (Hardhnon, 1994). 
Goffinan (1959) provided a classic framework for understanding the extent and
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nature of role-playing in our lives. Drawing constant comparisons with dramaturgical 
features, in the tradition o f psycho drama (Moreno, 1977), Goffman (1959) describes 
how we perform our roles, and work through and with various groups and props in 
front of an audience, how we deal with disturbances and disniptions, how we manage 
the transition from backstage to frontstage, and how we learn to hide our ‘se lf 
effectively. Role theory thus enunciated actually faces some serious moral questions.
Roles encompass both social and moral expectations although to varying degrees 
(Downie, 1968; Boatright, 1988). In this perspective, moral tensions result from the 
perception of a contradiction or a conflict between various moral expectations either 
within the boundaries of a single role (intra-role moral conflict), between the 
expectations o f separate roles (inter-role moral conflict), or between role 
expectations and self aspirations (Athanasopoulou’s study illustrates this viewpoint -  
see Chapter 2, part 2.4.2). Actually, moral dileimnas are not just the result of role 
conflict. Tensions in role enactment can originate from role ambiguity, role 
malintegration, role discontinuity, role overload as much as role conflict (Miles, 
1977; Biddle, 1986). However, the point role theory puts forward is that life is a play, 
people are actors and morality is a matter of expectations regulated by interaction 
with others. Such theory has undeniable descriptive qualities, but its moral qualities 
are a different matter. Indeed, the very concept of the vii tues is seriously challenged, 
in so far as a person cannot be truly virtuous, but only acts as a virtuous person. Let’s 
consider for example the virtue o f benevolence. The virtuous person is benevolent 
because it is in her character, that is it defines her as a person. If life is a play, 
however, a person might very well be benevolent but only through enactment. In 
other words, she can enact benevolence, but she is not benevolent per se. I f  the social 
or moral expectations bearing upon a specific role include acting with benevolence, 
then the person who is benevolent simply is a ‘good’ actress in the sense that she 
enacts what is expected of her (or what she perceives is expected of her). If the next 
role she enacts does not require acting with benevolence, she might choose not to be 
benevolent without it being immoral, wrong or non-virtuous.
O f course, one could argue that there might exist global rules that expect 
benevolence in each role people enact. In which case, being virtuous would be
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considered a global moral expectation against which everyone is assessed. Yet again, 
virtuousness would be addressed as the feature of a role rather than o f a character. 
Virtuousness is significant only because thus are designed the rules o f the play. In 
fact, virtuousness loses its intrinsic value. It might also be argued that a person can 
decide to enact her role in a virtuous manner, in which case she chooses to act 
virtuously. Yet, this is far from obvious. Indeed, if she chooses to enact her role 
virtuously, say with benevolence, then her benevolence is relevant to what she 
enacts, not necessarily to who she is as a person. Furthermore, if we were to accept 
that she is what she enacts, we need to identify a permanent feature that links all 
roles and all enactments together, which serves as a imity of character that bears the 
moral responsibility. Otherwise the person is just a puppet lacking moral strength to 
assert her convictions when pressured by social expectations attached to her role, as 
Goffman (1959:87) illustrates. Morally, the risk is high for individual autonomy and 
responsibility. As Vice (2003:105 -  italics original) notices: “If  we see ourselves 
purely in terms of roles, we both risk bad faith in the Sartrean sense -  mauvaise fo i -  
as well as losing sight of the individuality o f persons. [...] And it is arguably a sign of 
maturity to outgrow ‘role-playing’, to stop defining ourselves essentially with any 
role we may happen to take on and to become comfortable with or resigned to the 
kind of person we broadly are and to our inescapable limitations.”
We thus need to turn to the concept o f self. In role theory, however, the self is an 
ambiguous concept. The self refers essentially to the sense o f our own identity 
(Layder, 2004). However, opinions diverge on its nature. Some believe that it is 
constructed from our roles (e.g. Goffinan, 1959) whilst others adopt a narrative point 
of view, argumg that “we grow up on stories” (Vice, 2003:98). The real problem is to 
decide whether the self is stable or changing; that is, if the self constitutes an anchor 
to which the person comes back and which, therefore, can be held as the core identity 
of the person; or rather if  the self is yet another passing state that can be erased or 
called back at will. In the latter case, the self does not constitute a reliable moral 
fr amework in so far as it can be disposed o f temporarily. In the fonner case, the self 
is necessai'ily o f a different nature from roles. Practical wisdom requires consistency 
to be truly meaningful; therefore it is bound to be connected to a self that is present 
no matter what we want or what we think. The self appears in charge of building up
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the foundations for moral deliberation. The self should thus be perceptible at each 
stage of the process of ethical decision-making. Managers spend much of their time 
making decisions whose moral implications are more or less significant. The 
following part examines how research into ethical decision-making addresses the 
role of the self.
3.2.4, S tages o f  E thical D ecision -m a k in g
Trevino and Brown (2004:70) describe ethical decision-making as a “multiple-stage 
[...] process that moves from moral awareness to moral judgment (deciding that a 
specific action is morally justifiable), to moral motivation (the commitment or 
intention to take the moral action), and finally to moral character (persistence or 
follow-tlirough to take the action despite challenges).” Being moral thus necessitates 
that one is capable of sensing that a situation bears moral implications, of defining 
the appropriate response to the situation, o f committing one’s will to that response 
and then of acting upon one’s will. From the Virtue Ethics point of view, moral 
motivation and moral character are fostered by the possession and the practice o f the 
virtues. They do not requiie an effort for the virtuous person because she is naturally 
inclined to be coimnitted to the appropriate response and to act accordingly. 
Similarly, the person who strives for virtuousness should be familiar with good 
motivation and moral character, else she does not really strive for virtuousness. 
Moral awareness and moral judgment are more difficult qualities to master, because 
they appeal to both rational and ‘irrational’, sensitive (hence subjective) qualities. 
Nevertheless, the morally responsible person is expected to possess all four 
capabilities.
Indeed, the person who is sensitive to a moral issue and thinks about an appropriate 
response to the issue but fails to act accordingly is responsible for her lack o f action 
despite her good moral judgment. The person who acts appropriately but who has not 
grasped the moral implications of the situation equally fails to be morally responsible 
and fully virtuous. Morality is a complex phenomenon, which involves various levels 
of apprehension and understanding. It seems therefore necessary to pay attention to 
the individual self that “carries out reflection and that is the object of such reflection”
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(Vice, 2003:2). Louden (1988:377) similarly points out that “morality ‘begins with 
the se lf [...] in the sense that self-directed, reflective behavior constitutes the basic 
data of ethics”. Yet, the self is generally absent from moral discourses, at least in its 
human quality. Murdoch (1983:69) claims that: “Philosophy, on its other fronts, has 
been busy dismanthng the old substantial picture of the ‘self, and ethics has not 
proved able to rethink this concept for moral pmposes.” Nevertheless the self is the 
“starting-point to an inquiry about how to live” because it is the root of our 
knowledge o f the world, both inner and outer (Vice, 2003:3).
A majority o f research into ethical decision-making applied to management targets 
the external factors that help or impede the decision-making process. In particular, 
the influence o f codes (Cadbury, 2002; Goughian, 2005), organisational culture or 
leadership (Bowen, 2004), or organisational structure (White, 1999) has been 
discussed, whereas O ’Neill and Hern (1991) have argued that decision-making 
equals a collective negotiation between individuals within the organisational system. 
Wliat interests us, however, is to examine how the stages of ethical decision-making 
relate to the self, self-knowledge and practical wisdom. First, moral awareness, or 
moral perception, is the ability to detect the moral aspect of a given situation. It 
supposedly precedes any other form of moral activity. As such, it relies on personal 
values and principles (Blum, 1991) but also on the quality and sensitivity o f the self. 
To that extent, moral perception is a frmction of the self and reveals what the self 
cares for; yet moral perception is also shaped by the moral education received by the 
individual in the sense o f the community’s moral system and what the person 
perceives is expected o f her (Sparks and Shepherd, 2002). That the individual is 
influenced by the community he lives in, as well as by the rules and norms that 
regulate the community, is certainly true. However, it is the individual who perceives 
and not the community. Perception and awareness are individual faculties, abilities o f 
a self. The community can help the self cultivate or on the contrary disengage from 
acute moral awareness, but the decision lies with the self.
Moral judgment is about £^sessing the appropriateness of an action from the moral 
point of view. The perceived moral intensity o f the situation is supposed to detennine 
people’s cognitive process and evaluation of ‘the appropriate course of action’.
57
McMahon and Harvey (2007:337) examine the concept o f moral intensity, first 
introduced by Thomas Jones, and explain that it is composed o f six elements: 
“magnitude o f consequences, social consensus, probability o f effect, temporal 
immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect.” The underlying assumption is 
that these factors can be measured and are indicative o f how a person makes a 
decision when she faces a moral issue. Findings suggest that the greater the distance 
between the person and the moral issue (i.e. distance is understood as both physical 
and emotional) and the less impact the issue is anticipated to have, the more likely 
the person is to bypass the issue without contemplating it (Dukerich et a l, 2000; 
Mellema, 2003; Jaffe and Pasternak, 2006). Similarly, Krebs and Laird (1998) 
conclude that the degree o f self-implication, either real or hypothetical, m moral 
dilemma examined by the subjects, influences the judgment they pass on the 
transgressor. Yet we are here again confronted with an apparently objective 
measurement of a concept that is really subjective. Indeed, the intensity o f the 
perceived moral conflict will be function of the distance the person maintains 
between the situation and herself. Here, distance is best understood as the degree of 
emotional separation between the self on the one hand, and the situation, the role or 
the people affected on the other hand. Wliat I feel is important might not be what 
someone else feels important, from the moral point of view. Equally, what I judge 
important is not necessarily similar to what someone else will judge important. 
Although the concept of moral intensity is informative, it does not account for the 
emotional response that necessarily accompanies the moral decision and action. This 
does not imply that ethics is all relative but rather that our perception and 
consecutive reaction to a moral issue will be influenced by emotions that are 
necessarily subjective, in the sense that they are specific to us.
Moral motivation and moral character are both acts of will. Indeed, they imply a 
choice (le. to be willing to do something rather than something else) and the effort 
necessary to concretise it (le. the will-power to implement the choice). Roberto 
Assagioli, founder of the psychosynthesis movement, centred his psychology on the 
will. According to him: “the will’s function [consists] in deciding what is to be done, 
in applying all the necessary means for its realization and in persisting m the task in 
the face of all obstacles and difficulties.” (Assagioli, 2002:6). Essential to our actions
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in life, the will is however not easily assimilated, and it requires training to fully 
master it. The training occurs in tliree phases, argues Assagioli (2002:7 -  italics 
original): “first is the recognition that the will exists; the second concerns the 
realization of having a will. The third phase of the discovery, which renders it 
complete and effective, is that of being a will (this is different from “having” a 
will).” In any case, the will is located at the “central core of our being”, so that “the 
self and the will are intimately connected” (Assagioli, 2002:9). The willing self 
appears therefore as the ultimate source o f moral decision and moral action. It is the 
self who practices wisdom and we rely on our self, and not just on rational thinking, 
to assess the choices we have and to choose our course o f action. We will now 
explore in greater details the characteristics o f this self.
3.3 . P e r spe c t iv e s  o n  th e  Se l f  a n d  M o r a lity
It springs from the previous discussion the idea that the self is a core concept in the 
moral process o f individuals. We suggested that the self plays a significant part in the 
moral decision-making process, and that the self demands some degree of stability to 
provide a reliable basis for moral deliberation and moral enactment. However, we 
did not provide a clear definition o f the concept of self, which is what the following 
part aims to do.
3.3.1. D efin in g  A n d  Captu rin g  the  Se l f
The meaning o f self is manifold. Colloquially, the notion o f  self is used to 
distinguish one person from the others, and it identifies one’s personality or most 
essential character. Psychologically, the self is given different meanings according to 
the school of thought to which one belongs. Thus American ego-psychology 
associates ‘se lf with a construction o f the ego (the ‘T, the subject) whereas the 
English tradition is inclined to consider the self as the locus o f the whole psychic 
activity and the product o f dynamic processes that foster the unity o f the person 
(Doron and Parot, 1991:670-671). Jones (2004) confirms that the approach one 
adopts of the self relates to one’s ontological position, especially in psychology, so 
that the concept is liard to define.
59
Layder (2004:7) assimilates self with “personal identity” and contends that the self is 
“how a person regards themselves and how they, and others, relate to or behave 
towards themselves.” For Layder, the self is both sociological (i.e. part of a social 
context) and psychological (i.e. independent o f the social world). The self is also 
essentially though not exclusively emotional, as well as flexible and capable o f 
evolution over a life-span. Furthermore, Layder (2004) depicts the self as the centre 
of awareness but also a bearer o f something o f a spiritual nature (what people refer to 
as “the higher self’). The self is therefore a complex entity, both stable and dynamic. 
Colman describes the self as “the overall process of the organism as a whole” and 
stresses that “the totality o f our being is made up o f the totality of our action in the 
world” (2008:353 and 355 -  italics original). He distinguishes between being a self, 
knowing we are a self and having a self. If  every living being can be said to be a self, 
only creatures capable o f self-reflexivity can develop a sense o f self and then claim 
that they have a self (that is a soul). The sense of self is in Colman’s view the result 
of our knowledge that we are a self. The fact of having a self, however, depends on 
the others fust attributing a self to us in their mind. In other words, according to 
Colman (2008:359), we come to have a self by the recognition others make that we 
are just like them, which leads them to treat us “as beings” like themselves, and vice- 
versa. In that respect, Colman defines the self as partly personal and partly collective. 
Although the self refers to one’s personality and identity, it is commonly associated 
with its more spiritual aspect of “the higher se lf’, which alludes to a transcendent 
state o f realisation. Hubback (1998:283) uses the metaphor o f “layers o f insight” to 
explain how “the personal self is potentially in touch with the healing energy o f the 
greater self.”
The self is a rather ambiguous term but so is its counterpart the ego. The ego usually 
identifies the person as an entity but its unity and permanence are ambiguous (Doron 
and Parot, 1991:462). In everyday life, the self is associated with selfishness (or 
equally with selflessness), whereas in psychology selfishness (i.e. egoism) would 
tend to be concerned with the ego rather than the self. The self, however, is primarily 
involved in self-awareness, self-knowledge, self-realisation and so on. Self-mastery 
or self-control, on the other hand, is really about mastering the ego in so far as it is
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about controlling the expression o f our personality, and not the essence o f our being. 
To avoid such confusion, some use a capital letter (Self) when they refer to the 
“essential being” and a small letter (self) when they refer to ego-like concepts, but 
this is not a convention.
Aïssel (2005:284) lists the meanings attributed to ego and self. He starts with 
explaining that “personality is composed of a multitude o f pieces called the small 
egos (“fe-y petits mof)  whose gathering constitutes the self.” Personality is 
influenced by these small egos that occasionally act in contradiction with one 
another. Importantly, we identify with these pieces and think of us as a whole whilst 
in reality we are fragmented (Chakraborty, 2004:41). In White’s terms, the self is 
split into “interacting subsystems” which have “their own beliefs, goals, plans, and 
strategies” and which induce self-deception (White, 1991:193). Aïssel (2005:285) 
brings our attention to three types of ego: the imaginary ego (“/mo/ imaginaire') who 
fools us into believing we are conscious and free whilst we are in fact disconnected 
from reality; the material ego (“m/o/ matériel") who is active when we act 
automatically, for instance out of habit, without being conscious o f what we are 
doing; since this ego acts “like a machine” he is little concerned with emotions and 
feelings; finally the reactive ego (“ego réactif) only operates with regards to 
emotions and feelings, hence cultivating excessive subjectivity and prejudices 
without the mitigating support o f rational thinking. As it appears, the person caimot 
be complete nor act in a morally appropriate manner if she is dominated by one o f 
the egos. These small egos, however, are complementary. The self is the sum of 
these egos and the “true nature of human being” (Aïssel, 2005:285). According to 
Aïssel (2005:280) the self unwraps from the essence of the being, which is “the 
internal structure the individual possesses at birth and that is quickly covered up by 
the personality”. In that sense, the essence represents who the person truly is, and the 
self is the perfect manifestation of the essence.
Other researchers have attempted to study the moral significance o f the self, although 
they did not necessarily adopt the same definitions nor approaches to capture the self. 
Most research in this field, as was previously noted, focused on moral exemplarity. 
The subjects examined were different, from young adults held as exemplars by their
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organisation’s director (Matsiiba and Walker, 2005), to teachers and community 
members (McAdams et a l, 1997), to actors and witnesses of the Second World War 
(Monroe et al, 1990; Monroe, 2001). The common point of these studies, besides the 
finding that moral values and self-identity were particularly intertwined in moral 
exemplars, is their methodology. All undertook a narrative research on the life o f 
those outstanding individuals and aimed to identify elements constitutive of self- 
identity that made these individuals different from the ‘indifferent lot’. Somehow, the 
conclusions resemble one another but remain sufficiently different to prevent us from 
concluding that we can identify one model whose characteristics would somewhat 
guarantee moral exemplarity. Walker and Hennig’s (2004) questionnaire-based 
studies demonstrated that different people have different understanding of what 
moral exemplarity consists in: it is either regarded as being just, brave or caring. 
Maybe this suggests that one model does not and cannot fit all.
Tappan (1999) and Monroe (2001) appeal to linguistics to analyse the significance of 
the selfs relation to others, especially to suffering others. For instance, Tappan 
(1999:123 -  italics original) argues that: “One finds one’s moral identity, therefore, 
primarily in the ideologically mediated dialogue in which one engages, not in the 
process of reflection on one’s ‘inner’ moral self. And the development of moral 
identity, on this view, entails a process o f ideological becoming whereby one 
selectively assimilates the words, language, and forms o f discourse of others with 
whom one is in dialogue.” The problem with morahty viewed as generated by 
language, under whichever form, is that it suggests the self is not frilly independent 
but rather exists because of, thanks to or through others. The moral aspect of the self 
is taken to be necessarily constructed thiough a “narrative structure” (Crowther, 
2002:437) instead of being derivative and constitutive o f the essence o f beingness. In 
that case, to what extent is the self responsible for her morality? Indeed, if morality is 
socially constructed through a dialogue and embedded in the “universals o f human 
language” (Monroe, 2001:502), is the self entirely responsible for what she holds as 
moral standards? Could not we view the universality of morality as rooted in the 
“shared humanity” o f  various independent selves instead? This is discussed in the 
next part.
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3.3.2. Th e  Se l f  AND O thers
Two main questions are attached to the concept of self as introduced above. The first 
one relates to the unity or wholeness of the self, whilst the second concerns the 
ontology o f the self, in particular whether the self is independent and how the self 
relates to others. We will first turn to the second question and leave the issue of a 
whole self for part 3,3.3. The matter o f the independence of the self -  that is its 
independence from the community, society, others’ expectations, roles and so on -  is 
important because it informs the way the self relates to others. We noticed that 
linguistic-based morality challenged the possibility of a self independent from others. 
It could indeed be argued that the self does not live in a void, and that the community 
participates in shaping the moral frame o f reference the self uses and lives by. We 
also acknowledged earlier that the self can be influenced by social norms and 
develop some predispositions that make her more susceptible to some issues and not 
others (Colby and Damon, 1995:344). Yet we also concluded that this did not call 
into question the independence o f the self nor her moral significance. Relating the 
story of one of their moral exemplars, Virginia Durr, aristocratic Southern white girl 
who joined in the civil rights movement in the United States, Colby and Damon 
(1995:350) underline that: “although Virginia’s emerging new values were not 
entirely self-initiated, they do reflect what we might call an ‘active receptiveness’ to 
social influence of particular sorts.” What this quote suggests is that the self is 
reactive to a moral stimulus which indeed originates from some external locus; yet 
the self possesses the capacity to react to this stimulus, that is to perceive it, 
understand it and act upon it. I f  the self were entirely dependent upon others for her 
moral behaviour, she would not know how to respond in a morally appropriate way 
to a social stimulus. The self might have undergone a ‘social training’ into moral 
behaviour, but this theory would seriously undermine the moral significance of a self 
in so far as the self would be likened to yet another puppet, albeit a smart one, that 
reproduces what she has been taught.
The idea that the self needs others to become fully realised has been advanced for 
example by Hadfield (1964). The argument builds on both narrative and role 
perspectives. It states that “each person is always acting upon others and acted upon
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by others” so that interpersonal relationships are characterised by spirals through 
which one self would react and respond to the ‘stories’ others define for that self, 
until the self endorses the story (i.e. the role) composed by others (Laing, 1969; 
Ruddock, 1969). In brief, “we learn to be whom we are told we are” (Laing, 1969). 
Yet the nature o f morality demands that our moral reactions be not dictated by 
others, but experienced both internally and independently of what others think or 
feel. Rules and nonns o f the moral community must be internalised by the self whose 
autonomy, maturity and quality will determine her reaction. The self might indeed 
need a social community to fully grasp who she is, but she is not obliged to comply 
with whatever the community demands and she might present aspects of morality out 
of any moral community. It ensues that there exists a possibility for a moral self to 
develop outside the referential o f a given, bounded community.
With a view to examining automatism in moral behaviour, Hibben (1895:464) 
already noticed that a person’s morality develops thiough “continual conflict 
between social and individual impulses”. Because major social and moral progress 
often has its origin in a few voices raising against existing conditions, Hibben (1895) 
concluded that the individual self has a dimension o f her own, besides her social 
environment, a viewpoint supported by the very concept of moral exemplarity. He 
thus explains that “the social forces Imve play in the field of personality, modifying 
and influencing character in manifold way; and yet the character is active as well as 
passive, and reacts upon the social forces themselves” (Hibben, 1895:465). This 
argument does not contravene Cohnan’s (2008) or Layder’s (2004) stand on the 
nature of the self as both personal and social, as well as both stable and actively and 
reactively changing. In fact, we do not need others to be a self, but others help us 
grasp a sense o f self and grow in our consciousness of self. Consequently, moral 
conduct must have some value for the self beside the social values attached to life in 
the community, else the self would be diluted in society in the pursuit of altruism, 
Hibben (1895) proposes that the self’s boundaries are determined by the significance 
of an ‘ideal’ upon which moral ideas and actions are reflected. If we relate this 
‘ideal’ with the idea of a shared humanity, as mentioned in Chapter 2, part 2.2, then 
the argument is indeed convincing. The self feels morally concerned with others 
because they all share the same nature. Notwithstanding social norms, the self is
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intrinsically linked to other selves, and the moral imperatives derive from this 
relationship that Chakraborty (2004:35) words as “the Spirit-Self in an individual 
[being] identical with the Spirit-Self o f All”. It is not to suggest however, unlike 
Kant, that this imperative is based on reason alone. It is rather a matter of essence, in 
that the self and other selves are of the same essence in the first place, and moral 
education and social expectations just come on top of this to form our moral 
framework. The primal impetus is located in the essence, not in the social norms.
Frankfurt (1993) argues in that direction. In paiticular, he stresses that the will is 
somehow necessarily self-constrained in order for the person to know what she really 
cares about. The will directs the person among the “various impulses and desires by 
which [s]he is moved” and actually sets her moral boundaries and aspirations 
(Frankfurt, 1993:23). In return, the person is bound to her ideals and aspirations by 
love, so that the commitment to achieve this ideal just imposes itself and provides a 
self-frilfllling rather than constraining framework of action and personal growth 
(Frankfurt, 1993). It is, suggests Frankfiirt, as if we were enlightened by the 
constraints o f our will and the ideals it reflects. This argument is reminiscent o f the 
nature of Assagioli’s will which is, as we said, closely connected to the self. The will 
becomes the privileged connection to the full consciousness and realisation o f the 
self, the perfect essence o f the being.
Having discussed the independence o f the self and the strength o f her will in the 
moral engagement with others, we can now turn to the relation o f the self with 
others, that is with other selves. The self can be genuinely concerned for other selves, 
and we will argue that it even constitutes her nature. To relate and be concerned with 
others, the self ought not to be selfish, that is uniquely centred on herself. We 
explained earlier that such attitude was more characteristic o f the ego (i.e. being 
egoistic) than o f the self given how we defined it. We suggested that the ego tends to 
‘take over’ the personality and impair our understanding o f the world and of 
oiuselves. So should we explain selfishness purely on the basis of a dominating ego? 
Or does the self demonstrate selfish tendencies as well? Terestchenlco (2004) 
addresses this point when he asks which one of egoism and altruism can best 
describe human behaviour and human nature. He rightly points out that there exists
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other modes in between the two extremes o f pure egoism and pure altruism. Pure 
egoism expects every person to seek her own good, and her own good only; on the 
other hand, pure altruism proclaims self-sacrifice for the good of others, and the good 
of others only. In real life, the majority o f people make a preferential choice where 
egoistic concerns will either win over or be discarded by altruistic concerns. 
Terestchenko (2004:318) then argues that contrary to egoism, altruism is a pluralist 
concept which allows for a wider range o f attitudes more or less tainted with self­
concerns. It would be unreasonable to demand a complete ignorance o f one’s own 
needs to be called altruistic, or compassionate according to Piper (1991:745). As 
long as the ends pursued are primarily, if  not only, the good of others, then the fact 
that the person also receives personal gratification o f some sort for her action does 
not discard her altruism. And this, argues Terestchenko (2004), is what best describes 
human behaviour. In other words, the will to be good to others is morally worthy, 
even if at the same time one personally benefits from the action, an argument that 
Adam Smith would not have rejected (Doomen, 2005:114-115).
Altruism, then, originates in some sort of empathetic or sympathetic connection with 
the other (Magai and McFadden, 1995:195). Empathy, sympathy and compassion are 
closely related tenus, which are often used interchangeably to refer to the propensity 
or capability o f one person to relate either cognitively or affectively to another 
person’s emotional state. Magai and McFadden (1995:196) explain that empathy can 
be conceived as “feeling with” whereas sympathy can be assimilated with “feeling 
for”. Compassion (or compassionate love as worded by Sprecher and Febr, 2005) 
from latin compassio, literally ‘suffering with’ (CNRTL, 2008) has a meaning 
similar to empathy. Magai and McFadden (1995) insist on what empathy-sympathy 
is not, for instance a feeling of personal distress (which is egoistic) or a phenomenon 
of projection (which is cognitive rather than affective). Gordon (1995) uses role- 
taking, imagination and simulation to differentiate empathy emotional contagion 
from empathy as behavioural prediction. Consequently, his approach is highly 
cognitive, based on the ability to “transform [oneself] mentally into a given 
character” (Gordon, 1995:736). Morally, this practice can prove hazardous for the 
self, whenever “pretense and reality get blurred in the counteridentical pretending, or 
role taking” (Gordon, 1995:739). Magai and McFadden (1995:198) also insist that
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empathy must be handled cai*eful and thoughtfully because it involves a range of 
feelings that can be destructive (e.g. sadness or violence) besides the fact that the self 
might lose its sense of individuality (Piper, 1991:734). To prevent this, Deigh 
(1995:759) distinguishes emotional identification from empathy as follow: “Both 
involve one’s taking another’s perspective and imaginatively participating in this 
other person’s life. But it is distinctive o f empathy that it entails imaginative 
participation in the other’s life without forgetting oneself. The same is not true of 
emotional identification.”
Imagination indeed occupies a central place in Piper’s (1991) and Werhane’s (1999) 
models of moral interaction with others. Piper (1991:726) talks about “modal 
imagmation” as “our capacity to envision what is possible in addition to what is 
actual”; Werhane (1999:93) defines moral imagmation more comprehensively: “the 
ability in particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities not merely 
determined by that circumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or 
merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns.” When applied to 
managerial decision-making, “developing moral imagination involves heightened 
awareness o f contextual moral dilemmas and their mental models, the ability to 
envision and evaluate new mental models that create new possibilities, and the 
capability to reframe the dilemma and create new solutions in ways that are novel, 
economically viable, and morally justifiable.” (Werhane, 1999:93). Yet the moral 
and social ‘quality’ of my imagination is necessarily rooted in my own experience as 
a person. As such, my interpretation, basis for my empathetic participation in the 
other’s life, is necessarily limited in scope. However, if we base the imaginative 
projection on the idea o f a shared humanity, then it becomes more significant. My 
interpretation might be relevant to the other because we share the same essence at 
some level, hence I am truly able to relate to the other and to feel with and feel for 
because I and the other are somehow the same. The “psychological boundaries” o f 
myself and the other (Piper, 1991:734) are not trespassed because I remain conscious 
of the physical and psychological difference between me and the other; but at a more 
existential level, I am conscious that the difference blurs into a shared essence, in 
such a way that by hurting others I hurt myself (Zsolnai, 2004:4). In that respect, 
some religious teachings can be apprehended on another level. For example, ‘Love
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thy neighbour like thyself appears more obvious in so far as the other and I are 
‘one’. Equally, the Golden Rule ‘Do not do unto others that which you would not 
wish be done unto thee’ (whose formulation varies according to the tradition but 
whose meaning remains similar -  see Dawes et a l, 2005:86) reflects a ‘natural’ 
moral expectation based on a shared hmnanity, a shared essence between others and 
I.
3.3,3, Wh o le  Se l f  AND Com partm entalised  Se l f
We noted how the ego can actually be parted into small egos. We can wonder 
whether the self is equally parted or can be parted. A central concept in spirituality- 
based research, the self is often associated with a sense o f wholeness (Guillory, 
2001; Ashar and Lane-Maher, 2004; Forman, 2004). Indeed, the spiritual quest 
involves the connection to the inner self, locus of the spiritual in human beings, 
which incidentally brings about a growing perception of an inter-relatedness of 
everything and a striving towards wholeness (Guillory, 2001; Zsolnai, 2004). In fact, 
although we are firagmented by the small egos, the purpose seems to be the coming- 
to-consciousness of our fragmented nature and the working towards the state o f a 
whole self, given that the self contains the totality of our being. Expression o f the 
self is the necessary path to follow in so far as repression of the self by holding on to 
the ego (or the egos) can lead, according to King and Nicol (1999), to extreme or 
adverse emotional states tlirough which individuals project onto others their own 
repressed personality. To alleviate the ego-self tension, individuals should then 
acknowledge and confront particular aspects of their personality involved in the 
conflict through an effort o f consciousness. Terestchenko (2008:15) miplies a 
similar idea that salutes the moral significance o f consciousness and knowledge of 
self ^ 'présence à sof’):
“In brief, uncomiectedness to the self {absence à soi) is peculiar to the 
individual who contents himself with doing wliat he is asked to do, both 
passively and with zeal, and who sets aside the disapproval of his moral 
conscience by refusing to bear the responsibility of his actions. He claims 
to be just an agent within a system, and loses what constitutes his 
distinctive identity. The subject who resists or rebels, the dissident, on 
the contrary acts from a connectedness to the self {présence à soi) that
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makes him act with deep loyalty to his feelings, his beliefs, his ethical 
principles and, even more important, that makes him always conscious of 
the humanity o f the other.”
Being unconnected to the self implies that one is dominated by his ego, under 
whichever form. The person is somehow compartmentalised, in so far as the self is 
bracketed off whilst other aspects o f the personality take over. Compartmentalisation 
is probably the greatest threat to the realisation o f a whole self (Gotsis and Koitezi, 
2008). The compartmentalised person may, consciously or not, cut off the moral 
values, aspirations, feelings and emotions that are deemed inappropriate and 
irrelevant to a certain context (e.g. the workplace). However compartmentalisation 
can also liappen by simply distancing oneself from values, aspirations and feelings 
one holds but does not wish to or cannot confront. Through this process, individuals 
actually become unconscious o f parts of themselves and lose sight o f  their self as a 
unified whole. Ultimately, people can develop psycho-pathologies (Cottingham, 
2005) although more generally the symptoms take the form o f the general unrest of 
organisational members that can be observed in Western economies (Gotsis and 
Kortezi, 2008).
A few studies have examined the relevance o f spirituality in the workplace and they 
tend to suggest that allowing the whole person at work, that is a person who 
expresses emotions, feelings, aspirations alongside rationality, fosters greater 
intuition and creativity, and reinforces trust, honesty and organisational commitment 
(Guillory, 2001; Krishnakumar and Neck, 2002). In parallel, Mitroff and Denton’s 
(1999) study on spirituality in organisations highlights how managers do not wish to 
part themselves according to the demands o f the context, or even pretend that it is 
possible to do so. Yet compartmentalisation is often perceived as a necessity for 
success, especially business success (Lovell, 2002). Asliai' and Lane-Maher (2004) 
argue that this is symptomatic o f the old business paradigm, as opposed to a more 
integrative, hohstic model we would be developing now, although we probably are at 
the early stages. Figler and Hanlon (2008:619) also denounce this “psychological 
fragmentation” resulting from an excessive attention to rationality and logic, and the 
subsequent demise o f subjectivity and the unconscious sources that inform human 
relationships. According to these authors, acknowledging and accepting that the
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unconscious has a strong influence on oiur behaviour paves the way for more fruitful, 
psychologically smarter and more mature work relationships (Figler and Hanlon, 
2008). Psychosynthesis, on the other hand, focuses on the individual as a whole. It 
purports to help the individual to become “a meaningfully harmonized whole around 
a center: the self’ rather than to remain “a disordered collection of clashing 
tendencies” (Ferrucci, 2004:46). Wliilst role-playing, excessive rationalisation, 
extreme empathy, compartmentalisation or self-delusion widen the gap between our 
perception of who we are and our self, the ability to bring one’s consciousness back 
to one’s being (physical, emotional, mental, spiritual) constitutes an essential step 
towards self-completion in a holistic perspective. As Fermci (2004) explains, by 
identifying our subpersonalities (one might say the small egos, “/ea petits m ot )  we 
allow the self to be and express at her frill potential, that is to hve our full potential 
(FeiTUCci, 2004).
So far, we have identified the self as an essential element in the morality o f a person, 
and we have reviewed various psychological perspectives to assess whether they 
could help define and apprehend the place o f the self within the moral deliberations 
of individuals. We have concluded that the self impregnates the rational and 
emotional space for moral deliberation and moral behaviour; that the self has a 
dhnension o f her own, and contributes more fully to the community when she has 
claimed her independence fr om it; that the apprehension of the self is somewhat 
purposeful; and that the self is about unity as opposed to the fragmentation and 
compartmentalisation we usually live by, which is, besides, morally impairing. 
However, none o f the perspectives reviewed provided a framework encompassing 
these characteristics o f the self and articulating them in a clear, practical way so as to 
allow the exploration of managers’ experience o f morality. The next part argues that 
Carl Jung’s psychology offers such framework.
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3.4 . Se l f -k n o w l e d g e  A s M o r a l  K n o w l e d g e : A  J u n g ia n  
F r a m e w o r k
Howard and Welbourn (2004:49) underline that psychologists in general, and Carl 
Jung in particular, help bring a brand new perspective on the self, on the significance 
of the conscious and the unconscious, and on the spiritual dimension o f the self and 
self-discovery. This pait introduces Carl Jung’s psychology and argues that his 
conceptualisation o f the psyche around the ego-consciousness on the one hand and 
the archetypal self on the other hand, provides a clear, useful and practical 
framework to explore the morality o f managers. In particular, the process of 
individuation symbolising the conscious realisation o f self can be likened to an inner 
expression of the pursuit o f the virtuous life achieved in the realisation o f one’s telos. 
Developing self-knowledge (in the sense o f a knowledge o f the spiritual self) 
enlightens phronesis, thus self-knowledge becomes a vehicle for moral knowledge. 
Equally, the individuation process becomes both morally tainted and a moral 
achievement in itself.
3.4.1, J ung  AND HIS PSYCHOLOGY
3.4 .1 .1 . Carl  Gu st a v  Ju n g
Swiss-bom Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) is most famous for laying the foundations 
of analytical psychology and describing the psychological types “extravert” and 
“introvert”. His theories are very much linked to and inspired by his own experiences 
and his understanding o f himself. At first a disciple o f Freud, he later parted and 
went to explore many different disciplines. In particular, he showed a great interest in 
esoteric phenomena and experiences, which sets his psychology apart from others. 
His approach is very much spiritual, although he endeavoured his whole life to 
demonstrate how his psychology was ‘scientific’ and empirically-based (Cottingham, 
2005). After his doctoral dissertation that examined cases of spiritualism, he explored 
topics as varied as mythology and symbolism, alchemy, Eastern spirituality, African 
and Indian traditions and practices, the I-Ching and Teilhard de Chardin’s works 
(Jung, 1995; Crowley, 1998; Robinson, 2005). All o f these infonned his thoughts
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and helped shape what has become a complex yet complete view of oiir relation to 
the world and to ourselves. The historical events Üiat marked Europe in the fust half 
of the twentieth century certainly affected Jung’s thoughts as well, although he 
claimed that his insights did not address the social but the individual level. Wliilst in 
Switzerland, Jung witnessed two world wars, the rise and excesses of fascism and 
communism, and the beginning of the Cold war. His defiance against ‘the masses’ 
and ‘mass movements’ is very likely correlated to what he experienced in his hfe- 
time (Jung, 2002).
Jung’s analytical psychology is still not considered mainstream, yet his influence has 
spread beyond the field o f psychology. Jung is often considered a man ahead o f his 
time, and his writing style and his positions have brought him undeterred supporters 
as well as rash critics (Fauchant, 2000:42-43). Hence Jung had the feeling he was 
misunderstood and relentlessly explained he was neither a Gnostic nor an other­
worldly mystic (Robinson, 2005). He was not a saint (an image his most fervent 
disciples tend to put forward) but neither was he a self-obsessed, obsequious thinker 
(as would argue his most fervent detractors). Jung demonstrated a strong sense o f 
vocation, and he dedicated his life to finding out what he felt was there but could not 
be grasped immediately. His psychology possesses an inherent and distinctive moral 
flavour. What shall be argued in the following paragraphs is that a Jungian 
framework provides a comprehensive, practical and inspiiational basis to understand 
and develop practical wisdom that integrates the various elements reviewed earlier in 
this chapter.
3.4.1.2. Elem ents of the P syche
It would be neither possible nor relevant to provide a full account of Jung’s 
psychology. Therefore, we will only introduce the central elements that are necessary 
to miderstand how Jungian psychology relates to moral knowledge and morality in 
general. According to Jung, the psyche is central to our life and our perception of the 
external world. As he emphatically explains: “The psyche is the greatest of all 
cosmic wonders and the sine qua non of the world as an object.” (Jung, 2001b:93). 
Jung believed the psyche is composed of two parts, the conscious and the
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unconscious. The conscious part is the domain of the ego (or ego -consciousness). 
The unconscious part is twofold: the personal unconscious, composed o f our hidden 
memories or ideas we rejected and that remain on the edge of consciousness hut 
rarely cross over; and the collective unconscious, which contains the footprint o f 
humanity and emerges in the form, amongst other things, of archetypes. The study o f 
the personal unconscious would allow the identification o f complexes that are 
nothing but personal representation o f archetypes. An archetype is an image, “an 
unlearned tendency to experience things in a certain way” (Boeree, 2006) or “a 
ftmdamental and universal matrix” (Sédillot, 2005:336). It is worth noticing that the 
existence o f a collective unconscious constitutes one of the main disagreements 
between Jung and Freud, in that Freud did not acknowledge the existence o f a 
collective unconscious, or at least perceived it merely as a dump for undesirable 
emotions (Robinson, 2005).
Stevens (2001:49) schematises Jung’s model of the psyche as shown in Figure 1. 
Another way to represent it is proposed in Figure 2, which reverses the schema. In 
brief, if  what is ‘inside’ is our consciousness and wliat is ‘outside’ is the collective 
unconscious, then Figure 1 represents the psyche from inside-out whereas Figure 2 
represents the psyche viewed from outside-in. However, our psyche contains both the 
very personal ego-consciousness and the collective archetypes, and both participate 
in defining who we are. Whereas Figure 1 illustrates how self-knowledge requires to 
take on an inner journey towards the self. Figure 2 depicts how small consciousness 
is as compar ed with the wide and ovei*whelming collective unconscious.
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Figure 1. Jung’s model of the psyche
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Source: Stevens, 2001
Figure 2. Layers of the psyche
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The Persona
Jung (2005:464) had noticed that people tend to display “traces of character- 
splitting” through which they adopt a particular attitude to suit a particular milieu. 
What we earlier referred to as compartmentalisation is expressed by Jung as 
character-splitting whose strength varies depending on the degree to which the ego 
identifies with “the attitude of the moment”. Jung (2005:465) argues that the split 
person is not an individual but rather is collective, “the plaything of circumstance 
and general expectations.” The mask we present to suit the societal expectations is 
called the persona. The persona is who we pretend to be and how we want to be 
perceived by others, just like a “false se lf’ (Hill, 2000:211) or an outer personality as 
opposed to the anima/animus which represents our inner personality (Jung, 
2005:467). Identification with the persona actually constrains the expression o f our 
true individuality and personality, therefore the ego must disengage fi-om the persona 
to allow for individuation (Hill, 2000:211). The persona is by essence collective, the 
personal interpretation o f collective expectations, hence alien to the expression o f 
one’s individuality.
The Ego
Jung (2005:425) defines the ego as “a complex o f ideas which constitutes the centre 
of [the] field o f consciousness and appears to possess a high degree o f continuity and
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identity. [...It is] the subject o f [one’s] consciousness.” The ego is actually a 
complex (i.e. an associated group of ideas -  Hill, 2000:38) that emerges during 
childhood and is key to the development of one’s personality especially since one 
needs first to familiarise with the collective rules before one differentiates from them 
(Jung, 2005:449), It is the ego that gives us (and helps us maintain) the sense o f who 
we are tlirough our life changes and experiences. Chakraborty (2004:34) defines the 
ego as “a sort of initial nucleus around which a distinctive individual personality can 
form.” Sédillot (2005:113) stresses that ego-consciousness is necessary for our 
mental health and the manifestation o f our will. It is also the ego who can connect to 
the unconscious and little by little uncover what remains to be known about 
ourselves. The ego is thus essential, yet only secondary to the self who is the subject 
of the whole psyche (Jung, 2005) and actually prefigures the ego (Jung, 1973:259).
The Self
The self is “the archetype of wholeness and the regulating center of the psyche; a 
transpersonal power that transcends the ego.” (Sharp, 1991). Jung (2005:460) 
explains that “the self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It 
expresses the unity o f the personality as a whole.” The self is a postulate in that it is 
“potentially empirical” but consists in “the e?qperienceable and the inexperienceable 
(or the not yet experienced)”, that is conscious elements as well as unconscious 
(therefore unknown) factors (Jung, 2005:460). The self is also transcendental in so 
far as it unites opposites or dualities and “represents the integration o f all the 
disparate parts of ourselves [...so that] in accepting all the different aspects that 
make up our personality, we become who and what we really are” (Crowley, 
1998:38). Crowley (1998:37) further notices that Jung derived his concept of self 
from the Hindu idea of''"Atman ~ the divine Self within”; therefore the self may be 
likened to a divine presence in us. Self-knowledge, consequently, consists in 
“widening and deepening” our awareness to uncover the “mysterious and divine” 
aspect of the self so that “the self can be understood as both the source and goal o f 
human life” (Brooke, 1991:18). Wholeness is attained when self and ego (that is 
consciousness and unconscious) work together in harmony (Sharp, 1991). The self 
should not ‘assimilate’ the ego, just like the ego should not ‘assimilate’ the self, for 
both situations would lead to an inflated ego and a state o f serious psychic imbalance
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(Jung, 1978a:24“25). Rather, self and ego aie complementary, reflecting one another 
in some way. Colman (2008:356) summarises this clearly: “It is not the ego that is 
the agent of our lives but the self -  the agency o f free will is initiated by something 
that is beyond our conscious awareness, albeit our conscious awareness is a crucial 
element in the process.”
Individuation
The process tlirough which we become closer to our self, uncovering little by little 
pieces o f  our unconscious and gaining greater knowledge of the self is called 
‘individuation’. Sharp (1991) defines it as: “[...] a process informed by the 
archetypal ideal of wholeness, which in turn depends on a vital relationship between 
ego and unconscious. [...] Individuation involves an increasing awareness of one’s 
unique psychological reality, including personal strengths and limitatiomi, and at the 
same time a deeper appreciation o f humanity in general.” The process o f 
individuation is key to personal development; yet to become distinct one must have 
grown up out o f the collective. Jung (2005:449) insists that: “Under no circumstances 
can individuation be the sole aim o f psychological education. Before it can be taken 
as a goal, the educational aim o f adaptation to the necessary minimum of collective 
norms must first be attained. I f  a plant is to unfold its specific nature to the full, it 
must first be able to grow in the soil in which it is planted.” Thus individuation is 
clearly different firom individualism, in that there exists in the former a moral 
dimension and a respect for the community, even when the individual has drifted 
apart from it (Sharp, 1991). In Jung’s terms (2005:449): “ Individuation, therefore, 
leads to a natural esteem for the collective nonn, but if the orientation is exclusively 
collective the norm becomes increasingly superfluous and morality goes to pieces. 
The more a man’s life is shaped by the collective norms, the greater is his individual 
immorahty.” This would be so because the individual somehow has not confr onted 
his own moral responsibility but relies on and hides behind the collective instead. 
Von Franz (1968:169-170) also insists that individuation requires a “coming-to- 
terms” with one’s individuality which may be a great hardship and necessitates the 
moral courage to see it as it is, and to see oneself as one is:
76
“The actual processes of individuation -  the conscious coming-to-terms 
with one’s own inner center (psychic nucleus) or Self -  generally begins 
with a wounding o f the personality and the suffering that accompanies it. 
This initial shock amomits to a sort of ‘call’, although it is not often 
recognized as such. On the contrary, the ego feels hampered in its will or 
its desire and usually projects the obstruction onto something external. 
That is, the ego accuses God or the economic situation or the boss or the 
marriage partner o f being responsible for whatever is obstructing it. Or 
perhaps everything seems outwardly all right, but beneath the surface a 
person is suffering from a deadly boredom that makes everything seem 
meaningless and empty. [...] Thus it seems as if the initial encounter with 
the Self casts a dark shadow ahead o f time, or as if the ‘inner friend ’ 
comes at fiist like a trapper to catch the helplessly struggling ego in his 
snare.”
3.4.2. MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF JUNG*S PSYCHOLOGY
Robinson (2005:91 -  italics original) summarises how morality is inherently a matter 
of the Jungian psyche: “For Jung, the psyche, as the locus of conscious agency, was 
the necessary and essential factor for actualizing ethical goods. The entirety o f the 
moral life -  dependent as it is on a sense o f freedom and responsibility, capacities for 
creative and critical reflection, and sustained commitment of the self -  is simply 
inconceivable apart from the human psyche. Yet the psyche is itself the locus for the 
realization o f the individual personality -  an ethical good, for Jung, second to none. 
Psyche is thus both means and, often, the end for the realization of moral goods.” 
Hence most of his concepts and propositions are not only psychological but also 
morally engaged, as we will see below.
3.4 .2 .1 . Principles of Psychic  En er g y
Jung, as we said, endeavoured to approach psychology as a science and to base his 
conclusions on empirical observations. He borrowed the concept o f ‘energy’ to 
physics in an attempt to word his view o f libido (that is psychic energy) in 
‘scientific’ terms. Tlie psyche construed as energy implies a finality instead of a 
relation of causality, which means that the psychic activity tends towards a purpose 
which is not necessarily known (Sharp, 1991). Two interrelated principles play a role 
in the dynamics of the psyche: the principle of opposites (or “enantiodromia”) and 
the principle of equivalence. The principle o f opposites implies that every thought.
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every wish comes along with its opposite; for instance, whenever we have a ‘good’ 
thought, its opposite ‘bad’ thought has also crossed our mind even if so slightly. The 
psychic energy thus originates from the opposition of these two thoughts. Hill 
(2000:174) explains that “opposites are the extreme states in any event and form a 
potential. The psyche is even built upon processes where energy springs from the 
equilibration o f opposites.” The principle o f equivalence is closely related to the 
concept of opposition. Wliilst the opposition generates psychic energy, the principle 
of equivalence asserts that both sides receive the same amount o f energy (Boeree, 
2006). In our example, this would mean that the ‘bad’ thought receives as much 
energy as the ‘good’ thought.
In fact, the whole psychology of Jung is based on opposition (which is not 
necessarily conflicting but rather conceptual), with the conscious opposed to the 
unconscious, the ego to the self, and so on. Yet, given the law of entropy, everything 
tends towards a state of balance, thus the psyche necessitates a system o f 
compensation which Jung (2005:419) conceived as a “frinctional adjustment in 
general, an inherent self-regulation of the psychic apparatus.” He specifies his 
viewpoint:
“In this sense, I regaid the activity o f the unconscious as a balancing of 
the one-sidedness of the general attitude produced by the function of 
consciousness. [...] The activity o f consciousness is selective. Selection 
demands direction. But direction requires the exclusion o f eveiything 
irrelevant. This is bound to make the conscious orientation one-sided.
The contents that are excluded and inhibited by the chosen direction sink 
into the unconscious, where they form a counterweight to the conscious 
orientation. The strengthening o f this counterposition keeps pace with the 
increase of conscious one-sidedness until finally a noticeable tension is 
produced. [...] The more one-sided the conscious attitude, the more 
antagonistic are the contents arising from the unconscious, so that we 
may speak of a real opposition between the two.” (Jung, 2005:419 -  
italics original).
Hill (2000:174) points out that when the conscious mind is too one-sided, it becomes 
rigid by refusing to acknowledge the compensatory opposite unconscious thought, 
which increases the tension and a feeling o f uneasiness within the individual. In 
practice, this has a serious moral implication. For example, let’s say we have chosen
78
to tell the truth to a colleague about a work issue. According to the principle o f 
opposites, when the time came for us to decide on a course of action, we thought 
about telling the truth but at the same time the possibility to lie crossed our mind, 
although we rejected it straight away in our unconscious. Nevertheless, the thought 
of lying to our colleague received as much psychic energy as the thought of telling 
the truth, and the fact that we rejected this option did not suppress the energy it 
received in the fust place. It is thus imperative to deal with this energy, by 
acknowledging we had that thought and allowing it to become conscious and 
contribute through its energy to the overall development of the psyche. If  we fail to 
do so, then the energy is captured by the relevant archetype under the form o f a 
complex, and it remains unassimilated and potentially blocks our development and 
well-being. As Boeree (2006) explains: “if you pretend that you never had that evil 
wish, if you deny and suppress it, the energy will go towards the development of a 
complex. A complex is a pattern of suppressed thoughts and feelings that cluster -  
constellate -  around a theme provided by some archetype [...].That complex will 
begin to develop a life o f its own, and it will haunt you.” During his years o f clinical 
practice, Jung met a variety o f neurotic patients whose stories illustrated how an act, 
a thought, a desire repressed into the unconscious nevertheless had strong 
repercussions on the person’s life, sanity and well-being: “In my practice I was 
constantly impressed by the way the human psyche reacts to a crime committed 
unconsciously. [...] I f  someone has committed a crime and is caught, he suffers 
judicial punishment. If he has done it secretly, without moral consciousness of it, and 
remains undiscovered, the punishment can nevertheless be visited upon him” (Jung, 
1995:143-144).
3.4.2.2. A r c h e ty p e s  a n d  PRQ.TEcnoN
Many archetypes populate the collective imconscious including the shadow, the 
anima/animus, and so on. However the shadow is the archetype most of us confront 
first. The shadow can be likened to our dark side, which we should acknowledge and 
confront rather than reject or ignore. Jung (1973:76) explains clearly the importance 
of such recognition: “Unfortunately there can be no doubt that man is, on the whole, 
less good than he imagines himself or wants to be. Everyone carries a shadow, and
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the less it is embodied in the individuaFs conscious life, the blacker and denser it is. 
I f  an inferiority is conscious, one always has a chance to correct it. Furthermore, it is 
constantly in contact with other interests, so that it is continually subjected to 
modifications. But if it is repressed and isolated from consciousness, it never gets 
corrected, and is hable to burst suddenly in a moment of unawareness. At all events, 
it forms an unconscious snag, thwarting our most well-meant intentions.” King and 
Nicol (1999:137) concur that we should embrace “the opportunity to confront and 
eventually find a healthy way to integrate the dark side o f our personalities mto our 
lives. Through the integration o f one’s shadow, an individual develops an awareness 
of his/lier connection to other human beings, providing a basis for communication, 
understanding and respect.” Recognition o f the shadow means acknowledging our 
imperfection; it also authorises a more conscious relationship with others to develop 
(Jung, 2002:73).
The shadow is not bad in itself since our instincts, insights and impulses also 
originate from it. In fret, it appears dark in contrast with the bright image we project 
of ourselves in the persona, so that “shadow and persona stand in a compensatory 
relationship” (Sharp, 1991). If persona and ego become assimilated, then the shadow 
becomes the compensation of the conscious ego itself. Again, the more one-sided the 
conscious ego, the greater the shadow pei' the principle o f equivalence and 
compensation (Hill, 2000:234). The persona/ego thus inhibits the coming-to- 
consciousness o f the shadow, which in itself is a moral task. Jung (1978a:8) makes 
this point explicit: “The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego- 
personality, for no one can become conscious o f  the shadow without considerable 
moral effort. To become conscious o f it involves recognizing the dark aspects o f the 
personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind o f self- 
knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable resistance.” 
Recognising the shadow is thus a moral action that requires courage, but it is also the 
first and necessary step towards self-knowledge and greater moral knowledge and 
moral strength.
If we fail to acknowledge om' shadow, however, the energy is absorbed by the 
shadow nevertheless and nourishes our hidden violence, our primitive animal nature
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inherited from and carried within the collective unconscious. Jung (2002:68) stresses 
that: “None of us stands outside humanity’s black collective shadow. Wliether the 
crime lies many generations back or happens today, it remains the symptom of a 
disposition that is always and everywhere present — and one would therefore do well 
to possess some ‘imagination in evil’ for only the fool can permanently neglect the 
conditions o f his own nature. In fact, this negligence is the best means of making him 
an instrument o f evil.” That ignoring our dark side can make us “an instrument o f 
evil” is a consequence o f the phenomenon o f projection. I f  we neglect to 
acknowledge the potential for evil within us, we are likely to project that evil onto 
other people. Projection is “an automatic process whereby contents o f one’s own 
unconscious are perceived to be in others” (Sharp, 1991). It is subjective in that the 
subject projects onto the object (be it a material object or a person) his own 
unconscious features (Sédillot, 2005:345). Yet it is not a conscious process; 
projections happen but we do not consciously make them. They nevertheless play an 
important role in both facilitating and withdrawing from social relationships.
We can illustrate the phenomenon o f projection as follow: Mr A is a very 
conscientious person, very meticulous in his work. He will consciously work towards 
reinforcing his conscientiousness and presenting a persona that corresponds to his 
desire to be perceived as conscientious and meticulous. He might very well believe 
that he is genuinely conscientious, at least undoubtedly more conscientious than Mr 
B, his colleague whom he would qualify as a very messy and undisciplined person. 
In fact, Mr B’s messiness usually makes Mr A very angry at his colleague. But what 
Mr A may realise if he takes a step back from his emotions (that is the anger he feels 
against Mr B and the pride he feels at being very conscientious in comparison) is that 
his anger is the result o f the projection o f his own messy shadow onto his colleague. 
Mr A believes he is genuinely conscientious and meticulous but his overt 
conscientiousness is compensated by a very strong indiscipline and messiness that 
pertains to his shadow. Yet, because Mr A is not aware o f this aspect o f himself -  
because he is not conscious o f it or because he refuses to acknowledge it -  the energy 
it received every time Mr A proudly declares himself ‘the most conscientious person 
in the department’ finds its expression in the projection of this unacknowledged part 
of him onto his colleague Mr B. Once Mr A becomes conscious o f that, he might
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very well discover that Mr B is no less conscientious than he is, or maybe Mr B is 
not as meticulous as he is but Mr A would not feel so angry at him because the 
projection would have ceased. Becoming conscious o f a projection helps us 
‘regulate’ our relationships with others in a saner way, at least in a more honest way 
from our point of view. And this, in actual fact, morally empowers us. We 
traditionally fear our shadow, “our own evil” so that often the emotion or the image 
we project onto others gains even more control when it comes back to us, as if the 
tension and the threat escalated and eventually reduced our “capacity to deal with 
evil” (Jung, 2002:68). Jung (1978a: 10 -  italics original) highlights how much being 
trapped in projections is a difficult experience which requires a formidable effort of 
consciousness to be overcome:
“It is often tragic to see how blatantly a man bungles his own life and the 
lives o f others yet remains totally incapable o f seeing how much the 
whole tragedy originates in himself, and how he continually feeds it and 
keeps it going. Not consciously, of course -  for consciously he is 
engaged in bewailing and cursing a faithless world that recedes fiirther 
and fiirther into the distance. Rather, it is an unconscious factor which 
spins the illusions that veil his world. And what is being spun is a 
cocoon, which in the end will completely envelop him.”
3.4.2.3. Conscience
Jung articulated his moral vision around the concept of conscience. Conscience is 
viewed as “a knowledge of, or certainty about, the emotional value o f the ideas we 
have concerning the motives o f our actions. According to this definition, conscience 
is a complex phenomenon consisting on the one hand in an elementary act of the 
will, or in an impulse to act for which no conscious reason can be given, and on the 
other hand in a judgment grounded on rational feeling.” (Jung, 1978b:437). Robinson 
(2005:19) explains that: “Jung recognized three aspects of, or ways of seeing 
conscience: as an inner agency outside o f the ego’s sphere, as an intrapsychic 
dialectic between the ego and this unconscious agency, and as the form of knowledge 
that results from this dialogue.” Conscience as an imier agency is similar to a 
“numinous archetype” that puts moral demands on individuals in spite o f them 
(Robinson, 2005:18). Jung (1978b:445) affirms that: “Conscience -  no matter on 
what it is based -  commands the individual to obey his inner voice even at the risk of
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going astray. We can refuse to obey this command by an appeal to the moral code 
and the moral views on which it is founded, though with an uncomfortable feeling of 
having been disloyal.” This unconscious agency (the “vox Dei”) brings forward its 
moral ‘judgments’ to the ego (the centre o f consciousness) and engages in a dialogue 
with it in order to determine a final moral judgment, which constitutes the moral 
knowledge we work with (Jung, 1978b).
Individuals are influenced by the moral codes en vigueur in the community in which 
they have grown up and live. But the content of the moral codes is assumed to have 
emerged throughout time from an initial and fundamental “moral reaction” that arises 
from the unconscious and constitutes “a universal factor of the human psyche” 
(Robinson, 2005:20). Conscience is anterior to the moral codes, and if in general we 
feel happy to abide by the moral codes, it is because they partly reflect the 
conscience, the “inner voice” in every individual. Instances when we experiment a 
conflict between what dictates our conscience and what customary moral or social 
codes claim we should do, are evidence that codes are not essentially formative o f 
our moral values. When this happens -  that is when we feel uncomfortable with what 
the moral code we usually abide to prescribes -  we experience a “conflict o f duty” 
(Jung, 1978b:454). For this reason, Jung distinguishes between “moral conscience” 
and “ethical conscience”. Whereas the fonner is concerned with conformity to the 
social norms (the “mores”), the latter emerges when the individual is experiencing a 
conflict o f duty and involves consciousness of the inner voice.
As we said, conflicts of duty refer to situations where, after rational examination of 
moral reactions, the individual still has doubts regarding which course of action to 
take because both reactions seem acceptable, and invocation of the moral code does 
not provide any help in deciding which way to go. Because the “mores” are o f little 
assistance, “the deciding factor appears to be something else: it proceeds not from 
the traditional moral code but from the unconscious foundation o f the personality” 
which will eventually lead to “a creative solution [...] which is produced by the 
constellated archetype and possesses that compelling authority not unjustly 
characterized as the voice o f God. The nature of the solution is in accord with the 
deepest foundations of the personality as well as with its wholeness; it embraces
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conscious and unconscious and therefore transcends the ego.” (Jung, 1978b;454- 
455). In other words, whereas moral conscience is about conformity to moral codes, 
ethical conscience is concerned with establishing a dialogue between the 
unconscious and the conscious ego, in order to produce a “creative (moral) solution” 
that will be in accordance with the personality and the self of the individual. 
Developing the ability to hsten and trust that inner voice is thus essential for moral 
practice, even more so that it would enhance one’s practical wisdom A schematic 
representation o f the structure of conscience is proposed in Figure 3 below. Ethical 
conscience is the dialogue between the archetypal inner agency located in the 
collective unconscious, whilst moral conscience represents the reliance on moral 
codes endorsed by. the community though they ultimately consist in a formalisation 
of an initial moral impulse originating from the archetypal imier agency. Our 
conscious moral judgments, especially in case of dilemma, result from the ego’s 
assimilation of the dictates of the inner agency thi ough ethical conscience and the 
demands of the moral codes.
Figure 3. The structure of Conscience
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Ethical conscience resembles the moral imagination proposed by Werhane (1999) 
and the modal imagination o f Piper (1991) in that morality appeals to some 
creativity, a ‘third way’ solution that broadens the choices. However, ethical
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conscience avoids the necessary limitation o f personal imagination (discussed in part 
3,3.2) since it is not rooted in the personal but rather the archetypal level. Located in 
the collective unconscious, the inner agency is accessible to all and the same to all. 
Hence we potentially have the same morality, though our actual morality will depend 
on our degree of consciousness and self-knowledge. We pointed out that unless there 
existed a shared humanity amongst individuals that would give meaning to subjective 
interpretations, moral imagination was seriously limited as a tool for moral practice. 
Ethical conscience does not require this pre-condition since it itself reflects a shared 
essence, the collective unconscious. To obey ethical conscience is to be connected to 
our collective heritage, hence to other human beings. Similarly, the impulse one feels 
towards obeying ethical conscience is at the source o f our striving for the ideal o f 
being ourselves (Knobe, 2005), and it may also explain the nature o f the actions of 
moral exemplars (Colby and Damon, 1993 and 1995).
Importantly, though, conscience is dual in nature. We are all endowed with a right 
and a wrong (or false) conscience, the angel and the devil who more often than not 
have an equal power of influence (Jung, 1978b;447). Consequently, “the 
ambivalence of conscience radically complexifies the task of discernment and raises 
basic questions about the meaningfulness -  the very intelligibility -  of the concept of 
conscience.” (Robinson, 2005:24), Strength of character, faith and consciousness 
become determining factors in our ability to make moral decisions. Jung (1978b:442) 
explains: “Were it not for this paradox the question o f conscience would present no 
problem; we could then rely wholly on its decisions so far as morality is concerned. 
But since there is great and justified uncertainty in this regard, it needs unusual 
courage or -  what mounts to the same thing -  unshakable faith for a person simply to 
follow the dictates o f his own conscience.” Self-knowledge tlirough awareness of the 
ego’s tricks and conscious integration of the contents of our shadow participate in 
equipping us with such courage to follow the right call o f our conscience. Achieving 
wholeness is a moral endeavour, as Cottingham remarks (2005:76):
“The psychoanalytic project, correctly construed, is a deeply moral 
project, since it involves nothing less than a radical transformation o f the 
self, a kind o f re-birthing or re-education process, where the harsh 
imperatives o f the superego on one side, and the raw urgency o f our
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instinctual impulses on the other, are systematically scrutinized, and 
brought together into an mtegrated whole where they lose then 
threatening and destructive character.”
3.4,3. INDIVIDUATION AS MORAL A ctio n
Individuation is the overall process o f  coming to terms with one’s self, and becoming 
a true individual. It is commonly held as a life enlightening purpose not only for 
oneself but for others too, since individuated people have a more acute apprehension 
of the common good (Hart and Brady, 2005). This is again very clearly stated by 
Jung (2002:76): “anyone who has insight into his own actions, and has thus found 
access to the unconscious, involuntarily exercises an influence on his environment.” 
Figure 4 proposes a summary of a Jungian framework of morality tlirough self- 
knowledge. The persona is at the forefront of ego -consciousness and interacts with 
society. The ego is influenced by moral conscience, itself partly a by-product of 
social norms. To become individuated, the person must become consciously aware o f 
her personal unconscious. The images attached to her personal unconscious will 
direct her towards the relevant archetypes they refer to, in particular the shadow, and 
maybe later the animus/anima as well as other archetypes that are located in the 
fuzziness o f the collective unconscious. Once the archetypes are consciously 
mtegrated, then the person has established a connection to her self. Ethical 
conscience follows a similar yet reversed path. When the ego experiences a conflict 
of duty originating from the insufficiencies o f moral conscience, it appeals to the 
inner agency (which we can assimilate to the archetypal self since the self is also 
recipient of God -  'vox Dei ') which then produces moral knowledge true to the self.
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Figure 4. A Jungian framework of Morality
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Self-knowledge, and more generally individuation, represent the essential 
groundwork to establish a more solid, more complete knowledge o f the Good. Self- 
knowledge through greater consciousness o f the inner voice and confrontation and 
integration of one’s shadow could be, in practical terms, what will enable the 
individual to practice phronesis and to know the appropriate balance o f the virtues. 
This requires detaching oneself from the stifling security of the community’s norms 
and reaching for a transcendent principle, reflected in the self, which Jung refers to 
as God, but which we can construe “as representing the sum of psychical energy” 
(Thorbum, 1925:135).
“Just as man, as a social being, cannot in the long run exist without a tie 
to the community, so the individual will never find the real justification 
for his existence, and his own spiritual and moral autonomy, anywhere 
except in an extra-mundane principle capable of relativizing the 
overpowering influence of external factors. The individual who is not 
anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own resources to the
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physical and moral blandishments o f the world. For this he needs the 
evidence of inner, transcendent experience which alone can protect him 
from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass. Merely intellectual 
or even moral insight into the stultification and moral irresponsibility of 
the mass man is a negative recognition only and amounts to not much 
more than a wavering on the road to the atomization of the individual” 
(Jung, 2002:16-17)
Jung’s moral vision is spiritual in that the important element is to acknowledge the 
relativity of our existence as an individual human being, to become conscious o f our 
inner complex personality, and to perceive tlirough it those elements that reflect a 
imiversal history and a common groimd that both define beingness. Individuals must 
exist as individuals instead of standing as products of the mass liable to poor ethics 
because of a lack of consciousness. The process can be painful, warns Jung 
(1978b:447): “A more developed consciousness brings the latent moral conflict to 
light, or else shaipens those opposites which are already conscious.” Yet it is the best 
and only way to get closer to the Good, by achieving our full potential as individuals 
whilst contributing more fully to humanity. Robinson (2005:106) thus summarises 
the moral value of individuation:
“The point Jung was making is that the inwardly directed individual is 
more likely to be creative and energetic in his contribution to society, 
ultimately benefiting it more, than the person governed solely by external 
factors. [...] Yet Jung believed that individuation was conducive to the 
betterment of society not simply for practical reasons regarding social 
performance, but rather because individuation leads to a strengthened 
sense o f identification with others, which in turn benefits the collective.
This identification with others would, presumably, make one less 
inclined to dehumanize them, to project upon them one’s own shadow, 
and to place them outside one’s moral community. A self-identity 
grounded on the conviction o f a shared nature with others is, according to 
Jimg, the basis of harmonious relations with oneself and others.”
A Jungian framework o f morahty through self-knowledge and individuation is 
relevant to explore managers’ moral experiences. It points in the direction o f self­
reflection to assess the degree o f consciousness of the individuals. It highlights the 
moral significance of projections in the relationships with others, and provides a 
practical way to deal with them. As Hart and Brady (2005:419) explain: “By 
contrast, the best managers confront their managerial shadow. They realize there is a
tension between managing and simply being a person, a friend, a neighbor, etc. 
Confronting the shadow is the first step in backing away from inliumane control and 
moving toward a perspective that balances organizational and individual interests. It 
balances production with meaning. [...MJotives are often as complex as the matters 
that confront us, yet that realization empowers the individual to become more 
realistic and less cynical.” Having established that the self is central to any ‘true’ 
moral endeavour, we will explore how managers perceive their self in their moral 
experiences, and we will examine our findings in the light o f the Jungian framework 
exposed in this chapter.
3.5. Su m m a r y
This chapter aimed to determine more precisely how we can develop and use 
phronesis, that is the virtue o f practical wisdom that itself articulates our knowledge 
of the other virtues. We turned to psychology to review what the theory of moral 
development, the role theory and studies in ethical decision-making could offer. We 
concluded that these approaches put too much emphasis on rationality and thus did 
not take into account the whole individual, or rather the individual as a whole self. 
We identified the self as a key concept in an individual’s morality, and we discussed 
the definition and implications of the concept of self. We stated that being 
compartmentalised is morally dangerous and that the self should be conceived as a 
whole.
We then introduced Carl Jung’s psychology and demonstrated how his perspective 
encompassed a concern for wholeness through the conscious integration of the 
various and dual aspects of the personality in order to become individuated, that is to 
be a true individual freed from the collective mass. We exposed the various elements 
of the process o f individuation and highlighted how they constitute a practical 
framework to explore managers’ morality. The following chapter reviews the 
methodological choices that will guide the study.
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C h a p t e r  4  -  M e t h o d o l o g y
« We should always adopt a view that accords with the facts. If upon 
investigation we find tliat there is reason and proof for a point, tlieu 
we should accept it. However, a clear distinction should be made 
between what is not found \>y science and what is found to be 
nonexistent by science. What science finds to be nonexistent we 
should ail accept as nonexistent, but what science merely does not 
find is a completely different matter. An example is consciousness 
itself. Although sentient beings, including humans, have experienced 
consciousness for centuries, we still do not know what consciousness 
actually is: its complete nature and how it functions.”
The Dalai Lama 
Destructive Emotions and How We Can Overcome Them
4.1 . In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter discusses the methodological choices that will guide the study with a 
view to providing elements to answer the research question “How do managers 
personally experience morality?”. This research question will be examined in relation 
with the Jungian conceptual framework introduced in the previous chapter. Thus the 
methodological choices will be made in accordance with the assumptions underlying 
the conceptual framework to ensure logic and coherence.
This chapter starts with an exploration o f the philosophical perspectives on the nature 
o f the social world (ontological and epistemological assumptions) in part 4.2, with a 
particular focus on the interpretivist view (part 4.3). Part 4.4 summarises the chosen 
methodology. We will then introduce in part 4.5 the methods selected for the data 
collection and data analysis stages, and explain how we will analyse the data tlirough 
the conceptual framework. The relevance o f using an interpretive research method to 
analyse individual case studies will be more particularly discussed. Part 4.6 assesses 
the ethics and reliability o f the research methodology and methods, whilst part 4.7 
introduces the pilot study and examines its outcomes.
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4 .2 .  O n t o l o g i c a l  a n d  E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  A s s u m p t i o n s
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002:27), addressing philosophical issues is a 
necessary step in the research design because it clarifies the research objectives and 
the most appropriate way to achieve them whilst also presenting the limits and 
opportunities o f the chosen research approach. In that, they disagree with Patton 
(2002) who believes that too much focus on the philosophical stance may restrict the 
research’s contribution rather than enhance it, and with Seale (1999:27) who 
acknowledges the “insecurity o f philosophical conceptual divisions”. Knowing 
where one stands certainly helps identifying one’s assumptions about reality (Mason,
2002). Yet, it might at the same time commit researchers to a certain set o f research 
practices that are ‘compatible’ with their position, so that the distinction becomes 
self-reinforcing (Miller and Brewer, 2003). As Hughes (1990) suggests, in the end 
choices o f research design are more a matter of preferences than of objective 
assessment, and “it all depends upon what you are trying to do” (Silverman, 
1993:22). Seale (1999:26) agrees and views research as a craft skill: “This is founded 
on a pragmatic acceptance o f social research as a collection of craft skills, driven by 
local, practical concerns such as the expectations which particular audiences may 
have.” He concludes that “a good study should reflect underlying methodological 
awareness, without this awareness being continually made explicit so that it is a 
screen obscuring the artifact itself.” (Seale, 1999:31). How to ‘label’ and define 
philosophical approaches is also rather conftising (see Willis, 2007:20). Some like to 
start with an enquiry o f the existing paradigms in social sciences (e.g. Corbetta,
2003), yet there is no formal way to present the philosophical underpinnings of 
research. The following discussion will examine the most common ontological and 
epistemological positions, so as to make an “informed choice” on the “paradigmatic 
stance” eventually adopted (Symon and Cassell, 2006:312).
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4,2.1, MAPPING AND HISTORY OF THE MAIN ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL
P erspectives
Historically, social research has been influenced by two main philosophical 
perspectives: one strongly linked to natural sciences (objectivism), the other 
developing as a reaction to the former, mainly in the social sciences 
(constructionism) (Silverman, 1993). It illustrates a dichotomy recurrent in research 
design. Actually, ontologies and epistemologies can be pictured through a continuum 
ranging from objectivism-positivism to constructionism-interpretivism (see Figure 
5).
Figure 5. Mapping of Main Ontological and Epistemological Perspectives
Objectivism Reaiism ) Constructionism
Epistemology Empiricism Postpositivism CriticalTheory
Nature of reality
External to 
the mind
External to 
the mind Material and external to 
the mind
Purpose of 
research
Find
universal
laws
Find
universal
laws
Uncover 
instances of 
power 
relationships, 
empower the 
oppressed
Meaning 
of data
Mirror 
reality to 
develop 
theory
Falsification 
criterion to test theory
Ideologic 
interpretation 
to enlighten 
and emancipateL .
Source: Compiled and adapted from Willis (2007)
Interpretivism
Socially
constructed
Reflect
understanding
Contextual 
understanding, 
universais are 
relative
Ontology is concerned with the nature or essence of reality. It is a statement of what 
it is that is out there, and defines what we can know as ‘reality’ (Willis, 2007). 
Epistemology, on the other hand, addresses the nature of knowledge and provides 
assumptions about the best way to capture that knowledge o f the world (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989). It also defines the relation between the researcher and the reality 
observed, i.e. whether the researcher is detached from or part of what is being 
researched (Blaikie, 1993). Ontological and epistemological assumptions are used to
92
identify what is acceptable as knowledge, as well as which methods are acceptable to 
uncover this knowledge.
Willis (2007:21) identifies three major paradigms that currently occupy the field o f 
research philosophy: postpositivism, inteipretivism and critical theory. He believes 
these three perspectives differ on several levels:
They differ on the question of the nature of reality.
They offer different reasons or purposes for doing research.
They point us to quite different types of data and methods as being 
valuable and worthwhile.
They have different ways of deriving meaning from the data 
gathered.
They vary with regard to the relationship between research and 
practice.”
The rationale behind the assumptions o f each perspective is partly linked to the 
historical circumstances during which they emerged and developed. Recalling the 
development of qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) identify seven 
moments or phases during which research methods and the ‘spirit’ o f research had a 
very different focus. For instance, during the “traditional period” spreading from the 
early twentieth century until the Second World War, objectivity was the dominant 
criterion for good and reliable research. Then, historical, social and cultural changes 
contributed to challenging this particular understanding of social research, which led 
to the introduction of a variety o f new approaches and techniques deemed to be 
better-suited to study social life in context, in particular more participative and 
interactive approaches. The seventh moment, which we should be living right now, is 
distinctively cross-disciplinary and experimental (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).
Willis (2007) looks further back and examines in which context the main research 
paiudigms have emerged through time. He tells how the founders o f (post)positivism 
(Francis Bacon and empiricism, later René Descartes and rationahsm, and Auguste 
Comte and positivism) aimed at providing “a response to [the] metaphysical and 
magical explanations” that prevailed up to that point, especially through the Middle 
Ages. Postpositivism has inherited most of the rules laid by Bacon regarding the way 
research should be conducted, particularly the use o f experimentation and
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quantitative evaluations of facts. However, criticism o f “naïve positivism” led by 
Popper and others prompted some scientists to call into question their ability to prove 
anything with unconditional certainty, and to introduce the concept of “falsification” 
instead. It is believed that most positivists/postpositivists have now rejected naïve 
positivism and align themselves with Popper’s word of caution. They nonetheless 
hold that mind and body can be studied separately and that scientific enquiry can and 
should be value-free (Willis, 2007:44).
Both critical theory and interpretivism emerged from the history of positivism, 
although they pursue a different purpose. Critical theorists have been firstly 
influenced by Marxism, at a time when the downsides o f industrialisation became 
obvious in an increasingly dual society. Critical theory considers it necessaiy to 
analyse the ideological character of an issue, and often articulates the debate around 
the theme of class conflict (Willis, 2007:48). As such, it does not aim nor claim to be 
value-free. On the contrary, research in this perspective aspires to free oppressed 
groups by revealing the mechanisms o f domination to which they are subjected. 
Feminist studies, to a certain extent, come within the scope of critical theory; 
nonetheless, they are often considered a philosophical perspective in its own right.
Interpretivism, on the other hand, addresses the “excesses of ‘scientific’ social 
science” by combining rationalist and relativist arguments (Willis, 2007:48). 
Interpretivists tend to be rationalist, that is they consider that knowledge of reality 
cannot be acquired tlirough the senses alone (an empiricist argument) but also 
necessitates thinking and reflection. They also tend to be relativist, which implies 
that different coimnunities have different knowledge of reality, each being specific to 
the community. This claim discards the possibility of universal truths or laws, in that 
truths only ever make sense within the community that construct them. However, it is 
important to notice that some interpretivists position themselves as idealists, in line 
with Plato’s tradition of Ideal forms existing as such, regardless of the hnperfect and 
relative representation o f these forms in the perceptible reality (Willis, 2007:50). 
Interpretivism will be discussed in detail in part 4.3.
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4.2,2, Ontological  Ch o ic es: Obje ctiv ism  an d  Constructionism
If we adopt Willis’s classification, we notice that postpositivism aligns with an 
objectivist ontology, whereas inteipretivism makes sense within a constructionist 
view of reality and critical theory lies somehow in between. Before examining 
fiirther the particularities o f each epistemological position, let’s consider the 
implications of each ontological perspective.
On the one hand, objectivism posits that social reality is independent of human 
consciousness, and that “social phenomena confront us as external facts that are 
beyond our reach or influence” (Bryman, 2004:16). In other words, the reality exists 
out there, irrespective o f who we are or what we do, think, feel or perceive. On the 
other hand, constructionism (sometimes referred to as constructivism, although there 
might be more subtlety in the distinction than usually thought -  see Crotty, 1998) 
denies the existence o f an objective reality, or reality as an object. It rather holds that 
reality and social phenomena are constructed by social actors who attribute meanings 
to them usually through interaction (Bryman, 2004).
Both ontological positions have their own definition o f ‘truth’. Wliilst truth for 
objectivists implies an exact definition of what reality is, constructionists define truth 
as “that most informed and sophisticated construction on which there is consensus 
among individuals most competent (not necessarily most powerful) to form such 
construction” (Guba and Lincoln, 1989:86). This means that there exist multiple 
realities as multiple constructions, and that none of these constructions can be said to 
be truer than the others. These multiple realities can only be assessed on the basis o f 
the information one possesses about them, yet not even in a nonnative manner.
The conceptual framework on which the study is based glimpses at a constructionist 
ontology. Indeed, although Jung was anxious to be accepted as a scientist, he 
grounded his psychology on the idea that the psyche is and remains mostly unknown 
and unknowable (see Chapter 3, part 3.4.1). Therefore, reality is not ‘out there’ and 
ready to be discovered; rather, it expresses in various forms and is not reducible to 
what either our senses or our mind can grasp. On the contrary, the psyche we come
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to know has a personal quality. Furthermore, the purpose o f this research is to 
examine a diversity o f managers’ personal experiences. It is believed that each 
manager will have a specific experience o f the moral phenomenon, so that there will 
be multiple accounts o f the same experience, or multiple instances of what Bannister 
calls “internal reality” (2005:14). What each manager experiences is true and real for 
them, thus we need to respect this plurality o f views of reality in order to make sense 
of the phenomenon. Consequently, the constructionist ontology appears the most 
suitable for the enquiry we propose to lead. We thus adopt the assumption that 
“social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors; it is a preinterpreted, 
intersubjective world o f cultural objects, meanings and social institutions” (Blaikie, 
1993:203).
4,2.3, Epistem ological  Ch o ic es
4.2.3.1. POSTPQSmVISM
Postpositivism is finnly associated with objectivism, and is an attempt “to replicate 
the success of the natural scientists in controlling the natural world” (Seale, 
1999:21). Postpositivism differs from strict positivism in that it takes into account the 
possibility that data may be falsified, whilst positivists tend to believe that data 
collected and examined tlirough the scientific method reflect reality. The majority of 
social scientists m this tradition today adopt the more ‘cautious’ approach laid by 
postpositivism, therefore we can refer to postpositivism as the exemplar o f an 
epistemology that logically works within an objectivist ontology (Willis, 2007).
Postpositivists believe that things in the world can be uncovered tlirough scientific 
research methods. Although they admit there may be external elements that 
contradict the ‘truth’ of a theoiy, they argue that following the scientific method 
provides sufficient support to either validate or reject a theory. Postpositivists work 
from theory, then collect data to assess the theory. Theories need not be based on 
data, but their testing should follow the rigour of the scientific method, which aligns 
with the standards of research in the natural sciences. The goal pursued is to achieve 
an objective measurement and analysis o f data which will allow researchers to
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confidently describe and explain real phenomena. It is therefore paramount that the 
researcher be detached from what they study. Objectivity is deemed essential to 
claim knowledge that is value-free (Bryman, 2004).
Postpositivists tend to rely on quantifiable data. Because they are interested in the 
estabhshment of universal laws from testable hypotheses, they have imported 
techniques o f experiments and observations from the natural sciences. Consequently, 
quantitative research is often linked to postpositivism. However, this is so because 
quantitative studies share most of the assumptions of a postpositivist perspective, and 
not because they are restricted to postpositivist research studies. In other words, it 
makes sense to use quantitative methods within a postpositivist paradigm because it 
maintains the cohesion within the foundational assumptions o f the approaches.
Given we have adopted a constractionist ontology, it would be incoherent to choose 
a postpositivist epistemology. Besides, the purpose o f the research is not to find 
universais but to explore the particular. Jung (2002b:6) distinguishes 'understanding ’ 
fr om ‘knowledge ' o f the human, and views the latter as a scientific project prone to 
statistical generalisations whilst the former is a contextual exploration of the 
individual. If  our aim was to get to know individual managers, we could adopt a 
traditional scientific approach. But the focus of the study is to understand the 
particular meaning each manager attributes to his or her moral experience and 
perception o f the world. The central concepts of self and moral experiences are, 
furthermore, not easily definable nor quantifiable, just like not all relations between 
variables are logico-deductive and mathematically translatable. It ensues that a 
postpositivist epistemology would not relate to the ontological assumption's, and 
proves inappropriate.
4.2 .3 .2 . Critical Theory
Critical theorists combine “a loose collection of scholars and practitioners who tend 
to focus on the impact of power relationships in human cultures” (Willis, 2007:81). 
Distinct from but inspired by Marxism, its purpose is, as mentioned before, to 
denounce particular beliefs, values and assumptions that engender oppression.
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Critical theory is proactive in setting up the changes necessary to free oppressed 
minorities from the power struggle uncovered by the reseaichers. Because change is 
continual, the critique of the assumptions held in research also has to be continual. 
Research that adopts the critical theory perspective aims to change how things are, 
therefore it is closely linked to practice.
Critical theory is subjective (albeit it can be collectively subjective) in so far as it 
reads reality through the filter of a particular ideology, be it Marxism, feminism, and 
so on. Although critical theorists may very well admit there exists an external reality, 
they claim that our knowledge of the world is pervaded by power struggles, and they 
aim first and foremost to identify and denounce instances o f these (Willis, 2007). 
Critical theorists’ reality differs from that o f postpositivists because it is not value- 
free; rather it is a distorted reality maintaining the veil o f freedom over the eyes o f 
the oppressed groups. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are accepted in 
critical theory.
The main characteristic of critical theory lies in the way data is interpreted. For 
instance, where interpretivism would search for elements that help the researcher 
grasp the specific, contextual meaning o f a phenomenon, critical theory aims to 
stimulate reflection and self-reflection on falsely held beliefs about the structures of 
the world. It thus has “an explicit value-based and interventionist orientation” 
(Symon and Cassell, 2006:308). Similarly, where postpositivists would view data as 
a reflection o f how things are, critical theorists would interpret the same figures as 
evidence of the power relations that hinder our perception of how things really are 
(Willis, 2007).
Willis (2007:87) also highlights an important element of critical theory. He explains 
that critical theory research generates knowledge that is “superior to the knowledge 
of people the researcher studies”, so that the goal is “thus to get the subjects to 
believe as the researcher does.” This is understandable given the assumption o f  
critical theory that our perception of the world is distorted by existing power 
relationships we are not necessarily conscious of. However, given the focus o f this 
research, adopting such a stance would be ill-conceived. Jung’s deep appreciation o f
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the individual prevents us from adopting a critical theory perspective, for it would 
imply that the researcher ‘knows best’ and can see what the research participants 
cannot see. The significance o f self-knowledge as moral knowledge lies in the fact 
that it originates from the individual himself, providing all individuals are granted an 
equal status. A variety o f  voices constitutes the richness o f the data, and our purpose 
is to allow these voices to express their personal understanding of the world, and then 
to explore the meaning of the self and moral phenomena in context. That is why an 
interpretivist epistemology provides a better framework for this research than critical 
theory.
4.2 .3.3 . REALISM
Realism stands more or less in the middle o f the ontology-epistemology debate, 
which is why it is represented slightly out o f the ontology and epistemology lines on 
Figure 5. Realism takes from objectivism the belief that there exists a reality 
independent from one’s beliefs, and from constructionism the importance o f 
capturing people’s perceptions to uncover reality (Saunders et al., 2003). There exist 
several degrees o f realism: naïve realism is close to postpositivism, whilst critical 
realism, developed notably by Bhaskar and Miles and Huberman, adopt a more 
relativist stand (Patton, 2002).
Realism is described by Blaikie (1993) as one of the contemporary responses to the 
key question “Wliat kind o f science is social science?”. Blaikie (1993) reviews what 
he qualifies as various responses which address in different ways the nature of social 
reality and the way(s) to capture meaning of the social world. Starting from the 
‘classical responses’ that established the grounds o f the debate and that include 
positivism and interpretivism, he highlights the issues on which ‘contemporary’ 
approaches (notably realism, structuration theory and feminism) differ from the 
assumptions o f the two grounding positions. Bhaskar’s realism, for instance, aims to 
bridge the positivist-interpretivist gap by acknowledging the specific nature of social 
science (as opposed to natural science) and yet stating that the world consists in 
“generative mechanisms” that are “independent of the events which they generate” 
(Blaikie, 1993:59). Thus, there exist three domains of reality: “The empirical domain
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consists of events which can be observed [experienced], the actual domain consists 
of events whether or not they are observed, and the real domain consists o f the 
structures and mechanisms which produce these events” (Blaikie, 1993:60, italics 
original). Realists therefore concern themselves with making sense o f their 
experiences to identify the underlying mechanisms of social reality through their 
personal constructions.
Although the realist position seems, at first, to offer an alternative to the apparent 
dichotomy of the positivist-interpretivist perspectives, it does not seem to 
successfully transcend the natural-versus-social-world issue. Bhaskar’s view in 
particular draws on the inteipretivist argument that social reality is mediated by 
human action and interaction to the extent o f “conceding too much” to this view and 
becoming a shaky form o f anti-naturalism (Blaikie, 1993:118). Furthermore, as 
Willis (2007) explains, interpretivists do not deny that an external, physical reality 
may exist. What they argue is that it is not possible to objectively learn about that 
reality, or to put it differently, that there is no objective knowledge possible. 
Communication and understanding is possible because “making meaning is a group 
or social process” (Willis, 2007:97), but the reality thus uncovered is only contextual 
or culturally tainted. Interpretivists would reject the possibility o f learning about the 
universally real mechanisms that lie behind the phenomena experienced, because 
vmlike realists they argue that the expression of these mechanisms would itself be 
socially constructed, rather than universal or ‘out there’.
4.2 .3.4 . INTERPRETIVISM
Interpretivism fits within the ontological position of social constructionism. It 
therefore considers that social reality has a specific nature, which cannot be explored 
in traditionally scientific ways. Interpretivism acknowledges a multiple-voice 
approach, and accepts subjectivity as a necessary, even useful component of social 
research. Interpretivists want to understand social reality through the experiences of 
its actors. They do not focus on one ‘objective’ social reality, unlike postpositivists 
or some realists; neither do they focus on the effect a social reality has on its 
members, unlike critical theorists. Rather, interpretivists focus on capturing the
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meaning people give to social reality as they perceive it. Their purpose is sense- 
making, and they “aim to represent others’ life-worlds as fairly as possible” (Symon 
and Cassell, 2006:308).
It is important to highlight that ‘soft’ realism and ‘soft’ interpretivism have much in 
common. By ‘soft’ realism we imply the realist position that grants the utmost 
importance to the fact that reality can only be approached through the filter o f social 
interaction and meaning-making. By ‘soft’ interpretivism we refer to the perspective 
that concedes there might be an external reality, a world ‘out there’, although our 
perception o f this reality is only relative and subjective. Evanoff s (2005) tentative to 
reconcile realism and constmctivism to form a “‘realist’ version o f constructivism”, 
or Krausz’s (2000) proposal o f a constructive realism illustrate how blurred the 
boundary tends to be. Nevertheless, even though a majority of people may agree on a 
given aspect of their perceived reality, this shared understanding o f the real world 
cannot lead us to conclude this is reality. We will now turn to the specificities o f the 
interpretivist viewpoint.
4 .3 . T h e  In t e r p r e t iv ist  P a r a d ig m
4.3,1. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS OF INTERPRETIVISM
The interpretivist epistemology considers that social sciences cannot be the object of 
detached enquiry. Its basic premise is that the nature of social sciences (i.e. the study 
of “people and their institutions”) is distinct fi’om the natural sciences, that the 
purpose of enquiry is to grasp or understand meanings rather than capture facts, and 
that the researcher is part of the observed social reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; 
Bryman, 2004). The grounding assumptions o f interpretivism imply that reality is 
subjective and that knowledge is situated and should be gained by capturing the 
research participants’ own interpretations of the world (Saunders et al., 2003). It is 
believed that human action is meaningful as people give meanings to their acts and to 
those of others, which thereafter constitute their social reality (Bryman, 2004).
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The purpose o f interpretivism is to achieve ‘Verstehenf that is to understand or 
interpret people’s actions in order to uncover meaning (Schwandt, 2003). ‘ VersteheiT 
translates from German as ‘understanding’. It differs clearly from the goal, pursued 
by postpositivists, of ‘explaining’ reality, or from what Jung identified as ‘knowing 
men’ (2002b). It also marks the distinction between natural sciences or 
mturwissenschaft, and cultural (or human) sciences, geisteswissenschaft. The 
emphasis is on the fact that knowledge is not value-free and research is not, and 
should not aim to remain, objective for fear of not capturing the meaning of the data. 
The interpretivist position can be defined by its “empathie identification with the 
actor”, by its endeavour to provide an understanding of how the everyday world is 
constituted (i.e. ‘phenomenological sociology’), or by its analogy o f human actions 
with language games (Schwandt, 2003). The most important element, however, is 
what Schwandt (2003:299) summarises as the second dimension of ‘ Verstehen'':
“Hence interpretivists aim to reconstruct the self-understandings o f actors 
engaged in particular actions. And in so doing, they assume that the 
inquirer cannot claim that the ways actors make sense of their experience 
are melevant to social scientific understanding because actors’ ways o f 
making sense o f their actions are constitutive of that action.”
Many perspectives have emerged from interpretivism, but they all share the rejection 
of a causal, hypothetical, purely objective way of gaining knowledge of social 
phenomena. These include phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, hermeneutics, 
semiotics and ethnography to name a few. Most research studies in these 
perspectives adopt quahtative methods because they are more appropriate to collect 
and analyse data that will provide elements to answer the research questions. 
Interpretivists tend to be more lenient than postpositivists regarding the choice o f 
methods available to researchers. Because for them standards for ‘good research’ are 
subjective, what matters most to interpretivists is the research process and a rich 
description o f the context, rather than a standardised quantification. Stories and 
reflections are prized because they provide valuable elements to understand the 
reality explored (Willis, 2007).
Interpretive research is not remote from practice. Kessels and Korthagen’s (1996) 
discuss the Greek conceptions o f knowledge, ‘’episteme" and ‘phronesis", in relation
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to research. ‘Episteme" lies within the scope of the postposivist search for abstract, 
procedural and universal knowledge, whilst ‘phronesis" (le. practical wisdom, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, part 2.2.3.1) affirms the primacy of a contextual knowledge, 
directed towards the particulars. To that extent, interpretivism is in the spirit of 
‘phronesis", and emphasizes the relevance o f local knowledge and understanding-in- 
context.
4.3.2. Critical  Vie w s  o f  In terpretivism
Interpretivism has been criticised by realists and positivists alike. A realist, Bhaskar 
denounces the “linguistic fallacy” that social actors’ interpretations are not corrigible, 
which contributes to an “epistemic fallacy” by which social reality is reduced to what 
social actors interpret (Blaikie, 1993:111). In other words, interpretivism is accused 
of reducing ‘what-is-there’ to ‘what-we-know-is-there’. However, this criticism is 
only valid with regards to the realist assumption that there exists a reality beyond 
what can be linguistically constructed, and that we can access this reality. It has 
already been pointed out that inteipretivists do not object to the existence o f a reality 
out there, but rather object to the realists’ belief that our necessarily subjective 
perceptions o f reality can be ahnost ‘transcended’ to discover the objective 
mechanisms behind such perceptions.
Indeed, realists claim they can start from individual, hence subjective, accounts of 
reality, and study these accounts to go beyond their subjectivity and achieve an 
understanding o f their generative mechanisms. Yet, how can they Jmow that their 
interpretation of people’s subjectivity is more real, or more realistic? Could not their 
own interpretations o f people’s interpretations be as subjective as those very same 
interpretations they denounce as fallacious at worst, incomplete at best? Realism thus 
induces its knowledge o f the mechanisms o f social world from an interpretation, 
albeit uttered by a researcher instead of a social actor. It is not clear either why or 
how the researcher’s interpretation may be more objective than other people’s, and 
therefore would lead to the sphere of the more stable, generative structures of reality. 
Furthermore, even if we were to take this interpretation as a starting point to enquire 
further on the generative structures o f reality, the need will be felt at some point to
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define criteria upon which to judge what should be considered a generative structure 
from what is an abortive interpretation. In so far as the generative structures are 
stable and universal, those criteria ought to be of a similar kind, that is stable and 
universal. Yet, this means another step towards a postpositivist perspective, bringing 
up the necessity to establish universais.
Interpretivism does not concern itself with such dilemma. Indeed, interpretivists hold 
everyone’s account of reality as equally real. Subjectivity is not a problem because 
all our knowledge is based upon subjectivities and individual interpretations. Realism 
often ends up being obliged to choose to rejoin either the foimdational assumptions 
of postpositivism or those of inteipretivism, which makes its ‘middle-way’ or ‘third 
way’ position untenable. This is not to deny that realists have brought valuable 
elements of discussion to the previously antagonistic debate about research 
philosophy. However, it does not seem to have established its grounds clearly 
enough quite yet. Having discarded the realist objection, let’s turn to what 
postpositivism would argue.
As proud heirs to the natural scientists, postpositivists in the social sciences disregard 
research studies that do not adopt a scientific, objective, detached and value-free 
method of enquiry. They claim that the finits o f their research reflect the tnie reality 
of the world, providing data have not been falsified (something which can be easily 
checked, they say). Their claims are grounded in the concepts of validity, reliability 
and objectivity, which constitute the core criteria upon which one can assess the 
quality o f -  essentially quantitative -  research (Seale, 1999). Social scientists coming 
from a constructionist perspective were anxious to apply those positivist criteria to 
their own studies, so that their findings may also be considered ‘good science’.
Yet, one caimot just transpose one set of criteria from one ontology to another, if 
anything because constructionism accepts the existence of multiple realities, hence 
multiple truths. The traditional, positivist meaning o f ‘good quality research’ loses its 
relevance in a constructionist world. Not taken aback, constructionists have adapted 
the scope of validity and reliability criteria to fit qualitative research better. Of 
course, it is important to ensure that research is being made in ‘good’ conditions.
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notwithstanding its quantitative or qualitative scope. But it is questionable whether 
we should be so desperate to reproduce the strict standards of the natural sciences in 
the very different and varied field of human sciences. For both practical and ethical 
reasons, we could argue that the study o f the human should be approached differently 
from the study o f the natural world on the grounds of human consciousness. We do 
not argue that human beings are necessarily superior to other sentient beings, hence 
should be studied differently. Rather we notice that consciousness is a shared 
characteristic o f human beings, and that the self-reflexivity it allows is a distinctive 
feature of humanity that generates understanding o f the world. The subjective 
insights consciousness allows should be taken into account in our study o f the 
human, for to ignore them would characterise both a subjective choice and a non- 
systematic approach to science. If  we take our ontological assumptions seriously, 
then we should leave the door open for criteria that embrace difference, multiple 
voices and personal engagement with the research topic. Alternative standards for 
credible qualitative research are discussed further in part 4.6.2.
Interpretivism has been accused o f lacking rigour and objectivity, thereby implying 
That interpretivists cannot claim to knowledge creation in the same way positivists 
can. Yet there exists several criteria to assess the rigour o f a methodology, so that 
different methods might well be judged equally rigorous albeit on different groimds. 
In that respect, interpretivist research is rigorous in so far as it implements an 
interpretation procedure in a systematic manner. It offers heavy contextualisation and 
thick descriptions to eniiance faithfiilness to the text or data, whereas positivist 
studies are rigorous through their “unyielding and inflexible stiffiiess” (Yanow, 
2005:70). Rigorous interpretive studies also demonstrate internal cohesion and a 
logical flow in a meaning-making perspective rather than a number-based approach 
to social reality.
Furthermore, interpretivist researchers do not go for an interview unprepared, but 
carefiilly think through and assess their questions as if constituting a repertoire of 
probes to better cope with necessarily uncontrollable human responses. In that sense, 
interpretivism differs clearly from amateurism but resembles thoughtful and 
considerate improvisation. This is sustained by the fact that: “Researchers see and
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name patterns in other human actions because we are human ourselves, and it is our 
humanity, first and foremost, that enables such empathetic recognition of human 
reaction to human experience. But that means that these patterns exist as much in our 
habits and practices o f sight itself [...] as in what we are seeing.” (Yanow, 2005:75). 
This in turn claims that there cannot be detached knowledge; rather, “the certainty o f 
knowledge about the social world being observed and judgments about the 
‘goodness’ of that knowledge rest within the community that has established 
procedural rules for generating interpretations.” Knowledge claims are validated by 
the interpretive community tlirough the reporting of observations “in the rhetorical 
style developed and accepted by that community” (Yanow, 2005:79). This is all the 
more legitimate in so far as research into human action or human motivations often 
require a subjective reading rather than an objective counting to make sense (Yanow, 
2005:79).
4.3.3, INTERPRETIVISM OR PHENOMENOLOGY?
Phenomenology belongs to the interpretivist epistemology, but is just one form of 
interpretivist enquiry. Phenomenology is concerned with finding out the essence o f 
the things or the phenomena examined. Patton (2002:482) states that: 
“Phenomenological analysis seeks to grasp and elucidate the meaning, structure and 
essence of the lived experience o f a phenomenon for a person or group of people.” 
Willis (2007:172) specifies that “phenomenological psychology focuses on 
consciousness and perceptions. There is no effort to equate perceptions with external 
reality.” Phenomenologists are interested in the experiences lived by people and aim 
to retrieve the essence o f these experiences through a method of thick description and 
reduction (1991).
Jung is not estranged from phenomenology. Indeed, the subtitle of his work Aion 
(1978a) reads as “Researches into the phenomenology of the self’ and his writings 
reflect an interest for the phenomena as such. Besides, Jungian psychology is truly 
centred around the phenomenon o f consciousness. Yet, Jung can be equally 
considered a phenomenologist or a non-phenomenologist. Brooke (1991) reviews 
Jung’s works and tries to identify those aspects that would qualify him as a
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phenomenologist and those that would discard him. He concludes that although 
Jimg’s method is similar to a phenomenological enquiry, Jung’s practice does not 
qualify as rigorous enough against the phenomenological criteria. Because “Jung had 
a limited understanding of phenomenology”, he never followed the “methodological 
guidelines in a systematic and disciplined way.” (Brooke, 1991:34 and 50). He 
understood the significance o f  inniiediate experience to uncover the meaning o f a 
phenomenon, but he did not practice the phenomenological reduction to a sufficient 
degree to qualify as a phenomenologist. Brooke (1991:31) clearly summarises the 
interest Jung found in phenomenology: “Wlien Jung identifies his method with 
phenomenology, as he does frequently, he is arguing the case for an essentially 
descriptive approach that avoids nineteenth-century philosophical assumptions and 
psychoanalytic reductionism.”
To that extent, Jung is undoubtedly inclined to interpretivism, but not necessarily to 
phenomenological enquiry. His endeavour to understand experiences and his 
recognition of the primacy o f interpretation in the task o f understanding qualify him 
as an interpretivist, but not as a true phenomenologist. Thus we will opt for an 
interpretivist approach which shares elements with phenomenology but is less 
constraining. This approach is detailed in the next part.
4.4 . R e se a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y
Ontology and epistemology inform the methodological choices, that is the practical 
way social reality will be researched. As Guba and Lincoln (1989:83) phrase it, 
methodology provides answer to the question “How can we go about finding out 
things?”. Saunders et al. (2003:83) refer to this process as an “onion” starting with 
the research philosophy down to the data collection methods. Each “layer” o f the 
research design influences the one that follows, as well as the results o f the research 
enquiry (Hughes, 1990). Corbetta (2003:13) underlines the importance of having 
clarified one’s position on ontology, epistemology and methodology, and explains 
that: “The three questions are [...] interrelated, not only because the answers to each 
are greatly influenced by the answers to the other two, but also because it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish the boundaries between them.”
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Corbetta (2003) also highlights the imperative o f coherence within the research 
strategy. Indeed, social or hmnan sciences remain ‘scientific’ in so far as there exists 
an imperative of logical sense-making in the way knowledge and understanding is 
created or acquired. No matter whether one’s position is postpositivism or 
interpretivism, no matter whether the world is thought to obey natural laws or 
whether the meaning o f social things is constructed, one’s approach to knowledge of 
the social reality must make sense. As stated at the beginning o f this chapter, there 
must be coherence and logical links between the philosophy o f research and the 
methods employed to generate knowledge. Since the research has adopted a 
constructionist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, the methodology and 
methods elected must fit this paradigm.
Research methodology and research methods are often confiised and used 
interchangeably, whilst they stand for two different aspects o f a research project 
design (Easterby-Smith et a l, 2002). Methodology refers to the approach the 
researcher talces when exploring a topic. It summarises the researcher’s view of the 
world, her understanding and underlying assumptions o f the social reality she 
investigates. Research methods, however, consist in the tools and processes the 
researcher will use to attempt to uncover that part of social reality she has set herself 
to explore.
The methodology adopted here is an interpretive enquiry aiming towards “an 
understanding o f the meanings hmnan attach to events” (Saunders et a l, 2003:89). 
The research is set to be exploratory to clarify our understanding o f managers’ lived 
and reflective experience of the moral phenomenon and the significance of the self. 
Exploratory studies liave the advantage o f flexibility, so that if a new theme emerges 
fi-om the data, it allows the research design to be altered so as to integrate the new 
theme ftrom this moment on (Saunders et a l, 2003:97). Such approach is accepted by 
interpretivists since they admit new elements may emerge during the research 
process, and they de-emphasize the need to begin research with hypotheses. In the 
present study, the research focus is the manager and the phenomenon explored is the 
manager’s personal experience of morality.
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Willis (2007) provides a list of general guidelines for implementing interpretive 
qualitative research. These summarise the practical dimensions of an interpretive 
enquiry and include: the pursuit o f contextual understanding, the acceptance o f cross- 
disciplinary influences, the deliberate search for multiple perspectives, a greater 
focus on the foundational rather than the technical assumptions of research 
methodology, the practice o f iterative and emergent analysis, the use o f multiple 
sources of data, the primacy o f reflection and self-reflection, encouragement for a 
participatory research, an openness to changes and its influence on data and analysis, 
an open acknowledgement of bias and subjectivity, and a holistic approach to 
research. These elements have been addressed in the choice o f  research methods to 
which we now turn.
4.5. R ese a r c h  M e t h o d s
4.5.1. A  Ca s e  S tu dy  A p pr o a c h
Willis (2007:239) depicts the peculiarity o f case study research when he says that 
“[it] has been one of the most criticized and most used forms of social science 
research.” Case studies are neglected or disregarded by postpositivists, but 
particularly appreciated by interpretivists and critical theorists because o f their ability 
to capture ‘authentic data’ in context, and to allow themes to emerge along the way 
without having to predetermine hypotheses. Case studies can prove particularly 
useflil in achieving ‘verstehen" because they are, per se, focused on the particulars. 
They search for elements about complex, situated and problematic issues around 
which they are organised by the researcher (Stake, 2000a:439).
Case studies have been associated with many things, but Berg (2004:251) proposes a 
general and interesting definition that summarises the case study approach in 
quahtative research: “Case study methods involve systematically gathering enough 
information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the 
researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions.” Case 
study is close to storytelling, although the reported story is necessarily limited by the
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researcher’s choices (Stake, 2000a). Willis (2007:239) describes case studies as 
being particularistic, naturalistic, thickly descriptive, inductive and heuristic; whilst 
according to Willig (2001:70-71) the defining features o f case study research are an 
idiographic perspective, attention to contextual data, triangulation of collection or 
analysis methods, a temporal element, and a concern with theory development. What 
is most noticeable is that case studies put focus on a greatly-detailed particular. To 
that extent, they are “not a methodological choice but a choice o f what is to be 
studied” (Stake, 2000a:435). The way to go about the case is almost a different 
matter.
Case study research is found in many disciplines and takes a wide range o f forms: 
either single-case or multiple cases, intrinsic or instrumental, descriptive, explanatory 
or interpretive. They have in coimnon to free the objection that case study research is 
not generalisable. This has often been discussed (see Go mm et a l, 2000), and if no 
definitive agreement has been reached yet, we can at least assert that case studies do 
not aim at generalisability in the positivist sense (that is over a large population) but 
contribute to what researchers call either theoretical, “analytical” (Yin, 1994), 
“logical” (Mitchell, 2000) or “naturalistic” generalisation (Willig, 2001). Stake 
(2000a) defends the value o f single-case research and argues that instrumental case 
research is too often confiised with intrinsic case research. In the instrumental 
approach, the case study is just there to validate or provide support to the theory. It is 
partly similar to a scientific approach in the postpositivist tradition, in that there 
exists a working hypothesis at the start o f the research and the case is used to ‘test’ 
this hypothesis. However, in the intrinsic perspective, the case itself is at the core of 
the study. Generalisation is not a goal because the aim is the comprehension of the 
particular. Wliat actually happens is that:
“In intrinsic case study, researchers do not avoid generalization -  they 
cannot. Certainly they generalize to happenings of their cases at times yet 
to come and in other situations. They expect readers to comprehend the 
reported interpretations but to modify their (the readers’) own. Thus 
researchers use the methods for case-work that they actually use to learn 
enough about their cases to encapsulate complex meanings into finite 
reports -  and thus to describe the cases in sufficient descriptive narrative 
so that readers can vicariously experience these happenings and draw
no
conclusions (which may differ from those o f the researchers).” (Stake, 
2000a:439)
Lincoln and Guba (2000:36) mention this difference between a “rationalistic, 
prepositional, law-like” type o f generalisation (which is how postpositivists 
understand the concept) and a “more intuitive, empirical, based on personal direct 
and vicarious experience” generalisation. Yet, they go on suggesting the use o f 
“transferability” as a criterion for case study generalisation, implying that case study 
findings are generalisable as long as the contexts are similar, which is in itself a 
serious limitation to the generalisability o f case-based research (Donmoyer, 2000). 
Williams (2000:220) proposes that interpretivists generate “moderatiim 
generalisations” on the grounds o f “cultural consistency”. He explains that 
generalising from the interpretation of a case study is possible, albeit only relative, 
because the mterpretation reveals aspects o f a shared culture which bears meaning 
for its members. In a similar vein, Donmoyer (2000) joins Stake (2000a; 2000b) to 
view case studies as opportunities for experiential knowledge. Drawing from his 
experience as a school teacher in various geographical areas and with students from 
different social backgroimds, he insists that most of experiential knowledge, which is 
the knowledge we gain from experience, occurs tacitly. To attempt to transfer this 
knowledge implies to reduce it to its propositional form, which actually leaves aside 
a significant portion o f the tacit elements. The power of personal stories is greater 
than what we can learn from pre-structured working hypotheses, not least because it 
includes the emotional aspects o f the experience, something hard to translate in 
rational terms.
Consequently, Domnoyer (2000) defends case study-based knowledge and explains 
its advantages by using the elements of Piaget’s Schema theory according to which 
new knowledge follows the process of assimilation, accommodation, integration and 
differentiation when it becomes part o f our cognitive structures. First, Domnoyer 
believes that case study research allows us to discover worlds and places we would 
not be able to go to otherwise. This is obvious for exotic or remote cultures, but it 
also possesses a much wider scope. Indeed, case studies enable us to witness 
“vicariously” the experience o f unique individuals within our own culture and to 
learn from what we see, read or feel. It almost does not matter whether the reader
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agrees with the researcher’s interpretation of the case, because “from the schema 
theory view of generalizability, the purpose of research is simply to expand the range 
of interpretations available to the research consumer” (Donmoyer, 2000:63).
A second, and related, advantage o f case studies is that they “allow us to look at the 
world through the researcher’s eyes and, in the process, to see things we otherwise 
might not have seen” (Donmoyer, 2000:63). Not that the researcher’s interpretation 
is fully subjective (i.e. personal), rather it is likely to reflect a particular shared 
theoretical viewpomt. Therefore the case study may serve as an introduction to this 
viewpoint, as well as a refinement o f existing theory. Besides, case study reseai'ch is 
not devoid of theoretical contribution, in so far as “a case study is essentially 
heuristic; it reflects in the events portrayed features which may be construed as a 
manifestation o f some general, abstract theoretical principle” (Mitchell, 2000:170). 
Case studies are actually great vehicles for theory development, highlighting 
elements and relationships that might have been overlooked tlirough less 
contextualised methods (Saunders et al., 2003:93). In a similar vein, Mitchell 
(2000:180) also states that “the extent to which generalization may be made from 
case studies depends upon the adequacy o f the underlymg theory and the whole 
corpus of related knowledge o f which the case is analysed rather than on the 
particular instance itself.” Finally, the readers may feel less threatened, hence more 
inclined to change, if they are presented with an account o f an experience than if they 
are requested to directly participate in the experience. In other words, case study 
learning decreases the defensiveness and resistance we naturally feel against change 
in our cognitive structures (Donmoyer; 2000:65). Ultimately, generalisability is no 
longer an issue if we adopt this perspective.
Interpretive case studies are richly descriptive, but also ahn to validate or challenge 
theoretical assumptions identified before data was collected. In Willis’s terms: “The 
focus is on understanding the intricacies of a particular situation, setting, 
organizations, culture or individual, but that local understanding may be related to 
prevailing theories or models” (2007:243). In the present research, the focus is on 
understanding the lived experience o f various individuals who work as managers, 
and to relate their experience o f morality and their perception of self to a Jungian
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framework of self-knowledge and individuation. Each manager will be considered a 
case within which their experience o f morality and self will be explored.
4.5.2. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
4 .5.2 .1 . Collecting  Re a l-life Stories
The purpose o f the research is to explore how managers experience moral issues and 
how significant the self is in such instances. The need to collect real experiences is 
therefore central to the study. We have explained how important contextualised 
accounts are; in that regard, real-life experiences provide richer cases than responses 
to hypothetical scripts. Actually, many studies on moral development, moral 
autonomy, moral behaviour and so on have resorted to psychology-inspired 
techniques, notably the use o f hypothetical situations or scripts on which respondents 
have to express their views (McMahon and Harvey, 2007). It is assumed that their 
answers will reveal their deep feelings, characteristics, personality traits and so on. 
Some of these tests have a clear purpose o f measurmg a certain variable, for instance 
the level o f moral reasoning (more or less mature) in Kohlberg’s model (see the 
discussion in Chapter 3, part 3.2.2). These tests do provide some interesting insights 
into people’s approach and apprehension o f moral issues, and have been validated 
and widely used in subsequent studies, for example using Rest’s Defining Issues Test 
(Colby and Kohlberg, 1984). However, it is not clear whether the data obtained 
actually reflect how the person really is, feels and acts. It is possible that the use o f 
hypothetical dilemmas tells us how the respondent would like to be perceived by 
others in such situations, but it does not reveal how the respondent would actually 
react in these situations. In other words, there remains a possibility that hypothetical 
scripts reveal elements of a ‘consciously constructed social self rather than of the 
real self, a phenomenon known as the socially desirable response (Denzin, 1970). 
Indeed, the Jungian persona is more likely to show than the conscious ego.
Furthermore, Knobe (2005:337) targets research in the line o f Kohlberg’s study of 
moral development, and denounces the use of pre-set dilemmas, arguing that “the 
whole experimental design seems to force the subject into a certain type o f thinking.”
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As a consequence, researchers have tended to dismiss as outliers those subjects (for 
instance the ‘Raskolnikovs’) whose responses did not fit into the hypothetical 
typology o f moral motivation or moral decision-making (Knobe, 2005). Pre-set 
circumstances, scripts or behavioural options necessarily obstruct a more instinctive 
response. The present research aims to capture elements o f the self-knowledge 
behind the social mask of the politically, socially or morally correct persona. It is 
believed that people’s complexity is more likely to be evidenced in more 
‘spontaneous’ situations such as real experiences than in pre-defined scripts.
It is clear that people are affected by external circumstances and the level of personal 
involvement in a moral issue. This is evidenced by research led on people’s 
behaviour in Nazi Europe (Monroe et al., 1990). As the authors point out, some 
people who under other circumstances would not have acted bravely actually did 
demonstrate bravery (and vice-versa). They also highlight that people, who had a 
priori no particular interest nor sympathy for any side and who could have turned 
either way, got involved and made choices because they felt personally touched or 
implicated by the issues at stake. It becomes obvious that people may not respond the 
same way to a hypothetical dilemma than to a real-life personal situation (Silverman,
1993).
In real-life occurrences, people experience and interpret the specific circumstances 
their own way, and this strongly influences their actual behaviour; similarly, in real- 
life instances people tend to have a personal stake in the dilemma, which probably 
affects their decisions and actions. Hypothetical situations, no matter how well 
designed, cannot challenge someone’s beliefs as deeply as personal experience can. 
Of course, people can always present an artificial account of their real experiences, 
consciously or unconsciously altering the narrative in order to show themselves in a 
better light. Nonetheless, even ‘inflated tales o f se lf based on personal experience 
are more likely to reveal the nature o f the conscious ego and its knowledge o f self 
than a well-rehearsed answer to an hypothetical script. It is easier to remain 
emotionally detached when being presented a script than when one actually lives the 
situation (MacLagan, 1998:41).
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4.5.2.2. Interviews: Collecung Personal Accoijnts
Interviews are ofren used in, but are not restricted to, qualitative studies. They are 
considered relevant when the research aims at “studying people’s understanding o f 
the meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self- 
understanding, and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived 
world” (Kvale, 1996:105). Interviews in an interpretivist perspective aim to achieve 
authenticity in collecting accounts from the participants (Silverman, 1993:91), to 
produce a picture o f the interviewee and o f their representation of the world (Gomm, 
2004).
There exist three main types o f interview: structured, semi-stmctured and in-depth 
interview (Saunders et al., 2003). Exploratory studies usually require a greater degree 
of flexibility in the process o f data collection; therefore they favour either semi- 
stmctured or in-depth formats of interviewing (Denzin, 1970:127). The less 
stmctured the interview, the more flexible it is but also the less reliable the data 
might be considered (Silverman, 1993). Yet, for interpretivism, interviews are a form 
of social interaction between interviewer and interviewee, an “inter-view” as 
emphasised by Kvale (1996), and the reliability and validity o f data are measured not 
m terms of structure but in terms o f depth and ricliness of the account, in tenus o f 
how sincere and spontaneous the respondent was. Breakwell’s (2006) advice on 
interviewing shares similarities with Fontana and Frey’s (2000:660) description o f 
the general format o f unstractured interviews:
“Traditionally, the researcher is involved in an informal conversation 
with the respondent, thus he or she must maintam a tone of ‘friendly’ 
chat while trying to remain close to the guidelines of the topic o f inquiry 
he or she has in mind. The researcher begins by ‘breaking the ice’ with 
general questions and gradually moves on to more specific ones, while 
also -  as inconspicuously as possible -  asking questions intended to 
check the veracity o f the respondent’s statements.”
Another very helpflil and realistic guiding framework to lead imstmctured interviews 
is suggested by Fontana and Frey (2000) and commented by Willis (2007). Fontana 
and Frey (2000:649) provide the following guidelines for structured interviews:
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- Never get involved in long explanations o f the study; use the standard 
explanation provided by the supervisor.
- Never deviate from the study introduction, sequence of questions, or 
question wording.
- Never let another person interrupt the interview; do not let another person 
answer for the respondent or offer his or her opinion on the question.
- Never suggest an answer or agree or disagree with an answer. Do not give 
the respondent any idea o f your personal views on the topic o f the question 
or the survey.
- Never interpret the meaning o f a question; just repeat the question and give 
instructions or clarifications that are provided in training or by the 
supervisors.
- Never improvise, such as by adding answer categories or making wording 
changes.”
Willis (2007:246) explains that “It is a valuable list that describes what interpretivist 
research is not. Simply delete the nevers and don’ts and you get the essence of 
mterviewing in the interpretivist world.” This actually reflects my own experience of 
unstructured interviewing, and serves as a good reminder to help prepare oneself for 
interviews.
For the puipose of the research, a loosely semi-stmctured interview strategy was 
considered the best option, because it is believed that having a pre-set series o f 
questions might help the respondents feel more at ease in starting the conversation. 
However, the interview protocols (attached as appendix I, II and III) were only used 
as a template to guide the respondent towards discussing the themes researched. The 
initial questions aie more focused in order to provide a starting point to the 
participant and help launch the narration (Wengraf, 2001:122). Whenever deemed 
appropriate, the sequence of questions was altered in order to follow the respondent’s 
thoughts, illustrating the “intuitive data processing” suggested by Gomm (2004:185) 
and also mentioned by Willis (2007:246). This procedure aligns with the assumption 
that allowing space for the respondent to answer in a sequence o f their choice 
provides the best outcome (Denzin, 1970). The questions aimed to facilitate a 
discussion around the concepts central to the research, but also to bring forward 
elements tliat would infonn the case and help understand the participant’s answers.
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The interview protocol used for the main study is enclosed as Appendix III. The 
questions were translated from English to French as accurately as possible, although 
some necessary linguistic adaptations were made. The interview was split into four 
main parts, but the order was of little importance and served to guide the discussion. 
Part A was concerned with introducing the participant’s job and background, as well 
as his view on being a manager. It aimed to help the participant relax, whilst 
gathering information on his work and his responsibilities. Part B o f the interview 
protocol focused on the specific content of the paiticipant’s job and his personal 
expectations at work. The purpose for these questions was to uncover how the 
participant assessed himself. Part C introduced a discussion on a moral conflict the 
participant had experienced at work, and aimed to explore how he analysed his moral 
experience. Finally, in part D the participants were asked to comment three 
statements. The purpose was to grasp some aspects of the participants’ personal 
aspirations.
4 .5.2 .3 . Sam pling  Strategy
Participants were selected according to a case study strategy. As Mitchell (2000:180) 
says, the researcher tends to select a case to study “in terms o f its explanatoiy power 
rather than for its typicality.” Whilst postpositivists are very much attached to 
statistically representative samples, qualitative researchers are more open to 
purposeful sampling or convenience sampling methods (Maxwell, 1996). These 
suggest a selection of participants based on the degree to which they will provide 
rich information relevant to the research question (Patton, 2002). The size of the 
sample is not an issue, since all depends on what the researcher wants to mvestigate. 
Cost-related issues should also be considered, and sometimes influence the decision 
to choose convenience sampling over more time-consuming methods of probability 
sampling (Breakwell, 2006:234). However, what should guide the final decision is 
the purpose of the research. If  the research study aims to vahdate an hypothesis or a 
theory, then quantitative approaches and representative samples make sense. On the 
other hand, if the purpose o f research is exploratory, open to emergent meanings and 
intrmsic case value, then the selection criteria ought to be content-based. Stake 
(2000a:447) sums up the guiding principle: “Balance and variety are important;
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opportunity to leam is o f primary importance.” Redundancy or data saturation often 
serve as criteria to determine the appropriate sample size; nevertheless, Patton 
(2002:246) insists that the ultimate criterion should be a quality discussion of the 
sampling procedures and decisions, and how the sample’s characteristics might affect 
the findings.
For this research, twenty-five managers were interviewed, each o f them offering a 
basis for an individual case study. Three more people were interviewed for the pilot 
study (introduced in part 4.7). The criterion “manager” was given a loose definition 
to include staff managers, system managers as well as entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, a 
key determinant in the selection o f participants was that they had to supervise at least 
two people, indicating that they hold a distinct authority and responsibility towards 
the organisation as well as other employees. The human aspect of management was 
judged important for the study, thus the opportunity to work in and coordinate teams 
o f people, as well as being accountable for the work direction and outputs are central 
elements o f managerial responsibilities (see Chapter 2, part 2.3.2). A table 
summarising the profile o f  each participant is attached as Appendix VII. Out of the 
twenty-five participants, six were female managers. Being French, I had access to 
both French and British managers, so that fourteen participants are British (or at least 
work in Britain and were interviewed in English), whereas the other eleven are 
French and were interviewed in French. Since the chosen approach is to consider 
each participant as an individual case, the nationality o f the participants is not being 
considered for the analysis, except if comparison can be justified based on strong 
similarities or discrepancies, albeit only in a conceptual rather than a statistical 
viewpoint.
I first contacted managers from local companies in the U.K. that had taken part in a 
previous research project led by my supervisor, but they all declined to participate in 
this study. I then searched amongst my personal contacts for potential participants, 
who then recommended other managers they knew who might be willing to take part 
in the study. This technique, known as the “snowball” effect, is useful in identifying 
information-rich informants, but may also broaden the profile o f the cases studied 
(Patton, 2002). Interestingly, I believe participants felt more at ease talking with me
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as I had been introduced by one o f their friends or colleagues. Indeed, I was less 
perceived as an intruder with a hidden agenda, and the trust barrier was quickly 
dismissed.
4.5.3. M eth o d s  OF Data  A n alysis: Th e  Interpretive  P ro cess
Analysing quahtative data is a challenge because there are no straightforward 
methods to uncover meaning and findings from raw data such as interview 
transcripts. As Patton (2002:434) indicates, the purpose of the enquiry serves as a 
guidance for the direction o f analysis. Breakwell (2006:250) illustrates the process 
saying that:
“You are trying to generate slices of meaningfiil information and 
knowing where to cut into the flow o f information is tricky. It may be 
necessary to try out several cutting positions before you find one which 
reveals relevant results for your research question. Also, remember that 
some o f the best researchers rely on spotting wliat is omitted from what 
the respondent says in order to draw conclusions.”
In the case o f applied qualitative research with a purpose of theoretical contribution, 
the philosophical perspective partly defines what can be done with the data collected. 
Interpretivism is attached to individual meaning, perception and sense-making. What 
matters is the account people make o f their experience and reflection, Rubin and 
Rubin (2005:201) describe the process through which they analyse interviews as 
follow: after transcribing the interviews, concepts and themes are identified and 
coded, with inputs from the literature. Themes can then be either cross-compared or 
used to build a description of the setting. For the study we will adopt this data 
analysis process.
The task of transcribing the interviews is very time-consuming, but essential in 
interpretive studies. The level of precision o f  the transcripts, for instance the choice 
to mark hesitations or to transcribe grammatical mistakes as they have been uttered, 
can be important in the stage o f analysis. Each interview was audio-recorded and 
stored as computer files, before being traiKcribed. All transcriptions were made by 
myself, to ensure consistency in the way data was reported from oral to written form.
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In a few instances, only a partial transcription was made, leaving aside the data that 
was considered irrelevant to the research question (for instance the detailed 
description o f a specific work process the participant uses). I decided to report the 
hesitations and repetitions the participants made during the interview, because they 
inform the case and help build the participant’s profile (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:204). 
Those non-verbal cues are not always indicative o f a character trait, but sometimes 
the tone of the voice, a change in the vocabulary or a long pause or hesitation offer 
significant information on the participant’s reactions and what he or she really feels. 
Furthermore, notes were taken alongside the inteiwiew recording. They include 
reflections I had during the interviews, as well as comments on the respondent’s 
attitude during the interview. These notes complement the transcripts to provide a 
picture o f each respondent and form the basis of each case study. Although not as 
extensive as a research diary, these notes serve a similar purpose and help identify 
the researcher’s assumptions and preconceptions whilst offering new perspectives o f 
analysis (Kelliher, 2005). Each case is then summarised according to what Rubin and 
Rubin (2005:206) prescribe, that is it includes the date, place and length o f the 
interview and a general and brief overview of the discussion.
Denzin (2001:70) proposes six steps that take place in the mterpretive process, 
although his approach applies specifically to interpretive interactionism and is very 
similar to a phenomenological analysis. The steps start with framing the research 
question to surveying the literature, then capturing the phenomenon in context before 
“bracketing” it in a phenomenological reduction manner, then reconstructing the 
phenomenon and recontextualising it. Some elements highlighted by Denzin (2001) 
are relevant to the study undertaken here, but the strong focus on social issues and 
policy-making o f interpretive interactionism makes the overall approach slightly 
inappropriate with regards to our research objectives.
We will therefore adopt the analytical process Rubin and Rubin (2005) reconunend. 
As such, we will follow a rather holistic content analysis, where we will focus on 
interpreting the data and exploring patterns rather than counting down the number of 
mstances such and such themes or words appear. This is in line with Patton’s 
(2002:453) finding that “content analysis is used to refer to any qualitative data
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reduction and sense-making effort that talces a volume of qualitative material and 
attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings. Case studies, for mstance, can 
be content-analyzed.” Each interview represents a case in itself, therefore interviews 
are treated as case material, contextual and with intrinsic value.
The analytical process thus proceeds as follow:
o Interviews are read carefully several times, with note-taking at each stage. 
The first readings are made without referring to the conceptual framework, 
whereas the subsequent readings are informed by the Jungian concepts in an 
attempt to make sense o f the data. This is inspired by the “eyeballing” 
approach described by Willis (2007:298) as becoming familiar with the data 
and writing about what the data says to you. Eyeballmg is not entirely 
opposed to more structured approaches such as content-analysis, but it allows 
the research to not be restricted by categories. The important thing is to 
maintain “the wholeness and [...] the meaningfulness of the data” (Willis, 
2007:298).
o Once themes, concepts or events are recognised, the researcher clarifies their 
meanings and eventually synthesize and elaborate her understanding o f the 
case material.
o Concepts and themes are then coded, that is categorised although this is not 
necessai'ily systematic. The coding is essentially derived from the Jungian 
conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 3. It helps sorting out the data 
and synthesismg it further. Codmg is not an end in itself, but rather can help 
sense-making and interpretation through the identification of patterns of 
meanings. The emphasis is on contextual understanding, not on the 
structuring of the cases as such, 
o Finally, the literature reviewed previously is brought about to make sense of 
the concepts and themes identified through the coding process.
It is important to bear in mind that what has been said is as important as what has not 
been mentioned explicitly by research participants (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:210). 
Concepts that were expected to be found but did not emerge from the interviews are 
nevertheless meaningfiil and should be highlighted and discussed. Concepts and
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themes must be consistently defined in order to help make sense and interpret the 
data (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:216-217). We will rely on the conceptual framework to 
help us determine the boundaries of the concepts and themes whenever appropriate, 
so that the interpretation of the cases and the interviews be as much Jungian as 
possible to allow for a critical examination of the findmgs and of the framework 
itself. In particular, the following themes will be used as a backbone for analysis and 
interpretation: the persona as illustrated by one’s sense o f identity and self-image; the 
quality o f the relationship to others (for example, if one establishes friendly- 
professional or affective-personal relations with work colleagues); the perception o f 
choice in the moral decision, which also characterises elements of moral conscience 
as opposed to ethical conscience; and finally, evidence o f the degree o f 
connectedness to self and, on the contrary, o f compartmentalisation o f the individual. 
Other concepts such as the ego or the shadow will also be discussed if they appear 
relevant to the case content.
Denzin (2001) insists that the interpretation is valid only when it relies on thick 
description. He strongly emphasises that the original voices o f the participants (or the 
subjects, in his terms) be heard and presented to the reader so that the latter can 
experience vicariously the phenomenon and understand the elements of 
interpretation. In that he concurs with Donmoyer (2000) who explains how important 
presenting the reader with sufficient “medium-rare data” is, for instance direct quotes 
fi'om interview transcripts. Donmoyer (2000:64) argues: “There should be sufficient 
medium-rare data so that the reader does not simply assimilate the case being 
described into a theoretical ideal type; rather the reader should have an opportunity to 
enrich his or her understanding o f an ideal type by accommodating the novelty of the 
particular case.” The quality of the interpretation therefore consists in thick 
description, a coherent and meaningful understanding o f the phenomenon, and the 
acknowledgement that it always remains unfinished, amongst other things (Denzin, 
2001:81).
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4 .6 .  E t h i c a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a n d  E v a l u a t i v e  C r i t e r i a
4.6.1. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Ethical considerations in research are particularly important when exploring 
‘sensitive’ or personal issues, and they pervade the whole process o f research (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Although moral issues in management do not seem to pertain 
to the closet anymore, it was envisaged that managers might feel uncomfortable 
talking freely about this theme, as well as opening up then personal aspirations and 
life stories to an unknown researcher. Therefore, informed consent as well as 
guaiantees of confidentiality and anonymity in handling data were identified as 
significant points to address. Furthermore, ethical considerations ought to be central 
to the case study researcher because o f the personal relation established with the 
paiticipant, and consequently the personal character of the data collected (Stake, 
2000a). Willig (2001:82) stresses the responsibility researchers in psychology have 
regarding the effects the study may have on participants, especially when it focuses 
on highly personal or sensitive topics or experiences. It was considered possible that 
the managers interviewed would perceive questions about ethics as deeply personal 
and potentially traumatic. The level o f trust and comfort during the interview were 
conceived as two important elements to ehcit personal accounts from the 
respondents. In preparing the mterviews, these issues were addressed and I 
endeavoured to establish a relaxed and open discussion with the participants. The 
potentially stressfril questions were carefully worded. Demonstrating sensitivity and 
empathy (within limits) was also considered important to make participants feel at 
ease and to encourage them to open up.
Informed consent implies that participants fully understand what they are set to 
participate in, and do so voluntarily (Kvale, 1996). In the case o f this research, when 
potential participants were contacted, a brief description of what the research was 
about was included, in order for the participants to make an informed decision (see 
Appendix IV). Additionally, preceding the first interview, the overall research 
purpose and themes were explained again, and the participants were offered the 
possibility to withdraw from the research if they wished to do so. A consent form.
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summarising the objectives and process o f the study, was signed by all participants 
(see Appendix V).
Confidentiality implies the need to protect the identity o f the interviewees at two 
levels: to make sure that they cannot be identified by name or other characteristics 
(including job title or position), and to make sure that they cannot be traced by the 
quotes used in the data analysis. It is sometimes acknowledged by research 
paiticipants themselves (Arksey and Knight, 1999) that complete confidentiality and 
anonymity is impossible to achieve, especially in the case of loosely structured 
interviews. The best researchers can do, then, is to change names and places as much 
as possible without altering too much the quality of the data (Miles and Huberman,
1994). In the present research, all participants have been given aliases, and the name 
of the organisations they work for is not mentioned. Whenever required, elements 
that could help identify the organisation were altered or deleted in direct quotations 
in order to protect the confidentiality and anonymity o f the participants, providing 
the meaning of the quote was not altered by such procedure (Arksey and Knight, 
1999:134). Integrity during the research process and at the stage o f reporting the 
conclusions is critical in ensuring the quality of the study, and requii es the researcher 
to be self-reflective, self-critical, and aware of the limits o f her approach and her 
control over the research elements.
4.6,2. Cr e d ib iu t y  OF THE Rese a r c h : Criteria  o f  E valuation
This study follows the tenets of interpretivism iu aiming to understand people’s view 
of the social world in order to make sense of the phenomenon researched. It 
welcomes interpretation and acknowledges that social reality is the product of 
multiple accounts. Research value derives from the internal coherence and systematic 
process of data collection and interpretation, and generalisation is sought at the 
theoretical rather than statistical level. The purpose is not to achieve objectivity in a 
positivist sense, but to uncover the meaning which research participants attribute to 
the phenomenon and articulate this meaning within a theoretical framework which 
further enriches the interpretation and understanding. In this study, the puipose is to 
uncover the meaning research participants attribute to the self in their moral
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experiences, and articulate this meaning within the Jungian framework o f morality 
introduced in Chapter 3. The findings will possess contextual value which in turn 
bears theoretical value because o f a systematic, in-depth questioning o f the 
participants’ meaning-making processes -  systematic in the sense that it was guided 
by a clear theoretical framework, and in-depth because it entailed sensitive and 
consistent probing of participants’ responses.
Qualitative researchers in general, and interpretivists in particular, do not assess 
research in terms o f validity and reliability in so far as these concepts are positivist. 
Yet, these concepts still constitute the definitive evaluation criteria for many 
researchers, including interpretivists. Symon and Cassell (2006:311) insist that 
criticism only makes sense providing “the critic realizes and acknowledges that they 
simply do not share the same ontological and epistemological beliefs as the research 
being criticized”. Criteria to assess the quality of research are important, but the 
questions and items should be relevant to the research orientation and its epistemic 
position. Validity and reliability have therefore been adapted to suit qualitative 
enquiries better (Willig, 2001). Validity is principally about ensuring that what is 
being measured or explored is indeed what is aimed to be measured or explored. 
Reliability in qualitative research reflects concerns about consistency, 
trustworthiness of the interpretations and conclusions, and authenticity o f the data 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999). Consistency entails an endeavour o f transparency in 
providing account of how the researcher conducted the study, including the findings 
and analysis stages. Trustworthiness is about ensuring that what is being presented is 
“a fair representation of things as informants see them” (Arksey and Knight, 
1999:54). If inconsistency arises, this should be acknowledged and dealt with openly. 
Finally, authenticity addresses the question o f the implication o f the researcher in 
what is being researched.
Maxwell (1996:88) describes validity as “consist[ing] of the strategies you use to 
rule out these threats [to the credibility of your conclusions and propositions].” He 
identifies tliree types of tlireat to the validity o f qualitative research: threat to valid 
description of data; threat to interpretation; and threat to the theoretical validity o f the 
research. The last two points are usually addressed under the notion of reliability of
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the research fmdings. Validity at the level o f data collection implies that the 
researcher must ensure that the questions she asks are indeed targeting the research 
question. Many things can alter the validity of the research prior, during and after the 
interview process, hence it is necessary to be aware of these risks and ti*y to prevent 
them or at least reduce their liability.
Arksey and Knight (1999:52) list several tips whereby validity in interviewing can be 
enhanced. These include the “rapport” established between researcher and 
participant, the completion o f pilot studies testing out the interview questions and 
format, relevant prompts to encourage participants to clarify their thoughts, and the 
interview setting and timing. In this particular study, the completion of pilot 
interviews constituted an attempt to increase the validity o f  the findings. The 
adjustments made afterwards are explained in detail in part 4.7.2. Tlie interview 
prompts were carefully prepaied and efforts were made during the interviews to 
encourage participants to be as precise and thorough in their comments as possible. 
Besides, all interviews were audio-recorded in order to have an accurate transcription 
of what the participants said. If  doubt arises regarding a particular element or 
statement of an interview, the recording can easily clarify it.
The issue of reliability is more complex, especially in interpretivist research studies, 
because it questions the relation between the researcher, the research process and the 
interpretation o f the data collected. A major threat in mterview-based studies is the 
issue of bias. Saunders et al. (2003) stress the threat of bias on the part o f the 
interviewer (for example imposing their views and words onto the participant) as 
well as the participant (for instance the socially desirable responses). They propose 
several ways to limit such occurrences, including the preparation and schedule of the 
interview even in cases o f unstructured interviewing; the presentation, appearance 
and attitude o f the researcher during the interview; and the options available in terms 
of data recording. Breakwell (2006:248) also points out the risks associated with 
“interviewer effects”. It may consist in slight changes o f interviewing style or 
interpretation of the questions firom part o f the interviewer, which can seriously alter 
the reliability of the findings. It can be limited by having the same researcher lead all 
the interviews, for there is less deviation and more consistency in the way interviews
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are led. Additionally, Breakwell (2006:249) suggests that audio-taping is a cheap and 
easy way to “exclude interviewer bias from the recording of responses” as opposed 
to simple note-taking for example.
Gomm (2004:177-180) associates accountability with credibility o f the research 
interview, and considers that enough material and information needs to be shown in 
order to demonstrate how the data was produced and how ‘accurately’ the reality was 
reflected. He shares with Denzin (2001), Donmoyer (2000) and Maxwell (1996) the 
belief that providing rich exceipts from the data collected is necessary to assess the 
reliability of the researcher’s interpretation. Member checks is a favourite in 
qualitative research to enhance the validity o f the research. It is designed to rule out 
possible mis interpretation o f data, but it is often overstated because participants’ 
feedback is just another interpretation and not a truth-revealing assessment 
(Maxwell, 1996:94). They can be taken in as fiirther data, and they certainly can 
inform the researcher’s own analysis of the data, but they are not ‘more objective’ 
than the researcher’s interpretation. This illustrates how the issue of accuracy is 
problematic in interpretivist research using loosely stmctured interviews. Indeed, 
interpretation takes place at many instances during the interview itself. Since an 
interpretivist perspective recognises that the researcher paiticipates in shaping the 
research, the search for authenticity consists in the researcher’s critical reflection on 
her role, prejudices, expectations, and influence on the research outcomes.
Triangulation is another all-time favourite method supposed to make fiizzy 
qualitative research more valid and reliable. It consists in combining methods to 
collect or analyse data, in order to limit the threat of bias. Patton (2002:247) 
summarises where triangulation stands: “Triangulation is ideal. It can also be 
expensive.” Complementing interviews with participants observation and document 
analysis is an example of triangulation. However, this is not always possible, 
especially when the topic o f the enquiry is as personal as moral experiences and self- 
knowledge. There is no public document that could inform on the personal 
experiences of managers and their rational and emotional responses to moral issues, 
not to mention their understanding of self. Observation seems more adequate, yet 
Maxwell (1996:94) quotes Fielding and Fielding (1986) who question the validity o f
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triangulation on the basis that complementary methods can themselves be similarly 
biased. Patton (2002:248) points out that the purpose of triangulation is not to prove 
consistency but to test for consistency. Consequently, what matters is the recognition 
of apparently contradictory or odd findings, and their careful examination. Being 
open to contradiction and ready to discuss it is an equally effective way to improve 
the validity of the enquiry.
Eisner (1997 in Willis, 2007:166-167) proposes to replace traditional concepts of 
validity and reliability with three criteria more adapted to interpretive enquiries: 
coherence, consensus and instrumental utility. Coherence is the extent to which the 
research makes sense as a whole. Consensus refers to how other researchers and 
readers believe the research findings and interpretations are consistent with their own 
experience or their own reading o f the material presented. This does not imply that 
the conclusions are true, but rather that it illustrates a certain social phenomenon 
experienced by a group o f people. Finally, instrumental utility implies tliat the 
research should help our understanding of a situation or an experience. In any case, 
research should be assessed insightfirlly. Efforts should be made to provide sufficient 
information alongside the researcher’s interpretation, out o f respect for both the 
research participants and the readers. Nevertheless, it is equally necessary to be 
modest as to the possibility to lead completely valid and rehable research. Stake 
(2000a:441) reminds us of the reality of case research: “Even when empathie and 
respectful o f each person’s realities, the researcher decides what the case’s own story 
is, or at least what will be included in the report. More will be pursued than was 
volunteered. Less will be reported than was learned.”
4.6.3. REFIEXIVITY
Reflexivity refers to the degree to which the researcher is aware and conscious o f 
how her beliefs might be projected onto the research itself, that is tlirough the 
questions, the methods, the interpretation, the conclusions drawn (Langdridge, 2007). 
Phenomenology tries to limit, if not avoid, such inference by recommending a 
“bracketing off” of the researcher’s preconceptions, however this is not entirely 
achievable, not least because we are not necessarily aware of all our preconceptions
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(else we would all be individuated people in the Jungian sense). Furthermore, 
mterpretation makes sense within the cultural, social context of the researcher, 
therefore to cut off the interpretation from its context, its roots, would seriously 
reduce its richness and meaningfulness (see Donmoyer, 2000).
Fontana and Frey (2000:661) insist that reflexivity is not given enough consideration 
by researchers using interviews. They denounce a common belief that:
“the researcher is neutral, imbiased, and ‘invisible’. The data reported 
tend to flow nicely, there are no contradictory data and no mention of 
what data were excluded and/or why. Improprieties never happen and the 
main concern seems to be the proper, if unreflexive, filing, analysing, and 
reporting o f events.”
They thus welcome what van Maanen calls the “confessional style”, and explain that: 
“Although perhaps somewhat overdone at time, these ‘confessions’ are very 
valuable, as they make the readers aware o f the complex and cumbersome nature of 
interviewing people in their natural settings and lend a tone of reahsm and veracity to 
studies” (Fontana and Frey, 2000:661). Their concern echoes that o f Eisner (1997 in 
Willis, 2007:164) who encourages qualitative researchers to affirm their ‘I ’ and 
“display [their] signatures” in enquiry reports. Maxwell (1996:91) refers to integrity, 
as opposed to indifference, as the key component of validity in qualitative research.
Some consider that affirmation of the self o f the researcher constitutes a political act, 
whereas others believe it all depends on the subject and warn researchers not to 
drown the participants’ voice in their own subjectivity (Fine et al., 2000). However, 
if  one is careful to respect the respondents, reflexivity can contribute to the integrity 
of the research and interpretation. It may actually allow the researcher to provide the 
reader with an honest account o f her preconceptions and her ‘path’ so far. In order 
for the reader to understand and assess the researcher’s interpretation, it is important 
for the reader to know where the researcher comes from. The researcher should 
endeavour to disclose those elements that led her to make tliose choices o f 
interpretation, and to explain what her interpretation o f herself is according to the 
phenomenon examined.
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I shall therefore stress tliat ray reading o f the interviews collected is rooted in a 
personal understanding and interpretation o f Jungian concepts and thoughts, 
mformed by a reading of Jung’s work and that of commentators of his work. I am 
aware that my interpretation takes as given some of Jung’s concepts, in particular his 
view o f the psyche as divided between conscious and unconscious, and the 
importance o f the process o f individuation and the quest for wholeness through the 
archetype o f the self. Therefore my suggestions and conclusions are meaningful 
providing the reader accepts to read them within the Jungian framework I work in 
and that I have exposed in details in the previous chapter.
4.7 . T h e  P il o t  St u d y
4.7.1. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
The main purpose o f a pilot study is to test the data collection strategy in relation to 
the research question (Breakwell, 2006:240). It also enables the researcher to identify 
emergent concepts that may not have been brought up by the literature review but 
that are significant to the participants. In line with an iterative process, the researcher 
can at this stage re-work the research protocol and the interview protocol to include 
those emerging themes that may elicit further elements to understand the 
phenomenon.
The pilot study was scheduled to take place over June and July 2006. Its format 
consisted in two successive one-hour-long semi-stmctured interviews with three 
first-line or middle managers working in retail organisations. Two participants, Beth 
and Chris, were personally known by the researcher, and the third person 
interviewed, Adam, was contacted after being recommended by Chris. As explained 
in part 4.6.1, the names of the participants have been changed to respect their 
confidentiality. As specified in Table 1 below, all tliree participants are in their mid- 
30s, with a relatively stable personal situation. All o f them have had previous 
managerial experience in the same sector (i.e. catering and retail respectively) before 
their current job, but Beth has a much more varied background doing other jobs, 
notably teaching and recmitment consultancy.
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Table 1. P articip an ts’ profile  -  P ilot S tudy
N»ne Position Date^lace of interview
Adam
System  
Manager - 
Catering 
Industry
Part 1 : June 
2006 in 
coffee shop
studied catering management, worked In several pubs as a 
manager before starting his current job. Has been working there 
for 7 years. Ambitious, relatively self-confident In his abilities, 
career Is Important but so  Is his social network. In a relationship, 
no children.
Part 2; July 
2006 In office
Beth
Assistant 
Manager - 
Retail
Part 1 ; June 
2006 In office
Studied literature, then first went Into book selling before 
becoming an English teacher. Worked abroad for a few years, 
then becam e a recruitment consultant. Went back to book selling 
to gain more knowledge of the Industry. Sensitive, quiet, she  
wants her job and her other activities to be meaningful. Married, 
no children.
Part 2: July 
2006 in office
Chris
Executive 
Manager - 
Retail
Part 1 ; June 
2006 In 
coffee shop
Left school early, worked In book selling and climbed the ladder 
to becom e manager whilst studying management part-time. 
Ambitious, rather anxious and Impatient, focused on what he 
wants to achieve, personally and socially. Married with children.
Part 2; July 
2006 In 
coffee shop
Il was decided to interview each manager twice to test whether the attitude of the 
participants differed from one interview to the other. Narrative research explains how 
important it may be to establish a relationship with the participant to encourage 
spontaneity, honesty and personal stories (Wengraf, 2001; Murray, 2003). Because 
the research focuses on moral issues, a theme usually considered ‘sensitive’, it was 
thought that it might take more time for the researcher to gain the trust of the 
participants. Hence, during the second meeting, it was expected that participants 
might be more willing to speak openly about personal issues. However, such 
precaution proved somehow irrelevant, in so far as participants were quite happy to 
discuss the issue of ethics and their personal development and aspirations during the 
first interview. Therefore, the two-stage interview process was abandoned and the 
main study consisted in single interviews. The two pilot interview protocols were 
merged to form a single interview protocol for the main study, keeping the questions 
and prompts that worked ‘best’ and elicited the most interesting accounts from 
participants (see Appendix I, II and III). Both interview protocols were designed in
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accordance with the sub-themes underlying the main research question (see Chapter 
1, part 1.2).
All interviews were scheduled during working hours, and the respondents allocated 
time to participate in the interview. Although it is recommended to interview 
participants in a quiet room that allows for comfort and confidentiality, as well as a 
good quality recording, this is not always possible in practice. Often, researchers are 
in a position where they have to accommodate the needs of the participants rather 
than the participants being at the disposal of the researcher. Hence, when the 
respondents were unable to receive me in their office, the interview took place in a 
coffee shop, which allowed for relative confidentiality yet also provided a rather 
noisy background which made the recording unclear at times. Minor interruptions 
occurred a couple o f times, which also might have prevented the respondent from 
feeling totally relaxed.
Each interview was tape-recorded, and was later fully transcribed by myself to 
provide the basis for analysis, bearing in mind that a transcript is itself an 
interpretation of the participant’s account (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Audio-taping 
is a popular method for recording interviews (Breakwell, 2006) because it frees the 
researcher ftom taking extensive notes, and it allows conversation to flow better and 
the researcher to be more alert to what the respondent says. Also, audio-taping 
facilitates the recording o f rhytlim, tone o f voice and hesitations that might add 
richness to the data at the stage of analysis (Arksey and Knight, 1999). The 
respondents were explicitly asked if they agreed to be recorded, and were offered the 
possibility to pause the recording at any time, were they to feel uncomfortable. 
However, none o f the respondents seemed overly nervous about the tape-recorder, 
and all talked seemingly openly and honestly. The transcripts were examined to 
decide whether fiirther adjustments were necessary before the start of the main study. 
These adjustments, already alluded to, are detailed below.
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4.7.2. METHODOLOGICAL FINDINGS AND ADJUSTMENTS
The main problem identified after the series of pilot interviews related to the ‘critical 
incident’ type o f question or prompt. More precisely, the participants found it hard to 
think about an example o f moral dilemma they experienced, either at work or outside 
work. Because the participants were otherwise open to discuss matters relating to 
ethics and their moral sense, it was concluded that the problem came from either the 
wording o f the question or insufficient tune for respondents to reflect on the 
question. Consequently, the question was reworded to be much more straightforward, 
and participants to the main study were clearly informed prior to the interview that 
one topic of discussion would be a moral dilemma they experienced at work.
A second, rather interesting finding was the fact that managers did not feel 
uncomfortable discussing personal issues relating to their view o f ethics and their 
personal expectations at work and in life. It was therefore decided that over-caution 
was not necessary, and that in the main study, the key concepts that articulate the 
research question, in particular morality and self, could be introduced in the 
discussion more directly than they were in the pilot study. The respondents proved 
quite self-reflective and were surprisingly honest about their thoughts and their 
behaviour. They did not seem to provide “tales o f self’ but rather described how they 
perceive themselves and what matters to them work-wise and in their personal life. I 
already knew two respondents prior to the interview, which may have helped 
establish a higher degree of trust during the interview (see Fontana and Frey, 
2000:655). Yet, I did not personally know Adam, but he seemed as relaxed and open 
as Beth and Claris during the discussion. The selection o f participants for the main 
study was similarly based on personal contacts and snowballing recommendation. 
The fact that I could introduce myself to potential participants through the 
recommendation o f one of their acquaintances or colleagues certainly helped ease the 
anxiety generally felt at first meetings and before interviews. They also were more 
inclined to contribute to the research as best as they could and tell their stories than if 
I had been entirely external to their social or personal network. This choice proved 
beneficial overall, especially because I nonetheless managed to meet people with 
different backgrounds and different profiles.
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As explained before, the two-stage interview process was abandoned. A strategy 
based on a single but longer interview proved both as efficient and less time- 
consuming. Besides, the time constraints of the potential main study participants 
would have seriously limited the final number of people available for two 
consecutive interviews. The interview protocol was reworked and tliree statements 
were added for comments at the end o f the interview. This aimed to break the 
monotony o f a semi-directive interview format, and was designed to stimulate the 
participants’ reflection on the concepts of self and personal aspirations in life. This 
change of style proved valuable in revealing personal aspects of the respondents. 
Most of them were surprised by the format and curious about the statements. Their 
comments were sometimes unexpected and surprising, and they opened up fiirther at 
this stage, providing a greater insight into their perception of the world.
4 . 8 .  S u m m a r y
This chapter described the ontological and epistemo logical traditions adopted for the 
research, and introduced the methodological choices for the collection and analysis 
of data. We highlighted the characteristics of interpretivism and discussed the 
rationale for adopting an interpretive strategy of analysis in relation to the conceptual 
framework introduced in the previous chapter. We also addressed the potential 
ethical issues attached to this type o f research, before discussing the various criteria 
of ‘good quality’ research. Finally, the pilot study was described to illustrate and 
justify the methodological choices. The following chapter introduces the main study 
and proceeds with analysing its findings.
134
C h a p t e r  5 -  A n a l y s in g  C a s e s  o f  M o r a l  E x p e r ie n c e  I
“Because, in last resort, it is always singular individualities 
that make a society ; it is always singular individualities 
that act and not collective abstractions, even though men 
argue they simply obeyed orders because they were caught 
in the system.”
Michel Terestchenko 
Un Si Fragile Vernis d 'Humanité
5 .1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
This chapter introduces the context o f the main study and discusses cases o f moral 
experiences collected from managers. The purpose of the analysis is to examine the 
extent to which the sense o f self is relevant in understanding how managers 
experience moral issues, in relation to the Jungian framework presented earlier. 
Seven par ticipants have been selected and examined as case material. This chapter 
focuses on four participants who are characterised by a strong persona, which affect 
their sense of self. In different ways, these participants demonstrate a volatile 
connection to their self, and at most a partial sensitivity to ethical conscience. As a 
consequence, their ability to know what they should do and to act upon tliis 
knowledge is inconsistent. This is discussed in details in part 5.3 whilst part 5.2 
provides a general introduction to the overall cases and the selection process. The 
remaining three cases are presented in the next chapter.
5.2 . M a i n  S t u d y  P a r t i c i p a n t s
The list of all interviewed participants is included as Appendix VII. Fourteen 
participants, including five women, were based in England and interviewed in 
English, whereas eleven participants, including one woman, worked in France and 
were interviewed in French. Most participants worked in different companies, but six 
of them belonged to the same company but worked in different departments. All 
interviews took place between the end o f November 2006 and mid-April 2007. Due
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to the participants’ time constraints, most interviews took place at their workplace, 
although in a few instances we met at their house or in a public place. The latter 
choice was unfortunate in so far as the recording conditions were relatively poor and, 
as a consequence, I discarded these interviews because too many passages were 
inaudible and the transcription was too incomplete. This was the case for Brian, 
Gillian and Helena. In other mstances, the interview took place in conditions that 
seriously lacked the confidentiality expected to elicit honest answers fi'om the 
respondents. Thus in Fiona, Kyle and Quentin’s cases, the interview took place in too 
public a place so that the discussion was often disrupted and the respondents could 
not focus on the questions and take time to reflect on the themes discussed. These 
interviews were also discarded.
Out o f the nineteen remaining interviews, seven were selected to be analysed and 
discussed in depth. The cases were selected based on their greater richness o f data, 
their relevance in terms o f the themes explored, and their typicality as compared with 
the other cases. The remaining twelve interviews are only briefly presented at the end 
of the next chapter. The extent to which some of the participants could be considered 
“managers” was also debatable. For instance, John, Nick or OHver are first and 
foremost entrepreneurs or craftsmen, and only incidentally do they manage a team of 
employees. Their roles certainly possess distinctive managerial aspects, but their 
primary interest is technical achievement rather than the management of the team per  
se. Similarly, Ryan or Xavier are primarily concerned with the technical aspects of 
their work and only secondly are they managers. Teamwork is an important part of 
their job, therefore they are expected to know how to manage the people who work 
with them and whom they supemse. However, their discretion in managing the 
resources is somewhat bound to the technical aspects. This is not to say that their 
experiences are of a lesser value than those o f the participants whose case is 
discussed in details. Rather, we have chosen to present at length those interviewees 
whose job offers a wider perspective on management. Finally the analysis of the 
cases of Charlie, Tim, Louis, Samuel, Yohann, Will and Zack is only summarised 
because other participants provided fuller accounts and more complete illustrations 
of their experiences. The next part examines the first four selected cases.
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5 .3. C a s e s  o f  M o r a l  E x p e r i e n c e  I  
5.3.1. A m y
Ainy works as a Senior account manager for a company that provides direct 
marketing services. Although she studied business along with Japanese at university, 
she was not at first interested in a business career as such and worked as an assistant 
to a Personal Assistant for a while, before stepping into the direct marketing industry 
following the advice o f a colleague who had worked in this industry. At the time o f 
the interview, she had been working for the company for about six years. She is 
married and has one daughter.
Persona and Self-Image
Amy is direct and ‘tells it as it is’. She claims she knows herself very well and that 
she does not change her behaviour or her ways of doing things along with the 
circumstances;
I’m alw ays true to m yself. I know exactly  w hat my problem s are, I know  
w here m y dow nfalls are, I a lso  know  w hat I’m very good  at. Hem , and I think 
it’s  really important actually for your self-confid en ce to  be true to yourself. I 
think if you’re not true to  yourself, then you don’t know what you’re good  or 
bad at, or know w hat you n eed  to b e  aw are o f with other peop le. Like I can  
be very blunt and very frank, and I would tell you like it is. T here's certain 
things I wouldn’t tell you, that I wouldn’t say , but m ost of th e  tim e I am, 
and...I'm  like that with m yself. [ . . . ] . ..I think peop le alw ays know, they alw ays 
know d eep  down actually w hat’s  real. It’s  just that they ch o o se  to b elieve  it 
or not.
I'm alw ays m yself. I don’t think I could work som ew h ere w here I’m not 
naturally m e. H em ...I’m m ore m e at h om e than work, obviously. But 
b eca u se  I’v e  b een  at m y com pany for such  a long time, I can  just -  I do and 
I shouldn’t, I can  g e t really angry and I’d just tell -  I just get angry for the  
very w orst...on ly  b eca u se  I feel com fortable with the peop le I work with -  if I 
didn’t fee l com fortable, of cou rse I wouldn’t, and I probably w ouldn’t get so
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angry. It’s  b e c a u se  I know that I can  get angry that I let m y se lf ...so  I’m pretty 
much w hoever I am w herever I go.
Yet despite her claims that she is always herself, she admits that she “changes” her 
behaviour when she meets with clients or more senior managers in the company, but 
this is because, in her view, she ‘has to’ change, hiiplying that it is a business 
requirement.
T he w ay that 1 sp ea k ...y o u  know, w hen  you’re natural, you might h ave  
stupid thoughts or stupid q u estion s which you kinda think “oh ...I probably 
should know th e  answ er to  this but I'll a sk  it anyw ay’’, or you know, you’re 
not worried about looking or em barrassing yourself. But w hen  i’m with 
p eop le I’m not com fortable with, then it b eco m es h e m ...“I really don’t want 
that person to think le s s  o f m e or think that I’m a stupid, you know, account 
manager". S o , you know, you  h ave  to -  you pick your w ords s o  that you  
m ake yourself s e e m  m ore intelligent than you m aybe are, or to  g ive  that oral 
con fid en ce...an d  that e v en  though you ’re not really sure w hat you ’re talking 
about, the w ay that you com m unicate m akes you se e m  like you do. 
W hereas if I’m with m y clients, m y friends whom  I’m speaking with, I could  
go “hem , 1 don’t understand that, w hat d o  you m ean ?” -  you know, like, you  
can do that. But with m ore senior account m anagers, you’d n ever  d o  that.
You’d probably say  “could you expand on that a bit m ore?’’, you know.
In fact, Ainy is very much concerned with her image, at least professionally, but she 
justifies this concern as if it was a business need rather than a personal need. Yet, it is 
rather about what gives her the confidence to perform and establish good working 
relationships with the many people she interacts with.
[..,] it’s  all about perception. Even if, ev en  if I don’t know, b e c a u se  I’m 
representing m y com pany, if I don’t know som ething, you h ave  to appear a s  
if to the other p eop le  that you do, b eca u se , you know, just that im pression -  
c a u se  then you can g o  out and co m e  back hom e and find out about it. But 
you h ave  to g ive them  the confid en ce that they can trust you and you know  
what you’re talking about. C au se  if you g o  “well, oh. I’m not quite sure’’ then  
obviously it’s  “gosh , sh e  works from what, for m y com pany, and s h e  d o e sn ’t 
ev en  know what s h e ’s  talking about!” -  so  then it looks badly on the  
com pany. C au se  you are th e  com pany representative at the end of th e  day.
138
Ultimately, her career is very important to her, but she seems to have an ambiguous 
relationship to her job and to work in general, suggesting some contradictory feelings 
on what she wants and who she wants to be. For example, she describes herself as a 
“glorified secretary” but at the same time she complains that she lacks junior staff to 
take care of the administrative part of her job.
I think that the skills that I have, anyone e ls e  could do. T here’s  not like a  
sp ecia lised  skill - for exam ple you work in com puting you h ave  to know how  
they work, or you know, if you w ere a  doctor or a lawyer or som eth ing. This 
is just like general stuff that if you w ere taught how  to d o  it, I would just tell 
you "this is  w hat you h a v e  to  do”, you  could do it. If you h a v e  initiative and  
com m on se n s e , then you could d o  it too. [...] it’s  not a sp ecia lised  thing. And 
often I just think -  som etim es I do think I’m like a  glorified secretary. Apart 
from that, y e s , 1 will contribute, like I sa y  ’I don’t think you should talk to 
th e se  people; you should  be talking to th ese  p eop le in th is w ay or that w ay’.
Y es, I’ll do that. But actually, all I do  is m ake things happen. You know, and  
that’s  what secretaries do, right? T hey organise, m ake, book m eetings, you  
know. I d o  all of that, and I’ll d o  th e  other bits, which is ...a n d  m aybe it’s  
b eca u se  I don’t h a v e  en ou gh  junior support, c a u se  really w hat I should be  
doing Is getting the p eop le  w ho are m ore junior to actually organise the 
m eetings and do  all th e  day to day things that I don’t h ave  to, but b eca u se  
on the account I work on it’s  s o  hands-on, you h ave  to do everything  
yourself, you know, you don’t h ave  tim e to get other p eop le to  do things for 
you. W e h ave secretaries that can  help us, but by the tim e I tell them  how  to 
do it and w hat to do. I’d do it m yself, I would h ave d on e it.
She is equally irritated when her manager actually treats her as a secretary in spite o f 
her claims that her job is closer to that of a secretary than o f an account manager. Her 
reaction underlines her strong feeling about this behaviour.
[...] if I’m really busy, and then m y b o ss  sa y s  to m e “Am y can  you do th is?” 
and that’s  som eth ing I know h e can  do him self, that p is se s  m e  off. And I look  
at him and I g o  “But you know w here that is, you know w here that is on the  
drawer, w hy are you asking m e  to find it for you whilst I h ave  all th o se  other 
things to  d o?”, and I do talk to  him like that. Not quite in that tone, but I say  
som ething like that. And h e s a y s  to  m e “But you know, it’s  so  m uch quicker if 
you do it”, you  know, w hatever! [laugh]
139
Another example of a contradiction in her self-perception relates to motherhood. She 
explains that having her child made her realise that work was not so important after 
all, but she nevertheless felt eager to start working again so as to have a status of her 
own. The way people perceive her is very important to her self-confidence and self­
esteem, which in Jungian ternis illustrates a greater focus on the persona than the 
self.
Working, y e s , it’s  very important that I have my sort of own identity, my own 
life. And after having m y daughter, you know, for that first year I had just 
b ecom e the m other of this child, and then ever s in ce  I ca m e  back to work, 
this -  in March this year, I am  m uch happier b eca u se  I kinda - 1 h ave  m y life 
with her, and then I g o  out and I do my thing and I’m m e, and I’m working.
And, you know, it’s  two sep arate  things. And that’s  quite important to, to  
have that, b e c a u se  you know, you’re not v iew ed  a s  just that child’s  mother, 
or a  housevwfe or som ething. You’re actually v iew ed  a s  quite an important 
person or quite a key m em ber of a  team  or, you know - 1 know that m y client 
relies on m e to  get things d one, sh e  trusts m e, sh e  know s that I’ll do it for 
her, so  that’s  quite important I think for your self-confidence, hem , yeah , your 
se lf-esteem .
[,..] I’v e  b een  for so  long at the com pany I know what or how  the things are, 
but then that c o m e s  with being m ore mature and sin ce  I’v e  had my daughter.
I’v e  g o n e  back to work, I know that I h ave b een  very different. And I’m much 
m ore confident, and I don’t really scare  if I look stupid som etim es. I just ask  
the q u estion s anyw ay, b ec a u se  I think, m aybe, you realise that actually work 
isn’t th e  m ost important thing. Actually m y daughter is the m ost important 
thing. S o  you kinda -  it's alm ost like, I fee l like It’s  op en ed  m e up a bit more.
I’m not so  like “okay, I talk bloody silly things” -  that wouldn’t matter 
assuredly.
These excerpts suggest that Amy is maybe not as clear-cut as she believes herself to 
be. On the contrary, she contradicts herself on several occasions in terms o f her 
behaviour, her expectations or the significance o f what others think about her. We 
could say that Amy may confuse who she is with who she wants to be. In fact, she 
seems to confuse the self with the persona, whilst the latter becomes predominant in 
her relation to the world.
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R elation sh ip  to  O thers
Like many other managers interviewed, Amy is extremely attentive to her clients’ 
needs and feedback. She appraises herself mainly out of the feedback she receives 
from her clients and colleagues. Besides her colleagues at the company she works 
for, she also tends to develop close relationships with the people working at other 
companies whose account she manages. She actually feels like she is “an extension 
o f their team” and feels comfortable enough to communicate in a non-fonnal manner 
with them. It is unclear whether her relationships to her colleagues, both within and 
outside her company, is friendly in a purely professional manner or whether she 
develops some affective bond with them. Wliat is significant, however, is the 
importance others have in Amy’s construction of her self-image.
I think a s  you just mature, you b eco m e m ore confident, I think you b eco m e  
m ore like that. I know that I'm definitely m ore true in the last 2  or 3  years, but 
that’s  m aybe b e c a u se  i'm com fortable with w ho I am , you know ...you  know,
I’m married, my family are nearby, you know. I’m very confident in my 
relation with m y husband and in the relation w e h a v e  with his family, all of 
that, which m ea n s that all the other p eop le  that live out there, it d o e sn ’t really 
matter to m e, s o  I can  b e  com pletely, h em ...I know w ho I am, and therefore  
it d o e sn ’t m atter w hat other p eop le  think a s  long a s  I’m true to m yself, then  
that’s  fine. And if I d isagree  vwth som eth ing, well it d o e sn ’t really matter 
w hether you d isagree  or not, or w hether you a gree  with m e or, you know, 
w h atever ...
Y eah, I think if you’re, you’re com fortable with yourself, or with your life or 
other p eop le that you’re with g iv e  you confidence, then I think you can  b e  
m ore true.
We already stressed how the perception others had of her gave Amy confidence and 
helped her build her self-esteem. In the excerpt above, she once again displays some 
level o f inconsistency when it comes to the importance of others in her life. She 
acknowledges that she has matured and feels more confident m herself than before, 
and that having a family has contributed to this change. In fact, she does not care that
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much about other people’s opinions anymore because she is surrounded by people 
who help her feel confident. Yet, if the content of the relationship to others has 
changed, moving fiom a dependency on a larger group of others to a smaller group 
o f closed ones, Amy still relies on others to find the confidence and comfort to be 
who she feels she is.
Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Contradiction equally characterizes Amy’s moral perception. She seems a priori 
conscious that her job is partly manipulative and not always “morally right”.
S o m e  of th e  p eop le  in m y com pany h ave  to  work with them , but they just 
want to sa y  ‘no, I w on’t work with th is com pany’, b eca u se  they know they are 
so  awful. You know, but obviously, it’s  their job, they can ’t really sa y  no. If 
you’re high enough , and you’v e  b een  w th  the com pany for long then you  
can probably sa y  ‘sorry, no’. S o  th ere are things like this. T here’s  this guy  
w ho ca m e  in and a s  soon  a s  h e  joined, h e  had to work on that account. And 
h e didn’t really want to  but h e  couldn’t really say  no, h e  w a s only just new.
In this excerpt, Amy was discussing the case of a client financial company involved 
in barely legal activities consisting in lending money to people with a poor credit 
history at very high interest rates. Although she is not involved with that particular 
company (“For me, on a work basis, I don’t really have any moral judgments to 
make, you know, balance to make, because I don’t work on anything that’s o f that 
nature.”), she feels it raises some serious moral issues. However Amy somehow 
justifies working on this “aw M ” account by the absence of a choice. Yet is this a 
moral justification for contributing to something one condemns?
If I had -  there’s  o n e  client that w e  h a v e  to work on, that d o e s  that financial 
thing I w a s  say in g ...I  would h a v e  to find out m ore about it first, but w hat I 
hear is that it’s  really, it’s  obviously hardly moral what they do. I w ould try my 
b est to g e t out of it, and m ake m yself s e e m  like I’m just the w orst p ossib le  
account m anager that could work on it, b eca u se  “I don’t h a v e  a  financial 
background, you know, what would I do, you know, dadadada” or “I hate  
fiymg, you knov/’ -  I would h a v e  to  m ake m y w ay out of it, c a u se  you h ave  to
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fly to  Prague all the tim e for m eetin gs -  “I h a v e  a fear of flying, I ca n ’t do it”.
I’d lie and...and ultimately I su p p o se  if I h a v e  to ...I  probably w ould refu se  to  
do it. But then, b e c a u se  I’m s o  far rem oved with th e se  people, I know what 
they’re doing. But b e c a u se  I don’t s e e  th e  actual effects it h a s  on  th e s e  poor 
people, it probably d o e sn ’t actually a m a ss  that m uch to  m e. U n less  I can  
actually s e e  w hat’s  happening, then it d o e sn ’t matter. [...] it’s  this kind o f "it’s  
m oney, yeah , well, th o se  p eo p le  should work harder”. I’m that kind of person  
that thinks “th o se  p eop le  should work harder and earn m ore m on ey , they  
shouldn’t h ave  g o n e  into th is situation anyw ay, if this is what they h ave  to 
resort to, in order to g e t m ore m oney , well, that’s  their ovm fault” -  a  part of 
m e is like that. S o , yeah , I fee l sorry for them  “you shouldn’t b e  doing this”, 
but actually I own that com pany, I would too.
In fact, as can be seen in this quote, Amy finds herself in a delicate situation when it 
comes to deciding on a course of action were she confronted with this dilemma. Her 
attitude is fimdamentally ambivalent. The following excerpt illustrates this moral 
ambivalence even more clearly.
C au se  I w a s  saying “y e s , I w ouldn’t, I’d probably, I’d like to  sa y  n o  to working 
on a client that just m ak es, ta k es  advantage of th e se  poor p eop le  w ho  
h aven ’t got m on ey”, but ultimately, you know what? T h ese  fucking p eop le, 
th e se  p eop le  shouldn’t b e  in that situation In the first p lace, they put 
th em se lv es  in that situation. S o , you know, why should w e, w hy shouldn’t w e  
take ad van tage of th em ? W hy shouldn’t the com pany take ad van tage of 
them ? T hey are taking all th e  risks to g ive  th e se  p eop le  th e  m oney , and I 
don’t know what the c h a n c e s  are of them  getting it back, but th ey  h ave  taken  
that risk, s o  you know, m ake a s  m uch m on ey  a s  p ossib le  out of them . And if 
they’re clever enou gh , and they know that th ey’re already in this bad 
situation, then they  shouldn’t b e  taking on m ore debts. And if th ey  w ant to, 
it’s  their problem, th ey ’re the stupid o n es .
In her own words, Amy is “a capitalist -  you make your own money, you look out 
for yourself, and everybody should do that”. Because she argues that money is 
important as a means to sustain the living standards that keep her and her family 
happy, she virulently criticizes those indebted people who apply for credit cards on 
the basis that they should do just like she does and manage their budget realistically 
(“They’re just silly”, “It’s their problem, they’re the stupid ones”). Yet she does not
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feel entirely comfortable judging them that way. She actually reacts to the situation 
at two levels: the ‘rational’ pai t of her puts the blame on them, whereas a softer part 
of her empathises with their distress as she shows in the first part o f the quote below.
S o  part o f m e fe e ls  like that, then I think “okay, y e s , so m e  of th e se  p eop le  -  
they really ca n ’t live on a  day-to-day or a monthly paid w age , they d o  n eed  
that extra m on ey  every m onth just to help  them ”, and that’s  w hy -  I m ean  I 
worked for another client accou n t for a  little while, and that’s  w hat happened , 
so ...b u t you know, th ey  do, they just n eed  £ 2 0 0  every  month just to help  
them  give in the credit card, just to help them , and then the next month they  
pay off, and then it g o e s  on, and on and on. But you know, then  they’re just 
living...they’re just sp ending m ore than they have. S o  that’s  not right, surely?
Y ou’re encouraging them  to do that. But then w hat? T hey’re grow n-ups, if 
they w ant to  do that, let them  do that! T hey’re just silly! [laugh]
Morally, Amy applies to the situation the rules she lives by and which could be 
suimned up as “make your own money and look out for yourself’. Her moral 
judgment thus mainly reflects what we might call the material aspect of her moral 
conscience. Ethical conscience barely plays a role in Amy’s moral deliberation, 
except maybe when she feels that it is not quite right to take advantage o f those 
people in trouble financially.
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Amy does not seem much connected to her self, but rather focuses the ego’s attention 
on the persona. She cannot seem to find confidence in herself without needing others 
to validate her character, her actions, and her decisions. Although she believes she 
has reached a state of balance in her life, she demonstrates significant contradictions 
in her attitude and her asph ations. However she might not be conscious o f them. She 
makes many references to her company and to their profit-making ‘at all costs’ 
mindset. As can be seen below, she admits it affects her.
If you’re u sed  to  a lw ays sav ing  m on ey  for the client, w atching it, then  you  
b eco m e like that. But if you 've worked on -  like I u sed  to work on healthcare  
clients, I u sed  to  double w hat I go t charged to them , and I knew  that my
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client would n ever  look at it and say  "oh, w hy is that?” c a u se  I knew  that they  
wouldn't look into th e  details, so  1 u sed  to double it, triple i t  G et w hatever I 
could g e t aw ay with, and m ake an incom e. And then, you know, It d o e sn ’t - 1 
don’t think it -  it d o e sn ’t m atter to  m e how  m uch w e  m ake, but it d o e s  to the  
com pany, m y com pany. And so  it a lw ays kinda -  they a lw ays g e t you to  try 
and m ake a s  m uch m on ey  a s  p ossib le , alw ays a lw ays a lw ays, and it 
b e c o m e s  ingrained in you.
In fact, the imperative to make money that she claims pervades the company she 
works for often serves as a justification for her own morally questionable behaviour. 
As the following quote shows, she becomes the “company representative” whenever 
she has to make a decision, with or without moral implications. She thus willmgly 
endorses actions that part o f her conscience disapproves of.
W hen w e  do, w h en  I do th e s e  m ailings for my client, you h a v e  to put insight 
into your briefs, s o  you sa y  “w hat do th e s e  cu stom ers or w ho -  w hat do  
th e se  p eop le  think that yo u ’re writing to?”. And It’s  su p p o sed  to b e  truthful, 
it’s  su p p osed  to b e  actual reflection of them . But my client d o e sn ’t sp en d  the  
m oney to research  to find out w hat th e s e  p eop le  are actually thinking. S o  
then, actually, w hat I’m putting into it is just what I think. It’s  fa lse . S o  
everything that w e  sen d  them  is just what I m ake up. It’s  not true, it’s  not 
b a sed  on anything, it’s  not b a sed  on  any qualitative research  or you know, 
quantitative, nothing. It’s  just b ased  on m e  going "hum, I think th ey  think 
th is ...” and the client g o e s  “yeah , yeah , I agree, that’s  it”. You know, that’s  
like “well, should w e really b e  doing that?” If I didn’t do that, if w e didn’t do  
that, then  w e  w ould h ave  no work com ing out of the clients.
Amy, as a consequence, compartmentalises a very large portion o f herself, which she 
may not recognise as being herself, as in the example where her ethical conscience 
glimpses but is quickly discarded by her individualistic “capitalist” moral rule. She 
does not feel compartmentalised, but her behaviour tends to indicate this is not the 
case.
I should b e  say ing  “you’re w asting your m oney, b eca u se  you’re not sure this 
is gonna work b e c a u se  you don’t know what th e s e  p eop le  think, s o  you’re 
just throwing your m on ey  aw ay”. 1 couldn’t do  that, of course, b e c a u se  that 
would not b e  m aking m on ey  for my com pany. S o , I could sa y  “yeah , yeah , 
w e could te s t  it and m ake sure, you know, next time w e can  look at th e
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results and w e  can  ch an ge  it for next month”, but I wouldn’t be making a s  
m uch m oney  for my com pany if I did that.
5.3.2. E th an
For the past four yeais, Ethan has been working as a Human Resources (HR) 
divisional manager in a recruitment company specialising in the engineering 
construction sector. Ever since he left university, he has been working in recruitment 
agencies after a brief experience in banking and risk analysis, which he did not like. 
He recently studied part-time for a Master whilst working fiill-time.
Persona and Self-Image
Ethan is a clearly ambitious individual who strives to be “the best” as he himself 
admits.
- What do you expect from vourself when vou come to work? \Miat do vou 
set yourself to be?
Well, su ccessfu l, th e  best. H em ...[laugh]. T he com pany icon, i.e. not the  
m odel but like “everybody know s Ethan” type o f situation. Hem, busy, I think 
that the main thing, Is to  b e  kept busy, to  b e  h em ...w hat w a s I gonna say , 
yeah , to  b e  used  a s  the resource. You know, I think if peop le ask  m e a  
question, I can  answ er the question; if I don’t, I can refer them  to  the right 
person, th ings like that, you know, b e  resourceful for them . And a lso  with my 
team , in particular, b ec a u se  th ey’v e  grown with m e, etc, both with or without 
exp erience, that h as m e su ccessfu l a s  a result of my input to  them , yeah ?
S o  I can  s e e  how  they’v e  grown, and I can  s e e  their s u c c e s s  a s  the result of 
what I’v e  g iven  them , if that m ak es s e n s e . That would in turn m ake m e  
su ccessfu l a s  well, a s  a w hole team .
Ethan is objective-driven and his satisfaction depends on what he feels he has 
achieved. He enjoys the challenges because they constitute opportunities for him to 
shine even further.
I get easily  bored! [laugh] S o , b e c a u se  it’s  not Just o n e  thing, it’s  not just -  I 
don’t know how  to sa y  it without belittling accounting, for exam ple, or
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banking -  it’s  not just o n e  thing, it’s , you h a v e  to  do a little bit of everything -  
it’s  like running your own b u sin ess  within the bu sin ess, isn’t it? H em ...and  
plus, b e c a u se  I’v e  now  d on e it for w hat -  7  or 8 years now  -  e v e n  m ore 
challenging that I enjoy now  is I look after various different locations, so  I 
travel a lot and look at other p eop le . And the challenge that I g e t  is rem ote  
m anaging, a lso , b eca u se  I g e t p eop le  w ho I can ’t s e e  that I n eed  to m anage  
without see in g  them , you know. S o  that’s  obviously another ch allenge, and  
getting them  to be en g a g ed , you know, so .
He is very attached to his image, and his ego-consciousness seems overwhelmed by a 
need to be recognised in society. Whilst Amy needs others to give her confidence, 
Ethan needs others to feel like he exists. He demonstrates a constant habit of 
measuring hhnself against others, o f checking up where he stands as compared with 
his colleagues, his friends, people in the industry and so on, so as to know how he is 
doing, whether he is living up to his expectations. It is worth quoting Ethan at length 
here because this excerpt exemplifies his need for multiple levels of recognition.
Hum, various, I think, benchm arks. O ne is th e  recognition from the com pany  
-  w here I am , what level I g e t to, so  that’s  promotion [...]. I’v e  b een  here 4  
years and I’v e  b een  m oved  4  tim es; p eop le  have been  here 10 y ears and 
are still doing the sa m e  job, you know, that kind of thing. S o , you m easure it 
from that respect. But a lso , in recognition and en gag em en t from p eop le  in 
the b u sin ess , you know. S o m e  p eop le  in th e  b u sin ess, on other tea m s h ave  
their own DM (divisional m anager) that they  report to, yet they c o m e  to m e  
vrith their concerns, or they  talk to m e  about their concerns, that t h ^  
couldn’t talk to  their direct line-m anagers. S o , I don’t m an age th e se  peop le  
so  how  is that p oss ib le  that th ey  can  co m e to m e? 1 must do som eth ing right 
in that respect. A dvise on non-operational sectors like support functions.
W hen I, I involve a  lot of p eop le  in m y work, or 1 m ake m yself known to  m any  
people, and all th e se  p eop le  know m e a s  well, so  -  I don’t know w hether it’s  
called being popular, but it’s  m ore being, being well n ice, it’s  a  good  
m easure for m e a s  w ell. Then you go  in term s of like, “how m uch bonus you  
get? ” you know, that’s  th e  other thing, c a u se  w e ’re very much high on 
bonus, and that’s  the ultimate bottom-line, you know. The m ore m on ey  I get, 
okay I m ust b e  doing som eth ing right, you know, and things like that. [...] S o  
peop le I w ent to university with th e  first tim e round, I’m still In contact with 
them , so  I m easu re m yself against them  potentially, you know. W e all do  
different things, w e  all did the sa m e  d eg rees  clearly, but w e  all w ent to
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different lifestyles, and w e ’re a lso  the sa m e  a g e . S o  “w here are they right 
now ?”. And the recruiters I know, w hat roughly kind of salary d o  they m ake, 
what kind o f life they  lead, e tc?  And if you m easure th o se  things, you know, 
are w e  on par? Then w e look at other things in social sc ien ce , you know, 
they m ay b e on par with w here I am, but are they happy? -  this sort of 
things.
We could speculate that his expectations are also a reflection of what other people 
define as ‘being successful’ because being the best or the most is necessarily defined 
in relation to some others.
But yeah , 1 would sa y  that I look at initially the materialistic s id e  of things 
first, just to s e e  w here I am  today, b ec a u se  at the end of th e  day, th e se  
things will pay you and allow  you to live, if you think about it. And then you, I 
look at how happy I am , am I sick? H ave I got a fam ily? And not just that, 
h ave I got a h ou se  or generally th ings that are not related to work?
Relationship to Others
Although Ethan declares he likes his own company, he nevertheless entertains a 
network of contacts and relationships. His social hfe almost sounds like a field of 
potential business opportunities. Besides measuring himself to others, he also 
examines what he could learn from others. Though this is not an issue in itself, it is 
characteristic o f Ethan to make this learning experience a competition, so that he 
seems to perceive other people as resources rather than people. Again, the following 
quote highlights Ethan’s tendency to perceive others as comparative standards.
- And vour own standards, how would vou define them?
Ethical...[laugh] I su p p o se . W ell, you know, I don’t know w hether th e  word is 
proud or, or very high standard, [ ...]  but I m easure m yself and everybody -  
peop le  in my team  do the sa m e, m ayb e I recruit the sa m e  type of p eop le or 
personalities -  but I m easure, within th e  b u sin ess, I would say , you know, in 
term s o f -  not b u sin ess  specifically, but personal strengths, you know, 
actually things like that -  would that b e  ethical standards, professional or 
moral kind of stuff - 1  would rate m yself highly superior against m y p eers and 
the rest of th e b u sin ess, you know. Hem, and why do 1 sa y  that? I don’t know  
why I would sa y  that. Other p eop le  tell m e that. P eop le  in m y team  tell m e
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this, m aybe. I know it m yself that I -  I don't know, I’v e  got this, w hen you  
walk into a  room, and you get to  know peop le, you m easure yourself against 
th e se  peop le saying “w hat do they  d o?” -  no, it’s  "what is it that they do very  
well that I w ant to be like them , or to  learn from them ?” -  and after a w hile 
you go  “no, there’s  nothing I can  learn from th e se  b ec a u se  th ere’s  nothing 
they do that I ca n ’t do anyw ay”. Very rarely do I find som eb od y  -  I m ean  
outside here, you know, and obviously the senior m anagers you s e e , “oooh ,
I like that kind of sty le  [ ...]” and you learn from that -  and after a while, 3  or 4  
years, you know  “okay. I’v e  got that sty le, etc, I know w hat they’re doing, 
they’re not good  for m e  anymore", in that sort of respect, you know. And this 
is why I like to network, you know. T he m ore peop le  I s e e ,  then I’m not sta le .
A lot of p eop le  sa y  “you can b e  the b est that you will be in this office”, but 
there’s  no point b e c a u se  there’s  1,001 p eop le  outside that are b est equipped  
and h ave  b een  better ex p o sed , s o  you can  n ever ever  m easure yourself 
against th e ...th e  average, b eca u se  there isn’t an average. Y ou’d h ave  to s e e  
every single person in th e  world to m eet the average, you know. S o , yeah , I 
m easure m yself aga in st other peop le . 1 go: “Can I do it? Do I like W iat they  
do? No, y e s? ” -  that kind of stuff. And if I like what I s e e , then I g e t closer in 
term s of learning from them . Not say ing  “how  do you do that?” but you learn 
their behaviours, don’t you? You know, and s e e  w hat’s  their worth.
To that extent, it is likely that Ethan establishes only friendly-professional
relationships with his colleagues, clients or the people he supervises. His
relationships seem never remote from some degree o f self-interest or utility that 
supports his great need for recognition. Yet this may well disguise a lack of 
‘substance’ of his individuality rather than a Machiavellian mind.
Choice, Décision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Ethan describes himself as “ethical” and believes the key values that guide him are 
trust and honesty.
It’s  trust, honesty, you know, h em ...I ca n ’t back up my staff In anything if 
they don’t tell m e th e truth, b e c a u se  I look after them , in the s e n s e  of 
w hatever they sa y  g o e s , and If I h ave  to  step  in, then I w ll defend them. But 
if they don’t tell m e  the truth, ev en  if they screw ed  up and did their own
m ess , you know, if they don’t tell m e  that part, I cannot -  I will still defend
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them , not knowing that th ey’v e  b een  lying to  m e, and then, then if it 
transpires that they h ave  lied, then I vwll n ever support them  again. T here’s  
only o n e  ch an ce, you know. B eca u se , you know, p eop le working in my team  
or anybody that I am trying to defend etc, n eed  to be able to g ive  m e the  
right information for m e to defend them , you know. S o  I think trust -  trust and  
honesty  is  th e  m ost Important thing.
He thus attaches an extremely high importance to these values, and bears grudges if  
he feels others do not act upon these values, both in the professional sphere (as he 
explains above) and in the personal sphere, as we notice in the following quote.
I a ssu m e  peop le w ho are my friends and my drcular, that they are open  and  
trustworthy. And again, if I find out that th ey’re not, they’re not in m y books  
anym ore [laugh].
On the other hand, Ethan considers that people do have different standards, including 
ethical standards, depending on their upbringing and their cultural background, so 
that he avoids bearing judgments upon other people’s actions.
S o  you w eight the pros and con s. If it’s  a  real big impact, of cou rse I’ll sa y  
som ething, you know, so  y e s , I think regard less o f w hatever happens, I think 
you’ll w eight -  or I would w eight the yeah , the is su e s  and s e e  w hat's m ost 
important at that time. H em ...like, for exam ple, if I go  to family sid e , you  
know, [...] m y parents [...]  are all very “you m ust b e  from th e sa m e  race, you  
m ust b e  that” w hatever -  but m y sister married with an Irish guy, s o  do I 
think -  what’s  important: m y sister, w hether s h e ’s  happy, or fam ily va lu es?
S o , you know, o f cou rse I can  s e e  beyond that, so  I’ll say  “that’s  happy for 
her”, you know, things like that. S o , you w eight the is su es . And I think the  
is su e s  -  w hat I think th e  w eight of is su e s  d ep en d s on th e w ay the person  
thinks in term s of their perception, their education, what their exposure is.
[...] S o  I would sa y  it’s  up to  th e  individual and how  they, how  they  think it is.
You know, it’s  not a wrong way, but it’s  just the w ay they think, or th e  w ay I 
think. For m e, I would sa y  that I’m quite -  I don’t know w hat the word is, but 
you know, it’s  just looking at, looking at the facts and then see in g , b ased  on  
that information, is  it worth jeopardizing X for Y?
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We could classify Ethan’s approach as relativist in so far as he argues ‘it all depends’ 
as can be seen below.
I m ean, y ea h ...in  this job, it h e lp s you slightly b eca u se  you know there is 
m ore and m ore em ploym ent law, you know, thrown at you everyday, s o  
that's the, like a default that you u se . But generally, you know, I would sa y  
that there’s ...a g a in , individual p eop le  have different co n sc ien ce  levels, isn ’t 
it? H ow ever nice they are -  so m e  p eop le  think it’s  fine to  b e  rude to p eop le  
and not being very n ice. W hat I consider ethical m aybe is unethical for 
som eb od y  e ls e , you know? S o ...h u m , w hat’s  the m easu re?  It’s , it’s  - the  
m easu re d ep en d s on w hat you’v e  b een  given, and how m uch you’v e  b een  
told and how  much are things, if that m ak es s e n s e .
Wlien it comes to making a decision whilst confronted with a dilemma of a moral 
nature, Ethan would think rationally about the pros and cons and make the decision 
based on what is in his best interest.
...in  a work context, sa y  that there is o n e  person  that I really d etest, and any  
opportunity that I h ave to sa y  bad things about her, I will. But generally  in th e  
work context, it’s  again  how  se v e r e  is  the o ffen ce, yeah ?  Is it a -  if it is  truly 
illegal and could co st the com pany to  g o  -  it could risk the com pany to be, 
you know, being taken to court or being turned down, all that kind of stuff, 
then [...] no m atter what level that person is, or w hatever, I would m ake sure  
that -  not in a  bad way, but that behaviour actually or that action stops, you  
know. [...] But if it is just o n e  o f th o se  things that d o e sn ’t im pact m e  
n ecessarily , and it is not illegal n ecessarily , and it is not em otionally  
distressing [...] Then I just ignore it -  not ignore it, I just don’t involve m yself 
with it.
Actually, Ethan remains relatively detached from the human aspect of the situation 
( “I don’t involve myself with it...if  that doesn’t impact me”). His reliance on what is 
legal as a default mode to make his moral decisions, which is apparent in the 
following excerpt, suggests that he is more inclined to listen to his moral conscience 
than his ethical conscience.
And in so m e  w ays -  b ec a u se  so m e  things are unethical -  not a  lot of things 
anym ore, but a  lot of things that are not ethical are actually illegal. But if
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there is things that are not ethical but not s o  illegal, but they are still 
unethical in the personal context, then  you say  “okay, this is not really nice, 
don’t do it”, you know? And I m ay co m e and -  b eca u se  w e’re quite open  
here -  anybody can  just sa y  anything about it, you know, just sa y  "stop it” or, 
you know.
Ethan nevertheless expresses something that could be Idcened to ethical conscience, 
although ethical conscience is in fact not so much automatic as intuitive.
[...] you know, you’v e  b een  brought up or you’v e  learnt the default good  and 
the default bad. And you ’re doing som ething that’s  not right, you already fee l 
uncom fortable about it or “I know it is w rong” -  “this is not what I’m su p p osed  
to do” or “this is  not th e  right w ay of doing it” or, yeah  -  s o  I think it's like an  
autom atic thing. How do you know  w hen you’re walking on th e  street to put 
the next leg  in front of the other? It’s  an autom atic thing, you know, this is  
called walking. A s a  baby, you know that you’v e  learnt to put o n e  fe e t in front 
of the other -  and w hen you’re driving a s  well -  how  do you know that you  
h ave to put the clutch down to ch a n g e  th e  gear  stick, you know? it b e c o m e s  
autom atic, you know ...
The fact that his morality is “automatic” in his own words does not imply he is 
coimected to others, but might illustrate a smooth rational thinking process. 
Ultimately, his criteria for choosing a direction for action reflect his interests, or what 
will benefit him.
How it will benefit m e. Y eah, so , w h en ever  there is -  w hether it’s , w hether 
it’s , you know, if it’s  a  work d ecision  or a  personal d ecision  -  is this a  good  
route for m e? W ould this b e  good  for m e?  You know ...
- And being good for vou -  how do vou define it?
Okay -  being good  for m e would be w hether it’s  -  it d ep en d s on th e decision  
or the situation. You know, it’s  “would it m ake my life easier?”, “would it g ive  
m e m ore satisfaction?’’, “w ould it g ive m e m ore m on ey?” if it’s  a work 
context, “would it g ive m e m ore exp erience?” if it’s  a work context -  ev en  in 
the personal context. W ould it b e  som eth ing n ew  that I h aven ’t d one before, 
would it b e  challenging, would it be, would it b e ...a n  idea that would m ake  
som eb od y  e ls e  happy? You know, that kind of things. H em ...yeah , would it 
b e...w h at e ls e  can  I think of? -  hem ...w ou ld  I h ave to pay for it? - things like 
that, you know. But generally th o se  kind of things, you know. W hen I sa y  pay
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for, I don’t n ecessar ily  m ean  m onetary, but other w ays, like co n seq u en ces , 
etc., yeah .
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Interestingly, Ethan thinks he does not change his behaviour from home to work, or 
at least ever so slightly.
I do a  lot of -  do  you know th e  PPA  -  Personal profile analysis?  [...] 
W henever I do th e se  te s ts , m y mask-work -  m y work-mask and self-m ask  
are the sam e, you know. And no matter how  often I do it, they are alw ays the  
sa m e. And so , I know I'm -  m aybe in decision-m aking, b eca u se  I do  
d ecision s all the tim e at work, and peop le  know that generally for stupid 
d ecis ion s like going for dinner or "what are you gonna c h o o se ? ” and I 
haven’t got tim e to d ec id e  -  but I would sa y  that I am  exactly th e  sa m e at 
work a s  I am  at hom e, or outside work, you know. S o  I don’t act any  
differently -  perhaps a  bit m ore com m ercially-aware -  not com m ercially- 
aware, m ore professionally aw are at work, but other than that. I’m still the  
sa m e  individual, I don’t fee l th e  need  that I h ave to ch an ge the w ay I am .
- What do vou mean bv more professionally aware?
Hem, m aybe language u se  and hem  -  not just language u se  but h em ...n o t  
to offend other peop le, you know, i.e . in te im s of, like vWien you ’re being  
critical, things like that.
Ethan actually believes that if  he changed, he would not give his best hence he would 
not have the chance to be the best. His rationale is again centred on his performance.
Would 1 enjoy working in an environm ent w here I’d have to su p p ress m yself 
for it? No, b e c a u se  I don’t think you g e t th e  b est out of m e. I don’t know if 
you get the b est out of p eop le  in general, but from W iere I stand, I don’t 
think, you don’t g e t the b est of m e, I don’t think so .
Ethan also declares he gets “easily bored” and appreciates fast-paced activities, 
“doing more than one thing at a time”, being “always busy”. To him, this is a natural 
way to be, although we could interpret this behaviour as reflecting an inability to take 
time to confront oneself, as if being always busy would make up for one’s existence.
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S o  w hile I shut off, you ’re alw ays thinking “okay, how e ls e  -  w here e ls e  can  I 
m ake opportunities?" you know. I'm on the train, i’m thinking about figure or 
m erger reports -  if I do this, w hat I w ll get?  If they do this, what they will 
get?  I’m alw ays thinking about stra teg ies for like next month or w hatever, 
you know, s o .. .y e s ,  I can  sw itch off, y e s  I can  try not to  think about it, but to 
be h on est -  and not Just to b e  h on est -  just to be frank, just generally, you  
c a n ...w h en ev er  you sit aga in st things - "what e ls e  can  I do to do things 
right?’’, but it’s , it’s  in the mixture. I can  think of o n e  right now, and the next 
minute I can  sa y  “what d o  I n eed  from T esco ’s? ’’, you know? And to mix it 
together. But I don’t think I’ll ultimately switch off, b eca u se  w hen I’m going  
on holiday or w hatever. I’m thinking “oh, this is a good  opportunity, can I u se  
this in m y b u sin ess? ” you know. S o  you’re alw ays -  I don’t think anybody  
sw itch es off com pletely, don’t think about work full stop  at all. M aybe doing  
that consciously , but su b con sciou sly  th ey’re collecting things. I think so .
We could suggest that his reliance on other people to put him on the social ladder, if 
not on the social map, along with his need to be busy all the time reveal a void. It 
seems as if Ethan wants to keep up a whirl o f activity to fill in the void created by his 
lack of connection to his self.
5.3.3. IRENE
Irene is the Human Resources director for an international construction materials 
trading company, for which she’s been working the past five years. She studied arts, 
trained as an administrative assistant, then worked as an assistant for a HR director in 
a company, and really liked the field. She then re-trained in HR management through 
distance learning, and has been working in HR for more than twenty years. She is 
married with no children.
Persona and Self-Image
Irene enjoys her work but suffers from the “negative” image associated with HR 
management, in particular when HR directors are depicted as the ‘head-hunters’ and 
the ‘downsizers’. She feels that this image is false and comes from the fact that 
people do not see the other tasks HR directors do in organisations.
154
[ ...] P eop le  In organisations h ave a rather negative im age of HR directors, 
vdiich is com pletely fa lse , b e c a u se  w e actually tend to protect th e  em p loyee  
from m anagers w ho g o  wild rather than ...but it is true w e  g e t to  m ake peop le  
redundant.
- S o  vou think there is a negative perception of HR directors?
Y eah.
- Why so?
B eca u se  it’s  the HR director w ho -  w hen on the teily they explain that 
10 ,000  em p lo y ees  are m ad e redundant, or w hatever, it’s  usually the HR 
director w ho sp ea k s . And it’s  true w e  g e t to m ake this sort of decision , and  
that’s  this sort of d ecision  that c o m e s  first. W e are the o n e s  w ho cut the  
staff.
Although she declares she does not care about the image o f Human Resources as 
much now as before, she still is affected by it as she explams in the following 
excerpt.
- Does this image affects vou in vour work?
Hem, yeah , b ec a u se  actually it’s  fa lse , and I didn’t realise that - in betw een  
the previous com pan y and this on e, I w a s  unem ployed for about a year. And 
here, w hen I sa id  I w a s  a HR director -  that’s  w hen I ca m e  to  know the  
im age. W hile during m y first 15 years of experience I never ev en  thought 
about it, b eca u se  I had not had th e  opportunity to talk about m y work. But 
w hen 1 w a s unem ployed, and p eop le  asked  m e "oh yeah , w hat do you do?
W hat kind of job are you looking for?" "A HR director position” “A ah h h ...”.
And it w as really weird. E specially  s in ce  I w as looking for a job, I w as still 
mourning my, well, my work. W ell, now, I'm back on track, I don’t really care.
But I think it’s  a  pity and I would militate fully to  help regain th e  prestige of 
HR directors.
Consequently, especially during her first HR management experience, she felt she 
had to make a choice and choose whose side she would be on. She felt that she 
needed to accept to be on the management’s side and that some decisions she would 
make would be unpopular, yet necessary. Somehow, having made that choice eased 
her conscience. The following quote explains this apparently necessary shift;
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My first big moral conflict -  and I w a s  young at that time, c a u se  it w a s  in 86 , 
so  I h a d ...o n e  and a  half years o f exp erience, it w as m y first econ om ic  
dow nsizing program m e. S o  this, at 2 4 -2 5  years old, it's hard, ca u se ...!  
wouldn’t do it th e  sa m e  w ay at all if it w a s now, but w e  let g o  th e  o ld est  
em p loyees, so  it w a s  the guy w ho had worked for 40  years, w ho w a s  
illiterate and w ho w e  fired ...oh , I cried at nights really. And a lso , at the tim e I 
w as sort of anarchist and all that, just like you can b e w hen you’re young, 
and it w a s...I  really had a  guilty c o n sc ien ce .,.!  had talked about th is to  a  
friend of m ine w ho w a s  ev en  m ore anarchist than I w as, h e  w a s  truly an  
activist, and w e -  w e  h a v e  fallen out ever  sin ce, really. B eca u se  h e  could not 
admit that I would fire p eop le, that I had fallen in the hands o f th e  em p loyers  
w ho m ak e p eop le redundant. And it is actually true that it’s  w hat w e  did, w e  
fired them , h em ...I think they signed  on the d ole but so m e  died quickly after 
that...
[..•]
This, this h as b een  m y first big m oral...and  that's w hen 1 think I decided  that, 
okay, w hatever, that w as hard, but it w a s  kind of my path, and that I -  I 
positioned m yself on th e  s id e ...y e a h , on the em ployer’s  sid e , really. It w a s -  
I w a s  gon n a  b e  part o f the com pany’s  decision-m akers, and m ake d ecision s  
that are not n ecessar ily  e a sy  but that are neverth eless for the com m on good  
-  w e know  it’s  for the shareholder’s  good , but it is  n everth e less  for the  
com m on good . And from then on, there w a s hardly any moral is su e s , really, 
b e c a u se  you c h o o se  a line of conduct, you h em ...yeah , you work towards 
the com pany’s  good .
It seems that Irene could not live up to her personal standards while doing her job, 
and the only way she managed to cope was to draw boxes and choose one viewpoint 
exclusively. She thus opted for a sort of ‘HR persona’ because it suited the job and 
the context best. The company’s dress code probably contributes to delineating the 
role she feels she has to endorse at work (“what’s expected of my status”). She 
accepts it as part of the game, probably just like she felt she had to choose a side in 
order to live her work well. She literally dresses up and ‘wears’ the expected persona 
when she leaves for the office, as we note in the excerpt below.
I could not go  to work d ressed  like that. I wish I cou ld ...and  I cannot b eca u se  
that Is not w hat's ex p ec ted  o f my status. And I can s e e  that the higher th e  
status, th e  m ore efforts you h ave  to m ake to dress. No o n e  sa y s  it, but it’s  in 
other p eop le’s  g lan ce , and that's what you think yourself when
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so m e o n e ...so m e o n e  w ho would b e  on the board of directors and w ho would 
co m e in w earing jea n s  and trainers, weli som eh ow  I would be  
uncomfortable.
-  S o  how do vou feel towards it since this is not the style vou would naturally 
adopt?
H em ...I don’t like it, but it’s  part of the gam e really -  it’s  alm ost like the 
com pensation  for th e  w a g es , really. S in ce  they  g ive m e m oney, I’ll m ake  
minimum efforts to present m yself.
Relationship to Others
Irene has a complex relationship to others, in so fai' as she enjoys the contact with 
people but dislikes managing a team o f people. She does not like to be personally 
involved in managing people, but she likes to interact with and confront people.
W hat I enjoy the least, it’s  obviously  to  fire peop ie. Hem, it’s ...m a y b e  it’s  a lso  
team  m anagem ent, b e c a u se  it’s  not at the heart of the HR director role, it’s  
the m anager role, vdiich I have not ch osen , and it’s  not ea sy . I m ean  
m anaging a team , well, It ta k es tim e, it ta k es a lot o f energy, b e c a u se  you  
sp en d  your tim e motivating people, refocusing them , telling them  th ings that 
are not so  n ice. 1 m ean , sh e  screw ed  up, how  do i tell her without her 
starting to cry...it’s . . . i f  I could d o  without It, that would b e  just a s  well really! 
[laugh]
- That’s interesting because, at the same time. HR is about relationships, 
isn't it?
Y es, but you se e :  I’m happy to  do it for others, or ad vise others on how  to do  
it and all that. But w hen I h ave to  do it m yself, then it’s , then it bothers m e. 
B ecau se , b e c a u se  it’s  m e in front of my em p loyee , and it’s  up to m e to tell 
him. While on the other hand, I would sa y  “okay, s o  you tell your em p loyee  
to do that”. Very e a s y .. .
- Is it the distance that makes it easy?
Y eah. Y eah, yeah . I don’t h ave  to g e t involved.
In fact, what she enjoys most in human relations is the challenge o f the novelty, 
which enables her to develop her resources.
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S o  what ex c ite s  m e  now, it’s  th e  relation with the person, b e c a u se  there will 
alw ays b e  som eth ing  new  and you a lw ays h ave  -  you alw ays h a v e  to  be  
better. You a lw ays h ave  to  exce l yourself a  little...
It actually seems as if Irene is personally detached from the relationships she has 
with other employees, that she plays the role and represents, even incarnates, the 
company in the business “game”.
I like to b e  in a m eetin g  and m eet p eop le, hem ...I like to visit the  
b ran ch es...y es , visiting the b ranches I quite like. [...] You b eco m e  m ore 
available for peop le , and b esid es, w hen I’m in a  branch and I m ee t with the  
em p loyees, often at o n e  point or another, an em ployee will sa y  what’s  
wrong. [...] And s o  visiting a  branch, it m ea n s being ready to actually fa c e  
the em p loyee  w ho will sa y  th e s e  sort o f things. Ifs funny, it’s  like a gam e, 
b e c a u se  -  esp ecia lly  w hen  you know the branches, you know that well, you  
will m eet Mr w h afs-h is-n am e, h e  will system atically  sa y  w hatever Just like he  
d o e s  ea ch  tim e, and what am  I going to tell him this tim e? And then it 
b eco m es  a  gam e: how  am  1 going to con v in ce  him that what h e  s a y s  is not 
right? And hem , I pick up on that to sa y  som ething to o ...
Irene depicts her relationships as essentially strategic, yet she admits that the main 
factor in her success or failure is the very human factor of being in great or not-so- 
great form.
W hat I d o  a lso  enjoy, it’s  the works council m eeting, actually. Or the  
m eetin gs to  n egotiate  the w a g e s  with the union reps. B eca u se  -  but that is  
not n ice all the tim e. S om etim es it’s  n ice, b e c a u se  w e, you are in a  strong  
position, b ec a u se  you are in good  sh ap e , b e c a u se  this particular day, 
intellectually, you catch  it quickly, s o  you know you can  confront the d elegate  
w h afs-h is-n am e w ho w ill...and then other tim es. I’m in a  le s se r  good  sh ap e ,
I know that I’m gonn a fail and that...
Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Values are important for Irene, and she claims she wears them upfront when she goes 
to work. She views this as a way o f  checking whether the organisational culture can 
accommodate her values. To her, her values are part of who she is so that she’d
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rather state them loud and clear. The following excerpt is worth being quoted 
integrally as it shows how Irene gives a great importance to values that reflect what 
she personally cares for.
- How do vou set vour limits on what vou can and cannot accept?
B a sed  on m y convictions. I m ean ...I  b elieve in respecting hum an beings, s o  
w hen you don’t resp ect a  hum an being, I ca n ’t stand it...! can ’t stand for 
instance w hen I hear so m e o n e  w ho -  a  m anager m oaning b e c a u se  a 
w om an g e ts  pregnant. It’s  not normal, really, it’s  -  I w on’t fire the guy, but I’ll 
tell him, you know. Hem, racism  is som ething I ca n ’t stand. S o  the first 
person w ho d o e s  it, he g e ts  a warning im mediately, the law backs m e up.
Y eah, I m ean , it’s  resp ect for hum an beings, really. S o m e o n e  w ho bullies an  
em p loyee , it’s  the sam e, I’ll tell him.
- Does it go beyond what the law savs?
Y eah, yeah , exactly. B eca u se  it’s  m y...it’s  m e. It’s  m y education, it’s  my 
beliefs.
- And these values, do vou consciously bring them with vou at work?
Oh yeah! Y es, y e s . W hen I lea v e  for work, I actually announce them . In a  job  
interview, I spell them  out.
- Do vou feel the need to? Is it a choice vou make?
That, I don’t know. To sp ea k  about them , you m ean ?  It’s  a ch o ice  for peop le  
to -  s o  that I don’t, h em ...if  I put m yself back to w hen I w a s  looking for a job,
I didn’t want to  work for a  com pany which didn’t agree  with m y ch o ices .
- Why so?
B eca u se  I w ouidn’t b e  ab le  to  work with them . B eca u se  m ayb e I could be  
hired, but at the first, at the first d isagreem ent, I would h ave to quit, so  better 
to tell things upfront and say  “h ere’s  w hat I believe in” -  and som etim es it’s  
too m uch, I m ean . W ell, it’s  too  m uch -  it’s  not alw ays n ecessa ry  to alw ays  
talk about your convictions, but at least things are clear.
Despite the significance of her values in her hfe and sense of self, Irene still seems 
cautious when it comes to take action. Actually, she tends to rely on formal rules, in 
paiticular the law, even if the situation still makes her uncomfortable. It seems as if  
Irene needed the law to act, even though she felt a moral discomfort with the 
situation very early as the example below illustrates.
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[ ...] I can let an em p loyee  suffer in the hands of so m e o n e  w ho’s  alm ost 
harassing him for exam ple. W e do h a v e  a c a s e  like that right now, w here I 
know I shouid fire th e  director, but at th e  m om ent I haven’t had an  instance  
of true harassm ent, you know. It’s  c lo s e  to  it, the guy isn’t n ice with his 
subordinate, he really bugs him, h e ’s  gonna p iss  him off vvith the m ost trivial 
thing, but at th e  sa m e  tim e w e ’re not quite yet in the situation of true moral 
h arassm ent w hen you’re p u sh ed  to o n e  sid e , you’re being humiliated and all 
that. But if this happened , I know it would b e  difficult for m e to  h ave peop le  
a ccep t the guy being fired b e c a u se  it’s  not quite in p eop le’s  m indset. And I 
don’t know how  I would react then.
It is possible that the nature o f HR management makes her careful o f the legal 
consequences of any action. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that she does not seem 
to dare to act upon her gut reactions only. She prefers to wait until she can justify a 
legal action, even if in the meantime she does not live up to her values. In that 
respect, she seems to rely more on her moral conscience even though she is aware 
that this might not be satisfying.
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Irene admits to consciously compaitmentalise her life. For her, it’s a matter of 
maintaining a healthy balance; otherwise she would overwork and lose on an 
important aspect of her life.
I com pletely d issocia te , b e c a u se  w hen  I’m at work. I’m at work. And it 
d o esn ’t sh o w  through anyw here e ls e . W hen peop ie m eet m e ou tside work, 
so m e  can ’t im agine I’m a  HR director for exam ple. B eca u se  I d on ’t look like 
a  HR director or I don’t d r e ss  like a  HR director, or ...a t work I’m totally -  not 
different, but it’s  true I d ress  up, you could say  -  at work. I’ll w ear n ice  
trousers, n ice w hatever, h em ...b u t then I a lso  enjoy it very m uch, you know.
As the following excerpt shows, Irene gets into character at work and feels uneasy 
when both ‘worlds’ happen to collide, probably because her work persona differs 
from her ‘real self so that she needs to adjust.
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- D o vou force vourself to be different?
No! Actually it’s  totally natural, you know. T he m om ent I g e t in the car and  
lea v e  -  well, so m etim es ev en  in th e  morning I think, from the breakfast I 
start thinking about work, my husband notices it, h e  sa y s  “okay, here w e  go , 
sh e ’s  already left”. And vWien I co m e  back -  b e s id es  th ere’s  an ad van tage of 
working in the m etropolis c a u se  it’s  a  4 0  m inutes drive -  it h e lp s m e enter  
another world, w h olly ...- well, not wholly different, but different, you know.
[...]
And in fact, at work, w hen m y husband calls, or so m eo n e , or m y sister or 
w hatever, I don’t like it, you know, b e c a u se  it’s  tw o different worlds, and  
w hen I’m at work, I’m not at all in my private sphere. It p is se s  m e off w hen I 
talk to p eop le  w ho don’t belong to  m y professional sphere.
Yet, Irene does not really compartmentalise in so far as she keeps working from 
home, though “only exceptionally”. It is interesting that, as in the excerpt below, 
Irene does not seem to realise that she contradicts herself by explaining that she 
refuses to work at week-ends but nevertheless happens to work some week-ends.
W hen I started working, th e  first few  years, I worked a lot -  I m ean, I still 
work a  lot but I n eed ed  m ore energy  to do it at the time, and I would bring 
so m e  work h om e at w eek -en d s and spend , I don’t know, m y Sund ay working 
or som eth ing like that. And at so m e  point I realised I w a s  mixing up the two  
worlds, and I would not b e  a b le  to cut m yself off som etim e, yet I n eed ed  to  
cut m yself off. [...] so , I willingly refused to work the w eek en d s for exam ple. 
Actually I h ave started to  do it again  b ec a u se  I am  con sc iou s of it, so  I h ave  
just tried to do it only exceptionally, within a limited period of time.
We could argue that Irene’s ego is strong in making her believe she can preserve a 
clear-cut separation between the two worlds, although this separation is blurry, 
almost illusory. Even though Irene tries to be herself, she tends to give up when the 
pressure gets too strong so she accommodates by forgetting easily.
[...] being true to m yself is  som eth ing  I try to do a s  much a s  p ossib le . [...] it 
would b e  really hard for m e  to b e  untrue to m yself. T o m ake a decision  that 
g o e s  against w hat I think. I m ean, my convictions, really. M aybe I’m too  
m uch with m y convictions -  I m ean , for m e, respecting your convictions is 
being true to  yourseif. Betraying, pfff...but a lso  I h ave  a  rather, rather
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significant ability to forget, hopefully, e ls e  I would h ave  taken too m any  
things on board. S o  eventually, even  if there’s  a failure, ev en  if there’s  a  
conviction that can't b e  fully resp ected , I can forget and b ou n ce back or 
w hatever, and m ove on. I’m not the sort of person w ho g e ts  d ep ressed  or 
w hatever, I’m m ore positive. But I try a s  m uch a s  p o ss ib le  to b e  true to 
myself.
Her persona wins over because Irene’s connection to her self may be too weak to 
enable her to stand by her personal values.
I don’t like escap in g . Yet I’m som etim es obliged to, but I...in that c a se , it’s  
really not self-fulfilling, you know. B eca u se  b es id es  you don’t so lv e  anything
-  I m ean escap in g , really, it d o e sn ’t so lv e  the problem, you  just avoid it, 
really -  and at on e point or another it’ll co m e back. [...] som etim es it’s  not 
e a sy  at all b eca u se  it m ea n s you’ll e x p o se  yourself, or that it’s  gonna b e  very  
difficult and you don’t really know how  to  handle it. But on the other hand, 
the harder, the m ore p leasure you fee l in su cceed in g , it’s ...b u t som etim es  
it’s  really difficult.
- What do you mean bv ‘exposing vourself?
To e x p o se  yourself is  to  put yourself at risk of failing. H en ce to be unsatisfied  
with yourself. M oreover, b e s id es  self-satisfaction , it can  b e  difficult for the  
com pany or the co lleagu e or w h atever ...
However, Irene demonstrated a genuine interest in the topics discussed because they 
addressed issues she reckons are important but that she does not fully grasp. The 
following excerpt suggests that despite her anxiety of and resistance towards 
asserting her self, Irene feels a need to develop in that direction, albeit she finds 
excuses not to do it quite yet.
It’s  interesting to ponder on th e s e  is su es . B eca u se  actually you ’re far too  
often focu sed  on the operational asp ect, and you don’t take tim e to reflect, to 
say  “wait a  m inute, w hat are m y v a lu es? ’’. O bviously you live by them , but 
you don’t think about them . It would b e  n ecessa ry  to think a bit, it’d be good  
to rise a bit from tim e to tim e.
-  Would it be to better perform at work or to feel better personally?
H em ...n ot work-wise, b e c a u se  I already do this. To fee l better...no , but it 
would be, yeah , to  understand better. T o u se  a part of your brain you don’t
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work with in your private life, nor...th is intellectual sid e, you know. 
R esearching, reflecting -  it can lead  you som ew h ere e ls e . You a lso  n eed  to  
foster so m e  intellectual curiosity to evolve, b e c a u se  you can  easily  lock  
yourself up in the daily routine, and forget to  look around you, to s e e  the  
world changing. You s e e  it, but you notice it only afterwards. W hen you g e t  a 
c a se , for exam p le  a c a s e  of harassm en t like w e talked about earlier, this is  a 
notion that did not c r o ss  your mind 20  years ago . It w as -  yet it occurred  
th en ... - s o  p eop le  had to start talking about it and all that. And th is is  
normally, it’s  som eth ing I should h ave, I should h ave thought about it, I 
should h ave  noticed c a s e s  and I w ould h ave liked to b e  a  p ioneer on this 
topic. But you don’t h ave  tim e, in everyday life, you don’t h ave tim e to reflect, 
to s e e  how  th ings evo lve .
5,3,4. MARTIN
Martin works as Regional Director for Real estate operations for a bank. He has been 
working for about five years at this position. He trained in business and worked for a 
couple of banking institutions prior to his current position. During his first work 
experience, the bank he was working for was severely hit by a property market crisis, 
which seems to have made a lasting impression on him. He is married with children.
Persona and Self-Image
Martin’s self-image seems tormented. It looks like Martin is constantly in 
contradiction with himself, which shows in his perception o f a persona. Indeed, 
Martin likens his job to that o f a merchant, and as such describes himself as a 
comedian. He believes he has to wear the banker’s uniform, and seems to accept it as 
a means to detach himself from his job.
You know, here, you do w ear the banker's uniform, you know, w hether you  
like it or not, hem . I would h ave  received  you wearing a tee-shirt, with no tie, 
wearing light trousers or a  short, you would have thought "he’s  not a  
banker"...so, you know, w e  h a v e  to resp ect the uniform...
- This uniform, is it something vou accept easily?
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Y es, it’s  m y overalls! I think w e take to ...th e  art of com m erce at o œ  point or 
another lies in being a com edian. You ought not to  lo se  your soul -  w hen I 
say  sou l, co n sc ien ce , I know wtiat I m ea n ...
-  How do vou manage not to lose vour soul?
R easoning, so m e  introspection ...to  know yourself better. T o know yourself.
T he better you know yourself, th e le s s  you lo se  -  you know very well when, 
at so m e  point you n eed  to tell a guy “goodb ye, thank you, w e will no longer 
work with you’’ -  which w as the c a s e  recently -  it’s  not m e  w ho sa y s  that, I 
sa y  that b e c a u se  it’s  m y job, b e c a u se  ultimately I don’t care w hether he  
works with u s or not, really, ultimately. I m ean  it’s  n o n -sen se . [...]
Yet, Martin pays great attention to his relationships with his clients, not just because 
it is good for business but also because he might come to personally appreciate the 
client as a person. Hence, Martin is not as detached as he wants to believe he is. 
Rather, we could say that Martin wishes to be a ‘banker persona’ when at work 
because somehow he feels he does not play a part, he is his actual self, and this 
worries him. This shows in the following quote:
I alw ays try to maintain a  barrier betw een  m e and my clients. I know very  
well that so m e  clients would like to g o  further, I would like so  too, so m e  
clients -  th e s e  are clients, at so m e  point, you fee l you really g e t on  well, but 
there’s  a  tim e w hen a  signal lights up and sa y s  “no, you shouldn’t g o  too  far 
b eca u se  if you do, you w on’t be ab le  to tell th e  difference betw een  
professional and personal m atters’’...and  this, there’s  nothing w orse  than 
that. [...] Similarly, from a  strictly familial viewpoint, you co m e  hom e in the  
even ing , you d o s e  th e  door, you don’t exp ect a  client to phone you on the  
grounds that h e ’s  a  friend. W hat will h e  talk about -  do you think h e  will talk 
about th e  ‘friend stuff’ or th e  'work stu ff?  T he work stuff, right! No, to be  
careful, it’s  better not, hem , a s  m uch a s  p ossib le, this is som eth ing -  if w e  
should m eet up, h ave  a drink and all that, there are ca fé s , restaurants to do  
that. Better to  stay  within a ‘purely b u sin ess’ relationship.
Consciously constructing a persona appears to be Martin’s means of defence against 
his own self. Yet he believes in the unity o f his clmracter despite the fact that he 
admits he acts up.
164
You can b e  a  com edian , th e  only difference is to know that you are a  
com edian. That is, you know, I am  a m erchant, som etim es I exaggera te  a 
bit, I em p h a sise  so m e  details, but fundam entally, I would n ever go  beyond, 
e v en  within the sc o p e  of my ability to  act, never beyond w hat 1 m yself am .
By the way, just like I’m joking with you and so  on, that’s  a  s id e  o f m e, but I 
wouldn’t say , I w ouldn’t g o  beyond the proprieties or so m e  th in g s...Y es, w e  
are true to  ou rselves, I think, w e  are ou rselves.
Actually, we could say that Martin’s persona does not seem to be so much o f an 
issue, which is not the case of his shadow. Indeed, Martin appears to be conscious of 
all his games, his acting, and his pretending, as we noticed in the quote above. What 
he seems to struggle with is getting a clear sense of direction. Although he sounds 
like he knows himself fairly well because he is introspective, Martin often says 
something, then makes a contradictory statement right after. For example, he 
explains that he could never be nasty, yet he could act nasty. He also states that in his 
opinion being honest is not very good to advance one’s career, yet one can reach the 
top o f the ladder whilst being honest. The two exceipts that follow point this out in a 
clear manner:
-  What about vour values at work? Your deontology, how would vou define
it?
G ood q u estion ...T o  b e  ser iou s without taking yourself ser iou sly ...b u t still be  
serious! But w hat d o e s  being ser iou s m ean ?  You’d h a v e  to b e  m e to know  
that! No, I think it’s  about honesty , hem , with capital H. To b e  genuinely  
h on est is not the b est guaran tee  to  m ake a career, clearly, hem , that is 
hon esty  drives to tell the truth, I m ean  -  let’s  b e  clear, w hen I tell the truth to 
a  client, I u se  th e  correct form s, or w hatever you want, but it’s  not 
n ecessarily  -  integrity is not -  in d ep en d en ce, h onesty  are not n ecessarily  
gu aran tees for being prom oted. H em ...b u t at so m e  point, m y v a lu es  are to 
a ccep t m yself a s  I am ...an yw ay, I will never b e  a crook, I will never walk on 
so m eo n e  to b y p a ss them ...b u t 1 m ust admit that not m any would actually try 
to do  that to m e either. But like I often say , what you are not, you can  
b eco m e. Acting dumb, 1 can  do it too, and acting dum b and letting the  
situation g e t w orse and hem , or being nasty, I can  do that too. You don’t 
know, but...no. I’m not sure I would do anything to, h em ...to  su c c e e d . 
Anyway, what d o e s  su cceed in g  m ean ?
165
Human beings, w hat m ak es them  strong now -  for how long, I d on ’t know -  
is their ability to adapt. Ability to adapt, the faster you adapt, the m ore you  
can en su re you'll last long. That’s  a lso  why so m etim es you n eed  to be  
strong. T he higher you’ll b e  on the social ladder, either you’ll consider it’s  a 
guarantee for pow er and s o  on, or if you’re h on est and upright, you’ll be ab le  
to “im pose yourself" but, n everth eless, you’ll b e  able to let peop le  know -  
you can really get to that level wtiilst being h on est and upright.
Below is another example of Martin’s inconsistency in his self-knowledge, where he 
explains how he was not interested in partying as a teenager, yet he did enjoy 
partying with his friends at that age. Besides, he explains that he can live by himself 
but still needs others to reassure himself on the fact that he is not that bad a person.
My father u sed  to  sa y  this about m e: "Martin, on e day, p eop le will say  h e ’s  
alw ays b een  3 0 !’’. Hem, that’s  how  it is, w hen I w a s  14 or 13, so m etim es it’s  
hard w hen the friends g o  out, including the girls, I stayed at h om e to  read, I 
w a sn ’t in terested ...
[...] I quite liked -  m ayb e b e c a u se  I w a s  stay-at-hom e -  although, b elieve  
m e, I had tim es w here w hen  I partied, I did party, w here I enjoyed being with 
m y friends and going out and drinking o n e  too  m any -  well, I w asn ’t far from 
the bed -  so , no, 1 knew  how  to h a v e  fun. But it w as, but indeed ev en  w hen I 
w a s young -  and yet I w a s  a n ice fellow , peop le liked m e, I m ean  1 w a sn ’t 
the romantic o n e  in his ivory tower, but I quite liked -  how  did I sa y , what did 
1 sa y  at that tim e, at 17, 18 years old, I u sed  to say: first. I’m not afraid of the  
truth, or of m y truth, and I’m not afraid o f solitude. I’m not afraid of facing  
m yself. And still today  I’m not afraid of facing m yself. It’s  not - I know of 
w orse com p an y . . .Y es, b e c a u se  I’m true to m yself, I am  not ash am ed  to look  
at m yself in the mirror.
- Is it about accepting who vou are?
Y es, but with no pretence. I m ean  it’s  not a definitive accep ta n ce  and I’m 
not...I’v e  got progress to m ake, I reassure m yself by saying that others 
probably h ave  ev en  m ore to m ake than m e, and up to them  to progress or 
not. Anyway, I’m not here to  m ake m yself a  m odel either, and then tell 
everyon e they h ave to look like m e. i’m not God, I haven’t m ad e m an.
These contradictions in Martin’s view o f himself suggest that he does not really 
know who he is, what he wants, or even which image he wants to present to others.
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We argue that this ambivalence pinpoints at Martin’s inability to integrate his 
shadow, his darker motives.
Relationship to Others
Martin likes to depict his relationships to others as a game of negotiation. This seems 
to reveal an attachment to his merchant character, which prevents him from being too 
personally involved in the relationship. The quote below shows this tendency, which 
we aheady noticed in the first excerpts.
B esid es, you know, being a  m erchant, I ca n ’t help it, 1 h ave  to bargain. I 
don’t bring m y w ife, generally, s h e  h a te s  that. But you h ave to  bargain, the  
detail is not what I’m Interested in. It’s  like with m y clients, w hen I tell them  
instead o f being at 3  I'm at 2 . 7 5 ,1 just sh ow  goodwill. T he real bargaining is 
w hen you’re below  2, there you actually negotiate. It’s  a  real thing, I quite 
like it, and it’s  fun, you know ...w hen  you ’re u sed  to bargaining, it b eco m es a 
gam e, y es , that’s  it...
Risk and risk management are concepts Martin often uses, not just in his job but also 
regarding his personal and professional relationships. Trust appears to be a core 
element o f Martin’s job, yet it seems as if Martin fears all the unethical things he 
knows he could possibly do. In order to preserve his integrity, he seems to have set 
up strict rules to manage his relationships in and out of work. Nevertheless, these 
rules do not seem waterproof, and Martin implicitly stresses, as in the following 
quote, how great the temptation can be, which could suggest he anticipates 
experiencing this situation without knowing for sure how he would actually react.
S o , on th e se  ty p es of m arket w e  h ave  two different approaches; o n e  w here  
I’m there to g e t market sh a res  with low rates, and the other w here I’m there  
to m an age risk with a high margin. Thirdly, there Is a lso  on that seco n d  
a sp ec t of m y job the client’s  gratefu lness b e c a u se  to allow  him to  g e t a 15 to  
20%  margin w hen you’re dealing with 5 or 6 millions -  do the m aths, 20%  of 
5 millions it’s  o n e  million euros. To earn on e million euros h e  m ust b e  willing 
to pay 100 ,000  to the bank...but a  o n e  million margin, he te lls him self "I’m 
going to earn o n e  million. I'll pay 100 ,000  to  the bank which m ea n s that the  
bank le a v e s  m e  with 9 0 0 ,0 0 0 . [...] That’s  W iy I’m telling you that I’m here to
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m ake my clients richer...and w here you h ave  an important deontological and 
v a lu es-b ased  is su e , it’s  w hen you look at what you earn at the end  o f the  
month, and w hen you look at v\4iat you allow your clients to earn, it’s  not to  
fall on the other s id e  of th e fen ce . W hen I say  falling on the other s id e  of the  
fen ce , it’s  about not thinking about the rules, b eca u se  w hen a  project is not 
very good , there is w hat’s  on  th e  table, there is  w hat’s  under th e  
table...right? And it’s  particularly resisting what’s  under the table.
- Does this occur often?
No, and # i e n  it occu rs you think either you’v e  sen t the wrong m e ssa g e , or 
you are being tested , or th e guy you’v e  got in front of you is  so m eo n e  you  
should throw out. Often you should strongly bew are the p eop le  w ho offer 
you th ese  sorts o f things, you  should strongly bew are th em ...b u t they  try 
their luck, after all, if you  don’t try you don’t get. You know, the o n e  day - it 
can happen to  an yon e to h a v e  financial difficulties or th ings like that, and  
that day you h a v e  so m e o n e  w ho by so m e  miracle co m e and offer you ...an d  
you’ll pay it back, e v en  m uch d ea rer ...y es , it occurs, unfortunately y e s , it 
occurs.
Mai'tin seems to view the industry as an open door for corruption and 
misappropriation o f funds, wtnch maybe reveals how weak he feels towards the 
pressure. His concern emerges as strong in these excerpts.
Money! Y eah, I m ean ...lik e  I sa id  earlier, if you want so m eo n e , if you  want 
so m eo n e  to remain independent, you’v e  got to g ive  them  the m ea n s to do  
so . T he m ore, the m ore m oney you handle -  im agine traders at th e stock  
ex ch a n g e  w ho h a v e  com m ission s that s e e m  to you astronom ical, so m e  gu ys  
can earn 10, 15, 20  million eu ros in a  year, but they handle for 2 ,0 0 0  billion 
dollars. T hey might m ake 2  or 300  million dollars margin, if you don’t g ive  
them  th e se  20  millions, either they  lea v e  for the com petition -  that’s  the b est 
option -  or they’ll m anipulate the rates or w hatever ...a t so m e  point, you  
m ust consider -  I m ean , you m ust border, waterproof the risk, the risk that -  
how can I sa y  -  the risk of corruption. That’s  what it Is, b asica lly ....
[...]
Banking is an industry b ased  on  trust. That is  the bank will prefer keeping  
quiet, reimbursing th e  client but keeping quiet so  that no o n e  knows, 
b eca u se  at so m e  point in your pyramid, in your h ou se  o f cards -  the elem en t  
that joints everything, the e lem en t that holds all the cards together, it’s  the  
trust the client h a s tow ards you. [...] S o  w e  g e t to  notions o f laundering, 
things like th a t But you’ll be caught not n ecessarily  b e c a u se  you got paid,
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it’s  not corruption, it’s  rather b e c a u se  you w ere not careful in applying th e  
sa fety  rules concerning the funds’ origin. Another thing, w hen your job is  
becom ing difficult from the legal point of view , w hen it’s  not n ecessarily  w ell- 
paid, that your job is  no longer guaranteed , but you keep  on having, you still 
have m ore and m ore unrealistic objectives to ach iev e ...w h en  you add all 
that, h em ...you  aren’t n ecessarily  acknow ledged, and I think that, strictly 
from this viewpoint, from a  deontological view point - 1 think that’s  w hat w e’re 
talking about - 1 think w e’re facing so m e  pretty, pretty difficult years ahead.
Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Martin shows contradiction in his own approach to morality. His view o f ethics, 
heavily based on a respect for the law, evokes a moral conscience rather than an 
ethical conscience, yet th^ is not clear-cut. We noticed that trust and honesty are 
core values for him. In fact, although he states that his honesty goes even beyond 
what the law requires, he later insists that his acting honestly is not so much a matter 
of ethics as a matter of personal interest. In fact, Martin suggests he does not doubt 
his personal integrity, however he does not really act out of personal integrity but out 
of personal interest instead. The long excerpt that follows illustrates Martin’s state of 
mind about ethical matters.
S o  first of all, I go t to  tell you, I don’t know how  long it will last but I h op e it 
will last for a  long time, if there is  som eth ing that d o e sn ’t m atch w hat I 
believe  in, I don’t do it, clearly. S o  I would find a way, b e lieve  m e, to let the  
situation deteriorate -  which in itself is  not very moral -  to return the favour 
to  w h oever  is  concerned . And a lso , if I am  confronted with a problem, it’s  
b e c a u se  within the s c a le  o f the decision-m akers, there is so m e o n e  
som ew h ere w ho didn’t do their job. If that reach es m y desk , there is 
so m eo n e  w ho at so m e  point should h ave  said  “stop, it’s  up to m e to  m ake  
the decision , it’s  not som eth ing that should b e  forwarded to  Martin.’’ And this, 
generally, m a k es up for 99.99%  of th e  c a s e s .
- S o  how do vou define there is a problem? That it goes aaainst vour 
values?
I’ll b e  com pletely honest, either it g o e s  against m y values, or it g o e s  against 
my interests. Hem, 1 didn’t tell you  that tomorrow, accepting a  bribe would go  
against m y va lu es . Y ou’re th e  o n e  w ho concluded that. At the m om ent, it 
actually a lso  g o e s  against m y interests. It’s  clear that for the tim e being it’s
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m ore in m y interest to  k eep  doing m y Job than accepting a  sum  of m oney.
Let’s  be clear. It’s  not, it’s  not b e c a u se  w e  are talking about deonto logy  that 
th o se  p eop le  w ho tell you they  w ould not a ccep t a  bribe do it for 
deontological reason s. It’s  m ayb e only b e c a u se  they calculate faster than  
others and sa y  "it is not in m y interest to do s o ,” And personally, I didn’t tell 
you -  and you’v e  got ev id en ce  -  I didn’t tell you it would g o  against my 
va lu es. I only said it w ould g o  against -  now, I tell you m aybe it would a lso  
go  against my interests. W hat’s  the sign ificance of both? I w on’t answ er you  
for I don’t know. H onestly, I don’t know w hether it’s  a question o f v a lu es  or of 
interest. Isn’t it the sa m e  eventually? And, in th e end, the fact that I sa y  ‘no’, 
w e call it deontology and it reassu res everyon e. But in fact, if you g o  back, 
you will find that sa m e  deontology, that is: notion of v a lu es  or notion of 
interest?
- S o  what would go aaainst vour values, what sort of issue?
Hem, it’s  m ore...w h at would g o  against my va lu es, it’s  relative to  respecting  
th e  law, it’s  -  so  let’s  b e  clear. It’s  ultimately, it’s  h em ...it’s  intention. 
S o m eo n e  w ho d o e sn ’t know, w ho is m istaken and g e ts  round the law, 
peop le -  and there are m any m ore than you think, and that’s  how  it is, and 
for th e se  p eop le you h op e th e patrol w on’t catch them . But wtien there’s  
intention, y es , then it g o e s  again st b e c a u se  I would sa y  it’s  a  matter of rule, 
the rule of the community, to live in comm unity it’s  the law, it’s  the  
constitution, earlier it’s  th e declaration of hum an rights and citizen duties, it’s  
indeed the p eop le  who sp e a k s  through th e law s that govern ea ch  and every  
individual.
In this excerpt, Martin mentions a need to be reassured that one’s actions are indeed 
moral whilst one doubts they are (“notion of values or notion of interest?”). We 
argue that this might point towards a daunting shadow that makes him sense his dark 
side, his potential for “falling on the other side of the fence” in his own words. This 
in turn makes him frantically question his own motivations and his ability to do the 
right thing. Martin’s reliance on rules or the law to analyse moral issues emphasises 
his need to cling to a non-personal framework, so as to avoid confronting his own 
feelings. However, in as much as he wishes decisions be made on objective facts, he 
seems to regret that more personal factors of decision-making are nowadays 
discarded. It could be that his attachment to intuition, which is evident in the quote 
below, reflects some aspect o f ethical conscience which Martin nevertheless does not 
investigate.
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You’v e  got to  understand, in m y job vWien you handle millions of euros, w hen  
you lend millions o f euros, you m ustn’t sh ak e when you sign the contract.
You tell a  guy “1 trust you. I’v e  ch eck ed  your file, okay, I lend you 5 , 6 ,  15  
million euros’’ -  you m ustn’t sh ak e. And then, I lend that guy 15 million 
euros, w h ereas I wouldn’t lend them  to m yself, this guy will get 2  to  3  million 
euros of profits, y e s , you m ustn’t b e  em otional. Emotion m ust b e  left a sid e  
and all that, you h ave  to sa y  “okay, right". It's like that, you respect a few  
objective criteria, then c o m e s  the subjective a sp ec t for about 0.1%  - at so m e  
point there’s  a doubt, right -  then for another 0.1%  th ere’s  intuition, but all 
the rest is objective, it’s  facts. If you begin to add em otions. I’m afraid the  
subjective/em otional s id e  am ounts to  99%  and the facts only m ak e 1%, and  
then you -  you head  straight for the wall.
- What is intuition then?
Intuition then is ...ex p er ien ce  that m ak es you, m ak es you fee l things, if I dare  
say  -  on the condition you h a v en ’t caught a  cold! But that’s  it, it’s  exp erience  
which m ak es you rem em ber “oh, well, this or this type o f project, careful, tac  
tac  tac, okay, ev en  that sm all thing is worth being taken into account, but if it 
w a sn ’t, it would only account for 0.1% ”. S o  you have got to, h em ...n ow , I 
would tend to sa y , m aybe in the p ersp ective  of standardisation, m aybe that’s  
a sh am e, in the perspective o f standardisation all the subjective and intuitive 
a sp ec ts  are being le s s  taken into a cco u n t than 10 or 15 y ears ago .
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Unsurprisingly Martin eagerly compartmentalises his life. He justifies his behaviour
arguing, as in the following quote, that it is as much self-preservation as a way o f
ensuring he does his job well.
I don’t want, h ere ...it  might sound  crazy W iat I’m gonna sa y  ~  I d on’t want to 
feel here at hom e, h em ...I  don’t w ant here to h ave  -  how  could I sa y  -  to 
have th e  sa m e  p leasure a s  I h a v e  w hen I’m at hom e. Here, I’m at work.
H em ...p eop le  say: “w e ’re here to  earn a living”. S o , first of all, personally, it’s  
som ething I can ’t stand, b ec a u se  to  m e, I already earned my living by being 
born -  I’m the only o n e  thinking like that. S o , y e s , to m e, this is just an extra, 
what I do here is an extra. And d on’t c o m e  and tell m e it’s  to earn m y living!
Life is already earned . S o , now, it’s , I don’t know, it’s  to  k eep  you busy, but 
that’s  not what it is either...I think, it’s  not a  hobby either, or p leasu re...w h y?  
B ecau se , hem . I’m a lso  here b e c a u se  at the end o f the m onth, I wish to earn
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som ething. S o  th e  m ore p leasure you get doing som ething, the le s s  worried 
you are about w hat you’ll get at the end  of the month.
To him, the private must remain private and the professional must remain 
professional. He compartmentalises his life so well that his family actually finds it 
hard that he does not talk about his work at all.
In m y personal life, they criticize m e a  little for the fact that I never talk about 
my work. But I don’t, firstly I don’t fee l the n eed  to do  so , and secon d ly  I 
alm ost find that in d ecen t to  now  -  after all th e se  years of, of -  to be at hom e  
and talk about what I did at work, it’s . . .y e s . . . i t ’s  like splitting your personality.
Yet Martin could talk about work at home, if only for the fact that he is so used to 
compartmentalising that he would see it as a betrayal. In his view, it would not be 
natural to do it because he hasn’t done it for so long, and he became so accustomed 
to it that he cannot seem to envision doing otherwise without “splitting”.
We could argue that Martin wants to prevent his personal life from being 
contaminated by his work and his work persona, although he does enjoy his work 
(“it’s not quite a hobby but almost...”). Wliat Martin’s statements also suggest is that 
he deeply wants to feel confident in himself and affirms his right to exist as an 
individual (“I already earned my living by being born”) yet he fails to acknowledge 
what he stands for. In fact, Martin seems to be ‘lunning away from’ rather than 
‘running towards’ something. It appears that Martin has a sense o f his shadow, his 
shortcomings, his weaknesses, but that he has not managed to accept them and 
integrate them, so that he does not dare to trust himself.
I’m not afraid of em ergency . I’m -  stress  y e s , b e c a u se  stre ss  tak es m uch  
from you, but I’m not afraid of em ergency . [...] I don’t m an age  stress  w ell at 
all. I don’t m a n a g e  it very w ell, b ec a u se  str e ss  is m ore -  h ow  would I sa y  -  
perm anent. It’s  sort of hidden, you know it’s  there but you don’t s e e  it. It’s  
sort of nagging, it’s  like can cer  -  actually I probably should b e  wary about 
that. No, I don’t m a n a g e  stre ss  very well. I thought I did but in fact I don’t 
m an age stre ss  very  well.
- And does it spread to the personal sphere?
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S om etim es, y e s , that’s  w hen, I didn’t shut the hatchway. I didn’t shut the  
hatchway [...]
- You said that vou hadn't realised vou didn’t manage stress well, does it 
mean vou weren’t aware of it before?
No, I w a sn ’t stressed ! [laugh] I w a sn ’t stressed . You know. I’m c lo se  to 4 0  -  
I’m not there yet, fortunately, or unfortunately -  w ho cares?  But you don’t 
s e e  things the sa m e  w ay, you d on’t s e e  things the sa m e  w ay. I m ean , like I 
said earlier regarding anticipating the future, a  few  things, working m ore for 
others instead o f m yself and so  on, obviously  all that m ea n s you’re getting  
older and you tell yourself “okay, but...but tomorrow will I be ab le  to  ach ieve  
m y objectives?" T h ese  ob jectives are no le s s  am bitious b e c a u se  I’m 40  than  
w hen 1 w a s 20 , nor older, it’s  not tm e. On the other hand, I know that, so m e  
e lem en ts m ake m e think that it will be harder to  ach ieve  them , and s o  on.
Nevertheless, as we notice when he talks about how he copes with stress, Martin 
seems to have reached a turning point which makes him realise he does not 
compartmentalise as well as he thought, and brings him to question his aspirations. 
Maybe his stress partly reflects his great uncertainty about his self.
5.4. S u m m a r y
This chapter introduced the study participants and examined examples o f the 
importance o f the sense o f self in moral perception and moral experience. We 
analysed the transcripts of four selected interview participants in relation to the 
Jungian framework and the themes identified in previous chapters. We illustrated 
how a strong persona and the phenomenon of compartmentalisation tend to 
contravene the perception that one is an individual, and consequently impede the 
perception of one’s ethical conscience. The following chapter examines three more 
cases o f managers whose relationship to self is set differently. It also offers a 
summary o f the cases of the remaining participants.
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C h a p t e r  6 -  A n a l y s in g  C a s e s  o f  M o r a l  Ex p e r ie n c e  II
Tl is, however, true that much of the evil in the world 
is due to the fact that man in general is hopelessly 
unconscious, as it is also true tliat with mcreasing 
insight we can combat tliis evil at its source in 
ourselves.”
Carl G. Jung 
The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man
6.1. In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter examines the experiences o f three other participants selected as case 
material. The analysis in part 6.2 adopts the same Jungian concepts to assess the 
importance o f the self in the moral experiences o f these managers. We suggest, 
through the analysis o f the interviews, that these respondents seem to show greater 
awareness o f their self. In particular, as opposed to the cases discussed in the 
previous chapter, the respondents examined here have developed a greater sense o f 
unity of self with which their moral values are intricate. Part 6.3 proposes a summary 
of the analysis o f the remaining twelve participants whose cases have not been 
retained for an extensive case discussion. The analysis is also based on the Jungian 
concepts, but simply offers the main conclusions which characterise each case.
6.2. C a ses o f  M o r a l  Ex p e r ie n c e  II
6,2,1. D ebo rah
Deborah works for an IT engineering company as a lead technical architect and staff 
manager. Her background is in computing, but besides her technical role she acts as a 
career counsellor and Human Resources manager for twelve employees, mainly 
engineers or technical people. She has been working at her current company for more 
than fifteen years, and had no prior managerial experience before that. She is in a 
relationship and has children in their twenties.
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P ersona and Self-Im age
Deborah is not very concerned with her image, and her persona does not appear to be 
significant. She says she usually is herself and she seems to have clear ideas o f what 
she can do and what she cannot do, what she is good and bad at.
I find it very difficult to  not be true to m yself, to what I b e lieve  and what I 
think is right and all of that.
She also admits she is a perfectionist and dislikes “being wrong”, elements that may 
pinpoint to her persona.
No, I seldom  do things that I don’t believe I can do. S o  I do, I am  a bit of a 
perfectionist, I don’t like doing things that I know I can  do better. I don’t like 
submitting som eth ing that I know I can  do better, so  y e s  I would take tim e a s  
in that, but b e c a u se  I don’t a gree  to  do things that I d on ’t think I can  do, 
usually it’s  som eth ing that co m es  relatively easily . [...] And I’m quite happy  
to admit that I’v e  m ad e a  m istake or som ething like that, that’s  not a  
problem, I just have -  it’s  just w hen I have, I g u e s s  there, w hen I know  
som eb od y’s  waiting for m e to m ake a  m istake, then I try not to, c a u se  I don’t 
like being wrong.
However she is very critical of the politics in her organisation and of the acting (“the 
pretending”) that is required at work. As the quote below demonstrates, she feels 
strongly about the persona other people project, and even if she has learnt to adapt to 
it, she remains frustrated by it.
Politics. I hate having to  sa y  th e  right thing to the right person to  a ch iev e  
w hat you want. I d on’t like pretending, I don’t like acting. I like -  in m y perfect 
world, everybody would just b e  th em selv es , and I would sa y  what I think, 
and he would say  w hat h e  thinks, and w e would understand ea ch  other, but 
it’s  not like that.
[...] B ec a u se ...p e o p le  ex p ect you to  b eh ave in certain w a y s and they  react 
differently to different things. S o  I know now  how  I need  to  approach certain  
people, I know w hat I h ave  to  sa y  to  them , I know how I h ave  to sa y  it to 
them . But I just think it’s  wrong that I should h ave to do that -  they should
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just know what I m ean  w hen I sa y  som ething [laugh]. And they shouldn’t 
h ave to  act the part for m e either. I’d like to  know w hat they  really think, I 
don’t care what v en eer  th ey  h ave to  put on it, you know, how  they should  
say  som eth in g ...you  know, if som eb od y  s a y s  “y e s ”, I would like them  to 
m ean “y e s ”; or if they  sa y  to m e “no” I just w ant them  to m ean “no”. I don’t 
want them  to m ean  “y es , but”, “no m ayb e” an d ...you  know, if I sa y  "Cécile, is  
this pen blue?” and you sa y  "well, it’s  a  little bit greenish” that’s  w hat I hate, 
okay? I just want you to sa y  "yes, it’s  blue” [laugh]
- And how does that affect vou. the fact that there are lots of circumvolutions 
In the comoanv?
I find that very frustrating, very frustrating. I don’t handle it well. H em ...an d  
now adays I tend to just withdraw. At o n e  tim e I u sed  to confront, I’d try 
an d ...n o t force but sort o f push w hat I b elieved  in, but m aybe now  b e c a u se  
I’m just getting old or som eth ing I just think “oh. I’m never gonna su cceed  s o  
I’m just not gonna fight anym ore” [laugh]... S o  now  my attitude is m ore that I 
would sa y  w hat I think. I might sa y  it tw ice, I might sa y  it three tim es but by 
three tim es if you don’t b elieve  m e  or you don’t understand or you don’t 
accep t that this is w hat I think. I’m not gonn a sa y  it anym ore c a u se  there’s  
no point -  why do I just sa y  it a  hundred tim es, still at the hundred and o n e  
tim es it would b e  the sa m e  a s  three tim es, so  I might a s  well stop  at three!
Relationship to Others
People are important for Deborah and she says she cannot but treat people nicely.
And I would a lso  not con sc iou sly  treat p eop le  badly. I, I ca n ’t -  how ever  
m uch I dislike som eb od y  I ca n ’t treat them  unprofessionally, or w henever I 
h ave to -  I a lw ays h ave  to m ake them , g ive  them  the ch a n ce  to prove that 
i’m wrong or that they  h a v e  a  v iew  that I don’t understand or som eth ing like 
that.
She enjoys her staff manager role in so far as it enables her to help “people to grow’
which gives her “a huge amount o f satisfaction”.
[...] watching p eop le grow, or helping p eop le  to grow. S o  that’s  o n e  reason  
why I’m very interested and keen  on  staff m an agem en t b eca u se  I get a  
huge, hem , am ount of satisfaction from see in g  som eb od y  w h o se  functions 
are quite, a  very low  level to start with and suddenly h e  rea lises “hey w hoa”.
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it’s  like opening h is e y e s  and suddenly  he can  do som ething which h e  didn’t 
ev en  -  som etim es they  don’t ev en  know that they can do it. But if you can  
en cou rage them  to think and to  work in a  certain way, then suddenly  this big 
world o p en s up for them , [...] and that's w hat I find very very satisfying.
Besides the fact that she seems genuinely interested in people, Deborah appears to be 
a good judge o f character, which helps her decide quickly whether she wants to 
pursue something or not, as we can see in the following excerpt.
I h ave a pretty good  bullshit detector, s o  if som eb od y  is trying to bullshit m e,
I know. And I can ’t tell you how  I know that but I do know. H em ...an d  I think 
I’m quite a good  ju d ge of peop le, which d o e s  help a s  well. H em ...yeah , but I 
would sa y  I d o  know  fairly quickly what, w hether it’s  right or wrong. I might 
not know  all the details, 1 might want to investigate further the details, but I 
can quite quickly look at som eth ing and sa y  "yeah, that’s  worth investigating” 
or “you got that com pletely  wrong” or “you h ave to work really hard to  
convince m e that this is the right thing to d o .”
Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Deborah has a very strong ethos, which her behaviour seems to reflect quite clearly. 
She has set clear boundaries to guide her conduct, so that making decisions is not a 
problem. Her values represent who she is, and truthfulness is central to all her actions 
and decisions because she cannot do otherwise. The two quotes below reflect how 
much her values are intertwined with her sense of identity and integrity o f self.
I su p p o se  I n ever sa y  I w ould do som eth ing if I w on’t. I don’t sa y  I can  do  
som eth ing if I ca n ’t. And I w on’t a g ree  with som ething if I don’t. You know, if I 
d isagree with som eth ing I w on’t h e m ...s a y  that I a g ree  with it. I w on’t sa y  
that sort of “it looks a  bit like th e  sky”, I would sa y  “it’s  blue”.
B eca u se  for m e  v a lu es  h a v e  to do with how  you are, s o  I don’t -  you know, I 
would sa y  the sa m e  things about out o f work. I don’t com m it to som eth ing I 
can ’t do, I don’t sa y  I’ll d o  som eth ing  if I can ’t, I don’t sa y  1 can  d o  som eth ing  
if 1 can ’t.
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However, Deborah seems to lack the confidence to trust her sense o f right and wrong 
when it comes to making the decision. Although she does not doubt her “gut feeling” 
and she is confident there are things she cannot make herself do, she is eager to give 
a chance to be proved wrong. Indeed, she explains that she cannot make herself agree 
with the majority if she believes the majority is wrong.
For m e, i f s  som eth ing  that I h a v e  to  do, to b e  m e, to b e  h on est with m yself.
That’s  not th e  c a s e  vwth a  lot of peop le. A lot of p eop le can  just go  with 
everything -  you know, if 90% of the peop le  sa y  “y e s ” then y e s  m ust be the  
right answ er s o  I’m gonn a sa y  y e s  too . But I can ’t do that, I’m very bad at 
doing that. I never do that, I ca n ’t d o  it. B eca u se  if y e s  is th e  wrong answ er  
then I’ll sa y  no anyw ay. B e c a u se  you know, if inside you fee l no, then  how  
can you sa y  y e s?  You d on ’t b e lieve  it, you can ’t work with it.
Yet she also confesses in the quote below that she needs reassurance that she is right 
to follow her intuition and act on what she believes is the right thing to do.
In a difficult situation I a lw ays ch eck  that. I’ll check  it m th different p eop le  for 
different circum stances, but I would a lw ays...I would feel uncom fortable if I 
h ave  -  in so m e  c a s e s  -  if I had to  take th e  decision  just m yself. [...] 1 n eed  
som eb od y  to tell m e  “if s  okay, don’t worry!”...
Actually it seems as if she wanted to convince herself that she is not making the right 
decision, although ultimately she has already made the decision and does not really 
question it as we noticed (“I can’t do it, I can’t say yes if  it’s the wrong answer”).
S o  if som eth ing is wrong, if I think som ething is wrong or not good , I will 
alm ost g ive the guy too  m uch tim e to prove that I’m wrong, b e c a u se  I don’t 
h ave  -  it might sound  to  you that I’m quite confident, but I’m not. And I 
alw ays ex p ec t to b e  wrong, or that som eb od y  can prove m e  wrong. S o  I 
would n ever  -  that’s  another thing I ca n ’t look at som ething and sa y  “if s  
wrong, stick it in the bin”. I’m very very bad at that. I alw ays g ive  p eop le too  
m uch, I think, of th e benefit of the doubt.
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Deborah seems to rely not on codes or rules of conduct established by society, but 
rather by what she feels capable o f  doing or what she feels confident doing. She 
probably relies on her ethical conscience to make decisions that are in accordance 
with who she feels she is, though she is also aware that she can benefit from this.
1 w a s  working with th is bid, a proposal to a  com pany. And I w as just 
responsib le for creating th e  solution that would resolve, so lv e  the problem  
that the com pany has. W e  had a  team  and w e put together a  proposal, and  
everything like that. And it c a m e  to -  everything w a s written, and it w as  
written fine, and w e  g a v e  it to  th e  custom er and that w a s fine. Then it ca m e  
to a  point v4ien  w e  had to m ake a  presentation to  sum m arize what w e  had 
written, and th e  sa le s  guy w anted  to sa y  som ething that I knew  w a s  wrong, 
w as fa lse . But it sou nded  good , and it w ould h ave m ad e the custom er think 
that w e  w ere clever, w e’re good  and all that. And I couldn’t do it. S o  I said  
“no”. And he said  “you h ave to”. And I sa id  “no. I ca n ’t. You’ll s e e  w hen I sa y  
som eth ing that I don’t b elieve, you’ll s e e  it in my face. Y ou’ll hear it in my 
vo ice . I cannot do that.” And w e  had a  d iscu ssion  for 2 or 3  days. And in the  
end [...] som eb od y  e ls e  had to  d o  that.
- How did vou feel about the whole situation?
Very uncom fortable. I knew  that that w a s  probably vwong, I don’t know if it 
w as the right thing to  do. I could s e e  why he w anted to  sa y  that. But I think 
for m e, I knew I couldn’t sa y  that with any credibility, so  it w a s  quite an e a sy  
d ecision  for m e, c a u se  I would h a v e  b een  letting the com pany down e v e n  if I 
agreed  to sa y  that. B eca u se  I’m 100%  sure that I would have, som ething  
would h a v e  g iven  it aw ay in th e  w ay that I’d h a v e  said it, b e c a u se  -  I think 
that m y strength in presenting som ething, standing up in front of an au d ien ce  
is that p eop le b elieve  m e  b e c a u se  I don’t do the bullshit thing, I don’t lie, I 
don’t, you know, m ake things flowery or anything like that. I’ll sa y  w hat I 
think. And I think it would b eco m e  very obvious to  so m eo n e  if so  90% o f the  
tim e you’re saying on e thing, and then suddenly you ch an ge your w ords, 
your sty le  and -  b eca u se  I would not b e  confident about saying that, your 
v o ice  would ch a n g e  and I’m sure that m y fa ce  would ch an ge, and I thought 
“well, if you want to sa y  that, then I’m not the person to sa y  that”. I w on’t sa y  
“hey, look, you’v e  got that w rong” to th e custom er, right, but I can ’t sa y  that 
m yself. And then it’s  a ccep ted  in the end, and h e said that him self. I just had 
to sit there and listened to it.
179
This long excerpt demonstrates how Deborah seems to have managed to build a 
business credibility from her very personal sense o f morality. The fact that she 
cannot blatantly lie “because you see it in her face” could be considered an 
unconscious defence system to prevent her from being entangled into a situation that 
makes her feel uncomfortable from her values perspective.
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Actually, Deborah makes a distinction between acting for a customer and acting to 
get a bid.
To m e that’s  fa lse , that’s  a  ven eer , that’s  acting, and I’m not good  at acting.
Well, I’m not good  at that kind o f acting, I can  do the custom er kind of acting.
And y es, I like talking to custom ers, I think I’m quite good  at talking to  
custom ers. I can  convince them . I’m quite convincing, I’m quite credible if I 
talk to a  custom er.
For her, the “customer kind o f acting” is about finding the appropriate arguments to 
convince the customer whereas acting to get a bid implies moving away from the 
truth in order to achieve an objective.
[ . . .] . . .it’s  creating a  situation or a ...h o w  can  I describe it...it’s  being  
som eb od y  that I’m not, that kind of acting I find difficult. But using what is  
natural to  m e, being straightforward with som eb ody, being credible in front of 
som eb od y  and presenting the com pany, you know, with m y yellow  hat and 
my black w hatever, it’s . . .b e c a u s e  I b elieve  in the com pany and I b elieve  1 
can deliver som eth ing, that’s  not so , that’s  not out of character, that’s  not 
creating, you know, that’s  som eth ing  real.
Thus, for Deborah, lying is out o f the question because she camiot do it, because she 
would give it away, as she insists in the following excerpt.
I know that if I did som eth ing like this [i.e. acting], then iife would b e  a lot 
easier. But I ca n ’t m ake m yself do som ething that I don’t b e lieve  in. And from 
that perspective life would b e  m ore difficult b ecau se , you know, I m ake today
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ea s ier  but tom orrow w ii be m ore difficult, the future would b e  a  bigger  
problem. S o  for exam p le  If w e  had a project -  like today w e h ave  a  project 
that h as a major problem, and w e ca n ’t deliver, and I predicted this problem  
two years ago . [...] Politically the right thing to say  at the tim e would have  
b een  “y es , o f course, w e  can  d o  this, and w e  will do this and this and this” 
but I knew  that that w as the wrong thing to say . And I couldn’t sa y  it, I 
couldn’t agree  that this w a s  a v iab le project. S o  w hen, w hen it b ecam e  
obvious that nobody w anted to listen, th e only thing I could do w a s to -  well I 
felt that th e  only thing I could do  w a s to withdraw and to g o  and work 
som ew h ere e ls e . And that’s  actually w hat I did. And two years later w e  now  
find w e’re losing out th e  m oney.
We could argue that Deborah exemplifies a person who does not compartmentahse 
but rather brings her values to her work, cultivates and takes advantage of her moral 
strengths, and acts so as not to compromise her sense of self. In fact, compromising 
is not an option because it would damage her professional image and capabilities, 
which would in turn damage the company’s image and interests.
- How do vou know what’s  riaht and what’s  wrong?
I don’t know! H em ...w h ere d o e s  it co m e  from ? S o m e of it c o m e s  from  
experience, w here I’v e  s e e n  it before, w here I’v e  s e e n  it d on e wrong 
before...I don’t know, actually. I su p p o se  it might b e  from background and  
upbringing...m aybe w hat you learn at hom e, m aybe, w hat you learn at 
sch oo l...I  think it all, it all c o m e s  together, I don’t...m a y b e  you think of it a s  
like a  gut reaction to som ething, a gut feeling. But it must h ave  so m e  basis, 
it’s  only unconscious, you know, it d o e sn ’t c o m e  from now here. But I m ean  
for exam ple, treating p eop le a s  hum an bein gs -  w here d o e s  that co m e  
from? N obody told m e  that, I d on’t think, but I would never consider doing, 
you know. I’v e  s e e n  peop le doing just -  in fact w e h ave a  m anager here  
who, if you are useful to  him, you’re his b est friend and h e  will do anything 
for you. But the minute you b eco m e  not useful, h e  d o esn ’t ev en  
acknow ledge you, you know, h e  could be walking in th e corridor and you 
could be walking tow ards him and h e  w ouldn’t ev en  say  “hello" to  you or 
acknow ledge that you could. And I don’t think -  certainly consciously , I 
couldn’t do that. H em ...I h op e su b con sciou sly  I don’t do that either, I’m not 
aw are of doing that. But that d o e sn ’t -  that’s  not som eth ing that you’re 
taught, I don’t think...w ell, I don’t know. I can ’t answ er a  question like that, I 
don’t know. But I know I do fee l very strongly that som ething is right. Usually
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1 h ave a very very good  idea that som ething is right or wrong. And 
that’s . . .e v e n  from th e technical and delivery, not just from the p eop le  
perspective. And obviously, if you know som ething is wrong, then you will 
investigate to s e e  why it’s  wrong. M aybe I don’t do enough  investigation  
w hen it’s  right, or w hen I think it’s  right.
Wliat this quote shows is that Deborah appears very confident in affiimmg her 
individuality, which suggests she is connected to her self and able to listen and act 
upon these “gut feelings” that tell her what to do. However, her self-knowledge could 
be developed further in so far as she still does not entirely trust her initial judgment 
and needs other people’s reassurance to confirm she is right, as we saw earlier. Yet, 
it is important to stress that Deborali does not really call her judgment into question. 
Rather she calls into question her confidence in her judgment. Indeed, she does not 
think she is wrong, but she tends to wonder whether it is right that she feels 
something is wrong. Discussing an experience she had where she allowed an 
employee to train and change his career path although his choice proved inadequate 
for his abilities, Deborah expresses confidence in her decisions no matter what.
- D o vou regret the decisions vou made?
No, b eca u se  they’re right d ecis ion s. It w a s  th e  right decision . H em ...shou ld  I 
have taken this d ecision  ear lier? ...hem , I don’t think I regret that either. It’s  
p ossib le  that so m eo n e  e ls e  might sa y  “you should not h a v e  g iven  him such  
a big ch an ce’’ if you like but I think I w a s  right. Y eah, I think that w a s right!
6.2.2. Pau l
Paul diiects a children’s home he founded fifteen years ago. The home welcomes 
relatively young children who have suffered various abuses and who are placed there 
either temporarily or for a few years. Paul studied law and initially aimed to become 
a police superintendent, until one summer he worked as an instructor within an 
organised holiday scheme for children {colonie de vacances) and met people who 
encouraged him to work in this sector. He then trained to become an executive, then 
a director of social structures for children. He is married with grown-up children.
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P erson a and  Self-Im age
Paul identifies three different roles within his job, each with specific demands and 
requirements. In the following quote, he explains that the nature o f his 
responsibilities makes him shift fi*om one role to another very quickly, and that 
overall he enjoys this diversity of contacts and issues. Yet this implies that his work 
occupies a very large part of his life, especially because he founded the organisation 
and feels very keen on its development.
I jump from o n e  subject to another.[...] Personally, w hat I like In this job, Ifs  
that It is very rich and very varied, that you do a bit of everything, really.
Even now, for exam ple, I h ave this work to do: w e  are building a  n ew  unit.
The buildings belong to  the C onseil Général [the local supervisory  
authorities] but their architecture and property serv ice  d o e s  not h a v e  time, 
b eca u se  they h ave  got too  m uch work, to  m an age the building of a new  unit.
S o , in order not to delay, they  d elegated  the project m an agem en t to m e. I 
don't know a thing about this! Now, I'm actually d o in g ...-  here, th e se  are the  
bids, s in ce  it is In the public dom ain, that I h ave to m an age by m yself. S o  it 
m ea n s this: last w eek , a  m eeting with the supervisory authorities, w e  started  
the stuff; 1 plan a  board m eeting  to v o te  the d ecisions, and after that, w e still 
h ave [he points to  a  pile of various docum ents] -  i f s  gonna take a  lot of time.
But, well, I can  a lso  take so m e  tim e if a  veh ic le  n eed s  to  be replaced and so  
I’ll h ave to order o n e  and find th e  b est price for it. And then, five m inutes 
later, a  teacher will sen d  m e a child w ho’s  got into so m e  m ischief and I’ll 
n eed  to s e e  him. T hen I h ave a  vvtiole planning w hen I m eet with th e  fam ilies 
a s  part of the follow-up p rocess . S o , you s e e ,  I constantly shift from o n e  role 
to  another, really. But -  w ell, right, so m e  d ays i f s  exhausting, but at the  
sa m e  time, I personally find it very rich and very thrilling. And then, well, I 
could not picture m yself -  yeah . I’m at e a s e  in th is...but that m ea n s that well,
1 don’t really h ave a work sch ed u le , I d on ’t . . . -  my life is sh ap ed  around my 
work m ore than anything e ls e , to b e  h onest. Really. It is alright b ec a u se  my 
wife works here to, I live here, but well, it is  true that at night, there are night 
guardians, I’m personally on call o n e  every  two w eek s, so  after 10.3ÛPM, 
the last teach er le a v e s , th e  night guardian h a s arrived: if there is a  problem  
of educative or technical nature at night, I’m the one intervening.
183
Nevertheless, Paul does not seem to pretend to be each role he has to endorse. The 
difference between the roles is palpable in terms of content, but nothing suggests 
Paul adopts a different persona when he meets with different people. It may be 
because Paul has clearly defined the organisation’s mission and prioritised the roles 
he hî^. Indeed, for him the financial side is there to serve the educative system, so 
that when he manages resources his purpose remains the children’s benefit. This 
shows in the excerpt below.
[...] well, often p eop le  sa y  “educating children with sp ecia l n eed s , educating  
children, that m ust work just the sa m e , w hether there’s  o n e  or 2 0  children, 
anyw ay the w a g e s  are paid and the funding Is obtained’’, no. If I don’t fill In 
my beds, that is  if w e  deliver poor serv ices  and if the network within which  
w e operate, well, considers that the perform ance of the organisation is not 
good, tomorrow w e would h a v e  le s s  children left in our care, and w e  could  
h ave to let so m e  staff g o . S o  w e  are really within a  com m ercial dynamic.
From that point of v iew ...b u t -  then, if you talk about, to  talk about, to 
mention the ethical s id e  of it, knowing that for m e, the financial a sp ect  
se r v e s  the educative a sp ec t of it, and not the reverse, that is that you should  
not b e  m istaken, right. W e h ave so m e  asp ect o f com m ercial m an agem ent  
but w e  are not a com m ercial organisation, s o  everything that is undertaken  
is undertaken to serv e  th e  children in n eed ...a n d  not to -  that is  why I w a s  
saying m anager, yeah , but for m e, there’s  som ething e ls e  behind it.
The clearly-defmed objective of “serving the children” probably guides Paul’s 
decisions and actions to form a unity o f character, which itself seems close to Paul’s 
personality. Therefore Paul does not seem to have a strong persona. Rather he is 
mission-driven and he makes sure that his various activities contribute to achieving 
this mission as best as possible.
Relationship to Others
Paul explains he favours a participative management style so as to ensure the staff 
feels involved in their work and works well as a team.
W e have, well a s  far a s  I’m concerned , here my m anagem ent sty le is b ased  
on co n sen su s  or participation which allow s the tea m s to b e  -  how  would 1
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say  -  there is a real team  dynam ic both in term s of daily m anagem en t and  
the follow-up on the kids, but a lso  In, in our ability to  get together and create  
new  tools.
His concern is, again, driven by the mission of taking the best possible care o f the 
children. It seems that he adopts the approach which will best benefit the staff so that 
they provide the best service to the children and contribute to the development and 
good performance of the organisation. This is evident in the following quote.
W e h ave s e t  up the quality control sy stem , which h a s b een  im plem ented for 
a  year.[...] This m ean s, well this m ea n s refocusing the organisation’s  
functioning, it a lso  m ea n s im plem enting training p lans that will allow peop le  
to com plem ent their training ev en  if th e  staff here are all very m uch trained, 
but hem , it is  so m etim es n ecessa ry  to  -  so , each  year, I h ave a training plan  
which actually is  -  you know, w e  d on ’t h ave  o n e  penny left unspent on the  
training plan. And a lso , you know, it’s  a good  w ay o f investing in th e future 
b ec a u se  the m ore trained p eop le  are. th e  greater their com p eten c ies  and  
the m ore efficient th e  organisation is. S o , in that respect w e  so m eh o w  join 
m aybe the, so m e  com p an ies a lso  play that card, b eca u se  it s e e m s  important 
to  m e. And it a lso  a llow s you to estab lish  staff loyalty, b e c a u se  it’s  true w e’re 
at the border o f the county, and it’s  true the young teach ers or young  
psychologists or psychiatrists, they prefer to live in th e m etropolis than here, 
peop le don’t fight over com ing to work in the southern county area, so  to  
keep  them  or m ake them  co m e here, you have to offer interesting work 
conditions and, hem  -  how  can I sa y  -  not a  promotion b ec a u se  in our 
profession, promotion d o e s  not exist, you get a diploma, there are w a g e  
sc a le s  -  but anyw ay, so m e  opportunities to  progress in their work which will 
be interesting in term s of research, reflection, and...right? And then, in temns 
of m anagem en t -  if I w ere behind m y d esk  playing at the big jerk of director,
I don’t think I would h a v e  the team  I h ave  now. you know. After all, 
there’s .. .y e a h , there’s  all this m anagem ent which is important.
Paul’s behaviour is purposeful yet he is not necessarily instrumental in his 
relationships with his staff. It seems that Paul does not distinguish the organisational 
performance requirement from the children’s care, but views them as intrinsically 
linked. He allows autonomy and tries to break off the hierarchical barriers to be 
perceived as part of the team.
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Personally, I am convinced -  w ell, you know, m y w ay of doing things is  very  
hum anist -  but I am convin ced  that the head  should not b e  cut from the  
body, and s o  -  personally, th e  teach ers w ho c o m e  to s e e  m e, w e  chat about 
things, right...I am  just a  team  m em ber with just a specia l sta tus. But, you  
know ...m y v iew  is like that.
- Is it something vou have willinalv se t u p ?
Y es, y e s , b e c a u se  I b elieve  in it. I b elieve in this type o f m anagem ent. S o  it’s  
true that it’s  m ore -  it’s  m ore com plicated than to be the director-rector 
behind his d esk  w h o ...obviou sly , s in ce  you're m ore involved, it n ecessarily  
m ak es things m ore com plicated. But, you know, it is  a lso  so  rich on the other 
hand that really ...now , ea ch  activity sector  is accountab le here: the kitchen  
staff are responsib le for their budget, the cleaning staff are responsib le for 
their budget, w e  m eet every m onth to ch eck  up the expenditures, e tc ...b u t if 
I’m not there, they can sp en d  w hatever is  n ecessa ry  for the good  running of 
th e  organisation. I m ean  it’s  not b e c a u se  I’m not here that everything will 
stop  working.
- Do vou delegate trust?
Oh, y es, th is is  fundam ental. S o , right, a  good  delegation  shou ld ...involve a  
fair control in th e  good  se n s e , not being a  control-freak, but hem , y es,  
peop le are very autonom ous in their work, that’s  important.
In fact, for Paul tlie staffs well-being and the children’s well-being go hand in hand, 
and his view o f staff management reflects this perspective: the more competent and 
the happier the staff, the better the care they provide to the children.
[...] the right barometer, in the end , is the relationships -  you know, I can  
s e e , i f s  th e  staff satisfaction w hen  you ask  them  -  b e c a u se  the problem , the  
problem in an organisation su ch  a s  this on e, you  h ave  to  b e  -  the is su e  of 
m anagem ent is  n everth e less  critical, in s o  far a s  if the staff are not happy in 
their job, the o n e  w ho ta k es the rap is alw ays the o n e  at the bottom of the  
pyramid, w hich m ea n s th e  kid. And so  i f s  critical that p eop le  b e  com fortable 
with their work. S o  personally 1 am very very careful, but while being, being  
present on the ground, in contact with peop le, available, and I try to so lve, 
every tim e som ething is  wrong, w e  talk and w e  try to so lv e  th e problem  
quickly. Ifs  rather this w ay I try to ...b e c a u se , b ec a u se  I wouldn’t w ant that, 
well, the kid suffers on account of organisational m alfunctions which -  you
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know, they already h ave a  lot to deal with, th e se  poor kids, that if w e  add to  
it. And obviously, it’s  a lw ays th e  o n e  at the bottom who suffers th e  m ost.
Logically, Paul enjoys the contact with the children and is genuinely concerned with 
their progress and well-being. He encourages the children’s participation in making 
decisions that concern them, and he finds that being in contact with them helps 
remember more basic things one might tend to forget because o f all the other psycho­
social issues the staff has to care for, as he explains in this excerpt.
W e are so  involved in dramatic, com plicated c a s e s  about which w e  already  
h ave so m e  trouble calm ing th e children, im plementing things and finding 
appropriate gu idance s o  that they  can b e  b est cared for tom orrow -  I m ean  
that they b e  in the right p lace. W e are so , w e  are so  absorbed by th is that w e  
m ay forget about basic  n e e d s  -  well, not forget the children’s  basic n e e d s  
but forget to take into accoun t things w hich are m ore basic, you know. S o  it’s  
true that th e  fact w e  h a v e  all th e se  opportunities w here the kids -  and that 
they h ave the opportunities to  talk, w here 1 am there or m y co-director is  
there, w e  h ave  m eetin gs regularly -  you know, it helps you get your fee t  
back on the ground, not really th e  ground but to think "oh, yeah , th is is w hat 
the kid said , it n e e d s  to  b e  taken into account, b eca u se  it’s  important, w e  did 
not s e e  that really".
We could argue that Paul views the contact with other people as a learning 
experience, a “humblmg” experience that implies he establishes a real connection 
with the other as another person.
Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Paul describes his values as “humanist” and founded on a respect for the other. 
Because of the nature o f the organisation, Paul feels that these values are essential to 
his work and tries to include them in the daily care of the children. He feels very 
much in line with the values o f the non-profit organisation to which his organisation 
belongs m so far as he has written the charter hiir^elf. It seems that for Paul, without 
these values little work can be done. He insists on this point in the following excerpt.
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Oh, well, the v a lu es  are hum anism , it’s  respect for the other, it’s  all th ose  
va lu es which for m e -  I m ean  without which you can’t live in a comm unity  
outside, and without W iich you cannot live in an organisation, b e c a u se  after 
all w e  are here to m ake the kids learn th e se  va lues, really. W e work a  lot on 
the question o f rights, o f duties. W e work a  lot on the question  of respecting  
the other, on respecting -  w e  h a v e  kids from various backgrounds, various 
colours, w e  work a  lot on th o se  is su e s , c a u se  for m e it’s  e ssen tia l, really. It’s, 
it’s  -  yeah , you ca n ’t -  you ca n ’t h ave -  you can ’t d iscon nect from real life, 
n o ...T h e se  core v a lu es  are a lso  m y professional va lu es. And I happen to be  
lucky en ough  to work - 1 m ean  I’m lucky - 1 work for an organisation that h as  
the sa m e  v a lu es  a s  m e -  by the w ay w e  put them  on paper, w e  h a v e  an 
organisational charter. If I had b een  hired by an organisation that did not 
cham pion th e se  va lu es , I w ouldn’t h ave  stayed , it’s  very clear. I m ean  there  
are things on which I’m personally not prepared to  com prom ise, really. [...]
- D o feel like you have a duty to be an exemplar for the children?
Oh, y e s , y e s , com pletely . And I a sk  that from everyon e w ho w orks here, 
w hatever their role, ev en  if you’re a  cook, you still are in contact with the  
children, therefore you n eed  to b eh ave. [...] s o  here is our philosophy, it 
g o e s  like that -  but, I m ean , it’s  essen tia lly  mine. 'To resp ect th e  user, his 
singularity and intimacy’ -  s o  this m ea n s the children; 'To restore th e social 
and familial link’ -  so  th is is like I said  earlier, w e  work a lot with the families;
T o  prom ote the citizenship and social unity of the youngster with em otional 
difficulties’; ‘T o ack n ow led ge th e  cultural and religious backgrounds’ -  allow  
them  to  b e  ex p ressed  if the kids w e  receive  and their family w ish so; 'Allow 
ea ch  youngster, legal subject, to  b e  represented  in front of the  
representatives’ -  s o  w e  do h ave  bodies, w e  try to m ake the k id s ...-  
personally I m ake them  vo te  for lots of things: w e buy a car for the h o m e ...-  
and actually they bring -  not n ecessar ily  the you n gest o n e s  -  but they  bring 
m uch food for thought.
Paul’s sense o f responsibility towards the children is what informs his behaviour and 
how he actually translates his values into acts. He seems to have a clear view of what 
he should do in a given situation because his focus is on the articulation o f his values 
for the benefit of the childien. Paul spoke about an experience he had in another 
organisation he worked for, where the director used to drink and hit the teenagers 
who lived in the home. He decided not to leave but to stay and try to limit the 
contacts the teenagers under his care had with the director, and lobbied to change the 
situation. For him, to quit would not have solved the problem because not everyone
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was able to quit, and the teenagers would have stayed anyway. Therefore he probably 
felt a moral responsibility to stay and try to act from within. The following excerpt is 
quoted at length because it exemplifies the internal deliberation process which led 
Paul to his final decision not to quit.
[...] it’s  true I found m yseif in situations w h ere ...y ea h , it w as -  ev en  
situations w here you fee l you’re a coward som ehow , you know. You tell 
yourself “okay, w e ’re h ere to protect the kids. At the sa m e  time, w e  are in an 
organisation in which the director hits th e  bottle and so m etim es can  hit the  
kids, h em ...a n d  how  do I tell him I ca n ’t stand that?” S o  it’s  true there are 
tim es, v\4th occu rren ces w here it w a s difficult to  position yourself b eca u se  
the person in question  w a s -  hem , I m ean it w a s  im possib le  to m ake him 
understand anything at that time, s o  it m eant take care of kids that w ere  
initially placed in our care b eca u se  they  w ere  ab u sed  at hom e -  y e s  I found  
m yself in s itu a tion s...so  later, I tried to  deal with them  backwards, and it’s  
true I had m an aged  to not h ave  that director intervening in the boarding unit I 
personally m anaged . But you know it did not happen w th ou t c la sh es, 
w ithout...you know. W e eventually -  he told m e “if you’re not happy, go  and  
work som ew h ere  e ls e ”, so ...w e ll there, I had a  team  behind m e, with whom  I 
personally w as on the sa m e  w avelength , w e  knew  w here w e  w anted to go, 
w e particularly knew  what w e  did not want, s o  w e  w ere ab le  to put so m e  
pressure, I w a sn ’t a lone. But it lasted  severa l m onths, this stuff, so  it w asn ’t, 
it w asn ’t very com fortable.
- And how did vou feel all this time?
I felt bad, b e c a u se  it’s  true it w a s clearly contravening m y v a lu es -  both my  
personal v a lu es  and m y professional va lu es, I m ean , really. If, things that for 
m e are unbearable, really. But at the sa m e  tim e, at the sa m e  tim e w hen  
you’re married, and you’v e  got children, you cannot quit a job just like that -  
and a lso , I m ean, to  quit a  job b e c a u se  you d isagree, it d o esn ’t so lv e  
anything. B eca u se  the kids, well they’ll still b e  there, and facing -  s o  
so m etim es hem ...I do have m otto, I alw ays sa y  “it’s  urgent not to be in a  
hurry”. And in that c a se , it’s  th e  sa m e . If you storm out and lea v e , well you  
have storm ed out, you fee l relieved in the instant, but you h aven ’t so lved  
anything b ec a u se  you h a v e  left the burden to others w ho cannot, don’t h ave  
the possibility to  storm out. S o  so m etim es I think that you n eed  to  find out 
exp ed ien ts to g e t to w here you want. I m ean , it’s  true it can  b e  frustrating, it 
m ak es you unsatisfied , morally it’s  not s o  great, you don’t fee l great, 
but...but you know, I prefer this w ay to storming out, b e c a u se  in the end, I 
personally can storm out but others, they cannot stoim  out, s o . . .
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[...]
- This responsibility vou felt towards the children, did it make up for the fact 
vou had to compromise to get where vou wanted?
Y es, b eca u se , you know, the com prom ises w ere m ade for the children’s  
b est interests -  m aybe not th o se  o n e s  but the o n e s  who would b e  com ing  
the year after or th e  following m onths. S o , I think it w a s  important to b e  ab le  
to work in depth to stop  this sort o f behaviour bearing in mind that, you  
know, w e  couldn't stop  it really -  ev en  if w e all had resigned, what would it 
h ave so lved ?  H e would h ave  kept his job and h e  would h ave  continued. S o , 
there, it w as urgent to think, to gather th e  p eop le w ho shared the sa m e  
va lu es and s a m e  m ea n s to try and m ake it stop, and to put him aw ay w hen it 
c a m e  to th ese  is su e s . S o  it’s  true that som etim es, you h ave  to sit upon your 
initial visceral reaction if you  want to a ch iev e  sustainable results, b e c a u se  if 
you don’t, y e s , okay, you tell yourself "I storm out, right, I did not 
comprom ise", excep t that w hat did you so lv e?  In this particular exam ple, 
what would I h ave  so lved ?  Nothing at all really. A job, I would h a v e  found  
another on e, but the kids, they would h a v e  continued to b e  slapped  all day  
long, so ...a n d  m y substitute might not have had the sa m e  attitude a s  m e, he  
could h ave  thought “well, right...’’. S o , som etim es it’s  n ecessa ry  to m ake -
hem , not really to com prom ise, but you just have to postpone, you know.
Paul’s decision was reasoned, in so far as it was for him ‘logical’ to stay, yet his 
emotional link to the teenagers in his care seems to have played a significant role in 
his decision too. Tliis suggests he probably made his decision out of a duty call from 
his ethical conscience rather than purely and only following the rules set up by his 
values. It could be argued that Paul simply avoided to make a difficult decision and 
walk out of a job he needed to support his family. Nevertheless, the pressures he felt 
whilst lobbying against the director suggest he did not act cowardly but he actually
chose what he felt was the best option for all stakeholders from the moral point of
view, which was incidentally what he felt was the right thing to do. His focus was the 
best solution over the long-term.
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Unsurprisingly, Paul does not compartmentalise his life. Ever since he set up the 
organisation, he felt naturally very concerned with its good running and with the
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level o f care o f the children. The pleasure his job gives him seems to compensate for 
the demanding workload that comes with the director’s position.
Actually, I cannot do things half w ay, and h em ...an d  you know, w hen you  
create som eth ing -  and I had the luck to create, and to create other serv ices  
and to d evelop  them  -  you are actually necessarily  very m uch involved in it.
S o , well, personally I like w hen things work, function well, that th e kid can  
get the m ost out of what w e  can offer them . S o  obviously you g o  to  a  lot of 
trouble to  m ake it work, you don’t count the hours, really.
The nature o f the work is also emotionally demanding, and if Paul has learnt to 
manage this pressure, he admits it isn’t possible to withdraw himself from the 
situation anyway, as in the examples given below.
P ersonally, I’m not an anxious person or vWiatever, s o  you know ...and  I 
ca n ...I ’m ab le  to jump from o n e  topic to  another without too  m uch ...but, you  
know, w hen you work on the hum an, anyway, I m ean obviously -  b e c a u se  I 
m eet with parents but w hen I s e e  th e  parents -  w hen you h ave  parents who  
h ave ab u sed  their kid and with w hom  you h ave to work, and you h ave  the  
kid around you everyday, i m ean, I ca n ’t tell you it’s  ea sy . Then, there are  
p sychologists in the h o u se  with w hom  you can  talk a s  co llea g u es  and say  
“pfff, this is com plicated, can  you do the follow-up c a u se  I ca n ’t do it 
a n y m o re ...”, you know. On that work asp ect, w e  are relatively -  you know, 
and w e are trained to  help u s b e  prepared to d istance ou rse lves from a very  
distressing or difficult situation, you know.
[ • • ■ ]
If I lea v e  for the w eek en d , if I have worries of so m e  sort, I lea v e  with m y  
worries. But, 1 m ean , I m an age, it’s  true ...exp erien ce , a g e , habit m ak e it that 
-  i’m not saying you actually detach  yourself, w hen I walk through th e  door I 
d on’t stop  thinking about it ...[...j A lso, so m e  kids co m e in s o  d istressed , I 
m ean, no o n e  can  b e  indifferent, s o  you know ...it's true I think about it, but 
you know, it d o e sn ’t prevent you from living, really.
Paul seems connected to his self in so far as his relationships with others, both his 
colleagues and the children, are open and pervaded with respect for the other as an 
individual. He seems to know himself fairly well and has clear guiding values that 
determine his actions. We could argue that the strength of his decisions comes for his
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authentic commitment to a purpose which he pursues. Paul seems to be a ‘one-piece 
man’, focused on his core values and committed to living them out in eveiy aspect o f 
his life. Paul, like Deborah, appears to have managed to shape his work environment 
around his values rather than adapting his values to fit the organisational culture.
[ ...] I m ean, I try to hire p eop le  w ho h a v e  roughly similar v a lu e s  to m e, even  
if in th e  end, everyon e h a s his ow n w ay of living them  out, but w e  all h ave a  
com m on core in this organisation, I b e liev e ...if  I’v e  su cceed ed  in som ething, 
it’s  in doing this, I think. I’m actually rather proud of it. It’s  that p eop le  here  
have hum anist va lu es , th ey  try to  live them  out with the children, they live 
them  out in the daily activities, in the inter-personal relations. It d o e s  not 
m ean w e  a lw ays agree , and I m ean , really, it would b e  terrible to  h ave a  
team  full of yes-m en , b e c a u se  then you ca n ’t progress. But you can  d isagree  
whilst respecting each  other. You know, so  I’m very attached to this.
6.2.3. Vin c e n t
Vincent has worked as a field application-engineering manager for an IT company 
since 2002, He studied electronic engineering as an apprentice and worked for a few 
companies in the IT field, where he gradually began to manage a greater number o f 
people. He has also been working as a reservist for the army since he was a teenager, 
and now occupies a rank where he manages people too. He is married.
Persona and Self-Image
Vincent does not seem much concerned with liis image as such, but appears to be 
objective-driven. He enjoys his work, he cares about his performance and that of his 
team members, but he does not seem too worried about how he is perceived by 
others. His experience o f the “lonely manager” is the mam aspect that relates to his 
persona. Nevertheless, the rationale behind Vincent’s attitude demonstrates as much 
a concern for others as a concern for his own interests. Talking about the ranking 
system in use in the organisation, Vincent illustrates his viewpoint:
And I certainly had this year a guy w ho’s  actually very good, w orks very hard 
for m e, h e  is p laced  significantly far down th e  list. T he moral part is -  how  do
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you explain that to  so m e o n e  w hen  you don’t h ave any n egative things to 
say , that their perform ance isn't n ecessarily  bad. And that’s  what I would call 
the lon eliness of m anagem ent, b ec a u se  it’s  som ething that...
- Is it like being cauaht in the middle of a structure that vou cannot change. . . 
And how  m uch are you prepared to b e  honest, how m uch are you prepared  
to  u se  along so m e  of that m an agem en t skills of not entirely telling the truth? 
[laugh]
- Is that part of management, not telling entirely the truth?
I think there’s  certainly a  requirem ent for it, I think a lso , and I’v e  said it 
before, there’s  lon elin ess in m an agem en t in s o  far a s  there are tim es w hen  
you realise that being c lo se  to your team  m em bers is  actually probably not 
the b est thing, b e c a u se  you m ay actually b e  delivering so m e  pretty bad  
n ew s to  them  which they m ay not entirely want to hear. And if the  
relationship you h a v e  with your team  is a very friendly on e, i.e. they all 
con ce ive  you their friend, they  struggle ev en  m ore personally to understand  
how you could h ave p laced  them  in such  a  position.
Vincent ejqilains how some actions are personally difficult to perform, in 
which case removing himself and wearing a “manager persona” comes as a 
necessity for him.
I think I started with a  very friendly-friendly approach, and it’s  only a s  you  
gain exp erience  and probably fa c e  so m e  of the tougher is su e s  of 
m anagem ent -  m aking p eop le  redundant, having to  sa ck  p eop le -  both of 
which I’v e  d on e not in th is com pany but in previous o n es, w here you begin  
to realise that there h as to  b e  a d istan ce level b etw een  you upfront, betw een  
yourself and the team . B eca u se  you m ay h ave to m ake d ec is io n s that aren’t 
initially, that aren’t actually pleasant, and you m ay h ave to follow them  
through and act upon.
However, Vincent stresses that it does not prevent him from being affected by 
what he does. Vincent seems to have clearly identified his “manager persona” 
as something that might come in handy as part o f the job, but which is not him 
eventually.
Telling som eb od y  th ey  no longer h a v e  a  job [is difficulty...] You begin  to  
think about do they h ave  a  w ife? Do they h ave  children? Do they h ave, you  
know, large m ortgage and bills to pay? Even if you try to  rem ove yourself
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com pletely, that will still go  a cro ss  your mind at so m e  point c a u se  losing  
your job is a major life changing thing for m ost people. S o  from a morality 
perspective, you  certainly think about it. Anybody w ho sa y s  they don’t I 
wouid sa y  is  probably a  liar.
[...]
- And removing yourself, is it something vou find easy to do?
H em ...I would sa y ...p erson a lly  you n eed  to -  or I certainly n eed  to  kind of sit 
and take a  little bit of tim e before I actually get through with the action, and  
that bit of tim e is  actually that tim e to sort of rem ove all the thoughts of 
“concern and why" out of my mind to actually fo cu s  on what n e e d s  to b e  
done. S o  it’s  taking tim e to sort of reflect and b e  quite co n sc io u s of pushing 
so m e  thoughts out o f th e  w ay. B eca u se  it’s  d early  a  function of “this m ust b e  
done and you n eed  to ex ecu te  that”, albeit so m eo n e  might say.
Relationship to Others
Vincent seems genuinely concerned with others, not just as employees but also as 
individuals. It could be argued that Vincent’s friendliness towards his team members 
is instrumental in so far as it allows him to achieve good results.
- And spontaneously, vou would ao for the friendly approach?
H em ...it certainly is a  vray o f getting a  good  result from people. In term s of 
m anagem ent sty les, I would h ave  a  military background a s  w ell, s o  so m e  
would sa y  they would ex p ect m e to h ave  a military style to my m anagem en t 
and in fact I don’t, c a u se  to  g e t th e  b est out o f peop le it’s  better not to dictate 
what they should do  but to actually u se  so m e  of th e  other skills like 
coaching, mentoring etc, a  bit of a friendly approach ultimately, pretty m uch  
getting p eop le to  really want to  do w hat you want them  to  do a s  op p osed  to 
telling them  w hat th ey  should do.
However, the importance o f teamwork and team spirit in his approach to 
management suggests that his concern might be more than mere pragmatism or 
utilitarianism. Vincent does not seem to pretend to be a friendly manager, rather he 
acts friendly because he feels it is the right thing to do for everyone to work well and 
feel at ease, for example to “smile and laugh once in a while”.
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I g u e s s  o n e  of the b iggest th ings that contributes to hap p in ess is d on’t ever  
alw ays fo cu s on the n egatives, particularly w hen you do it with your peopie.
Even if you’v e  go t so m e o n e  w ho is  h o p e lessly  bad, and everything h e  d o e s  
is wrong, you h ave  to find a w ay to  m ake him sm iie and laugh o n ce  in a  
while. B eca u se  m orale, individual p eo p le’s  m orale will g o  down rapidly and  
stay dow n. And so m eo n e  w h o se  m orale is  very low  Isn’t efficient to  you or to  
the com pany at all. S o , find a  way, w hatever way, to m ake p eop le sm ile  and  
laugh o n ce  in a  while.
Vincent seems to care for the people who works with him. However he explains that 
things differ depending on how well he knows the person. In the following quote, 
Vincent mentions how firing people he did not personally know was much easier 
than firmg people he worked with for several years. In the first instance, Vmcent 
seems to find it easier to wear the “manager persona” and execute his task because 
there is less personal connection between him and the others; whereas in the second 
mstance, Vincent feels personally involved in the relationship and does not seem to 
be able to remove himself.
In my last com pany, b ec a u se  th ey  laid lots of staff off, I actually ended  up 
doing that in severa l countries and in countries w here I didn’t know p eop le  it 
w as getting e a sy  b ec a u se  you h a v e  no relationship to th e individual. S o  I 
w a s really th e  axed  m an that c o m e s  along and sh o p s p ie c e s  of th e  com pany  
apart. W here you’re in a position of a  relationship with an individual, it’s  
w here it g e ts  a  lot m ore difficult.
- And vou find it reallv easier that if vou don’t know the person, then vou 
don’t have the same problems?
Well, that’s  your actual b u sin ess , isn’t it? I’v e  b een  sen t to  this country to  tell 
5 p eop le  they no longer h ave  a job -  okay. I can do that. I g e t to fly out to the  
country tomorrow morning and throw in th e  n ew s. I g u e ss , I d on’t want to 
sound really cold in that respect, but it is  very e a sy  if you don’t know peop le.
If you actually know p eop le and you h a v e  known them  for a long time, I’m 
thinking in particular of o n e  individual in France w ho I had to  lay off but 
whom  I worked with for 8  years -  if you do it th e right m anner, you never  
know how  life will turn around. He now  w orks for m e again, and I w ent and  
hired him last year after a  5-year break.
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Vincent’s apparent coldness however does not necessarily imply he does not care for 
people he does not personally know. Equally, he does not necessarily calculate his 
interests in the relationship. Rather, Vincent seems to act out of decency, bearing in 
mind that people have lives outside work and that they deserve consideration. 
Actually, Vmcent seems to naturally empathise with others, which requires a 
significant connection with other people in the sense o f perceiving that they are 
similar to him. It is remarkable that he shows great concern for the people he fires 
despite the fact he personally never was laid off. He demonstrates a personal 
responsibility about the way his actions affect other people’s lives. The following 
quotation relates experiences he has had o f people being fired and clearly shows how 
he is concerned at a deeply personal level by the implications of such a decision.
No o n e  likes to  hear bad n ew s, no on e likes to be told bad n ew s in a  
conflicting style if you like, or in an argum entative style or a very stern, you  
know “your perform ance is absolu tely  terrible. G et out" -  you know, you  
clearly can't sa y  that from an HR perspective, but -  in th ose  term s, you  
know, very very negative. H em ...aga in , you know, if I -  in th e  story w here I 
h ave to lay off p eop le , or let p eop le  go , the worst thing in the world is to  
literally take so m eo n e ’s  m orale dovwi to a  very very low level. It’s  a very very  
depressing thing losing your job. Thankfully I’v e  never lost o n e  but talking to  
friends w ho h ave, you know, there are huge things that g o  through p eop le's  
minds. You know, how  would I feel a s  a  m anager if I told so m eo n e  that they  
didn’t have their job and hours later they com m it su icide that night? 1 would  
think about every word I sa id  to that individual, and w hether the w ords I said  
contributed to the action that they took. It soun ds drastic but you kind of 
have to  think about that... Clearly there are reason s why so m eo n e  h a s to 
lea v e  the com pany, w hether b e  it financial or b e  it perform ance issu e , etc .
But there are ways you  can  break the n ew s to  them  in a  [...] m ore gentle  
fashion s o  that doesn't lea v e  so m eo n e  terribly d ep ressed  with the p ossib le  
bad co n seq u en ce .
- S o  vou think it’s  almost a moral responsibility that vou have in trvina to be 
as nice as possible?
Y es. W ould you fire som eb od y  on a  Friday? No, for then they  h ave  the  
w eek en d  to think about it before they can  talk to  you about it again. You 
would fire them  on  a  Monday or tell them  they don’t h ave  a job on a  Monday,
But they h ave  four w e e k s  o f notice to  work, which m ean s on T u esd ay  they  
can actually c o m e  and talk to you. T he tim e of the w eek  is  important, you
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know. Do you know enough  about your em p loyee  to sa y  It’s  h is birthday this 
w eek-end  or his w edding anniversary or you know -  if you know enough  
about that and there’s  som eth ing con sequentia l com ing along, you’d actually  
sa y  “d’you know  what. I’m not going to do it then, I’m gonna push to  try to do  
it a few  d ays later.” D on’t ruin a  particular sp ecia l occasion . S ou n d s m aybe a 
little bit oversensitive but at the sa m e  tim e you just try to think “don’t ruin 
som eth ing com pletely for som eb od y”.
- And when vou don’t know the people?
It’s  a  lot ea sier  to  fire them , you don’t n eed  necessarily  to  think about that, 
it’s  le s s  hard c a u se  you d on’t know the details. In m y last com pany, w e -  I 
w a s involved, but ultimately w e  laid off 20  staff on the last day before  
Christmas. Personally, I think it w as a really nasty  thing to do. I think if it w as  
m e and I w a s ab le  to m ake th e  decision , I would h ave all let them  h ave a  
nice Christm as and on the first day back in January, given them  the new s. 
B eca u se  w hat’s  w orse  w ay to sp en d  Christm as than to hear you h ave no  
job, you just sp en t all your m on ey  on presen ts and everything e ls e  for the  
kids and the family, and you probably end up worrying the entire Christmas.
And trying to find a job at C hristm as tim e is not that ea sy , everyon e’s  gon e  
on holiday, so ...th a t’s  me!
Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience
Vincent appreciates discussing issues and taking advices when it comes to making a 
decision, especially when it has moral implications. He explains below that everyone 
should be aware that one’s action could have wider implications for both oneself and 
the organisation, so that one might be well advised to ask for a second opinion.
T here can  be c o n se q u e n c e s  for things you sa y  and do for the com pany and  
you n eed  to b e  -  clearly w e  g e t training in all this kind of stuff but clearly you  
n eed  to  b e  aw are o f the fact that your actions a s  an individual could place  
the com pany in a  com prom ised position. And in th ose  c a s e s ,  y e s  there are 
d ecision s you c o m e  to w here yo u ’ll actually say  “I’m not prepared to  call this.
I’v e  got to go  up to the appropriate level of m anagem ent to explain the  
situation and say: I’m not prepared to call this b e c a u se  I believe this could  
be an  issu e  for us, it could go  both w ays, e tc .”
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For Vincent, this reflects “moral courage” in acknowledging one’s limits and 
pursuing more than just one’s own interest.
Talking is  a good  thing. A talk would quite often get you around to  the  
decision  point of what n e e d s  to b e  don e or etc , etc. K eeping everything 
inside, it just kind of bubbles around in your mind. You m ay co m e up with a  
solution but it m ay not b e  th e  b est on e . That’s  the other thing, what’s  to say  
that if you m ake a decision  com pletely on your own that it is exactly th e b est  
on e to  d o?  S o  w hen th e  o ccasion  arises, actually get another opinion on  
things. It m ay not ch a n g e  your initial approach, or it m ay ch an ge it slightly,
[...] but eventually in p eop le  situation I think that’s  quite important. C au se  
you m ay not s e e  it, so m e o n e  m ay s e e  it com pletely differently from you.
In that respect, Vmcent is not always confident in his analysis o f a situation, but he is 
confident in his ability to seek advice if he feels unsure, and to sense his limits if he 
is unable to do something. It is as if he has managed to set up a process that enables 
him to make sure he is doing the right thing, both within or outside the moral 
domain. This shows for example in the following excerpt.
I would sa y  definitely looking at som eth ing and realising that it’s , it’s  not 
within your capability, m aybe -  I don’t know, a job opportunity -  you know, it 
might pay £ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0  a year but you actually look at it and sa y  “do you know  
what? T here’s  no w ay I can actually do this” -  that’s  being true to  yourself.
[...] Understanding if you’v e  reached  your limits on som eth in g ...an d  your 
self-confidence or your pride might h a v e  to g ive w ay to the fact that you  
n eed  to  go  and s e e k  a ss is ta n ce  or help  with som ething. Having the humility 
som etim es to deal with th e  situation c a u se  not everybody likes to admit that
-  yeah , they might call it failure som etim es. It m ay not b e  failure, it m ay just 
be that you actually ... m aybe you don’t know th e  w ay out, but you m ay s e e  
that a s  a  failure in yourself b e c a u se  you w eren’t ab le to deal with som ething.
- Is that something that vou feel?
No, not really. T he humility o n e  -  I think that humility, to be ab le  to put your 
hands up on o cca s io n s  and sa y  "yeah, I screw ed  up” -  I’v e  certainly don e  
that one! -  and having the con fid en ce to say  “ do you know what? Y eah, 1 
m essed  up here, but you know I’m prepared to learn from it. I’m prepared to 
take the input, help, etc” -  that’s  a  great quality and a great skill. Hem, it’s  
also  som eth ing that I think is essen tia l in anybody, b eca u se  otherw ise, if you
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don’t -  if you cannot do som eth ing like that, you find that inevitably you h ave  
to  lie on o cca sio n s.
Vmcent thus seems to have an acute sense of his responsibility in the chain of 
actions. This m turn appears to bring him confidence in his ability to manage his 
resources and his “inner strength” in order to bypass his pride and achieve the best 
outcome. Vmcent has established what looks like a structured, logical way o f 
approaching an issue. Yet Vincent seems more in line with an ethical conscience 
than a moral conscience, in so far as he does not rely on existing rules or customs to 
make up his mind. Rather he acts on how he feels like acting with “enough 
consciousness in his mind”.
I think so m e of it’s  b e c a u se  you might start trying to do som eth ing and you  
find you’v e  reached  your limit, s o  there’s  this sort of trial-and-error approach.
H em ... it m ay well be that you try to  an a ly se  it, and so  from an analytical 
perspective you look at it and sa y  “can ’t s e e  how  I would deal with this” and  
at that point you’re going to  se e k  advice. H em ...w ith th e  trial-and-error 
approach I would sa y  it’s  a lso  having the confidence to sa y  “hum, I’m gonna  
h ave a g o  at this and s e e  w here it tak es m e” [laughf but with enough  
co n sc io u sn ess  in your mind that s a y s  “if I reach a certain point w hen this 
isn’t working I know I’m gonna h a v e  to g o  and se e k  a ss is ta n ce  or w hatever  
to actually get it to term .”
- So how do vou put the limit “okav. at that point, if I haven’t succeeded, it’s  
because I can’t do it and I have to seek assistance?”
[...] I think it alw ays d ep en d s on th e  circum stance. You kind of n eed  to  -  you  
n eed  to  identify what I would call the control m easures, th e  yardsticks with 
which you sa y  “it’s  this, this and this in order to actually m ake that happen”.
Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation
Vincent does not try to compartmentalise his life, but acknowledges how other 
aspects of his hfe can help him deal with a work-related issue. He does not deny that 
he becomes emotionally involved in his job, but he seems to have learnt to manage 
the importance it bears, especially as time passes by.
Tim e is a great healer. Y ou’ll get to  a  point w here -  after a period of tim e 
w here som eth ing e ls e  ta k es a  m ore em otionally significant im portance. And
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that might be a  m atter of hours, it might b e  days, it might be a few  w eek s, 
but eventually it will m ove into the background in your own mind. You’ll still 
rem em ber it, a s  I w a s  talking I w a s thinking of the scen arios I’v e  b een  
through, but I don’t think about them  everyday. They might co m e back into 
my mind if I’m presented  with a  situation of having to do the sa m e  things in 
this com pany, and you begin to think “how  did I deal with it last tim e? W hat 
happened? Etc”.
Vmcent does not consciously try to forget about how he feels, because it would not 
be possible (“You'll still remember it”). Instead, he accepts that the issue is on his 
mind and takes the opportunity to discuss problems with other people to identify new 
solutions.
[...] I certainly g o  hom e with work is su e s  on m y mind. My w ife sa y s  “w h a fs  
up?”, I try explain with a  lot of technical sp eech  term s, sh e  stares very  
blankly and sa y s  “I don’t understand a word you said". Hem, but particularly 
on the p eop le’s  front, you do take is su e s  hom e, you do think about it, you  
probably d iscu ss so m e  things in a  slightly different light to it b u t.. . [ . . . ]
- te that something vou do wilHnalv or vou can’t help it?
H em ...I would say  it’s  probably b e c a u se  you can’t help  it b e c a u se  from a  
body lan guage p erspective it’s  very clear that things aren’t normal. You 
know, you look a bit d ep ressed , you look like you’v e  had a  hard day at the  
office, which naturally brings the question  “h ave  you had a  hard day? W hat’s  
up? Do you w ant to talk about it?" at which point you m ake a  d ecision  y e s  or 
no to talk about it.
[...] Well until very recently, m y wife w as equally a m an ager in a  local 
governm ent, s o  com pletely  different institute doing com pletely different 
things, but that is  quite interesting, you know, to b e  ab le  to co m e hom e and  
talk to so m eo n e  e ls e  w ho m a n a g es  p eop le  about a  particular problem that 
they are totally rem oved from any familiarity of the staff etc, and can to so m e  
extent g ive  you an unbiased  opinion of what they think and how  they would  
handle it.
We could argue that Vincent has some sense of his self, although he may not be 
consciously aware o f it. He seems to acknowledge the humanity in other people, and 
he tries to act not out of duty but more out of a sense of personal responsibility for 
the other person. Even when he argues he finds it easy to fire people he does not
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personally Icnow, or when he states that there is not much he can do when someone is 
being laid off, he still demonstrates a tendency to behave in a decent manner, to do 
what he can to respect the other person, as this quote illustrates.
Well, the reality is that there’s  nothing you can normally -  there’s  nothing 
you can do to actually ch a n g e  th e  fact that they are going. H em ...personally , 
if I can, you know, I offer to  help them  by w ay o f “if you n eed  a  job reference"  
if you want, th ose  kind of things. Clearly, in so m e  circum stances that might 
not b e  appropriate if they’re a bad performer, but for exam ple, so m eo n e  
being m ad e redundant you can  offer to help them  in the p ersp ective of you  
know “if you want so m e o n e  to write you job references". And a lso  finding 
from a  com pany sid e  w hether there’s  help and a ss is ta n ce , particularly to 
p eop le w ho are being laid off, that th e com pany can provide to help them  
find a new  job. But there isn ’t that m uch you  can do. [laugh]
To that extent, Vincent seems to have accepted the challenges o f his job but he 
nevertheless brings his whole self at work, which maybe gives him greater 
confidence in managing his team and making fair decisions.
I think I probably carry things from m y personal life into work. Hem, the  
military bit I referred to earlier, [ ...I I  carry a  lot of that into the w orkplace with 
m e, [..,] so m e  of th e  v a lu es  that you g e t taught there in term s of m anaging  
peop le albeit in a clearly far m ore disciplined fashion. And you apply so m e  of 
th ose  and you don’t apply others. For that reason I’d sa y  I carry m ore from  
the inside to  the ou tside than in th e  other w ay round.
6.3 . Su m m a r y  o f  O t h e r  C a se s  o f  M o r a l  E x p e r ie n c e
The following cases introduce both managers whose persona is very strong and 
oveiivhelming, managers who are more or less conscious of their persona but 
nevertheless are affected by it, and managers who seem to have found a sense o f 
moral balance between their work and their self They show the large range o f 
attitudes in the way different managers experience morality and they highlight how 
each case tends to be unique. The cases are presented in alphabetical order and take 
up, as in the extensive analysis presented above as well as in the previous chapter,
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the themes o f the persona, the self, the shadow, compartmentalisation, and moral and 
ethical conscience.
6.3.1. Ch arlie
Charlie works for a Telecom company as Director o f a regional product centre. He 
used to work as an engineer, then a product and project manager before starting to 
manage teams about five years ago. He is married with children.
Charlie’s self seems to have been taken over by a persona that has been built from 
what Charlie perceives to be society’s expectations. Charlie appears to have adopted 
a “well-performing, efficient and committed manager”-type o f persona, both in his 
professional and personal life. To him, being true to oneself means being interested 
in what one does and enjoying one’s achievements. Hence, professionally, Charlie is 
objective-driven, and personally, he cares for his family, as if he thus responded to 
what society expects o f a manager and family man. He is clearly guided by a moral 
conscience, in that he believes in fairness within the frame of good business 
relationships. Charlie actually does not seem to display any awareness or discomfort 
in being so cut off from his self, although we could argue this potentially makes him 
morally “weaker”.
6.3.2. J o h n
John directs the transport company he established twenty years ago. He had 
experience in transportation, working for a big company, but grew interested in the 
wine market and decided to create his own enterprise to be independent. He trained 
in management by distance learning. He is married with children.
John seems desperate to find his self, but he does not really trust himself. He has 
complex relationships with others, in so far as he declares he needs tune to know 
someone, yet he tends to trust a person based on their amiability. Furthermore, he 
needs others to validate him, and his image and the way his employees perceive him 
are extremely important to him. The various parts of his life overlap, but in all
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aspects, Jolm seems to seek to determine what he stands for, to realise himself 
somehow, although he does not really know what this entails. John tries hard to 
adopt a “boss” persona at work because “he has to” so that the staff respects him as 
sucli, yet he suffers from the distance he thus creates. Actually, Jolin relies on others 
rather than himself to find answers about who he is and who he wants to be. He is 
open to his gut feelings, but his intuition is scrambled by his need to be connected to 
others, so that he fails to enact his ethical conscience.
6.3.3. LOUIS
Louis directs a testing and maintenance centre for aircraft engines, mainly dealing 
with the Army. Trained as a teclmician, he worked in the nuclear sector first, before 
studying to become an engineer when he joined his current employer some thirty 
years ago. He is married with grown-up children.
Louis appears to have a strong persona which he uses as a façade or a shield because 
it reassures him. Image is central to hnn, and he pays much more attention to what 
others seem to think of him than to what he thinks of himself. His front is bright, 
colourful as if to demonstrate he exists, he is there. Yet, his apparent unshakable self- 
confidence, core element o f his persona, seems to conceal his uneasiness when he 
faces the apparent lack o f substance o f his self. It looks like Louis lives for the 
pretence and has shut off most of his self to favour what he sees as a brilliant, honest 
and confident image, but which really is an illusion which covers up his 
shortcomings. Indeed, his rationale for being honest is not moral per se, since he 
worries that people may find out the truth from someone else, and this might 
discredit him if he lied. His relationships to others are essentially instrumental, and 
his ethos seems directed towards his self-interest, although he argues his actions are 
guided by the organisation’s interest.
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6.3.4. Nic k
Nick is a joiner-cabinetmaker who has set up his own company six years ago to 
implement his creativity. He remains a craftsman although he had some management 
experience in his previous company, and he now supervises a small team of people. 
He is married.
Nick personifies the craftsman, and his morality is pervaded by his view o f his craft. 
He is passionate about his work and the ability to create high quality furniture for 
customers. He seems to view his staff as resources, as tools that contribute to the 
creation o f a product. Nick does not seem to compartmentalise his life (his work 
takes much o f his life), nor does he distinguish productivity from his staffs well­
being. To him, these two aspects are linked, in so far as you must take care of the 
production tools (including the employees) so that you achieve a high quality 
product, which provides the satisfaction o f mastering a craft. He thus invests a lot o f 
money and a lot of himself into ensuring good working conditions to his employees. 
Yet this does not appear to be purely motivated by profit, rather it epitomises his love 
of the craft and his willingness to perfect it. Nick does not seem to calculate or over­
think too much, yet being his own boss, he seems to have managed to find a balance 
which enables him to express his self tlirough creativity, and his ethics directly 
derives from that.
6.3.5. Oliver
Ohver trained in design and worked in various architecture practices. A serial 
entrepreneur, he currently oversees tliree small enterprises covering various aspects 
of the building industry. He used to be an associate in architecture firms, before 
founding his first own fiim two yeais ago. He is married with grown-up children.
Oliver’s main obstacle appears to be his persona which disguises an uncertainty 
about himself. Indeed, Oliver seems full o f  contradictions, and somehow lacks a 
clear sense of direction. He has had quite a few failures and disappointments in his 
professional life, which he argues has made him adopt a less risky attitude nowadays;
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yet he still gets involved in projects with maybe too much enthusiasm and not 
enough reflection. Oliver also argues that he makes liis decisions mainly through 
rational thinking, but also depending on his intuition and the “affective” component; 
although later he explains that he does not rely on his intuition nor emotions that 
much. Actually, Oliver seems anxious to build an image that would give him some 
sense of direction, yet he seems unable to decide on an appropriate image to 
cultivate. His persona is not quite defined, and he seems focused on it rather than on 
liis self. His morality is equally unstable, although it tends to be self-interested in so 
far it is based on meritocracy, i.e. one gets the reward one deserves thanks to one’s 
efforts.
6.3.6. RYAN
For the past seven years, Ryan has been working as team leader and project manager 
for a civil engineering company doing mainly road-works. He studied plant-biology 
and came to work in this industry by chance. He is married with children.
Ryan tends to feel the need to prove himself, maybe because he lacks confidence in 
his self. He has a good contact with various sort o f people, and he actually enjoys the 
relational aspect of his job. Ryan is also very demanding both of others and himself, 
and he cares about achieving his objectives. Ryan seems to have set a strong and 
personal rule o f conduct, which is based on fairness and exemplarity. Hence, he will 
not accept o f someone that they refiise to do something he himself does. Thus, his 
ethical conscience is entangled in an excessive concern for being an exemplar. 
Actually, Ryan does not seem to try and adopt a persona which conveys great work 
dedication; rather, it looks like his ethos o f exemplarity reassures him on his 
behaviour and his fair retribution. It is as if Ryan wanted to be his self, but does not 
think that what he does, or what he is, is enough or good enough. He thus creates a 
behaviour to enact what he thinks is appropriate.
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6.3.7. Sam uel
Samuel spent most o f his career working m the automotive industry. He started as a 
technician and climbed the ladder to become a manager. He currently works as a 
franchisee and manages two car servicing concessions. Prior to this, he worked as a 
director of a car servicing unit for a supermarket company for about five years, 
before deciding to become independent four years ago. He is married with grown-up 
children.
Samuel seems to present a softer persona than who he really is. For instance, he 
claims he doubts himself although he rarely questions his decisions once they are 
made. He also argues that you can really know what you are made of through the 
image others have o f you, and yet he tends to self-refiect a lot and thus uncovers his 
shortcomings and strengths. Actually, Samuel is ambitious and has a clear need to be 
independent, although he does not appear to feel entirely comfortable with being 
perceived as such. Hence, it looks like he creates a persona to soften his character. 
Samuel demonstrates some sense of ethical conscience and is clearly ill-at-ease when 
he feels he has gone too far, yet he does not fundamentally question his behaviour. 
This suggests that Samuel’s ambition is nurtured by some aspect of his shadow, 
which in turn prevents him from coming to terms with his self and which drives his 
need of a persona that balances his sense of self.
6.3.8. TIM
Tim works as a European business manager for an IT company. He has been part of 
the company since 1979 and has hold various sales management positions. He first 
trained and worked as an engineer before moving into marketing and sales. He is 
married with children.
Tim seems to have found a satisfactory balance in his life, although his drive is in 
winning challenges in both his professional and personal life. Although he states he 
“naturally” compartmentalises his life, he can think about a work issue at home until 
he has found a solution. He is quite open to various cultures, but he seems anxious to
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locate himself amongst others, as if  he felt unsure of his own identity and o f what he 
stands for. Values are important for him, yet Tim does not reflect much on his 
actions, but rather acts out o f a sense o f pride and self-motivation. Tim seems to 
display a need to prove to himself that he is indeed as he wants to be, suggesting a 
hidden influence of the shadow. Tim probably uses a mix o f moral conscience and 
ethical conscience, backing the latter with the former when feeling insecure.
6.3.9. WILL
Will is a director of operator marketing for an IT company. He has been working for 
the same company for about twenty-five years, although the company he started with 
was purchased by another company a few years ago. He trained as an engineer but 
then moved on to sales, and later marketing, quickly after having figured out he 
would not make a great career as an engineer. He is married with children.
Will seems to have a strong “business-like” persona, although he endeavours to 
demonstrate he is unlilce many other “business-focused” managers. Will considers 
himself a good leader, but an equally good manipulator. He states he cares for his 
team because they then work better, and he seems rather anxious to illustrate how 
considerate he is in his relationships to others. Yet, Will appears to be extremely 
proud of himself, and his need to be perceived as different from others suggests that 
his shadow sustains this aspect of himself. Will seems to seek recognition and his 
behaviour towards others, although partly genuine, may also be pervaded with a 
sense of instrumentality, i.e. what others will think of him if he acts in such or such 
way. His decisions seem to rely on a mix of moral conscience and ethical conscience, 
in so far as he clearly separates the business aspect o f a decision (i.e. this action is 
justified for economic reasons) from the relational aspect of the decision (i.e. how do 
I tell this person about so and so?). This maybe creates some tension which he 
alleviates by focusing on the perception others have of him.
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6.3.10. Xav ie r
Xavier is a technical staff engineer for an IT company in which he’s been working 
for twenty-tliree years in various technical roles. He punctually managed teams 
tliroughout his career, though his job remains mainly technology-oriented. He is 
married with grown-up children.
Xavier tends to rely on clear guidelines and boundaries to make decisions regarding 
his job and more generally in his life. He seems anxious to remain within the lines o f 
what is acceptable and what is not. Although he argues that he has pretty strong 
ethical values, he admits that there is a significant grey area in which compromises 
are necessary. He explains that for the important things, one should not compromise; 
however, this does not seem to reflect an ethical conscience but rather a moral 
conscience. Indeed, Xavier seems to find rules and codes reassuring, in so far as it 
helps him justify his decisions “objectively”. It seems like Xavier finds it difficult to 
rely on his self, so that he prefers finding support tlirough written texts or customs.
6.3.11. YOHANN
Yohann has been an advanced technology director for an IT company for one year, 
although he has had various managing positions in the same company over the past 
fourteen years. Trained as an engineer, he went into management by choice. He is 
married with children.
Yohann tends to be very self-reflective. He questions his decisions a lot because he 
wants to ensure it is the right one and he is not misleading himself. In fact, Yohann 
seems to be sensitive to his ethical conscience, but at the same time he demonstrates 
some awareness of his shadow, in so far as he is conscious that he might make a 
decision that makes things easy for him, although it might not be the best solution for 
everyone else. However, his shadow seems to lead him to doubt his ethical intuitions, 
in which case Yohann adopts a more formal, “moral conscience” framework based 
on codes of conduct. Yohann does not really compartmentalise, although he feels the 
need to stop thinking about his work in order to enjoy the time spent with his family.
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Others’ well-being is important for him, both because people are key resources and 
because he believes people should feel comfortable at work. Although this might 
look instrumental, it seems that Yohann does not aim to use others, but rather to 
ensure they work in the best conditions for the best results.
6.3.12. ZACK
Zack has worked as European director of strategy and business development for an 
IT company since 2005. He has worked for that company for fourteen years, holding 
various positions. He trained as an engineer, then moved into sales and sales 
management “for the money”. He is married.
Zack admits that he is “a completely different person at work”. However, his 
business persona appears to help him protect himself from the emotional strain o f a 
job he does not seem entirely comfortable with. He claims he can compartmentalise 
his life, yet he does think about business issues when he’s at home. Zack seems able 
to empathise with other people, yet he argues that the business decision “has to” win 
over. In that situation, he tends to rationalise and wearing his persona helps him keep 
his distance with the person in front o f him. Zack states he finds it easier to be true to 
himself at work than in his personal life. Actually, this rather means that at work, his 
moral conscience prevails, especially a business rationale, which makes him feel 
confident. Yet, he does not seem comfortable with this acting, in so far he wants to 
escape as much as possible from it in his personal life. Zack seems to fear being 
“uncovered” as he really is by his work colleagues, which could explain why he 
adopts a persona which tends to toughen him, although it is illusory.
6.4 . Su m m a r y
This chapter analysed extensively tlnee more cases o f moral experiences, and 
discussed the interviews against the Jungian framework. In this in-depth analysis, we 
highlighted how knowledge and connectedness to self seems to play a significant 
role in the way one reacts to a moral issue. We also suggested that those managers 
who shape their work around their values seem more confident in their ability to deal
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with morally difficult issues than their counterparts, whose cases were analysed in 
the previous chapter. The chapter also provided an overview o f the remaining cases, 
wliich were not presented at length, to illustrate the uniqueness o f each case and the 
significance of these managers’ moral experiences as made apparent through a 
Jungian conceptualisation. The following chapter critically discusses the meaning 
and implications of these findings.
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C h a p t e r  7 -  D is c u s s io n
“A million zeros joined together do not, imfortxinately, add up to 
one. Ultimately everything depends on the quality of the 
individual, but the fatally shortsighted habit of our age is to think 
only in terms of large numbers and mass organizations, though one 
would think tliat the world has seen more than enough of what a 
well-disciplined mob can do in the hands of a single madman.”
Carl G. Jung 
The Undiscovered Self
7.1. In t r o d u c t io n
This chapter discusses the main findings and compares them with the literature. The 
discussion examines the implications o f being an individual to foster moral 
perception, deliberation and action. Part 7.2 discusses the findings to assess the 
relevance of the Jungian framework in understanding how managers experience 
morality, as well as the importance o f the self in this process. The following part, 
part 7.3, addresses the relation between individuation and phronesis, and considers 
the implications of this relation for managers. Finally part 7.4 considers other factors 
that potentially influence the process o f moral dehberation and moral action, in 
particular the issue of free choice. It also discusses the implications they have for the 
self.
7.2. P er so n a  a n d  Self  in  M o r a l  E x p e r ie n c e s
The two previous chapters introduced the cases and analysed their characteristics 
with regards to the issue of morality. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
significance o f these characteristics in developing a better understanding o f 
managers’ moral experiences.
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7.2.1, MAKING Sen se  o f  m o r a l  Expe rie n c es
The analysis o f the cases showed how various Jungian concepts could be used to 
inteipret managers’ moral experiences. This part will briefly sum up the significance 
of these concepts. The persona and its correlate, the self-image, proved to be primary 
in apprehending and making sense o f the moral experiences narrated by the study 
participants. The persona often seemed to be at the root of a person’s relationship to 
the world, and more specifically to her perceived obligations as a manager. Some o f 
the respondents clearly evinced a ‘business persona’ or a ‘manager persona’ which, 
in their view, carries out the features necessary to perfonn well in a somewhat 
ruthless and result-centred world. In this respect, the persona plays up a stereotypical 
view o f  what a good business person is expected to be: ambitious, results-oriented, 
pragmatic, rational instead of emotional, able to favour the organisation’s interests 
over the individuals’ interests. Yet for many respondents the persona seemed to 
occupy the major part of consciousness so that the ego could not turn its attention to 
the richness of the psyche. Indeed, when the ego-consciousness is busy fostering a 
persona, it does not have the resources to uncover the contents of the unconscious 
and to gain knowledge o f the self at the same time. The apparent confidence or the 
obvious contradictions that were evident in some interviews illustrate how the 
persona has a direct effect on the perception of who one is as a person, and 
consequently on the actions of that person.
The persona also influences the quality o f people’s relationship to others. Indeed, the 
respondents with a relatively weak persona seemed to establish a link with other 
people based on an appreciation o f these people as deserving the same respect as 
anyone else. However a strong persona can more easily influence one’s projections 
and confuse the perception one has o f the other person in terms o f what she stands 
for or what she represents. In fact, when a person directs, either consciously or 
unconsciously, her psychic energy towards creating an image she wants to project in 
society, her perception o f reality might equally be filtered by her persona. Thus 
instead of seeing others ‘as they really are’, that person is partly blinded by her 
persona and perceives others in a deformed way, although she might be certain her 
judgments about them are accurate. The type of relationship one has with others.
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especially with one’s colleagues, employees or customers to a lesser extent, also 
shows the degree of compartmentalisation o f the individual. Indeed it proves difficult 
to delineate when professional friendliness slips into personal friendliness. Yet a few 
respondents were keen on separating the professional fr om the social sphere, only to 
later admit that it is a difficult and relative boundary to maintain.
Jung’s conceptualisation of two various types of conscience is an important device in 
helping make sense of the moral deliberation of managers. In the analysis, moral 
conscience and ethical conscience, which respectively stands for the social norms on 
the one hand, and the inner voice that reflects the self on the other hand, were linked 
to the perception of having or not having a choice in the moral matter. The 
respondents who seemed to rely mainly on their moral conscience tended to feel 
more constrained by the context (for example the short-term profitability imperative) 
than the respondents who had a stronger sense of self and could rely on ethical 
conscience as well. This is because moral conscience is necessarily limited by the 
rules and customs o f a social group, whilst ethical conscience draws from an 
archetypal source o f knowledge. Indeed, as Jung explains, ethical conscience enables 
us to find “creative solutions” when we face a dilemma which we cannot solve by 
calling upon the moral rules and customs we usually use. Ethical conscience can be 
viewed as a way to fr ee oneself from the bounds of customary morality in order to 
find a new path of moral action.
Finally, the contrast between compartmentalised and non-coinpartmentalised study 
participants is particularly interesting, in so far as it most clearly demonstrates the 
significance of connectedness to self in the enactment of one’s morality. Non­
compartmentalised participants, who do not split their personality between work and 
home, are much more able to bring their values to work and to shape their 
environment according to these values, so that they can be ‘whole’ and they can be 
themselves at work as well as outside work. Their moral choices tend to be less 
compromised as a consequence. On the other hand, compartmentalisation, that is 
when a person dissociates depending on the context she is in, has the opposite effect 
on that person’s morality. The next part discusses in greater detail the meaning of 
these findings and provides illustrations drawn from the cases.
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7.2,2. Tow ards A Typology o f  M a n a g e r s ’M oral Ch a rac ter?
Since we insisted on the intrinsic value o f each individual case, it would be 
incongruous to override the specificity o f each participant interviewed by collating 
them into collective types. It is however possible to compare the cases, bearing in 
mind that our knowledge o f each case is only relative and necessarily constrained by 
the amount of data collected. The typology proposed is therefore relative to the cases 
studied, and should be viewed as a tentative way of interpreting the conclusions of 
the findings and relocating them within the literature. Jung (2001a:86) himself called 
for lenience when considering the accuracy or pertinence of a classification, and I 
make his position mine: “The list of possibilities seems both endless and useless for 
purposes of classification. I do not know how other people would set about the task. I 
can therefore only tell you how I myself have approached the matter, and I must 
submit to the reproach that my way o f solving the problem is the outcome of my 
individual prejudice. Indeed, this objection is so entirely true, that I should not know 
how to meet it.”
As was suggested above, the persona occupies an important place in the overall 
moral character o f the study participants. In many cases we could identify some level 
of a persona. The extent to which the persona prevails, as well as the reasons behind 
the persona’s strength, are varied. Nevertheless, the presence of a persona usually 
directs the attention o f ego-consciousness away from the self to more collective 
matters, weakening the individuality of the person. On the contrary, some cases did 
not seem to show the existence o f such a persona. Instead, the connection to the self 
seemed stronger in so far as these participants embraced their individuality more 
frilly and seemingly more comfortably than others. We could thus tentatively classify 
the respondents according to their persona-self characteristics. Three broad 
categories could be identified: the cases where a strong persona prevails, the cases 
where the persona is used as a protection, and the cases where the participants are 
connected to the self to a gi eater or lesser degree. Each category is discussed below.
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In the first category, we could argue that the respondents provide two main reasons 
that could explain the significance o f the persona. For Charlie, Ethan and Louis, the 
persona tends to “fill in” for something else. In Ethan and Louis’s cases, the persona 
seems to make up for an unsubstantial self, whereas for Charlie, the persona seems to 
have completely replaced the self. For these three respondents, the persona is the 
essential point of contact with the world, and the ego-consciousness seems fully 
directed towards fostering the persona rather than questioning it. Morally, we noticed 
that these respondents tended to adopt a self-interested approach, although they do 
not frame it in those terms. For Amy, Oliver and Will, things are slightly different. 
Their persona prevails, but its function seems attached to a sense o f existence. 
Indeed, Amy and Oliver characteristically present a front because it reassures them, 
it gives them the impression that they exist. In other words, they seem so unsure o f 
the value of their self that they rely on a constructed image to claim their place in 
society. The brighter this image, the more they feel then existence is confirmed. 
Rather than filling in a void as the respondents mentioned above, these respondents 
use the persona to disguise a deep uncertainty or insecurity about themselves. Will 
would fit into this category in so far as his need for recognition seems to reflect an 
insecurity about his real capabilities, and his ability to stand out. Yet, again, the ego- 
consciousness seems completely dedicated to nurturing the persona rather than 
questioning it.
The second category subsumes the respondents whose persona is present but to some 
extent is weaker tiian in the first categoiy. A common factor is that they tend to use 
the persona as a protection, but they are not as comfortable with this situation as the 
respondents who belong to the first category. Somehow, they seem to have a more 
spontaneous relationship with others, which suggests they feel or yearn for 
something more than just the persona. Establishing ‘fake’ relationships with people 
based on their persona does not appear to satisfy them. Yet, they seem to neither 
understand the nature of this dissatisfaction nor to know how to challenge it. Within 
this group, two types of attitude can be distinguished: some o f the respondents 
appear to use the persona as a protection almost deliberately, whilst others seem less 
aware of acting in such a way. Using the persona dehberately does not imply some 
manipulative behaviour; rather it means that the respondents tend to demonstrate a
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certain awareness that they display a front to others, which somehow does not fully 
correspond to who they actually aie, and they feel an uneasiness about it. Samuel’s 
and Yohann’s use of a persona as a deliberate protection seems under some degree o f 
control. Both participants are very reflective and display some sensitivity to their self 
and to their ethical conscience. Yet it seems as if they hide their self behind a 
business persona because it seems to them the most appropriate behaviour given the 
circumstances, that is managing a profitable business. Although different, Samuel 
and Yohann both appear to be affected by their shadow, and they seem conscious o f 
their capacity to act in a way they would judge morally wrong. Yet, instead o f 
integrating the shadow and asserting the self, as the process o f individuation would 
require, they appear to focus on the persona to help them cope with their shadow. 
Actually, acting a part is perceived as a safeguard against their own dark motives, in 
so far as the part they act is under control whilst the influence of the shadow is far 
less controllable. Should they accept to confront the shadow and to integrate their 
dark motives in a conscious effort to achieve their individuality, Samuel and Yohann 
would no longer need the illusory protection of a persona for they would embody 
their self, that is their true nature.
The cases o f Irene, Martin and Zack are slightly different, in so far as they do not 
seem to control the use of their persona so much as they need their persona to protect 
them. It is alrhost a matter of survival because the gap between their self, their values 
and their job requirements is too wide to be managed consciously. Interestingly, 
these tlnee respondents consciously tiy to compartmentalise their life tightly, 
although they do not really succeed in doing so. It is as if  they need to convince 
themselves that ‘being the persona’ will prevent them from feeling ill-at-ease when 
they have to make difficult work decisions. Thus, it seems as if  they have 
deliberately built a character which they wish to be different from who they really 
are, but whose features are adapted to the business envhonment. Yet, the pain, 
especially the moral pain, remains, in so far as they nevertheless have the feeling of 
having betrayed their core values despite having done what their jobs asked them to 
do. They want to find a comfortable moral space, which is why they try to convince 
themselves they can cope with adopting different moral behaviours when acting in 
different settings.
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Other respondents, as we said, use the persona as a fomi of protection, yet they seem 
completely unaware of doing it. To this category would belong Jolin, Ryan, Tim and 
Xavier, although the reasons for which they use their persona vary greatly. All o f 
them share (along with the other respondents of this gr oup) the commonality of being 
connected to their self to some degree. However, they do not seem to trust their self 
entirely. John feels he “has to” put some distance in his relationships with others, yet 
he suffers from this because it does not correspond to his personality. Ryan wants to 
do too much as if being himself was not sufficient, whilst Tim wants to win and learn 
from others as if to distinguish himself from the crowd and to be able to define who 
he is. Xavier doubts his ability to make the best moral decisions, hence he prefers to 
hide behind the fonnal codes attached to his business responsibilities rather than to 
engage himself with the issue. None o f these four respondents seems to have 
established this protective persona deliberately; rather it seems that it has developed 
through time, without them being aware of it. Nevertheless, they display some 
instances of dissatisfaction with the existing status quo, and their otherwise open 
relationships with others may entice them to aspire for something different, that is for 
a more spontaneous, true-to-self behaviour.
The third category includes the respondents who seem to be more acquainted with 
their self. We cannot state whether they are fully individuated or not, but they 
nevertheless seem to display the most direct connection to their self, compared with 
the Other respondents. Within this category, we can highlight two paths: Nick and 
Paul seem closer to their self by way o f the passion they can express in their work. 
Nick is an authentic craftsman, and his enterprise is more a means to serve his ait 
than a business organisation. Paul is genuinely dedicated to the children’s well-being, 
and his work is ingrained in his dedication. Neither Nick nor Paul care to count the 
hours they spend working, because their work is almost an extension o f who they 
are. They express their nature in what they do, so that they do need to pretend to be 
someone they are not; instead, their actions echo the concerns and aptitudes of the 
self. In other words, Nick or Paul appear to actually ‘realise’ their self. They 
‘naturally’ celebrate the virtues of perfection because their purpose is the perfect 
realisation o f their art or their mission. Deborah and Vincent are also closer to their
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self than the other respondents, but their rationale lies more in the strong values they 
carry than in the love of their job, although they do enjoy their work. Actually, 
Deborah and Vincent both act out of a strong consideration for others, which takes a 
different form. Deborah believes in honesty and fairness, and her values are so strong 
that she acts as if they were constitutive o f her being. To not act according to her 
values would be like betraying herself. Vincent has a strong connection to others, so 
that to not act in full consideration o f the other person as a person would be morally 
wrong. To consider the other person as a person means that we acknowledge the self 
in the other person, so that the connection is actually made between two selves who 
acknowledge one another. In fact, Vincent would not be true to himself if he did not 
act in a considerate way towards others. Hence, for Deborah and Vincent, their 
values are central to their sense of self, to who they are, so that betraying their values 
would mean betraying themselves, something they are not readily capable of. Neither 
of them manage to control the circumstances in which they work, so that they 
sometimes face situations they morally disapprove of, but which they cannot change. 
Yet, in those cases, they either feel a strong uneasiness, or they disengage themselves 
so as not to compromise their values. Table 2 below provides an overview of the 
respondents classified according to these three main categories.
Table 2. Summarised Typology of Participants’ Moral Character
Participant ^  Type 0
C harlie
Stron g  p e r so n a  p reva ils  and  "fills in"Ethan
L ouis
A m y
Stron g  p e r so n a  p reva ils  and  c la im s to  "exist"Oliver
Will
S a m u e l P e r so n a  is a  d e lib era te  but "controlled" protectionY oh an n
Irene
P e r so n a  is a  d e lib era te  but n e c e s s a r y  p rotectionMartin
Z ack
Joh n
P e r so n a  is " non -con sciou sly"  u s e d  a s  a  protectionR yanTim
X avier
Nick Cofinectednesa 1o self enacting a pas^onPaul
Deborah Connectedness to setf ttirmtgh i^ ac^ng stro i^ valuesVincent
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7.2.3. Relevance  o f  the J ungian  Fram ew o rk
It is possible to link this typology with the Jungian framework of morality. As Figure 
6 shows, the different types are located in different areas of the framework. The 
respondents whose persona prevails (coded as yellow) have their ego-consciousness 
mainly orientated towards the persona and the social world as in a representation. 
The respondents whose persona is used as some sort of protection (coded as green) 
might have some sense of their persona but tend to avoid exploring their personal 
unconscious. They are mostly concerned with conflicts o f duty which they do not 
always solve by appealing to their ethical conscience, and which they rarely 
experience with comfort. Finally, the respondents who are closer to their self (coded 
as violet) have stepped in the dynamics o f ethical conscience and the realisation of 
self. They are therefore more capable of resolving conflicts of duty and intuiting into 
ethical conscience and the archetypal knowledge of the self.
Figure 6. Participants located within the Jungian framework of morality
SOCIETY....z
M oral
Conscience
Persona
Samuel, Yohann, Irene, 
Martin, Zack, John, Rvan.-j^»»
Charlie, Louis, 
Ethan, Amy, 
Oliver, Will
Xavier, Tim Conflict of duts
Personal Unconscious
Shadow
Deborah,VIhcettt,mk,Pali
Archet>pes
Collective
Unconscious
Source: Compiled by author
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We shall discuss in more detail the characteristics of each type. For the respondents 
whose persona prevails, the significance o f the moral rules and customs tends to be 
relative, in particular to their own interests. This means that they refer to the moral 
rules and customs that best foster their personal goals. O f course, these six 
respondents have different motivations and we do not argue that they act immorally. 
However, their actions are guided by values which emerge from a collective image 
rather than an individual will. Being selfish does not necessarily imply that one 
person expresses her individuality in the Jungian sense. The persona is “a mask o f 
the collective psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise 
between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be” (Jung, 
1977:158). Thus the respondents subjected to the influence o f a strong persona 
remain the object a collective and do not exist as true mdividuals. The persona 
prevents them from breaking off the dominating influence of the collective to assert 
their individuality. Morally, they are enslaved by an image which they take as deeply 
personal, but which really is just the expression of collective archetypes. Again this 
does not mean these respondents are morally bad, but rather that they seem unable to 
use that libre arbitre so constitutive of moral responsibility, hence unable to decide 
to act according to the highest degree o f conscience, the ethical conscience. Jung 
(1977:153) stresses that “every man is, in a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man 
when he is in society than when acting alone; for he is carried by society and to that 
extent relieved of his individual responsibility.”
The respondents who seem more connected to their self appear to be sensitive to 
their ethical conscience. Even if they are not individuated as yet, they have a strong 
enough sense o f self to act as individuals and extricate themselves from the 
collective. They seem to have sensed that “[Qar too much o f our common humanity 
has to be sacrificed in the interests of an ideal image into which one tries to mould 
oneself’ (Jung, 1977:157). By rejecting the persona society wants them to wear, and 
by enacting instead what they feel is right, they get closer to that “shared humanity” 
that is embodied in the archetypal self. They react to that humanity in their 
relationships with others, whom they recognise as being o f the same nature as they 
are. Since ethical conscience goes beyond the rules and customs o f a society limited 
in time and space, drawing from the collective history of humanity, it potentially
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attracts more innovative solutions to moral dilemmas, or at least it gives the strength 
or the impetus to act “as one should act” according to the vox Dei, albeit one can 
never be sure o f the real nature o f this inner voice (Jung, 1978a:26).
In between are the respondents who live tlirough a persona but show signs o f 
discomfort with it. They might glimpse into the self and get some sense o f an 
intuitive moral call that echoes ethical conscience, but they feel more comfortable 
with the “formality” o f moral conscience. They experience sometimes painful 
conflicts of duty, they may be sufficiently reflective to feel that they are not who they 
pretend to be in society, but they remain attached to this image, deliberately or not. 
Their position is morally difficult, because they tend to be constantly unsure o f what 
the right thing to do is, given that they are tom between what the moral customs say 
(which tends to align with the persona) and what they perceive as another, perhaps 
more radical but no less imperious, voice representing the vox Dei, the expression of 
the self. For Jung, the only way out is to pursue the process o f t^similation of 
unconscious contents, both personal and collective, in order to build up the 
individual personality: “In the last resort it is a man’s moral qualities which force 
him, either through direct recognition o f the need or indirectly through a painful 
neurosis, to assimilate his unconscious self and to keep himself fully conscious. 
Wlioever progresses along this road of self-realization must inevitably bring into 
consciousness the contents o f the personal unconscious, thus enlarging the scope of 
his personality” (Jung, 1977:136). It is all the more important to obey “the will o f 
God” as controlling it is not entirely possible, and resisting it leaves one with “a 
resentment that makes the otherwise harmless natural impulse our enemy” (Jung, 
1978a:27).
The proposed typology of the moral character o f the study participants is not unlike 
existing developmental models. In particular, Gozdz and Frager’s model (2003), 
inspired notably by Wilber’s work and transpersonal psychology, is articulated 
around characteristics similar to those of our findings. Their four-stage model is 
designed for both organisations and individuals, but we shall focus on the individual 
level. Stage 1 people are considered “narcissistic and egocentric”, lacking 
conscience, consciousness and compassion, rationalising their “own selfish
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behavior”. In addition, “their learning process is distorted by an ego-centered lens”. 
Stage 2 people are called conventional, “characterized by self-doubt. They seek the 
comfort of external rules and authoritarian structure because they are afraid to rely on 
themselves and their own judgment. [...] Others cover their self-doubt with a façade 
of certainty and superiority.” (Gozdz and Frager, 2003:486). They are afraid of 
questioning the system and don’t question their motives either. Stage 3 groups the 
self-actualizing people who are “present-centered; they experience the world more 
fully than most people. [...] they have managed to reduce their ego defences and 
have become more capable o f relating to others and perceiving the world around 
them with minimal distortion.” (Gozdz and Frager, 2003:487). Yet, they are also 
ambitious and in need of recognition for pursuing excellence. Finally, stage 4 people 
are “integral”, in so far as they are more fully connected to the world and to others 
tlirough experiences which have tended “to increase humility and compassion and 
decrease self-concern and self-importance” and to aspire for “a sense o f inner and 
outer unity” (Gozdz and Frager, 2003:489).
On comparing the two typologies, respondents submitted to their persona could fit 
into stage 1 or 2, whereas stage 3 and 4 would include participants who show a 
greater connectedness to their self. In particular, the process of reducing the “ego 
defenses” suggests the abandonment of the persona and the endeavour to bring the 
ego-consciousness’s focus onto the content of the collective unconscious. Integral 
people are seemingly individuated people. However, the Jungian framework enables 
us to grasp the specificities behind each case whereas Gozdz and Frager’s model 
remains descriptive or didactic at best. It does not provide tools to understand why 
stage 1 people are enmeshed into narcissism and egocentrism, nor does it offer more 
than general observations about how stage I people can move up to the higher stages. 
It is possible, or even likely, that the cases are so specific that no detailed advice can 
be formulated. Nevertheless, the Jungian approach brings forward concepts that 
allow for a more complete analysis o f the particular reasons that make an individual 
belong to a given stage, and suggests that disassociation of the ego-consciousness 
from the persona and integration of the shadow and other archetypes are part of 
people’s progression.
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Since the ultimate goal is to become a complete individual, the process to achieve 
this goal should naturally respect individual needs and aspirations. Jung’s 
conceptualisation of the miconscious as partly personal and partly collective offers 
the possibility of using a general method to achieve a specifically individual 
outcome. Archetypes are by their essence collective, but their expression is 
influenced by our personal history. The persona is equally a reflection o f the 
collective, but it is tainted with the memories and experiences the individual has had. 
The self is an archetype, thus it is collective; but at the same time, its expression and 
realisation is veiy specific to the individual. Ethical conscience, which echoes the 
self, is by nature both collective in spirit and peculiar in its expression. 
Understanding that we are all different and yet made of the same essence is a 
challenge that underlies every model o f moral development, because we shall 
acknowledge that all models are potentially regressive as well as progiessive. To 
guarantee a more solid progression and avoid a possible regression, it seems 
necessary to fully understand the context and content of the stages, the obstacles that 
prevent an individual from evolving and the challenges of progressing. For Jung, 
consciousness was central to any work o f self-development because, without it, some 
issues remain unsolved and will need to be dealt with at a later stage (Jung, 1977). 
Colman (2008:360) emphasizes that knowledge of self and self-perception are 
necessary to direct one’s behaviour: “actions of the self become increasingly 
conditioned by the self-reflexive sense of the self we feel ourselves to have. This is 
why it matters so much who we think we are and whether our image o f the self is in 
accord with oiu basic nature, our personal way of being-in-the-world.”
7.3. In d iv id u a t io n  AND P h r o n e sis  in  M a n a g e r s’ M o r a l it y
Bankwala (2004:162) states that “In understanding behavior it is important to see 
that I behave the way I do depending on what I value in life. [...] I f  I lack clarity [of 
my values], any method will do.” We have attempted to clarify the relationships 
between values and behaviour. The findings have pointed out the significance of the 
self as the central component within one’s morality and moral system. We could thus 
reformulate Bankwala’s statement as follow: In understanding moral behaviour it is 
important to see that I behave the way I do depending on how I value my self; if I
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lack clarity o f my self, any moral attitude will do (whether right or wrong). Besides, 
if I lack clarity of my self, the virtue o f phronesis will not prevent me from making 
the wrong choices. Individuation and phronesis are thus entangled as necessary 
conditions for sound moral deliberation and moral practice. Persona, shadow or other 
archetypes can alter our perception of what good conmion sense is. Indeed, the wise 
man sometimes ignores in good faith that he is unwise, because his perception of 
himself is blurred by some archetype whose influence he has not become aware of. 
In good faith, he believes he acts guided by the self whilst he actually responds to the 
influence of another, perhaps darker archetype. Thus, unless we have managed to 
free ourselves from the pervasive influence of social roles and expectations to 
become a true individual, standing on our self-inspired values, we cannot be siue that 
we practice the virtues according to the appropriate mean. Connectedness to the 
archetypal self appears to be a more solid safeguard against the possible illusion o f 
virtuousness.
We stated in Chapter 2 that phronesis was an important element of morality, which 
nevertheless lacked clarity. Wlien read along the Jungian framework, phronesis gains 
clarity. Actually, phronesis enables the person to make just moral judgments, which 
are themselves inspired by ethical conscience. Ethical conscience is itself fostered by 
the achievement o f an individuated state of being. Individuation therefore provides a 
necessary backgroimd to connect with ethical conscience and to apply its moral 
imperatives with the adequate sense o f balance that phronesis offers. When faced 
with an ethical challenge, the individuated person who possesses the virtue of 
phronesis should be able to make sense o f the choices she is presented with and to 
choose amongst them the morally appropriate behaviour (we called this process 
‘moral deliberation’). Furthermore, she also possesses the moral courage to listen to 
her inner voice and integrates it within her moral deliberation, as well as the moral 
strength to act in confidence that she does the right thing for others and for herself. 
On the other hand, the person who is not individuated because she is 
compartmentalised or because her consciousness is dominated by her persona should 
find it much more difficult to practice phronesis because she would lack a necessary 
sense o f cohesion and direction o f her actions. Indeed, we noticed that individuation 
brings a sense of realisation, implying that the individuated person actually realises
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what she is meant to be (similar to her telos). But this realisation is one and unique, 
which is why it carries with it a dimension o f wholeness. If the person has split 
herself or if she lives thiough an image that does not reflect who she actually is, her 
behavioiu will lack cohesion and unity o f direction. Wliatever she aims to achieve 
tends to be multiple (hence losing some o f its strength and meaningfiilness) or fake 
(hence contradictory with the essence of beingness). Therefore she would experience 
difficulties in identifying the course o f action which would lead her to the Good, to 
etidaimoma and to self-fitlfilment. Becoming an individual in the truest and most 
essential sense, by connecting to one’s self, constitutes a safe moral anchor from 
which phronesis can properly proceed. Individuation is not a pre-condition for 
phronesis, though; rather it provides the most favourable setting for phronesis to 
develop consistently. The person who is not individuated can practice the virtues and 
judge the appropriate balance o f virtues in a given situation; however her ability to 
sense this appropriate balance o f virtues could be disrupted by a persona or an 
archetype whose influence would not be recognised. On the other hand, the person 
who is also capable of identifying the disruptions of unconscious elements other than 
the archetypal self can sustain her sense o f appropriate balance o f virtues much 
longer. Besides, virtues for Aristotle aimed to miite the soul, just like the self claims 
the unity of the whole person. It is thus logical that the process o f individuation 
echoes the piupose o f Virtue Ethics, whilst clarifying its practical implications.
Berthouzoz (2000:250) maists that the process o f individualisation (that is 
recognising each person as an individual), which characterized the development o f 
society since the Middle Ages and especially since the second half of the eighteenth 
century, is “the expression o f human being’s dignity as a distinctive and primary 
value within every society.” Consequently, ethical thinking ought to be founded on 
“an anthropology which accounts for the person in each and every dimension of her 
existence and in her dignity.” (Berthouzoz, 2000:256). Bankwala (2004) concius that 
the individual is the focal element o f morality in society and in organisations, even 
before brmging one’s attention to more universal purposes. If  the person has a clear 
sense of who she is and what she stands for, as well as what she is capable of, she is 
more likely to unleash her potential and contribute to strengthening “higher 
aspirations about the outer world” (Bankwala, 2004:166). As we exp lamed in
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previous chapters (see especially Chapter 2, part 2.4), a comprehensive moral 
enquiry ought to consider the people who enact particular moral behaviours. The 
individual level of business ethics research remains primary to understand moral 
experiences and improve moral behaviour. As a consequence, managers should not 
forget that morality begins with the individuals who comprise the organisation. 
Working on the organisational culture or the organisational ethos is not sufficient 
because it fails to acknowledge the intrinsic value of the organisational members 
(Pfeffer, 2003:32).
We mentioned in Chapter 2 that successful modern managers should be able to adapt 
both from experience and from a knowledge-database to respond effectively and 
efficiently to the issues and the prospects of the business (Hannagan, 2005). On the 
moral front, successful managers appear to need to develop a propensity to self- 
reflect; they equally need to adapt less to the circumstances so as to fevour the 
expression o f their self. Failure to do so does not make managers necessarily wrong 
in ethical terms, but it certainly makes them much more susceptible to fail morally in 
the course o f their job. In the meantime, if the pressure gets too strong, they would 
develop defence mechanisms, which include compartmentalisation and endorsement 
of a ‘business-like persona’ as exemplified in some of the cases studied. Being and 
acting as an individual, capable o f  discerning the appropriate virtues and values to 
further one’s good as well as the common good, cannot possibly prevent moral 
mistakes. However, it could encourage the development of a more comprehensive 
approach to moral issues, which would eventually lead to a more human and more 
fulfilling management style, that is a management style which is based on common 
human values and which respects individualities. In Losoncz’s terms (2004:81): “To 
exist as a self is for management to be situated in the spiritual and moral space o f the 
organization” which is viewed as “a communal structure for the personal identity.” 
Managers in this purview are expected to adopt a “hohstic frame o f thinking”, 
meaning that they ought to accept to expose their being to the community if they 
want to contribute (Losoncz, 2004:83). Managers also need to acknowledge that they 
are not detached from their work but rather project much o f themselves into 
management.
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To that extent, management becomes more closely related with leadership, and even 
more with exemplarity. Because o f the extensive decision-making and liaising in 
managerial jobs, managers have an opportunity to encourage change, providing they 
embody a changed attitude towards the morality of their actions. Individuated 
managers can potentially become moral exemplars in their organisations without 
sacrificing profitability. However, management must endorse a more fundamental 
moral responsibility towards the organisational members which accords with the 
implications of individuation and implies that: “An individual’s desire and right to be 
treated with dignity at work, to be able to grow and learn, to be connected to others, 
and to be a whole, integrated person cannot shnply be sacrificed for economic 
expediency.” (Pfeffer, 2003:42),
This is not to deny that individuals live amongst other people, and interact within 
social structures that tend to have some degree of influence on them. These external 
circumstances certainly affect the process o f self-reflection and individuation, as the 
cases analysed have suggested. In particular, we mentioned that participants 
sometimes felt they did not have the choice but to behave in a certain way, however 
pamful or immoral they felt it was. This issue o f choice, or lack of choice, needs to 
be explored fiirther, because it calls into question the moral authority and 
responsibility of the self.
7.4. T h e  I ssu e  o f  C h o ic e  a n d  A u t h o r it y
7,4.1. Fr e ed o m  TO A c t  AND M itig atin g  Circlm stances
Many study participants argued that their discretionary power was limited by the 
nature of the ‘system’. They declared that they enjoy their work and accept that the 
organisation puts demands on them in terms of performance, growth or even 
profitability. Actually, the case o f Deborah or Vincent, who both work in rather large 
companies and within a very competitive industry, indicates that it is possible to 
combine strong values and organisational commitment, as Guillory (2001) or 
Krishnakumar and Neck (2002) suggested. Being ‘whole’ at work means being a 
complete individual, having realised one’s self and embodying its ethics.
227
Nevertheless, both participants also felt constiained by the imperatives o f the 
business and the politics of the organisation. Vincent dislikes firing people, yet he 
concedes that sometimes there is no other option because the company has a good 
reason for firing these people. He adds that these decisions are not always in his 
hands, so that there is little he can actually do, except to try and deliver the news in 
the ‘best’ possible manner. He wants his organisation and his team to be successful, 
and he aims to achieve a good performance, yet he suffers from the ruthless mindset 
of the business. Deborah equally cares for her work and is deeply committed to 
performing well and satisfying the customers. She thus does not have an anti­
business or naively altruistic viewpoint, and she firmly believes in the company and 
participates in its success. However, she feels uneasy with the organisational 
“politics” and the undue business claims made for marketing purposes. She wants to 
do business by the rules, but not at all costs. Yet, both Deborah and Vincent feel that 
they cannot change the rules and they cannot influence the decisions made by the top 
level management.
This feeling o f powerlessness, or lack o f choice, is even greater amongst respondents 
who compartmentalise their lives. Irene typically epitomises managers who feel they 
have to adopt a certain character that is appropriate to the business context, because 
else they would not be able to do the work. Like other respondents, she disapproves 
of some aspects of the profit-seeking business ethos, but she feels she does not have 
the choice but to accept them. We can recall that Athanasopoulou’s managers used 
similar mechanisms to cope with conflicting situations (2004 -  see Chapter 2, part 
2.4,2). However, we can wonder to what extent resorting to this “systemic effect” 
argument exonerates managers o f their moral responsibility, as we already pointed 
out (see Chapter 2, part 2.3.2). The question can be asked at the organisational level 
(i.e. “I do not have the power to influence nor make the final decision”) or at the 
institutional level (i.e. “The business world is like that, this is what is expected of 
me”). The implications for the individual are nevertheless the same, and target his 
moral authority. The ultimate question becomes: is it true that comes a time when 
one does not have a choice? Thus, do people have mitigating circumstances for 
behaving in a morally questionable manner because they were operating within a 
morally questionable (or worse) context? Are we ever free to act as we wish or are
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we always constrained by the circumstances one way or another? These questions are 
particularly relevant for managers as well as for the field of Business Ethics in light 
of the on-going enquiry about the morality of business organisations and o f business 
practice. If  business is an amoral or an immoral playground, which creates conditions 
to sustain this amorality or immorality, then business actors might not have the 
choice but to operate under conupting circumstances. Their degree of moral 
discretion could be bound to the morality of the business context as well as to the 
spirit of management (that is acting as servant or agent on behalf o f capital owners).
Terestchenko (2007) refers to studies on obedience to authority, in particular 
Milgram’s studies, as well as studies on assistance to a stranger in need. He 
highlights that people tend to alter their perception of the facts to justify their 
behaviour. For example, people witnessing an assault might declare that they did not 
think it was “for real” to conceal their lack o f courage to intervene directly or even 
indirectly by just calling the police. People appeal to various mitigating 
circumstances to vindicate their decisions not to act and to exculpate themselves 
from the moral judgment of their weakness or cowardice (Terestchenko, 2007:171). 
Yet, Terestchenko suggests that this type of behaviour can be better understood if we 
account for the influence others have on our self-identity. Indeed, the persona is a 
product of the collective, so that others play a significant role in shaping the main 
traits of our persona. Others inhibit our self but reinforce our personia, so that when 
we feel the presence o f others, we more easily slip back into our persona to make 
decisions. Out of fear or out o f a sense o f camaraderie, the latter differing from the 
essential quality o f the ‘shared humanity’ we mentioned earlier, the person 
eventually acts for the group rather than for herself. Organisations where emphasis is 
put on a collective spirit of some sort, either positive or negative such as extreme 
competition between organisational members, nurture the conditions that favour the 
emergence of persona-led characters. The bottom-line question thus becomes more 
subtle, because the persona is naturally influenced by the circumstances given that it 
is a product of the collective. The persona is thus partly shaped by the social context, 
by the expectations carried out in the collective, which can change along with time. 
Indeed, the persona may rightly feel that it does not have a choice but to act in a
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certain way, since the expectations upon which it has been elaborated points in that 
direction.
However, it does not mean that the person is not free to act otherwise, especially if 
her self, through her ethical conscience, points her in another direction. The person is 
eventually responsible for making the choice to do what the collective expects of her 
or what her self (which is also collective but of a different quality) impels her to do. 
Jolin, Samuel and Yohann are good examples of individuals who are clearly 
confronted with making this choice everyday, although they are not always 
conscious o f the natmre of the choice. John, for instance, feels that he has to juggle 
with the various expectations o f his employees, his clients and himself. This situation 
is difficult for him because he does not feel free to act as he feels like acting. Yet, he 
participated in creating this persona because he believed it was necessary to maintain 
the level o f respect employees should have towards their director, or to establish the 
cordial but respectfully distant relationships with wine growers (his clients). John 
reproduces a collective image o f SME director because he sees it as the only 
accepted way of behaving, although he would intuitively prefer acting differently to 
manage his company.
The structure o f the social institution may equally exert pressure on people to give up 
their individuality and to adopt the role they are expected to fiilfil. Bureaucratic 
organisations are concerned with directing individuals to fiilfil a common good or to 
achieve a common performance by way o f an anonymous structure. Any system 
organised around a central authority which imposes its will over that of its individual 
members creates conditions o f alienation. Compartmentalisation is the first step of a 
gradual process that aims to disengage people from their sense of self and their 
individuality to create a mass o f obedient workers. Extreme examples of this 
phenomenon are Nazi Germany or the USSR tmder Stalin’s ruling, whose excesses 
are not comparable with any existing organisation. However, the process of de­
individuation is essentially the same, and proceeds sufficiently slowly for people not 
to feel that they are changing, or rather that they are losing their identity 
(Terestchenko, 2007:93).
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Consequently, organisational culture should encourage rather than discourage the 
search for, and expression of, individuality, like Jolinson (1981) suggested, without 
this shift being necessarily detrimental to organisational goals such as profitability. 
Although Kahn (1990) believes that ideals must accommodate work demands, we 
could argue that, notwitlistanding the legitimacy of these work demands, 
individuated people would naturally work for the good of others as well as 
themselves. Therefore, individual aspirations and organisational goals would 
eventually adjust, but the moral standards thus obtained might change. Individuated 
employees might redefine organisational priorities, and challenge the acceptable 
minima of moral standards to support objectives that sustain respect for the shared 
humanity. The phenomenon o f the persona, as illustrated by the cases examined, 
confirms how hypothetical models can shape real-life behaviours as Ferraro et al. 
(2005) noticed. The respondents who used their persona as a protection enacted what 
they perceived to be the managerial model, and endeavoured to remove Mieir feelings 
and emotions from their decisions because there is no place for such things in 
business transactions. By acting in that manner, sometimes against their own feelings 
and emotions, they fulfilled the fallacious prophecy that people are rational decision­
makers. On the contrary, they literally acted against the interest of their self even if 
their behaviour is labelled ‘self-interested’. Indeed, the interests of the self lie in the 
realisation of one’s individuality, the integration of the various emotions and rational 
capabilities to form a whole individual. Fragmentation or compartmentalisation thus 
go against the interests of the self. This stresses further how significant 
connectedness to self (the ""présence à s o r  underlined by Terestchenko) is in the 
making of moral decisions. Reinforcing moral rules or holding bureaucratic actors 
responsible for their role does not suffice to foster better ethics if people are not 
complete individuals, fully conscious of their moral authority.
In fact, granting a collective body the right to design the content o f good ethics may 
strengthen the dominance o f the persona even further. MacIntyre’s characters, in the 
end, are nothing but extremely strong and pervasive personas that overtake the 
personahty and identity o f the individual. The individual thus becomes the persona. 
In that purview, the individual self surrenders to the collective image of the 
“legitimate[d] mode of social existence” which the character represents; this
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collective image stands for an ideal which is imposed on the individual, although he 
then begins to act as a moral and cultural referent for this same collective 
(Maclntyie, 1985:29). The responsibility to resist lies, again, iu the hands o f the 
individual, and constitutes the stepping stone of morality infonned by ethical 
conscience, rather than just moral conscience. Actually, “it is up to each one to guard 
oneself against one’s own propensity to obey so as to be ready to act, under the 
circumstances where a ‘destructive’ authority exerts its commands, in accordance 
with the principles to which one adheres but which he is requested to leave aside” 
(Terestchenko, 2007:293).
7.4.2. M oral S trength  A n d  th e  A uthoritt  o f  the Se l f
The capability to act from the self rather than from an external source of authority 
becomes the most essential element to nurture moral strength. Moral strength has a 
significant influence with regards to each element of ethical decision-making 
discussed earlier (see Chapter 3, part 3.2.4). Moral strength is indeed necessary to 
enact our moral motivation and to develop our moral character (Trevino and Brown, 
2004). Thus a person connected to her self is likely to be more able to follow her 
initial moral motivation and to display the necessary moral strength to act according 
to her ethical conscience. Connectedness to self also influences moral awareness and 
moral sensitivity, in so far as the persona may hinder the initial gut reaction a person 
might have felt towards a moral dilemma. The less a person is connected to her self, 
the less she is able to perceive when a decision goes against her moral values. 
However, if the person is connected to her self, she is more likely to have developed 
the awareness and sensitivity to assess a moral issue. Finally, moral judgment also 
depends on our degree o f connection to the self. The more people are individuated 
and closely connected to their self, the more sensitive they are to the collective 
humanity of which every one has arguably inherited. The more sensitive to their self, 
the more concern for others they will tend to show, yet without sacrificing concern 
for themselves as well. Indeed, Nick or Paul care for their own interest and their 
well-being, but they do not separate it from the interest o f the other people involved 
in their projects. These two respondents exemplify Terestchenko’s (2004) argument 
that altruistic people can also be self-concerned. The quality of altruism lies in the
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fair combination of self-concern and concern for others. Terestchenko insists that 
self-sacrifice is not, and has never really been an altruistic requirement. Sometimes 
circumstances make se lf sacrifice an altruistic necessity, but other times they do not.
Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007) asked a similar question. They felt the need to 
investigate further “how people determine whether or not they will act in a morally 
courageous way when faced with an ethical challenge” and articulated their study 
around the concept of moral courage (2007:132). They identified a path people 
follow when they have to make a moral decision: faced with an ethical challenge, a 
person will spontaneously have an emotional reaction that will lead her to a desire to 
act in a certain way. She then exqxeriences a process o f “se lf  regulation o f the desire 
to act”, which is influenced by social norms and pressure, her perceived se lf  identity, 
contextual factors, as well as her character in the Aristotelian sense (i.e. her virtues, 
her values). Only then emerges the decision to act, which is necessary but not 
sufficient to generate an action. Indeed, the action is equally triggered by the 
automatic and conscious se lf regulation process, that is the character traits on one 
hand, and the consciousness o f one’s emotions and social factors of influence on the 
other hand. Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007:133) conclude that “tliis se lf  regulatory 
process is governed by an appraisal of whether acting (or not acting) is consistent 
with the type o f person the individual is or wants to be.” This view confirms the 
centrality o f the sense o f self in any moral action, and provides a similar logic o f 
decision-making and decision enactment to the Jungian framework we proposed.
The significance o f ethical conscience as a reflection of the self to guide one’s action 
shows clearly in cases o f potential “weakness-ofwill” that the authors discuss. 
Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007:144) notice three cases in which the individual can lack 
moral courage. Firstly, he may be aware of a desire to do evil, so that he will need to 
be aware of his sense o f right and wrong and commits to do the right thing; lacking 
moral courage would mean that he fails to connect to his sense o f right and wrong. 
Secondly, the individual may know he could do evil but does not feel a desire to do 
so, in which case he should know what is right for him, be committed to do the right 
thing and be aware that he can indeed achieve the right thing; if he either ignores 
what is right for him, fails to commit to do the right thing or fails to believe he can
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achieve the right thing, the individual would have lacked moral courage. Thirdly, the 
individual may have the spontaneous, “first-order” desire to act in a morally right 
way, in which case he still needs to consider whether this is how the sort o f person he 
is would act, and commits to his “personal standards of conduct”; failure to question 
his aspirations and failure to commit to his own standards of conduct would equally 
imply a lack of moral courage. Moral courage thus appears to be essential in each 
and every aspect of moral deliberation, because the individual can potentially fail to 
act morally well at any stage of the process and in any circumstances. From a 
Jungian perspective, each case requires a strong connection to the self and some 
progress towaids being an individual, if  the individual is to actually choose the 
morally right action. Knowledge o f self, in particular knowledge of the “sort of 
person” one wants to be, is critical; however it is even more critical to detennine 
whether the sort of person one is or one wants to be, which contributes to regulating 
one’s moral behaviour, is indeed a reflection of tire self, or remains an object of the 
collective under the form o f a persona or other archetypes.
Actually, Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007:145) rightly insist that “the multiple points of 
self-reflection, self-evaluation and self-regulation that the individual faces along the 
way to action are like Tittle mental acts’ o f moral courage”; yet they fail to underhne 
how deceiving the mental process of reflection can be. They perceive that individuals 
are vulnerable throughout the process, and they understand that organisational 
context can stimulate or undermine our moral courage. Yet, they do not notice that 
the authority o f the self lies in the complete expression o f one’s individuality, outside 
the scope of what others expect o f oneself. Moral strength could be described as the 
propensity to act with moral courage. If  moral courage represents the ability to listen 
to the iimer voice that tells right from wrong, moral strength would represent the 
quality o f the connection to that inner voice. A person may well be capable o f 
listening to her self, but if she is prisoner of a collective image, the quality o f the 
communication will be poor. On the contrary, a frilly individuated person has 
established a solid basis with her self, so that she can more readily capture the inner 
voice and focus her efforts on understanding its meaning, rather than pondering on 
whether it reflects ethical conscience or the ego-persona, for example. In this regard, 
Jung (2002:39) warned that the source of one’s actions must be individual and self­
234
led instead of collectively-bound, for the moral implications for the person and the 
community are clearly different:
“By that time, the patient [the individual] should have acquired enough 
certainty of judgment to enable him to act on his own insight and 
decision and not from the mere wish to copy convention -  even if he 
happens to agree with collective opinion. Unless he stands firmly on his 
own feet, the so-called objective values profit him nothing, since they 
then only serve as a substitute for character and so help to suppress the 
individuality. Naturally, society has an indisputable right to protect itself 
against arrant subjectivisms, but, in so far as society itself is composed of 
de-individualized persons, it is completely at the mercy o f ruthless 
individualists.”
Terestchenko (2007:290) subscribes to this view and explains that those mdividuals 
who resist giving in the domination of the collective have in them certain qualities: 
“the irreducible consistency of a singular individuality, the sense o f personal 
responsibility and o f the absolute value o f the principles on which it is based, the 
lucidity to tell truth from lies at once, the ability to see the world through one’s own 
eyes and to act in accordance, the incontestable certainty to be within one’s rights 
{"'’.son bon droif’), the consciousness that preserving life is undoubtedly for every 
being a legitimate end, but not all cost.” The decision-malcing and decision 
enactment stages are a subtle mix o f emotions, reason and intuition, along with a 
sense of the relativity o f our existence and the irreducibility o f our humanity. These 
elements appear necessary to save morality from becoming subject to mechanistic or 
automatic modes o f behaviour.
7.5. Su m m a r y
This chapter has reviewed the findings from the cases analysed and confronted them 
with the literatiue. We discussed how the Jungian framework provides useful 
insights to tmderstand how individuals experience moral issues, and we highlighted 
that connectedness to self and individuation appeared essential to lay the basis o f 
one’s moral authority, the authority o f the self. We clarified how individuation 
contributes to fostering phronesis, and we discussed the implications this has for 
managers’ moral practice. We questioned the constraints managers identify to justify
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their behaviour, and we concluded that the ultimate moral responsibility of a person 
is to live as an individual rather than as the reflection of a collective. In particular, we 
argued that being an individual would equip one with the necessary moral strength to 
act in a morally good and consistent manner, in full consciousness of one’s actions.
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C h a p t e r  8 -  C o n c l u s io n
8.1. R e v isit in g  R e se a r c h  Q u e st io n s  and  O b je c t iv e s
This study aimed to provide elements to better understand the way managers 
experience morality, thereby establishing the significance of the self in morality. The 
questions raised at the beginning of the thesis have guided the discussion, and we can 
now turn to them again to review our findings.
The main research question was concerned with how managers personally 
experience morality. From the cases examined, we first need to stress that each 
experience is unique to the individual and his circumstances. Amongst the study 
participants, some demonstrated a cleai sense o f self shaped by their personal values, 
whereas others were more inclined to act the part, out of fear, lack of confidence or 
ignorance of their self. Nevertheless, the self emerged as a core element influencing 
the decision-making and the enactment of the decision made. The self affects the 
person not merely in a rational way, in so far as its influence goes beyond asking 
oneself “Is this how the person I am, or the person I aspire to be, would act in this 
situation?” The spiritual aspect of the self, what some psychologists call the “higher 
self’, plays a great part in apprehending the morally appropriate behaviour, which 
accords with the self we are. It provides coherence, a sense of unity o f identity and o f 
direction. The self provides phi^onesis with a safe anchorage to develop moral 
practice.
The sub-questions we raised regarding morality have been addressed in the course of 
the literature review as well as the main study. Our aim was to investigate how 
managers experience their personal morality and their moral boundaries. Although 
the data collection and analysis were conducted systematically and with 
acknowledgement of contextual factors, the findings discussed in the previous 
chapter remain the researcher’s interpretation o f the participants’ views articulated 
within the Jungian theoretical framework. As such they do not claim to be
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categorical statements about management ethics, but they invite managers to 
envision their self and their moral experiences in a different manner.
We can conclude that morality tends to hold both a personal and a universal 
dimension. Many respondents referred to similar values such as honesty, integrity 
and respect when they defined what they believe morality entails. However their 
understanding o f morality seemed influenced by their connectedness to their self, 
that is the relative significance of their persona, and to some extent of their shadow. 
The cases tend to suggest that the stronger the persona, the more self-interested the 
person tends to be; whilst the weaker the persona, the more sensitive the person is to 
the shared humanity in every one. As a consequence, the way the respondents 
apprehend their moral boundaries is also function o f the extent to which they are 
comiected to their self and o f their degree o f consciousness. Some respondents 
seemed certain that they had a clear code of conduct to which they easily conform, 
whereas the rest felt imsure about their reactions should they be confronted with a 
moral dilemma. Yet the apparent self-confidence of the former seemed to reflect an 
attachment to the persona and a reliance on collective rules and moral conscience, 
rather than a profound faith in oneself and a sensitivity to ethical conscience. Some 
other respondents seemed to illustrate how consciousness of self strengthens one’s 
moral knowledge and integrity o f actions, although they showed the tendency to 
question the legitimacy o f their moral intuitions.
These findings thus confirmed that the self occupies a central place in the practice o f 
morality. In particular, consciousness and knowledge o f self determine how 
managers experience their own morality. At the beginning o f  the thesis, we asked the 
two following questions; ‘How do managers perceive their self?’ and ‘What is the 
role of the self in the moral decision-making, moral action and overall moral 
experience o f managers?’ We can now provide some elements o f an answer.
It is the contention o f this thesis that the Jungian view of the self offers a particularly 
insightfiil conceptualisation to apprehend individuals’ moral experiences. For Jung, 
the self stands for the essence of the individual person. Jung defines the self as the 
archetype o f wholeness and both the centre and the totality o f the personality. It
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comprises our reflective and affective abilities, but also possesses a distinctive 
spiritual dimension. As such it is recipient of the vox Dei which directly informs the 
more creative ethical conscience, and an anchor for our moral decisions and moral 
behaviour. For Jung (1995:224) the self lays out our life orientation and meaning. It 
is therefore the central element o f our psyche, our personality and our life endeavour, 
as it transcends duality to enable our potential to unfold completely. The Jungian 
conception o f the self is unique from other definitions o f self and selfhood. In fact: 
“Jung’s idea of the self is different from ordinary feelings of selfliood or the 
psychoanalytic concept o f personal identity; these important qualities Jung locates in 
the ego. [...] There is a sense in which a definition of the self emphasising wholeness 
and totality can be seen as a conceptual hypothesis (ideal), whereas feelings o f 
having a central self-core express the experience of the self.” (Samuels, 1985:91).
The role of the self in the overall moral experience appears to be primary. In terms of 
decision-making, we identified the self as a key factor to enhance the practice of 
phronesis, and a trigger to develop moral strength necessary to nurture moral 
courage. The ability to reflect on the various options available, to sense the 
appropriate “mean” and to intuit that “it is the right thing to do”, along with the 
capacity to enact one’s decision, are all affected by one’s degree o f  connectedness to 
self. The scope o f moral deliberation and moral action is also influenced by the place 
of self within one’s consciousness. An individuated person, that is a person who is 
connected to her self and reflects this connection in her behaviour, tends to consider 
other people, be they colleagues, subordinates, customers or friends and family, as 
deserving respect because they participate in the shared humanity. The idea o f shared 
humanity is best represented by the archetypal self in which ethical conscience is 
grounded. Being an individual, free to create and express what makes him unique, 
can contribute on a greater scale than being a person whose peculiar identity has 
been drowned by the forces o f the collective. Organisations provide many examples, 
both good and bad, of this phenomenon (Guimet, 2000; Pfeffer, 2003:37)
The study participants often declared that being true to their self was important, if not 
essential to their lives. Nevertheless most o f them had a blurred perception o f  their 
self, defining it as an image closer to a persona-phenomenon, either ‘freely’ endorsed
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or imposed on them by society. However, as we already noticed throughout the 
discussion, some respondents demonstrated an ability to integrate their most 
fundamental values into their work. This did not necessarily mean that the decisions 
became easier to make; rather it suggested that those managers were able to show 
greater consistency in their moral behaviour especially with regards to their sense o f 
self and their aspirations to behave without betraying what they stand for, nor what 
they believe in. Morality and self are therefore closely intertwined, so that perception 
of the self, understood in a Jungian sense, determines perception o f one’s moral 
boundaries. The respondents who seemed more closely connected to their self than 
the others tended to identify their self with the essential values that inspire their 
actions and define who they are. More than an image, the self was perceived as the 
most essential dimension o f their identity as individuals. A contrario^ the respondents 
with a strong persona tended to project a constructed image in lieu of their self, an 
image which did not shed the same moral imperative as the real self. These 
participants generally found ways to accommodate with the context more or less 
easily.
We therefore established that a Jungian framework of analysis, and particularly the 
concept of the archetypal self, provides some interesting insights into the moral 
experiences of managers. The framework particularly clarifies the role of phronesis 
by integrating it within the larger process of individuation. The concepts o f the 
persona, the self as well as the distinction between moral and ethical conscience 
proved relevant to depict the way managers responded to and felt towards a moral 
issue.
The research objectives set at the beginning of the research study aimed to elicit 
knowledge on:
(1) whether managers consider their self when making decisions o f a moral 
nature;
(2) the relative importance o f the self in managers’ moral system;
(3) other elements of importance in managers’ moral system.
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In response to these objectives, we can state that the interviewed managers generally 
consider their self when they make decisions o f a moral nature, although they do not 
necessarily perceive their self in the same way. We understand the self in a Jungian 
sense, as an archetypal representation o f the individuality of the person. In this 
respect, only some study participants had a sense of self. Others had uncomfortable, 
sometimes conflicting relationships with their self, as they did not seem to fully 
grasp the extent to which they were constrained by a persona. In any case, the self 
appeared to be primary in nurturing moral strength. More generally, we can state that 
lack o f connectedness to self implies that the person does not live up to her 
individuality, which makes her much more susceptible to give in to the values of the 
mass. The values of the collective may be judged morally good; yet even in this case, 
accepting the dominance o f the values of the collective would potentially threaten the 
well-being of the individuals who would have surrendered their ethical conscience to 
a collectively-inspired moral conscience.
We can also suggest that the authority o f the self, although challenging, provides a 
better and more consistent moral ground than the authority of the collective. This 
argument has direct implications for the practice of business ethics. The existence o f 
collective codes of ethics would actually carry less importance than the actual moral 
views of the individuals who comprise the organisation. Morality is distinctively 
imier, so that the moral choices are and remain those o f a distmct individual. What a 
manager does both influences and reflects the person he or she is because it is 
impossible to separate the manager from the person. In fact, tliis study argues that 
prior to considering the manager, efforts should be made to consider the person 
because the quality of the person will determine the moral quality of the manager. 
Individuated managers embody their moral values under any circmnstances, 
illustrating a case of moral exemplarity that could influence others, and gently but 
firmly challenge the organisational culture and dynamics that commonly entertain a 
questionable approach to ethics and to people management.
We highlighted in the discussion the relative importance of external factors to moral 
practice. In particular, we examined the role of mitigating circumstances to which the 
respondents appealed in order to justify their behaviour. Although we should
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acknowledge that the context partly influences the extent to which one is encouraged 
to express one’s self, we argued that accepting that a person does not have a choice 
already suggests that she has given up her individuality. Ulthnately, we have the 
choice to not have a choice. The issue of choice is particularly relevant in the 
business ethics field because o f the recurring ai'gument that business is what it is and 
managers cannot but accept the rules o f the game. We demonstrated in this thesis 
how such attitude characterises a detachment from the self and a surrender to the 
collective by compartmentalising or endorsing an appropriate persona. Our doubts or 
lack o f confidence regarding our moral capabilities also affect our decisions. Yet the 
study suggests that these doubts might simply reflect some aspects o f the shadow that 
have not been dealt with. As a consequence, extensive self-reflection, work on 
consciousness and vigilance are needed to cope with the challenge o f individual 
morality.
8 .2 . PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
The findings of this study suggest that business organisations should think of their 
employees not as human resources, but rather as human beings. Indeed, casting 
employees merely in their professional role is highly restrictive and prevents the 
employees from expressing their full potential. Organisations, as we stressed, are 
made o f individuals who ought to be treated as such. Individuation, the Jungian 
process o f realisation o f self, is a lifetime process, so that one is ‘in becoming’ rather 
than ‘in being’. However, organisations should and can allow their members the time 
to become more aware o f their self, and the possibility to express their self. Context 
can indeed stimulate or discourage self-expression. Companies have been using 
psychological tools for several years, but often in an instrumental way. A Jungian 
framework of self-development would require a different approach. The path and 
pace of development are necessarily personal and individual, but they can be 
integrated within a collective contribution. The study provided examples o f managers 
who had successftilly brought their values at the core o f their job, without 
prejudicing the profitability o f the company. Their moral standards were high, but so 
seemed to be their performance.
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This has a direct incidence o f the performance review processes. Formal criteria that 
aim to assess how close an employee is to an ideal actually reinforce the dominance 
of a ‘business persona’ and discourage the expression o f the individual self. 
Initiatives that purport to instil ‘spirit’ into the workplace point in the opposite 
dii'ection, and stress that people who feel happy and fulfilled by the work they do 
tend to be more productive and committed towards the organisation. Expressing 
one’s individuality does not imply that there can be no rules. However, the rules 
should be based on a concerted discussion and should respect the basic values 
ingrained in the expression of humanity. Managers have a key role to play in setting 
up this discussion. However, it will only be beneficial if managers are willing to 
engage with their self so as to sense what is truly right for them and for others in the 
respect o f the shared humanity.
This study’s approach echoes concerns expressed by the growing research field o f 
spirituality in the workplace. Indeed, recent studies and ejqperiences in business and 
management have embraced the view that organisational beings were also spiritual 
beings. People’s life disenchantment and disarray have been identified as the result 
o f their spiritually empty, thereby unfulfilling lives (Gotsis and Kortezi, 2008). Work 
as a vocation urges people to seek meaning in their workplace (Howard and 
Welboum, 2004). If  management is primary rooted in action, and ethics in reflection, 
then spirituality is associated with transcendence; however all three constitute 
necessary pillars for a successfiil and sustainable collective practice (Fauchant, 
2000:60).
The concept o f spirituality is nevertheless rather fiizzy, in spite of the renewed 
interest in the field (Hicks, 2002). Typically contrasted with rehgion, spirituality is 
perceived as informal, non-rational, loose and personal, whereas religion is perceived 
as a more formal, rational, dogmatic form of institutionalised spiritual expression 
(Forman 2004; Collins and Kakabadse 2005). Pruzan (quoted in Zsolnai 2004:3) 
holds that spirituality focuses on ‘basic, deep-rooted human values, and a 
relationship with a universal source, power, or divinity’ and that religion is an 
institutionalised form o f this relationship. Guillory (2001:33) defines spirituality as 
“our inner consciousness... the source of inspiration, creativity, and wisdom”. The
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spiritual quest involves the connection to the inner self, locus o f the spiritual in 
human beings, which incidentally brings about a growing perception o f an inter­
relatedness of everything and a striving towards wholeness (Guillory 2001; Zsolnai 
2004). This view is clearly reminiscent o f Jung’s aichetypal self and process o f 
individuation which both frees the individual from the mass and allows for a more 
fundamental feeling o f belonging to grow.
A Jungian framework nevertheless offers a more structured alternative to 
investigating ethics in a spiritual perspective than existing literature on spirituality in 
the workplace (e.g. Giacalone and Woodhead, 2003; Heelas and Woodhead, 2005; 
see also Ketola, 2008). The latter too often overlooks the fact that not all managers or 
organisational people readily accept that spirituality be an intrinsic part of our 
existence. By taking for granted the spiritual aspirations o f managers, management 
spirituality, for example, may miss a critical audience o f spiritual-skeptics who will 
not feel persuaded by the arguments put forward. Whilst the Jungian framework we 
propose comprises clearly defined concepts that can be articulated at both a 
theoretical and practical level, the spirituality in the workplace movement has yet to 
establish a working frame o f reference to guide further contextual and conceptual 
research. Besides, research into spirituality does not focus on ethics as such, but 
rather considers it a secondary issue naturally solved by an increased spiritual 
awareness. Although we agree that growth in self-consciousness is likely to 
positively affect our ability to make morally good decisions, we stress that it is 
equally important to make these mechanisms explicit and to clearly delineate the 
linkages between spiritual self and morality. In that purview, the Jungian framework 
appears more appropriate to the study of individual ethics.
Jungian thought has been introduced in management and organisational behaviour 
studies most significantly through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, However this 
approach does not account for the complexity and depth of Jung's theories, but rather 
simplifies them by synthesizing his personality types to create a measurement 
instrument (O’Roark, 1990). For example, Myers-Briggs and Myers (1993) argue 
that Jung focused mainly on the dominant function to the detriment of secondary, or 
auxiliary, function which is yet almost as significant. However Jung’s statements
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ought to be read in the perspective o f his overall theory (Pittenger, 1993). Thereby, 
the role of the secondary function is not detailed in so far as the individual is 
evidently dual -  for example necessarily compensating conscious extraversion with 
unconscious introversion. Myers-Briggs and Myers (1993:24) also notice that “Jung 
saw his theory as an aid to self-understanding, but the application o f the theory (like 
the theory itself) extends beyond the point where Jung was content to stop. The type 
concepts shed light on the way individuals perceive and judge and on the things that 
they value most [...]”. In that respect, Myers-Briggs and Myers overlook that for 
Jimg, self-understanding w ^  the task of a hfetime. Rather, they seem to favour an 
instrumental approach to managing one’s relationships and one’s life choices, or 
more pragmatically to finding the most suitable job according to one’s personality. In 
contrast, Jungian individuation aims to achieve a similar goal but in a more 
comprehensive, in-depth, albeit occasionally painful manner.
The research findings o f this thesis also resonate with developments in positive 
psychology. Positive psychology shares roots with humanistic psychology, in the 
tradition of Maslow, and argues that psychology has historically favoured the cure of 
psychological pain rather than the identification of the factors allowing happiness 
and well-being (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Robbins, 2008). Emphasis is 
put on training consciousness to live in the present moment by enhancing self- 
determination, subjective perception o f well-being and furthering optimism 
(Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Boyd-Wilson et al., 2002). Achieving 
happiness is the optimal goal, in the spirit o f Aristotle’s eiidaimonia. On the moral 
front, the good life is seen as embodying the following six “core virtues”: courage, 
justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom and transcendence (Dahlsgaard et al, 2005). 
In management practice, positive psychology has found its place in the 
organisational behaviour field (Crowell, 2005; Martin, 2005). However, despite 
apparent similarities, Jung’s agenda differs significantly from that of the positive 
psychologists.
Positive psychology focuses on directing consciousness by trained attention and 
control o f the bodily reactions such as pain, wants and drives (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990). For Jung, however, consciousness must enlarge to integrate the unconscious.
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To achieve this, we need to consciously turn our attention to the unconscious, but 
this endeavour does not compare with the self-programming methods proposed by 
positive psychologists to generate the “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Furthermore, 
the ontological assumptions o f the Jungian self are different from those of the self as 
viewed by Csikszentmihalyi (1990:34), for example. For the latter, the self is a 
construct o f consciousness, whereas for Jung, the self is an archetype at the centre of 
the collective unconscious. Finally, Jungian psychology embraces a quest for 
symbolic meaning through the various messages of the unconscious, whilst the 
concept of flow arguably adopts a more pragmatic goal. This is not to belittle the 
significance of positive psychology, however. Indeed, both perspectives pay great 
attention to a concept o f self characterized by both individual uniqueness and a 
shared bond with fellow human beings. Rather, we suggest that the perspectives 
differ in their perspective on happiness, Wliilst Csikszentmihalyi (1990:20) argues 
that “the control o f consciousness determines the quality o f life”, Jung would argue 
that the key determining factor is really the understanding of the unconscious.
8.3. C r it ic a l  Re f l e c t io n  a n d  L im it a t io n s
Research is on-going by nature, therefore this study could be improved. Firstly, the 
analysis of the findings is based on my personal understanding of Jungian concepts. I 
cannot but acknowledge that someone may disagree with my interpretation, although 
in the interpretivist paradigm such criticism would be considered an opportunity to 
expand our knowledge rather than a piece o f evidence that the framework is 
erroneous. Nevertheless, readers should appreciate that the analysis and the 
discussion of the findings draw heavily on Jung’s ideas, hence they do make sense 
within this conceptual framework. The definition o f the self, the persona, or the 
existence of a collective unconscious are peculiar to Jung’s view o f the psyche, and 
they naturally limit the scope of application of the proposed framework.
Methodologically, we can recognise that a more extensive account from the study 
participants would strongly enhance the quality and depth o f the analysis. We should 
bear in mind that Jung worked as an analytical psychologist, and he applied his 
concepts to clinical cases. His work on di'eam analysis w ^  very important to the
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overall psychoanalysis. Its purpose was to enable the patient to understand the roots 
of the psychic problem. Our goal was not to psychoanalyse tlie research participants, 
but to understand their moral experiences. Nevertheless, we needed to understand the 
person in order to make sense of her experiences, especially within the Jungian 
framework we defined. A one-off interview may not have been sufficient to really 
apprehend the person; however we may wonder how many additional hours o f 
interview would be needed to fully apprehend the person. If the study could be 
replicated, the use o f personal journals along with interviews could be used to gain a 
deeper understanding of the individual and his view of the world.
The sample size and profile could be considered a serious limitation within a 
postpositivist perspective. Since we postulated that the research was designed from 
an interpretivist epistemology, the characteristics o f the sample are not assessed in a 
similar way. We could argue that the range of the managerial profiles was very wide, 
which puts some restriction on the comparativeness of the findings. The expectations 
and pressures that a small enterprise director faces are indeed different from those of 
an IT manager; nevertheless, the analytical process remains the same. The discretion 
of the director may differ fr om that o f the manager, in so far as the director can make 
global decisions whilst the manager has to apply the directives that come from the 
top level. However, both can choose to set their work standards according to what 
their self dictates or to what their perceived social roles dictate. The Jungian 
framework hence applies to a great variety of profiles and professions.
8 .4 . F u t u r e  R e s e a r c h  O p p o r t u n i t i e s
This research study has attempted to show that the self is an essential element of 
morality. We have proposed a framework to investigate the relationships between 
moral decision, moral action and self, and we have illustrated how this framework 
could be used to understand and make sense of the moral experiences of some 
individual managers. We suggest that this framework could be perfected and tested 
with other professions. Future studies could aim to collect more extensive data, 
through journals and interviews as suggested above, and analyse in greater details the 
experiences narrated. Indeed, a narrative approach could be envisaged, since it would
247
locate the experience in the life story o f the individual, and it would provide 
interesting insights into the perception the individual has of himself. The proposed 
typology could also be refined and expanded, with a view to map out the possible 
psychological obstacles to an enlightened moral practice.
Within organisations, studies designed in an action-research perspective could 
provide interesting information on the lived experience of self-knowledge and self- 
realisation. This approach would call for a multi-disciplinary approach, bringing 
psychology further into the research framework. We could propose that a 
longitudinal study in which managers would work alongside Jungian psychologists 
could detennine the practicality o f the approach as well as the long-term benefits for 
both the organisation and the individuals. Managers should not be expected to 
engage in a psychoanalysis; instead they should be invited to reflect on certain 
themes and on their own experiences, and to discuss their reflections with ‘experts’. 
Ultimately, only the managers would know what is relevant to them and what is not, 
providing they accept the challenge o f their persona by their own self.
This reseaich study has addressed the gap of individual morality in a management 
context. By integrating Aristotle’s phronesis within Jung’s process o f individuation 
and self-realisation, we have tried to demonstrate the importance o f understanding 
how a person views and experiences her self. We have argued that morality is 
essentially a matter of individuals and that the self is the most significant element 
that influences moral beliaviour and moral practice. Connectedness to self and 
individuation pave the way to ethical conscience. As a consequence, the individual’s 
actions are reflective o f his self and of the values attached to a sense o f shared 
humanity. We have attempted to demonstrate how this Jungian framework o f 
morality is relevant to understand the moral experiences of managers, and we have 
concluded that managers and organisations could learn from this approach. In 
particular, we draw attention to the fact that managers cannot cut off from the other 
aspects of their lives, and that the extent to which they connect to their self 
influences their moral deliberation, their moral courage and their moral strength.
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A ppen d ix  I -  Interview  Pr o to co l  fo r  P ilot  Study  (I)
Introduction to the research -  looJdng at self-perception and moral issues, focusing 
on managers
The interview process — t^ecorded (agreement), data treated with confidentiality and 
analysed anonymously. I  am interested in your experience and personal account, so 
please mention what you think is relevant even if  I  didn’t ask the question 
specifically. If at any point you wish me to clarify a point, or feel uncomfortable with 
a question, please let me know.
Part A -  Current position and background
1- Can you tell me your exact job title and briefly describe what your responsibilities 
are
Prompt: What do you do on a regular basis
How many people do you supervise 
To whom do you report 
With whom do you work
2- How long have you been in that position/company?
3- Was your previous job a managerial one as well -  briefly describe what it 
consisted in
4- How did you decide to become a manager -  what interested you most in it
Link to formal business/management education 
Transition: the questions I ’m going to ask now relate to your experience as a 
manager, .so it is not restricted to your current job, and if  relevant you are welcome 
to refer to previous experiences.
Part B -  Expectations
1- How would you describe your personal expectations as a manager
Prompt: What expectations do you set yourself in your job as a
manager (by expectations, I mean the standards o f conduct and 
behaviour that would be attached to a role or a position)
How do you assess yourself against your expectations
2- How would you describe the expectations people (at work or outside work) have 
of you as a manager
Prompt: What do you feel people expect you to do/to be
How do you feel expect you to act as a manager 
How does this affect the way you work + the way you feel 
about your work
3“ Can you tell me about an instance/a situation when your expectations conflicted 
with other people’s expectations
Prompt: What was it about, what did you do
How did you feel about the situation/your action/the others’ 
actions
If it happened today, how would you react (the same or 
differently -  why)
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4- Can you tell me about an instance/a situation when you felt your expectations and 
other people’s expectations of you perfectly matched
Prompt: Wliat was it about
Wliat did you do
How did you feel about the situation/your action/the others’ 
actions
If  it happened today, how would you react (the same or 
differently -  why)
5- How typical o f your work experience are the examples you described 
P art C -  Aspirations
1- What would be your depiction o f an ‘ideal’ manager
Prompt: What is in your view the characteristics managers should
aspire to possess, not only work-related criteria but also 
personahty traits
If  there was a manager you would look up to, what would that 
person be like
2- How close to this ideal do you feel you are
How important is it for you to be close to this ideal (esp. for the way you 
perceive yourself to be)
What do you feel comes into the way of this ideal
3- How does this aspiring picture relate to the person you want to be in life in general 
(i.e. not only at work but also in your social and personal hfe)
Prompt: Can you identify a similar ideal of the person (instead of the
manager) you would like to be 
What would you like to achieve in your life
4- How would you describe the relation between your job and your aspirations in life
Prompt: What is the place / role of your job in your life
How does it relate to self-development 
How does this satisfy/dissatisfy you
5- How do you view the place of morality and ethics in management today
-> How does this affect you and at what levels
Conclusion and reminder about a possible second interview
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A ppendix  II -  Interv iew  Pr oto co l  for  P ilot  Study  (IT)
lnt}‘oduction -  Thank you fo r accepting to meet again, I  would like now to expand on 
some o f the points raised during the first interview. This interview focuses on your 
experience and your perception o f the issues, so please be as spontaneous as you feel 
comfortable being.
Part A -  Life narrative on moral values
I’m going to start with general question about yourself and your personal history.
1- Tell me what values/principles are most important for you
Prompt: How would you describe your personal ethos
2- How did you ‘acquiie’ these values
Prompt: Who played a significant role in the construction o f your moral
system (did you have any role model to whom you aspired) 
What played a significant role in the construction of your 
moral system (any significant event that played a role in 
shaping/challenging your moral values/ethos and conduct)
3- How important are these values and beliefs in your life/everyday life
Prompt: How often do you think about them
(How) do you ‘use’ / refer to them when making a decision 
(How) do you re-evaluate them
Part B -  Moral tension -  incidents
Give personal example to lead if  necessaiy
1- Could you describe an example o f a moral conflict you experienced
Prompt: What was it about
Who was involved 
What did you do (and why)
How did you feel about the situation/your action/others’ 
actions
If  it happened again today, how would you react (would you 
do things differently - why)
2- Could you describe an example o f a moral conflict you experienced at work 
specifically (in this job)
Prompt: Wliat was it about
Who was involved 
What did you do (and why)
How did you feel about the situation/your action/others’ actions 
If  it happened again today, how would you react (would you 
do things differently - why)
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3- Why did you describe those particular instances
Prompt: Are these instances typical/recent/particularly strong conflict
Part C -  Life purpose
1- What would the ideal work environment be like for you
Prompt: If you could ‘fix’ or get rid o f the constraints you feel restrain
you and your well-being/self-development, what would you do 
to feel good in the workplace
2- Wliat do you feel participate most in your self-development/personal development
Prompt: What or who plays a part in making you feel good about
yourself
3- How would define happiness and completeness
Prompt: What would be the characteristics o f a state where you feel
happy / complete / in harmony
Anything you wish to add or comment on 
Conclusion
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A ppendix III -  I n te r v ie w  P r o t o c o l  f o r  M ain  S tu d y
Part A -  Current position and background 
Occupation actuelle et historique
Can you tell me your exact job title and briefly describe what your responsibilities 
are?
Pom^ez-vous m ’indiquer l ’intitulé exact de votive poste et décrire brièvement vos 
responsabilités ?
Prompt: How many people do you supervise
Combien de personnes supeiwisez-vous
To whom do you report
A qui rapponez-vous /  qui sont vos supérieurs
With whom do you work
Avec qui travaillez-vous /  qui sont vos collègues
How long have you been in that position/company?
Depuis combien de temps occupez-vous ce poste /  travaillez-vous dans cette 
entreprise ?
Was your previous job a managerial one as well -  briefly describe what it consisted 
in?
Quelle était votre occupation avant cela ?
How did you decide to become a manager -  what interested you most in it?
Pourquoi et comment avez-vous décidé de devenir manager /  chef d ’équipe ?
Part B -  You and your job 
Vous et votre travail
Tell me about your tasks, role, responsibilities.
Décrivez-moi vos tâches, votive rôle, vos responsabilités.
E.g. What do you do on a regular basis?
Que faites-vous normalement?
What is a typical day at work?
A quoi I'essemble une journée de ti^avail typique?
In this typical day, what tasks do you enjoy most? What tasks make you feel 
discontent, unhappy?
Dans cette journée typique, quelles tâches appréciez-vous le plus? Le moins ?
Please describe what your expectations (e.g. your standards) about your job are. 
Décrivez-moi vos attentes personnelles, vos standards en ce qui concerne votre 
travail (càd ce que vous attendez de vous-même et qui constitue pour vous ‘un travail 
bien fa it’).
What to you is important or significant at work?
Quels éléments sont les plus importants pour vous dans votre travail ?
What are your expectations of yourself when you are at work?
Qu ’exigez-vous de vous-même au travail ?
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Part C -  Moral conflict 
Conflit moral
Think about a moral conflict you experienced (e.g. when a particular set of 
expectations didn’t coincide with what was expected of you to do). Please describe in 
as many details as possible the situation (what was it about, who was involved, what 
was the outcome).
Réfléchissez à un conflit moral vous avez connu (par exemple lorsque Von attendait 
de vous certaines choses mais vous ne vous sentiez pas à Vaise dé faire ces choses). 
Décrivez avec autant de détails possibles la situation (de quoi s ’agissait-il, qui était 
impliqué, comment cela s ’est terminé).
How did you feel? How did you sort it out?
Comment vous êtes-vous senti ? Comment avez-vous résolu ce conflit ? Comment 
avez-vous réagi ?
Why did you choose this particular example?
Pourquoi avez-vous choisi cet exemple-là?
Part D -  Life purpose 
Attentes existentielles
What guides you in life (i.e. in making decisions and choices in life)?
Qu ’est-ce qui vous guide dans la vie (par exemple lorsque vous prenez des décisions 
ou faites des choix) ?
Is it any different (and how) from what guides you when you are in the workplace? 
Est-ce différent (et comment) de ce qui vous guide lorsque vous êtes au travail ?
What do these statements evoke to you:
Qu ’évoquent ces phrases pour vous :
“Happiness is a state o f mind”
« Le bonheur est un état d ’esprit »
“Being true to your Self’
« Etre fidèle à Soi-même »
“To be complete, one needs others; to feel complete, one needs only one’s Self’
« Pour être complet, on a besoin des autres; pour se sentir complet, on a seulement 
besoin de Soi-même »
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A ppendix  IV -  R esea r c h  P urpo se  & Letter  Of  Introduction
Introduction to research project
I am a final year PliD student researching on managers’ sense o f self and morality. 
For that, I am interested in interviewing managers on their experience and view on 
the topic. The interview focuses on themes such as work expectations, personal 
standards, personal aspirations and drives, plus a discussion about a moral dilemma 
(work-related) that you experienced.
I understand some possible restriction on that latter question due to confidentiality 
issue, but I am more interested in how you dealt with the situation (e.g. emotionally, 
psychologically) rather than in the particular details of the dilemma. The interview 
would last approximately 1 hour, maximum 1:30 hour. It is aimed at being 
conversational, loose and informal, although I have some questions prepared to get 
the discussion going. The interview will be treated anonymously and in a non­
imputable manner.
Contact details:
Cécile Rozuel 
xxxxxxxxxxx
Proiet de Recherche
Sens dll Soi et éthique chez les managers 
Université du Surrey, Guildford, UK
Etudiante en dernière année de doctorat, je mène un projet de recherche centré siu le 
sens du soi et l’éthique chez les managers. Ce projet examine la relation des 
managers avec leur Soi et l’éthique. Il s’agit d’étudier comment les managers 
comprennent, définissent et perçoivent la notion d’éthique ou de moralité. Il s’agit 
également d’examiner le rôle que joue l’éthique dans la définition et la perception 
des attentes et exigences personnelles des managers.
Les thèmes centraux examinés lors de cette étude touchent aux attentes et exigences 
personnelles et professionnelles, à la perception de soi, et aux motivations et 
aspirations qui guident autant les choix dans la vie quotidiemie que les choix de vie. 
Pour cela, je souhaite interviewer des managers (par exemple chef d’équipe, 
superviseur, chef de projet, dirigeant) de tout horizon et secteur d’activité. 
L’interview dure approximativement une heure et quart, maximum une heure et 
demie. Le format d’interview est déstmcturé et relativement informel, car il s’agit de 
parler de votre expérience et votre point de vue sur les thèmes mentionnés 
précédemment, notaimnent comment vous voyez, percevez et inteiprétez ces 
éléments. Entre autre, une partie de l’interview est centrée sur l’analyse d’un 
dilemme moral vécu dans le cadre professionnel -  il ne s’agit pas de fournir des 
détails potentiellement confidentiels sur une situation, mais plutôt de recueillir votre 
réaction et ressenti fiice à ce conflit.
Si vous souhaitez des détails supplémentaires sur ma recherche, n’hésitez pas à me 
contacter par e-mail. Merci d ’avance.
C. Rozuel
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A ppendix  V  -  Consent  f o r m
Consent Form 
Formulaire de Consentement
Research Project on Managers’ Sense of Self and Morality 
Projet de Recherche sur le Sens du Soi et Péthique chez les managers
By 
Mené par 
Cécile Rozuel 
School of Management 
University o f Suney
I confirm that I have agreed to take part to the above research project and that 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions.
Je confirme que j ’ai donné mon accord pour participer à l ’étude mentionnée 
ci-dessus, et que j ’ai eu l ’opportunité de poser des questions par avance.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at 
any time. I understand tliat I can ask for any sensitive remarks to be removed 
from the record and that I am free to withhold infomiation which I regard to 
be of a sensitive nature.
Je reconnais que ma participation est volontaire et que je  suis libre de me 
retirer de l ’étude à tout moment. Je comprends que j ’ai le droit de demander 
que les remarques sur des sujets sensibles soient supprimées de l ’étude et que 
j ’ai le droit de ne pas révéler des informations que je  juge être de nature 
sensible.
I understand that interview records and transcripts will be anonymised and 
rendered non imputable to me or to my organisation ifrwhen referred to or 
quoted in the project report and other eventual publications.
Je comprends que les enregistrements et scripts issus de l ’interview seront 
traités de manière anonyme et qu ’ils ne pourront être imputables à moi-même 
ou à mon organisation si ou lorsqu ’ils seront mentionnés dans le rapport 
d ’étude final ou dans d ’éventuelles publications futures.
1 confirm that I have / have not* agreed for the interview to be tape-recorded 
as part of the above study.
Je confirme que j ’ai / je  n ’ai pas* accepté que l ’inteiview soit enregistrée 
dans le cadre de l ’étude mentionnée ci-dessus.
* Please delete as appropriate / Merci de biffer la mention appropriée
Date and Signature: 
(Please print name)
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A ppendix  V I -  Sam ple  of Interview  Transcript  (V incent)
To start with, there are some general questions about your Job, So can you tell me 
your exact Job title and a bit about what you ’re doing?
Okay. My job title is the Software geographic and distribution field application 
engineering manager. That’s a very long one. Essentially, I look after a team of field 
engineers, eight in total, spread all across Europe, who have responsibilities either for 
software tools, or geographic and distribution customers.
So i t ’s mainly distance management?
There’s only one employee who works in the same office as me. Everybody else is in 
France, Germany, Israel, Scandinavia -  spread all over the place. So it’s a very much 
remote management role.
Olcay. And how long have you been working het'e?
Since 2002, although the current team was only structured from the begimiing of this 
year, so prior to this year I only had four people, and then I got an extra four in 
January.
And before that, what were you doing?
Hem, a similar role in a company that just made software tools and that was 
purchased by CpmpanyW.
And before that?
[laugh] Hem...A similai" role in another company that made software tools, 
hem.. .and that was for about a year.
And what is your background? Did you study engineering or management?
I ’m actually -  when I left school, I did what is called an apprenticeship, which 
essentially is four years o f attending college and at the same time attending a training 
school and touring the company effectively that I worked for, working in every 
department for a couple of weeks to sometimes a few months basically to understand 
how the whole company functions, at the end o f which you’ve got a choice o f “what 
would you like to do?” And I chose essentially given that my coursework was 
electronic-based, I chose to actually work in the service and customer support 
division.
And it was a company dealing with electi^onics?
Yes. It was called Company X.
And you chose that company?
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The apprenticeship that I got was with this company. So ultimately the aim o f an 
apprenticeship -  they’re not so common nowadays, but the aim nonnally is to -  they 
invest and train someone who hopefully^will be around in the friture for them. And 
actually most people who have been trained through that channel will stick around 
for a short while and then realise that they can get more money from somebody else, 
so they leave, [laugh]
So you went into support because o f your technical ti a^ining.
Yes.
And what motivated you to become a manager of a team?
That would be in a company called Company Y; where I moved to following my 
apprenticeship. Quite a small company, forty people, with a growing business. I was 
initially a one-man show, and then groomed a small team of people from that. So 1 
was given the responsibility, having been the initial staff within the support part, to 
actually hire the staff. And that was really my first foot onto the management ladder.
So it was on-the-job training?
Essentially yes. Hem, when I moved on companies from there to a company called 
Conipany^Z, I effectively step backward for a short period. So I became what we 
would call an individual contributor. But when the manager some 18 months later 
subsequently left, I took on that role and the responsibility for eight staff.
Was it something you were interested in doing?
Yes, definitely. It was a matter there of waiting for the right opportunity. Or “dead 
man shoes” as some people call it.
What do you like most in managing teams?
Personally for me, I don’t like being a completely administrative manager. And the 
role that I’m in today actually allows me to do -  50% of my time I ’m actually doing 
the same ftinction as everyone in my team members do. So I still maintain an 
element of what I call “hands-on” [uncleaic], and the other 50% clearly is sort of 
personnel administration, etc. Being in a technical role, maintaining the “hands-on” 
part is actually extremely useful because it keeps you [unclear], it means you can 
interface with your team in a more [lincjdar], because you truly understand their 
issues because you equally work on some of the very rational things. You also know, 
for example, if a member o f your staff is not entirely being truthful if in a bid or 
something, you’re in a better position to challenge that for example. So, hem, I enjoy 
managing, I enjoy -  I enjoy the decision-making side I think, allocating tools, 
resources to issues, being able to, presented with an issue cause clearly we’re in a 
customer [unclear] world, and actually being able to bring about resources to 
[miclear] to resolve that as quickly as possible. Keeping the customer happy, cause in 
our busmess the customer is king.
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And the customers are who in this respect?
Customers are anyone who buys products. So, everything from very
large companies, you know, the Nokias and Ericssons of the world ail the way down 
to some fairly small customers who probably make, you know, five or ten o f a 
particular product that they think is the best product in the world a year. So it’s a 
very wide customer base that we have to interest, so...
And how are you in contact with them -  is that on a technical basis?
Hem, basically, clearly it is in the technical aspect. The team, each member of the 
team, myself included, has a role -  we have a pre-sales role which is really technical 
presentation and demonstration and we have a post-sales role in helping to 
troubleshoot. We clearly, particularly in the post-sales role, there is an infrastructure 
behind us to actually accommodate most of that, with the customer having built a 
technical relationship with us in the pre-sales domain, will typically use us as their 
initial interface. So, we will take issues on initially, if necessary we will then pass 
them on to the organisation but we resolve them ourselves.
Did you find it easy atfirst to lead a team?
Hem...yes, to a certain extent. Wlien you grow from nothing and you hire your first 
person, it’s really a two-person team more than a manager and a subordinate. I think 
the challenge tends to come as the team grows bigger than that. So you grow from 3 
or 4 staff to 8 staff where you cannot maintain that same level o f relationship very 
easily.
So how do you handle that, if  you handle that?
[laugh] That’s the same system with the remote-team today, because clearly most o f 
my team don’t actually see any o f  their peers very often. We interact clearly via 
telephone, we interact via email. But we’re in our own country, or own regions. They 
probably feel very much that they’re still a one or two person shot. Hem, so that -  the 
amount of competition is probably not there as much as it would be if everyone was 
all based in the same place. Although it does become evident particularly at the time 
of year when we do perfonnance reviews, cause everybody likes to see where they
Does that make your job more difficult, the distance, to create a team spirit?
Yeah. And I try very hard at that mainly by insuring tlmt everyone comes together at 
least once a week on Monday on a team call. We encourage, or I encourage the use 
of an e-mail address list where there’s all o f us which is very informal, if you have a 
problem or an issue, put on there, send it out because someone else in the team may 
well have had the issue already. So it’s a very quick and easy way o f saying “I am 
stuck with issue X Y and Z. Has anyone seen this?” and probably 90% of cases, 
someone else already has the answer. We don’t need to |o  iiito the organisation or 
anything. So there’s a lot o f encouragements to say it [uncfiar] and collaborate, in
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that respect. And whenever the opportunity arises -  it may be only two or three times 
a year -  I think of getting the team together in marketing for instance almost all of 
the team will be at a large event in Vienna next week, where I will ultimately take 
the time to grab everyone for one or two hours probably in the evening over some 
sort o f a social function, so to sort o f  get people together and help build that team 
spirit a bit more.
Is that important for you?
It is. I think people within the team really do need to feel part o f the team. One o f 
reasons I was given four extra staff was essentially -  that was a reorganisation o f the 
overall structure in Europe because a couple of the teams that we have -  and there 
are 6 or 7 teams pretty much similar to mine, a couple of them were very fragmented. 
People couldn’t identify, they couldn’t identify with anyone else in the team because 
they deal with things that are so vast and different. They couldn’t problem-share 
because another guy in their team dealt with a completely different product, so there 
was no commonality. So in the reorganisation, the people I inherited all have a 
commonality with one another and with my existing team. So that helps to sort of 
foster and build a team spirit.
You said you try to maintain a 50-50 balance between admin or management role 
and hands-on role. Is that a personal choice or is it just how the job is designed?
No, that is the way the team is stmctured today. There are approximately 70 field 
engineers in Europe, and underneath the top-level management there are -  I should 
really count them -  there are eight managers. So the team effectives from that 
number are divided by eight. So that kind o f gives you an idea tliat there are 
sublevels of management, cause managing 70 people for a single manager is an 
impossibility. But in doing that, there are effectively 8 managers, but if we just did 
administration, that’s actually put off resources that could be available to the 
customers, so it’s a choice really at the management level to say “we should be able 
to manage our people in 50% of our time” and ultimately, then, to utilise our other 
50%. So if you look at our numbers, 8 managers half o f 8, or half of their time is four 
more field engineers that the company has on the ground. It works for most the time. 
There are times of the year when that split doesn’t work. Particularly at the 
performance review time. It takes a lot of time and a lot of cycles, and in my case 
with 4 new members coming into the team I ’ve spent quite a lot o f more time since 
January just at the beginning to build that team spirit a bit more. But that should -  
well it will return to normal pretty much from pretty much next quarter.
And that suits you in tetnns of allocation o f time?
Yeah.
So your colleagues are basically the other managers, the eight that you mentioned? 
Yes.
And these ones are also spread over Europe?
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Yes.
And how regularly are you in contact with them?
We have a bi-monthly meeting off-site where we all get together. We also have a 
weekly conference call.
And to whom do you report?
I report to the European FAE director, so the European field application engineering 
director who is based in Munich.
So i t ’s not an every week meeting?
No, the often I meet him is like I said, so that’s why it’s bi-monthly because again 
the managers are located in France, Germany, Scandinavia, UK. So bringing that 
team together from a cost consideration perspective is not something that you can do 
regularly. But we do make an effort every two months, we actually everybody goes 
off site to actually discuss issues and work on plans and strategy, etc.
What do you enjoy most in your work? And what so you enjoy the least?
[laugh] Million dollar question. Well I think I aheady said, I enjoy the ability to have 
some hands-on, and I think that’s very important for me. I’d be quite bored if I just 
dealt with administration and projects. What do I enjoy least? Probably the 
perfonnance management side, not because I don’t like praising someone or telling 
someone they’re not perfonning very well, but because the system through which the 
company manages performance management, there is a very thick system involved 
which presents some issues.
[N sW Lpassage fojr Vtpcent |
And I certainly had this year a guy who’s actually very good, works very hard for 
me, he is placed significantly far down the list. The moral part is -  how do you 
explain that to someone when you don’t have any negative things to say, that their 
performance isn’t necessarily bad. And that’s what I would call the loneliness o f 
management, because it’s something that...
Is it like being caught in the middle o f a structure that you cannot change...
And how much are you prepared to be honest, how much are you prepared to use 
along some of that management skills o f not entirely telling the truth? [laugh]
Is that part o f management, not telling entirely the truth?
I think there’s certainly a requirement for it. I think also, and I ’ve said it before, 
there’s loneliness in management in so far as there are times when you realise that 
being close to your team members is actually probably not the best thing, because
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you may actually be delivering some pretty bad news to them which they may not 
entirely want to hear. And if  the relationship you have with your team is a very 
friendly one, i.e. they all conceive you their friend, they struggle even more 
personally to understand how you could liave placed them in such a position.
So when it becomes too personal then. So how do you live itfrom your perspective?
Well interestingly, I mean the approach that I took in this particular instance -  I 
realised this [p iic le^  was probably not the best approach but I still approached it 
with a flaggy more friendly angle to it. And it’s actually come back to haunt me, and 
my manager at this point in time, because I clearly didn’t probably explain it very 
well in the fu st place and as I said tried to talk too much o f a friendly approach, as a 
result we were kind of going to a second cycle of that particular individual’s 
performance review to be able to explain in a better light to him. So, as I said, 
sometimes the friendly-friendly approach isn’t the best way.
And spontaneously, you would go for the friendly approach?
Hem...It certainly is a way o f getting a good result from people. In terms o f 
management styles, I would have a military background as well, so some would say 
they would expect me to have a military style to my management and in fact I don’t, 
cause to get the best out o f people it’s better not to dictate what they should do but to 
actually use some o f the other skills like coaching, mentoring etc, a bit o f a friendly 
approach ultimately, pretty much getting people to really want to do what you want 
them to do as opposed to telling them what they should do. Hem...so, yeah.
Is that something you’ve always done or is it something that came with the time or 
expeiience?
I think it’s come with challenges. We did a set of -  with some o f other managers -  
we did a set of management training which is to do with leading, “making great 
leaders” it is called, which is basically based on 360° feedback where all your team 
participate in it, so do your peers and so does your manager. And then you sit down 
and over two or three days you work tlirough the results. The interesting part is my 
team -  which was my original team of last year’s 4 people was that it actually 
demonstrated that we’re very, very well in line, i.e. thefr opinions and my opinions 
are sort of 2% different and which says a very well aligned team, a team that works 
very well with their manager. Clearly expanding the team now, I imagine if we redid 
the test the results would currently look quite different as you begin to integrate the 
new people. But that’s really the goal, in my perspective, to have a team which is 
very well aligned, where we all think the same, we all share the same opinions, and 
you get the most out of people in that respect.
How come? How alignment works in getting the best results?
Hem...Because if there’s no conflict, say if there isn’t any real conflict in the team, 
then people are always working toward a common goal. If  people are sharing 
problems, getting help from others, no one will feel that they’re the only guy doing 
all the work and everybody else is having a coffee break, [laugh] Hem...
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I t’s just [jutcleÿ] a sense o f team-work. Probably -  I mean the event I’ve already 
mentioned next week in Vienna, my team, my software team, which is effectively 5 
people, with myself included, have a very, very active part to play in that whole 
event, so while we are presenting like many others we are completely involved in the 
whole infrastructure behind it and we have been for the last couple o f months but 
every single person in the team has put really good effort into making that happen. 
There’s not a single person who hasn’t participated in the preparation work 
requirement. Every single member of the team is deliberately flying in to the event 
early to make sure that everything is ready in advance. And in quite a few cases, 
people in the team have come forward to offer help in areas they hadn’t been offered 
since they wanted to make sure that the whole thing is a success, because there’s 
pride in the team and the team’s name is against the event.
It seems i t ’s very much a small team within the bigger team. How does this 
articulate?
That’s interesting because, yes, it does today feel like a team within a bigger team 
doing the same [uncl&@. One o f the challenges of me as a manager and my peers is 
actually to get these small sub-teams to interact better. Now again, not all o f them 
have the same commonalities, so it doesn’t make sense in some areas but certainly 
for my team there are two other teams where they share great commonality, albeit 
their customers are slightly different, but all their subject matter and product detail is 
exactly the same. So again, we’re beginning to get some initiatives going where the 
collaboration within these three team is building. For example, people are now 
involved in design reviews every quarter and they’re very large groups. So my team 
actually gets to hear what the others are doing, and again this is all about information 
sharing it’s all about “I have a problem with this customer or this issue” and 
somebody else in one o f  the other sub-teams has already witnessed that and they can 
help one another. They’re fairly early initiatives, we’ve really only just started in this 
quarter, but already the early feedback is for everybody that it is very useful and very 
good. So we’re trying to build up a bigger spirit, with the overall aim o f the 
management above me that having built that spirit within Europe, you can then 
spread that spirit across the world because there clearly are similar teams to ours in 
America and in Asia. Knowledge sliaring and information sharing and collaboration 
is a big focus for the company this year.
Do you think it's something easy to do, it goes smoothly or it's hard?
No, it’s frill o f challenges. Some would tell you that everything is different in 
America, everything is different in Asia, and everything is different in Europe. And 
then even within Europe, they’d say well, the issues we have in Germany aren’t the 
same as what we have in the UK. You can accept degrees o f that, maybe that 
particular parts o f the world have a specialisation. Automotive electronics, for 
example, Germany is probably one o f the strongest places for that. But at the same 
tune there’s still a large amount o f common issues, where team work and 
collaboration is probably one o f the best thing.
264
You mentioned that you developed from experience the management style. How did  
you evolve or grow into this style?
No, I think I started with a very friendly-friendly approach, and it’s only as you gain 
experience and probably face some o f the tougher issues of management -  making 
people redundant, having to sack people -  both o f which I ’ve done not in this 
company but in previous ones, where you begin to realise that there has to be a 
distance level between you upfront, between yourself and the team. Because you 
may have to malce decisions that aren’t initially, that aren’t actually pleasant, and you 
may have to follow them through and act upon. Making somebody redundant is not a 
pleasant experience. Sacking somebody for a bad perfonnance isn’t a pleasant 
experience, but it’s necessary in so far as it’s good for the benefit o f the company in 
terms of piofrtability.
Is that what you tell yourself to help with the process?
Well, you need to, to some extent. One o f the companies I worked for, we went 
through financial difficulty, which to some extent was slightly easier because 
everybody knew the finances were bad, everybody knew the business wasn’t good. 
So when it comes to the bad news that some people will have to leave, everyone 
already understands the reason why. There’s still the “why me and not him?” 
question that comes up, but there’s a general understanding that “okay, the company 
has to hcence people off simply because there isn’t enough money to pay 
everybody”. The more unpleasant one comes when you have someone who is a poor 
performer, who you try your hardest to turn around, invest time and effort in, but 
ultimately if their perfom^nce does not increase to a level that you would deem 
acceptable, you reach the decision point and says “it’s not worth spending anymore 
time, we’d better get rid o f this person and look for somebody else”. And certainly, 
in those scenarios, there are a lot o f legal implications so that things have to be done 
correctly and be done properly.
And what makes it not so nice in that case?
Telling somebody they no longer have a job.
So it's the consequence for the person?
Yeah. You begin to think about do they have a wife? Do they have children? Do they 
have, you know, large mortgage and bills to pay? Even if you try to remove yourself 
completely, that will still go across your mind at some point cause losing your job is 
a major life changing thing for most people. So from a morality perspective, you 
certainly think about it. Anybody who says they don’t I would say is probably a liar.
What do you actually do with it?
Well, the reality is that there’s nothing you can nonnally -  there’s nothing you can 
do to actually change the fact that they are going. Hem.. .personally, if I can, you 
know, I offer to help them by way o f “if you need a job reference” if you want, those
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kind of things. Clearly, in some circumstances that might not be appropriate if 
they’re a bad performer, but for example, someone being made redundant you can 
offer to help them in the perspective of you know “if  you want someone to write you 
job references”. And also finding from a company side whether there’s help and 
assistance, particularly to people who are being laid off, that the company can 
provide to help them find a new job. But there isn’t that much you can do. [laugh]
So at the end o f the day, you say you can tty to remove yourself as much as possible 
but you can’t totally. How do you cope with it?
Time is a great healer. You’ll get to a point where -  after a period o f time where 
something else takes a more emotionally significant importance. And that might be a 
matter of hours, it might be days, it might be a few weeks, but eventually it will 
move into the background in your own mind. You’ll still remember it, as I was 
talking I was thinking o f the scenarios I’ve been through, but I don’t think about 
them everyday. They might come back into my mind if I’m presented with a 
situation of having to do the same things in this company, and you begin to think 
“how did I deal with it last time? What happened? Etc”.
And t'emoving yourself, is it something you find easy to do?
Hem...I would say...personally you need to -  or I certainly need to kind of sit and 
talce a little bit of time before I actually get tlirough with the action, and that bit of 
time is actually that time to sort o f remove all the thoughts of “concern and why” out 
of my mind to actually focus on what needs to be done. So it’s taking time to sort of 
reflect and be quite conscious o f pushing some thoughts out o f the way. Because it’s 
clearly a function o f  “this must be done and you need to execute that”, albeit 
someone might say.
So i t ’s 'wearing a manager suit ’ type o f action?
Yeah, or put on some blinkers so everything else sits up here, and you have a very 
structured vision that says “I need to do this task, albeit unpleasant”, you know, let’s 
deal with the task and leave everything else up here that you can’t [ iin c j^ ] and tiy 
not to think about.
[ uhclean^ùësijon]
Yeah, I mean when you remove, you still think about it. I think the hardest part o f 
that, in telling someone they no longer have a job, is saying the physical words. 
Hem...and, you know, thhiking about exactly how you’re gonna say these words. 
When saying these physical words you know...do you apologize when you say it, for 
example “I’m very sorry you know but we’re gonna have to make you redimdant” or 
“I ’m very sorry but due to perfonnance, you no longer have a job.” Is it appropriate 
to apologize when you actually say it? So, you know, there’re probably things that 
are the hardest part, that’s the biggest hurdle to go over. Cause having said it, you put 
it in the open -  this is what’s going to happen. Everything else becomes slightly 
more set to a format, almost.
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What informs how you do it? What influences you?
[laugh] I think a lot depends on the character and the relationship you have with it. In 
my last company, because they laid lots of staff off, I actually ended up doing that in 
several countries and in countries where I didn’t know people it was getting easy 
because you have no relationship to the individual. So I was really the axed man that 
comes along and shops pieces o f the company apart. Where you’re in a position of a 
relationship with an individual it’s where it gets a lot more difficult.
And you find it really easier that if  you don’t Imow the person, then you don’t have 
the same problems?
Well, that’s your actual business, isn’t it? I ’ve been sent to this country to tell 5 
people they no longer have a job -  okay. I can do that. I get to fly out to the country 
tomorrow morning and tlirow in the news. I guess, I don’t want to sound really cold 
m that respect, but it is very easy if you don’t know people. If  you actually know 
people and you have known them for a long time, I ’m thinking in particular of one 
individual in France who I had to lay off but whom I worked with for 8 years -  if you 
do it the right manner, you never know how life will turn aromid. He now works for 
me again, and I went and hired him last year after a 5 year break. And I went and 
find him and said “I have a job opportunity, would you be interested?” and he never 
even hesitated and he said yes immediately and went for an interview. But I had to 
let that guy go five years previously, so if you do it in the right manner you can do it 
to such an extent that there is no room for hard feelings. And he was more than 
willing to actually lose the job he was in and come for an opportunity to work for an 
old manager that he, in his own words, “liked and respected”, and couldn’t wait.
So what motivates you in choosing the nice manner? Is that because there might be 
another opportunity later on?
You never know. It’s a small world, particularly in the business we’re in. It’s not 
particularly big. Business-wise it’s big but in terms o f the people in it, it’s not 
particularly big. You know, go to any o f our trade shows and you will see the same 
people every year. Sometimes they’ve moved companies but the faces are the same. 
So, maybe there’s an element o f that. I don’t consciously sit and think that that may 
happen. I just gave you that example of the way the world is a mall place and you 
know it may turn around and come back from you. And in that particular individual 
case, yes, I went and rehiied him, cause I needed his ideas for the job I was trying to 
do.
So what counts -  the business side or the human perspective, that is try to be nice 
because being laid off is not nice?
I would say put yourself in those shoes. No one likes to hear bad news, no one likes 
to be told bad news in a conflicting style if you like, or in an argumentative style or a 
very stern, you know “Your performance is absolutely terrible. Get out” -  you know, 
you clearly can’t say tliat from an HR perspective, but -  in those tenus, you know, 
very, very negative. Hem...again, you know, if I -  in the story where I have to lay 
off people, or let people go, the worst thing in the world is to literally take someone’s
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morale down to a very, very low level. It’s a very, very depressing thing losing your 
job. Thankfully I’ve never lost one but talking to friends who have, you know, there 
are huge things that go through people’s minds. You know, how would I feel as a 
manager if I told someone that they didn’t have their job and hours later they commit 
suicide that night? I would think about every word I said to that individual, and 
whether the words I said contributed to the action that they took. It sounds drastic but 
you kind of have to think about that... Clearly there are reasons why someone has to 
leave the company, whether be it financial or be it performance issue, etc. But there 
are ways you can break the news to them in a [unclear] more gentle fashion so that 
doesn’t leave someone terribly depressed with the possible bad consequence.
So you think i t ’s almost a moral responsibility^ that you have in trying to be as nice as 
possible?
Yes. Would you fire somebody on a Friday? No, for then they have the week-end to 
think about it before they can talk to you about it again. You would fire them on a 
Monday or tell them they don’t have a job on a Monday. But they have four weeks o f 
notice to work, which means on Tuesday they can actually come and talk to you. The 
time o f the week is important, you know. Do you know enough about your employee 
to say it’s his birthday this week-end or his wedding anniversary or you know -  if 
you know enough about that and there’s something consequential coming along, 
you’d actually say “D ’you know what. I ’m not going to do it then. I’m gonna push to 
try to do it a few days later.” Don’t ruin a particular special occasion. Sounds maybe 
a little bit oversensitive but at the same time you just try to think “Don’t luin 
something completely for somebody”.
And when you don ? Imow the people?
It’s a lot easier to fire them, you don’t need necessarily to think about that, it’s less 
hard cause you don’t know the details. In my last company, we - 1 was involved, but 
ultimately we laid off 20 staff on the last day before Christmas. Personally, I think it 
was a really nasty thing to do. I think if  it was me and I was able to make the 
decision, I would have all let them have a nice Cliristmas and on the first day back in 
Januaiy, given them the news. Because what’s worse way to spend Christmas than to 
hear you have no job, you just spent all your money on presents and everything else 
for the kids and the family, and you probably end up worrying the entire Christmas. 
And trying to find a job at Christmas time is not that easy, everyone’s gone on 
holiday, so.. .that’s me!
And the experience of having said to someone you ’re being laid off, do you carry that 
outside work like when you go home? Or do you manage to split workfrom home?
Do I take my work issues home -  is that what you’re saying? Yes, of course I do. 
Hem... I think gone are the days where a lot o f people can identify that they work 
from 9 until 5 and then when they walk out the office, work is left behind them. 
Certainly in the role that we’re in, in a customer-focused role, you will even find that 
customer contact you after hours if it’s really important, so you’re kinda in a work 
I unclear] anyway that says if  an interruption comes in, you weight up -  what am I 
doing here? Is this an interruption to me and my family? Can I deal with this now?
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You know, do I just answer the phone or whatever the interruption is and say “can’t 
do this now. I’ll do it on Monday”. But yes, I certainly go home with work issues on 
my mind. My wife says “What’s up?”, I try explain with technical speech tem%, she 
stares very blankly and says “I don’t understand a word you said”. Hem, but 
particularly on the people’s front, you do take issues home, you do think about it, 
you probably discuss some things in a slightly different light to it but...
What do you mean by people’s front? When people are involved in the issue?
Yes.
Is that something you do willingly or you can’t help it?
Hem...I would say it’s probably because you can’t help it because from a body 
language perspective it’s very clear that things aren’t normal. You know, you look a 
bit depressed, you look like you’ve had a hard day at the office which naturally 
brings the question “Have you had a hard day? What’s up? Do you want to talk about 
it?” at which pomt you make a decision yes or no to talk about it.
And how do you deal with it when i t ’s not work time, when i t ’s social time or family 
time and those issues are at the back of your mind?
Well until very recently, my wife was equally a manager in a local government, so 
completely different institute doing completely different things, but that is quite 
interesting, you know, to be able to come home and talk to someone else who 
manages people about a particular problem that tliey are totally removed from any 
familiarity o f the staff etc, and can to some extent give you an unbiased opinion of 
what they think and how they would handle it. and it works both ways, I talk to my 
wife about somebody she has had in her workplace etc. In a very formal environment 
-  local govermnent is very formal in terms o f the rules and regulations, far more than 
public companies, so -  then again, I find that and my wife finds that quite useful. 
Yes, I don’t go home with an agenda o f “I ’m gonna talk to my wife about this 
problem, this problem, this problem”. It just kinda comes up in the conversation or 
you know, the other lialf doesn’t look particularly happy and you say “Is there 
something you want to talk about?”
So the ability to discuss it helps relieve the pressure?
Yeah, and I mean it’s not, you know, as if  I can’t talk to other managers here. Even 
though there is no one else in this office that manages similar staff to me, there are 
numerous managers. So particularly if you’ve got personnel issues or things like that, 
when you want to talk about how you might deal with a particular strategy there are 
at least different other people in the building, and I have gone and used them, and 
gone and talked to them, and just said “Listen, have you got ten minutes? I want to 
chat about something, get your opinion on what you might think or what you might 
do?” Because again, some o f the managers here have been managers a lot longer than 
I have and have a lot more ejqierience. And it’s useful to be able to do that. And 
really I get the tliird leg of the stall if  you like, so it’s kind o f talk to your own 
manager, be it locally or my own peers, there’s possibly a bit of talking on the
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upfront and the third leg of the stall is the fact that you have got HR help who are 
there for you as a manager. Yes, you’re an employee to them but you’re also a 
manager to them, so if  you go to them with a manager-related issue, they all clearly 
talk to you and get you all the help you nee, although it’s a very formal HR- 
style...[laugh] because it has to be. But they can be an extremely useful resource. 
And our HR team is actually based in Scotland, this is where our big facility is, there 
are about 1,200 employees there. We’re probably fortunate in that there is one 
particular HR person -  there’s always one assigned to this office, but this particular 
one has actually proactively been here quite a lot, so he’s built a relationship with 
people. You can pick up the phone and talk to him and gain a better understanding o f 
who he is and where he comes from because he comes to the staff meetings down 
here, he deliberately comes early to them and makes himself available for anyone 
who wants to chat and talk about issues. He’s a UK HR specialist, his background is 
in UK HR but he doesn’t have a problem with me walking in and talking about one 
of my Israeli staff or one of my German staff. He may not know the local HR laws, 
but if he doesn’t know he will find out or maybe it is not something that involves 
employee’s law so he can give me just general advice. That’s kind o f the third leg of 
the stall o f chilling things out by taUcing about it.
Is that how you manage to evacuate the tension, by talldng things through?
Yeah. Talking is a good thing. A talk would quite often get you around to the 
decision point of what needs to be done or etc, etc. Keeping everything inside, it just 
kind o f bubbles around in your mind. You may come up with a solution but it may 
not be the best one. That’s the other thing, what’s to say that if you make a decision 
completely on your own that it is exactly the best one to do? So when the occasion 
arises, actually get another opinion on things. It may not change your initial 
approach, or it may change it slightly, but getting a second opinion I think - 1 uncleai | 
but eventually in people situation I think that’s quite important. Cause you may not 
see it, someone may see it completely differently from you.
So that’s for all the management-related issues. And for the purely moral issues you 
might have, the personal values-based issues, is that the same process? Do you need 
to talk about it to help you get through them?
Yeah, I think so. I think fr om the perspective o f -  again because you may have an 
opinion that you think is correct but is it the right more, is it the right thing to do? If  
there’s any doubt in your mind -  probably that’s the biggest tiring -  if there’s any 
doubt in your mind, certainly you can seek advice from someone else, whether it’s 
someone completely independent to the whole thing, or someone who know 
sufficiently more details [ungear]. But that moral, yeah, that moral component, you 
could be extremely wrong about something and just not be able to see it, because it’s 
like this in your thoughts, and someone else near by can say “Hang on, what about 
this and that?” [ijnclear]. Talking to someone is a good way o f  ascertaining whether 
or not you’re in tne rignt track.
And does that happen to you? Or has that happened to you?
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[laugh] H em ...I’m just trying to think...I guess it has in a way, and again around 
problems of employees. It really -  you know you need to do something, you’re not 
entirely sure of, certainly from a moral perspective whether it’s appropriate or coiTect 
to do something and you’re really seeking another opinion that says “yes, the tactic 
you’re taking or the approach you’re takmg is appropriate or certainly is right for the 
problem you’re trying to address”. So...
And where does the doubt come from?
Well, if  everyone in the world walked around believing that everything they did was 
right, the world would be a strange place, wouldn’t it? Because, you know, nobody’s 
perfect, nobody can be right 100% of the time, and anyone who believe they are I 
would say is a liar, [laugh] It may be that you know, you feel strongly that, you 
know, this is the right thing to do and this is the way to do it. It’s interesting because 
the company actually invests quite a bit in terms of...morality training and that kind 
of thing, and tries to certainly teach people the rights and wrongs o f  -  with examples 
of how you could do something that morally is unacceptable without having even 
realised that it was. And I witnessed again something similar there with a colleague 
in the US who was a busy guy, a very busy guy, who needed to do some update to 
parts o f the company’s website. At that particular time we were in a very competitive 
situation with two competitors, and he was actually short of time and couldn’t really 
get his creative thinking so he didn’t bothered and utilised their websites, cut from 
their websites and put it into ours, etc. And he got spotted, and he got spotted by a 
competitor who probably read the text and said “Oh, that looks remarkably similar to 
our own text” and, you know, at very, very top level, he looked into it and he said 
“Yeah, sorry, I did it”. Now morally, he knew at the time what he was doing was 
wrong. But he was a busy guy, trying to attend to a lot of issues. And the moral patch 
would have been to go and talk to somebody “You know, I am actually swamped 
that this had to be done, and the only way I can see doing it is to actual go and cut 
fr om there”. You can be sure people would have said “Don’t be stupid!”. Ultmiately, 
he lost his job, and he lost his job immediately because it goes against our code of 
conduct within the company.
So talking about it, even if  it doesn ’t solve the issue, can make you avoid mistakes?
It avoids getting you into a situation where you could put yourself in trouble as well. 
I mean in that particular case like the guy did.
So how do you set the separation between what is acceptable to you and what’s not?
[laugh] A million dollar question! Wliat’s acceptable for me -  in what sense?
What you feel comfortable doing as compared to what you feel unprepared to do?
Hem...I think the situations that certainly you’ve experienced at least once before, 
you find a level o f comfort with. Something that is completely new, never even had 
dealt with it before, which could be anything is where your comfort zone -  you’re 
immediately outside your comfort zone, you start to look at it and think “Okay, can I 
do this on my own? Do I take the right approach? If  I’m not sure, who do I ask?”
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And that could be anything from a teclmical customer problem where it’s completely 
outside your domain but you happen to be the only person available who has picked 
this thing up and you’re looking at it thinking “My God! How can I do this? Wlio do 
I turn to?” all the way round to anything, a staff-related issue. But you need to do it.
So, everything you ’ve experienced so far you feel you could do it again?
Yeah. You may not go the same again, cause everyone learns by mistakes. 
Hem...you know, no job is done perfectly every time, so it may be that you 
approached it in a particular way, and with hindsight afterwards you reahse “You 
know what, if I had done it differently or if I had done it this way I think it would 
have worked better”. But that knowing experience o f I’ve been tlirough this once and 
I was able to deal with it, yes I know I can deal with a similar situation again. It may 
be or it may not be exactly the same in terms o f how I deal with the problem.
And what about situations where you felt very uncomfortable with the outcomes, in 
terms of your values? Would you do it again and tiy to find another way to do it?
Hem, yeah. Personally I might seek slightly more advice, particularly if I couldn’t 
think of another way o f dealing with it. So youjcnow if I was very uncomfortable the 
first time and I couldn’t really find another [pn^ear], so it looks like it’s gomia be the 
same thing again, that’s the scenario where I think I would dig around harder to see if 
anyone else had a better idea or a better approach to help with it.
Are there things you Imow you’re not willing to do?
[laugh] Well if you know you’re not ready to do it -  it’s a bit of an interesting 
question. Something you know you’re not ready to do...hem...I guess in the day-to- 
day limning o f business, no. Those kind o f thoughts are probably more reserved to 
the fact “Could I do my boss’s job today?” No, cause I don’t have enough experience 
-  that’s my opinion. Those kind of things are quite easy to separate out. But if you 
sort o f said “Okay, from a manager’s perspective, o f people administration, is there 
anything there that you couldn’t do?” Not tlmt I could think of. From a customer 
perspective and the product, the stuff that we do and all that side, is there anything 
there I wouldn’t do? Hem, yes, hem...and I say that in so far as we deal with fairly 
sizable deals in some customer cases, significant amount of money, and you heed to 
be conscious sometimes that companies have legal responsibilities. There can be 
consequences for things you say and do for the company and you need to be -  clearly 
we get training in all this kind o f stuff but clearly you need to be aware of the fact 
that your actions as an individual could place the company in a compromised 
position. And in those cases, yes there are decisions you come to where you’ll 
actually say “I ’m not prepared to call this. I’ve got to go up to the appropriate level 
of management to explain the situation and say; I ’m not prepared to call tliis because 
I believe this could be an issue for us, it could go both ways, etc.” I had recently a bit 
like that, customer perspective-wise, and effectively took the issue to the vice- 
president of sales for Europe, explained it to him, explained what the issue was 
because I was greatly concerned that the situation could go one o f two ways, and if it 
was in the negative fashion we could effectively lose a massive amount of business, 
not just this year but over the next four years. And I certainly wasn’t gonna be the
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one to put my neck on the line, without backing from above at least, that said “you’re 
right”. In particular case, the VP said -  interestingly enough, he was having a 
meeting with that very same customer that week, he said “Let me pick it up, let me 
run with this, and I ’ll come back to you about how we’ve discussed it” cause clearly 
he can have conversations at a far higher level than me. So, well, there was a 
resolution in the end, they took -  well I don’t know, I think it took moral courage for 
me to actually say “I’m on the verge o f saying pretty much to the customer 
‘everything w e’ve got doesn’t work, we know it doesn’t work, we don’t know why 
we’d given it to you at this point in time, we prefer to give it to you in six months 
time when it will be ready, but that would be too late for you’.” The effect of saying 
all those things could be massively damaging to us. The big boss here will sit down 
with the big boss there and they could have a gentlemen’s conversation which is 
“How do things go? How’s in the organisation you are?” “Here’s what we do, here’s 
what we’re trying to do because you want all this right now. You know we’ve got X, 
Y and Z people working on it right now, you know. Yes there are problems, yes there 
are issues, but you know we’re there to help you, we’re there to give you everything 
you need. And work with us and we’ll work with you.” And suddenly the whole 
relationship grows stronger, and that’s because of that intervention at the top. 
Wliereas the way it was looking we were about to say “too bad” . ..
So i t ’s about your ability to deliver and peiform?
It’s deliver, it’s perform, it’s being conscious of, if you like, the [micjear] 
responsibilities in the world. You know, large corporations do like to see one 
another. Contracts can have penalties. If you thinlc that a lot o f our products end up in 
cars, imagine the consequences that a whole car production stops for even one day 
because o f something that we can’t do or haven’t done. You know, pick up the Ford, 
BMW, everyone, think o f how many cars they make in a single day in the world. If  
they all stop because of the actions of an individual, that implication is massive.
Is it something you have in mind in your day-to-day job?
You certainly do depending on the customer you’re talking to. But ultimately yes, 
you’re acutely aware. Hem... so, you know, you are sort of certainly thinking about 
“What’s the problem, what’s the issue, what’s the consequence of this to the 
customer?” It’s not just a question o f saying, you know, how do I simplify -  you 
know, oh, you’ve got a flat tire on your car, bad luck. You know, what are the 
consequences of having a flat tire -  well it means you can’t drive to where you’re 
meant to be. So yes you are, as well as trying to troubleshoot when there’s an issue, 
you do have something in your mind particularly in high volume areas -  car is a 
classic one, or any commercial product, anything in this kind o f consumer industry 
where there are thousand o f them made very quickly, the consequences o f something 
stopping has huge financial considerations.
Does that affect how you approach your job?
It affects the way you approach the customer, yes. So it’s a very customer-focused 
attitude if you like. The guy who makes ten things a year in the shed at the end of his 
garden, we probably don’t have the same level o f thought process as to a major car
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maker who has a problem. Because the guy who only makes ten a year, the 
consequences financially are not talking at the billions of dollars level. [ïïj|c J |S ]
So the customer is a very important thing in the business. What about the values that 
you use? You mentioned that honesty was important, at least trying to do it, to be fair 
M’ith the customer as well as having in mind his and your best interests, so what other 
values do you think you use in making decisions?
[laugh]...Hem, what other values...hem...well cause honesty may not always be the 
one that you’d lead with, or that you use initially. I think certainly there are 
considerations made fi"om a commercial perspective to business impact, that kind of 
things, so there’s a financial consideration to it. I think the other thing -  and I can’t 
think of the right word, but there’s certainly an element to the relationship you have 
and how your relationship works with the customer. And the reason I say that is it’s 
more easier to keep existing customers and repeat business than it is to find new 
ones, you know. If you look into any sales book it says that, pretty much at the 
beginning of all of them. So maintenance of that relationship you have with the 
customer is actually really quite important. You don’t really want to do anything that 
really upsets the customer because when they wanna go and buy something new, if  
you’ve upset them, chances are they’re gonna buy it elsewhere. So to every situation, 
even if your [uncBah] or answer has to be negative, it’s really how you approach that, 
how you deliver that, that says have you saved enough face so this customer will 
continue to come back to you. And that’s quite a consideration to make. You quite 
often find in business relationships you know, the guy at the bottom threatening that 
they’ll never ever buy your product again because that’s his opinion and the whole 
thing is around how you manage that account relationship. It may be that one 
particular guy has ended up mihappy due to a particular incident but if you’ve 
actually managed to manage the account, his more senior managers, etc in a very 
good fashion it may be that as a company you’ll get away with that with that guy 
being upset for a while. You can’t please everyone all the time, that’s for sure.
And maintaining a good relationship with the client, is that something you find easy 
to do?
Yes. It’s probably really come with time.
What does it take? Do you have to get to Imow the people?
Yes, you - 1 guess you need to be comfortable with people you’ve potentially never 
met before. You need to be confident so as to be able to stand up in fi-ont o f a strange 
audience and present or even discuss a topic or an issue. You probably need to be -  
well, yeah, you do -  you need the confidence that if you meet someone in a more 
senior position you don’t suddenly start worrying “Oh my God, what is he going to 
ask me?”. So you need to be confident to sort o f be able to hold the conservation to at 
least two levels above where you are. Because there are certainly people around who 
-  you know, if you said, if you’re gonna meet the general manager of company X Y 
Z, would go “Oh no, what am I gonna say, what am I gonna do!” and they would 
basically fall into pieces. Whereas the guy, you know, might actually ask you a 
couple o f things and they’re all completely a walk in the park. There is no harm to
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say you don’t know the answer to something, I guess that’s one of the biggest 
lessons, but you will get back to him with an answer. And in fact it’s having the 
inner strength to say “No, I don’t know the answer to that, but I ’ll get you one.” And 
at the time you say that, you may not even know how to get the answer, but just 
make the commitment that you’ll get to him. And be confident enough to say you 
don’t know -  it’s better to say you don’t know than give a very poor answer.
And is that something you developed through time or was it something you were 
always able to do?
Hem...I think to be honest I probably learnt some of that on the early crash sales 
courses that I ’ve been on. I’ve been on a few sales courses. And yes, some of it 
comes with experience, but it’s certainly one o f  the things that sitting talking to the 
team, I say to them, you know “don’t lie to a customer, that’s the worst thing in the 
world. At least don’t certainly lie to a customer I there’s any chance he finds out.” 
[laugh] That’s probably the better way to qualify. But equally “don’t give an answer 
that is kind of a half-answer, maybe plainly wrong. If you don’t know, say so”. And 
that’s very much, you know, in a pre-sales lie that has quite often will come up. 
You’ll get questions coming, there’s always development to [uncled] but it’s still 
relevant to the company product, [iî^lear]
And the attitude of taking care o f the relationship with the customer, is that 
something you also adopt in your social life, personal life? the sense o f inner 
confidence, saying things in a straight way, acknowledging when you don’t Imow, 
commitment to getting back- these lands o f things, are they also?
I guess in a way. I guess the one thing you can’t say that carries on in your social life 
is you haven’t got the confidence in a product so you’re not told to that [uncl%r]. So, 
you know, yes, I would say, largely the same values etc. carry over. Hem...[rfticlear]
And do you think you change from work to home?
No, I carry.. .1 think I probably carry things fi’om my personal life into work. Hem, 
the military bit I referred to earlier, which is actually something, hem ...I’ll explain it 
briefly. In the UK you have something called the territorial army which is part-time, 
[unclear] so it’s something you do as a hobby. And so my military stuff is something 
I’ve always done since I was 17 yeais old as a hobby. And I carry a lot o f that into 
the workplace with me, some of the fun, some o f the [JmclearJ, some of the values 
that you get taught there in terms o f managing people albeit in a clearly far more 
disciplined fashion. And you apply some of those and you don’t apply others. For 
that reason I ’d say I carry more from the inside to the outside than in the other way 
round.
And why do you do it? Is it a balancing element in your life?
Hem, yes, I would guess so. Hem...you come across a very diverse audience jfrom 
the military side in terms o f  people, quality o f people, skills o f people, and you get to 
deal with a very diverse array o f themes and issues. This teaches you a lot about not 
everyone is the same and not everyone works the same. I guess the other core value
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that the military side o f me brings is that you can nearly always find a solution to 
everything even with very limited resources. Giving up is not an option that you 
would normally do from a military perspective, hem...
So some land of resilience?
Yeah. Pull the rabbit out of the hat...[laugh] The old magician’s trick [laugh]
Was it a choice you made, was it something you were looking for?
I joined in 20 years ago because the father o f my friends joined in, and it seemed like 
a fim thing to do. None of them are in it anymore while I’m still there cause I enjoy it 
clearly. I ’ve worked my way through the system now, but...
So how important is it to you now?
Hem...I would say very. I ’m actually consciously within my last year of doing it, 
and that’s my own choice. I ’ve actually reached a ceiling there, which was an 
ambition ceiling that I set probably only five or six years ago. I manage more people 
there than I do here, I have 110 soldiers who work for me, so [^qîeâi]. And yet, it 
does provide some interesting challenges, and I do enjoy it, and I do feel that there 
are elements of that I have used very frequently at work.
Having reached that ceiling, what are you gonna do after?
Come and play golf!
So a completely new activity?
A  complete change, yeah.
Do you feel you’ve learnt everything you couldfrom that?
No, I could go further. But to go fiirther I would go from a role where I command my 
-  that’s the wrong word, in the military sense having command means that you 
actually have real people who work for you, okay? To go further, you go into a staff 
role, and in the staff role you’re more process, you’re more sort of, you’re desk 
jockey actually. So, hem, but you can still climb the ladder higher. And that doesn’t 
really appeal to me as much as where I am now, there are real people, there are real 
things to deal with, you’re playing around with real assets as well as doing some o f 
the staff work. So if you like it’s kind o f like my current role today, hands-on partly, 
partly administrative. So right now, certainly in the military, I doubt I’ll go higher.
The final part consists in three statements and I  just want you to tell me what it tells 
you, whate\^er comes to your mind. So here’s the first.
What do you want me to say?
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Whatever it evokes you.
Happiness is a state of mind.. .yeah, I agree with tliat.
So is it something you choose to do?
Well, yeah I mean. If  somebody is on your conscience and bugging you and bringing 
you down, you won’t feel happy, and that’s what I mean -  happiness is a state of 
mind, you’ve got -  you know, if there are bad things going on, you won’t feel happy.
So i t ’s a matter of circumstances?
Hum hum.
Okay. How do you manage to be happy if  things are on your mind?
Don’t think and do something else, [laugh]
Escape?
Switch off for a while.
Is it something you find easy to do?
Not always. It depends on the circumstances...[laugh]
Anything else you want to add on that?
Hem...no, I don’t think so, no. Well, no, there’s something I would. Smiling is 
infectious which is a thing with happiness. If you start smiling and other people will 
start smiling they won’t stay unhappy, so one o f the ways of changing a state o f mind 
is, you know, smile, make a joke, [ # c l ^ ] .
And is being happy or happiness something important for you?
Hem, yeah. It’s important for everybody. If  somebody’s happy, they work better.
So it’s something you ’re trying to do?
Hum.
And how do you manage to do it? Do you start smiling?
Oh God! [laugh] Hem...I guess one o f the biggest things that contributes to 
happiness is don’t ever always focus on the negatives, particularly when you do it 
with your people. Even if you’ve got someone who is hopelessly bad, and everything 
he does is wrong, you have to find a way to make him smile and laugh once in a 
while. Because morale, individual people’s morale will go down rapidly and stay 
down. And someone whose morale is very low isn’t efficient to you or to the
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company at ail. So, find a way, whatever way, to make people smile and laugh once 
in a while.
Olmy. Here’s the second one.
Being true to yourself...in what respect...hem ...I’m not entirely sure of what you 
mean by being true to yourself...
How do you understand it?
I don’t know...don’t live a lie. Hem...be honest if it’s not something within your 
capability I guess, being true to yourself, yeah. Looking at something and, 
hem.. .yeali, hem.. .1 would say definitely looking at something and realising that it’s, 
it’s not within your capability, maybe - 1 don’t know, a job opportunity -  you know, 
it might pay £500,000 a year but you actually look at it and say “do you know what? 
There’s no way I can actually do this” -  that’s being true to yourself. That’s actually 
about making a decision that is well beyond your capability, or even potential 
capability. Understanding if you’ve reached your limits on something...and your 
self-confidence or your pride might have to give way to the fact that you need to go 
and seek assistance or help with something. Having the humility sometimes to deal 
with the situation cause not everybody likes to admit that -  yeah, they might call it 
failure sometimes. It may not be failure, it may just be that you actually... maybe 
you don’t know the way out, but you may see that as a failure in yourself because 
you weren’t able to deal with something.
Is that something that you feel?
No, not really. The humility one - 1 think tliat humility, to be able to put your hands 
up on occasions and say “Yeah, I screwed up” -  I’ve certainly done that one! -  and 
having the confidence to say “ Do you know what? Yeah, I messed up here, but you 
know I ’m prepared to learn from it. I ’m prepared to take the input, help, etc” -  that’s 
a great quality and a great skill. Hem, it’s also something that I think is essential in 
anybody, because otherwise, if you don’t -  if you cannot do something like that, you 
find that inevitably you have to lie on occasions.
So i t ’s a manner of Iceepingyour integrity^?
Yeah.
And to actually know yourself your limits, your capability, you have to know fairly 
well what you ’re capable o f and also your potential and how you can pt^ogiess. How 
do you Imow that?
[laugh] Yet another million dollar question! Are you planning to write a book -  
“How to get to the opthnum level”? I don’t know, I think some o f it’s because you 
might start trying to do something and you find you’ve reached your Hmit, so there’s 
this sort of trial-and-error approach. Hem... it may well be that you try to analyse it, 
and so from an analytical perspective you look at it and say “cant see how I would 
deal with this” and at that point you’re going to seek advice. Hem...with the trial-
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and-error approach I would say it’s also having the confidence to say “Hum, I’m 
gonna have a go at this and see where it takes me” [laugh], but with enough 
consciousness in your mind that says “If  I reach a certain point when this isn’t 
workmg I know I’m gonna have to go and seek assistance or whatever to actually get 
it to term.”
So how do you put the limit "Okay, at that point, i f l  haven’t succeeded, i t ’s because 
I  can‘t do it and I  have to seek assistance? ”
It depends on what it is you’re dealing with. Pride might be a limit to you, in terms of 
being able to deliver something at a certain time. Hem...it could be that, you know, 
in a commercial sense, it could be, you know, truly monetary firom a transaction 
perspective that kind o f defines the limit you put in. I think it always depends on the 
circumstance. You kind o f need to -  you need to identify what I would call the 
control measures, the yardsticks with which you say “It’s this, this and this in order 
to actually make that happen”.
Is it something you practice?
Yeah. Breaking something down into control measures is something, yes, I definitely 
use.
In your personal life as well?
Yeali, and the mihtary. That’s where it comes from, actually. Because if  you can do 
tliree (unclear] of something, you’ve almost certainly started to undertake it, and the 
other 25% may develop along the way.
So it makes it easier to manage all in all?
Yeah.
Olcay, and the final one.
To be complete one needs others. To feel, one only needs oneself -  that’s a very 
selfish attitude at the bottom, [laugh].. .One needs only oneself -  it’s only myself and 
I. No. I tliink the proper statement -  if you asked me which one of those were the 
truest statement, I would say yes, to me certainly the top one. There are always 
things that other people can do. Make things complete.. .[pncMar]
So, completeness, how would you define it?
Hem...pfff...hem...[laugh]... How would I define completeness? I don’t know 
because completeness is a personal thing. I would say essentially, I liken it more to 
being content with yourself, content with life, hem...content pretty much with 
everything around you. Hem...and it may be that you’re the kind o f person that, you 
know, you are completely content and that everyone else around you envy, etc, etc. 
That said, in the personal sense, I mean, in life, to be complete or be content with 
everything around you -  typically there is a relationship involved, typically there’s
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clearly is around and they’re all together and, you know, without reflection one needs 
others, he needs family, he needs an infrastructure, and that’s what makes life -  by 
and large in society as everyone gets older that’s what happens, [laugh] You know, at 
19 years old you probably feel complete cause you only need yourself, because it’s 
“me and myself and I”, and you know, you’ve got your own place but you’re only 
[u n c^ j]  to yourself. It’s a phase in life to go tlirough because if  you think about it, 
when you live at home with your mum, to be complete you need the others around to 
hold that whole infrastructure that’s around you. You then move out and find when 
you’ve got a flat, young, firee, single, you can drink and do whatever you want every 
week-end, pretty much you’re into a sort o f wild anyway in your life, it’s me and I ’m 
totally in control of my life. But inevitably, life takes that turn when you meet 
someone you begin a relationship you begin to settle down and you’re becoming 
more sort of two, where others are a great part of life and a great part of your 
completeness.
So it's the ability to be content with what you have at a particular time?
Hum, yeah.
Ohiy. Again, is that something you practice or find easy to do?
Not consciously. I wouldn’t say I go and say I consciously practice that. If it’s a 
situation where I find myself in, yeah, but it’s not something I kinda -  it’s not on my 
tick hst “On Monday morning, I must go and do”.
Is that an objective in your mind -  trying to be complete to try and be happy?
Hem, I wouldn’t describe it as complete. Cause, clearly, you know, within your own 
mind, you’ve got in your mind that you want to be happy, you want to feel content. 
Whether you would describe that as complete...to me, to say something is complete 
it’s almost like you’ve reached the end game, there’s nothing else to do. 
Hem...perhaps in my military speaking sense, I feel complete because I ’ve made the 
decision I’m gonna leave in a year. So I ’ve reached the stage where you know. I’ve 
reached where I want to go with that, the situation is complete so I will finish it and 
move on. But I think in most things in life to me to feel complete says “That’s it, 
there’s nothing else”. That’s a boring place to be. You need to have challenges in 
life.
So is it like an idea of achievement?
Yeah. Win the deal. Close the business. That’s completion. And you need others to 
do that cause you can’t do this on your own.
Okay. Well that ’s all I  have to ask you. Do you have any comments before closing? 
No.
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